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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is an anthropological study of how village headship became an 
ambiguous position of power in Myinmilaung village tract of central Myanmar. 
Based on twenty months of fieldwork between 2014 and 2019 and on archival 
research, it explores headship as a matter of craftmanship and personality through 
the evolving relationship between the government and villagers. It focuses 
specifically on the making of the local polity of Gawgyi, the village which 
controlled the headship of Myinmilaung tract during most of my stay, and shows 
how, besides factionalism and clientelism, a group of bigmen took care of village 
affairs with or without the presence of the headman. They embodied notions of 
propriety and upheld an ethics based on earlier models of power. They also kept 
their distance from the state which, after having forcefully tried to bring about 
socialism in the countryside, was a more disengaged presence during my stay. 
Myinmilaung headship is an ambiguous position because it sits at the juncture 
between village government, village affairs and family relations, the balance 
depending on who embodies the position and at which time.  
 The historical part of the thesis explores the fashioning of Myinmilaung tract 
and the way this brought about debates over conceptions of power, on the 
transformation of land relations and on contestations about local history. In these 
debates, headmen are described as either usurpers of precolonial chiefs, as servants 
of a foreign state, as buffers against state demands, as charismatic patrons anchored 
in a local, as corrupt officials, or as political entrepreneurs. However, as much as 
headship is debated in history, its everyday practice goes beyond the institution and 
requires the ability of navigating relationships and gauging obligations. I argue the 
authority of a village headman is based on craftmanship and that diverse forms of 
engagements pervade social processes and leadership such as the transmission of 
inheritance, the making of ceremonies and the caretaking of village affairs.  
 Showing how each of these forms of engagement is shot through with 
ambiguity, this thesis suggests that the questions of responsibility, obligation and 
morality are crucial to local politics insofar as the temporality of relationships is 
accounted for. In doing so, this research renews the literature on local politics in 
Myanmar from an ethnographic starting point and combines history and 
anthropology of uncertainty and of morality; it contributes to political anthropology 
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at large by exploring key concepts – power, authority, headship, bigmen, patronage 
– and the way they play out in the Burmese context; and to a wider set of debates 
about gift-giving, ethics, masculinities, land tenure, colonialism and the state. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
The glossary includes the most relevant Burmese terms used in this thesis. 
 
adunay adusa  Lit. “living and eating together”, expressing commensality 
(together with tit-o tit-ein, lit. “one cooking pot, one house”). 
ahkwint-ayay  Right or opportunities. 
ahlu  Meritorious donations. 
aku-ngway   Lit. “aid-money”, referring to the money given by the guests 
to the host during certain ceremonies (during weddings, it 
becomes a lethpwe). 
akywinme ahlu  Donation without remainder. A donation with remainder is 
called akywinshi ahlu. 
amway  Inheritance (its main rule is anyi ahmya, referring to an equal 
division between all children). 
ana  To have ana is to have the capacity to enforce one’s order (it 
has been translated by “power” (Spiro 1997) or “authority” 
(Nash 1965)). 
a-na-de Feeling of uneasiness. 
apyan ahlan Expression meaning “one good turn deserves another’’ and 
underscoring the ethics of living together. 
apyin pyitsi  Outer property (of a household), in opposition with inner 
property (atwin pyitsi). 
ahsaung-ama A generic way to describe an exhortation to follow morals, 
often referring to Buddha’s teachings. 
athet  Life as a vital breath. Life as a condition of existence is called 
bawa. 
athi / ahmudan  Commoner / serviceman (bearer of an obligation); 
precolonial division of the population in status groups 
depending on their relation to the king. 
auratha  A legitimate son or the ablest child in Burmese Buddhist Law 
(also transcribed as orasa or aw-ra-tha). 
awza  Authority to command, ability to impose judgment. 
bayin  Title of a king as cosmic pivot. 
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beiktheikhsaya  Master of ceremony. 
bobuapaing In relation to land, it refers to a form of hereditary private 
tenure. 
dago  Supernatural potency. 
dama-u-gya In relation to land, it is a claim by first clearing. 
eindaunguzi  Head of a household. 
eindaung keiksa Household affairs 
gaing  Monastic grouping. 
gon  Honour or virtue. 
gawthagan Area of a monk/pagoda/monastery’s outreach. 
hpon  An individual’s quality, a substance, translatable as 
charismatic power. 
hsayadaw  Honorific for monks heading a monastery. 
hse-eingaung Ten-houses’ head 
hswemyo Kinship terms meaning relatives or kin (also called amyo). 
Term used in expression denoting belonging such as 
hswemyotitthaik, lit. “nest of relatives” or extended 
compound, or yathswe-yatmyo, lit. “people akin by (sharing 
a) dwelling” 
htitat To know something and act accordingly without the need to 
spell it out.  
kan Karma (from the Pali kamma). 
kotukotha  Lit. “rising by and defining oneself”, expression denoting 
self-reliance. 
kuto Merit. 
kwin  Cadastral unit created during the colonial period (land plots 
are called upaing). 
kyayzushin  Benefactor, lit. “master of gratitude”.  
kyun Temporary debt bondman. 
lethpwe  Wedding gift. 
lok-a-pay  Forced labour. 
lokpainghkwint  Authorisation to cultivate a land (legal land access under the 
socialist state). 
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lubyogaung  Head of the bachelors’ group, also called kalathagaung, the 
head of the virgin girls’ group is apyogaung head of virgin 
girls. 
lugyi Bigman. 
luhmuyay  Social affairs or people’s affairs. It is a domain minimally 
encompassing the “joys” (tha-yay) and “griefs” (na-yay); 
sometimes opposed to kokoyay, lit. “one’s own affairs”. 
luhso Bad person, infamous. 
mingala Good auspices. A term found in mingala pauk, lit. 
“auspicious gate”. 
myaukthu Labourer as opposed to farmer (taungthu). Labourers and 
daily workers are also called myayloktha, hpangan, 
kulikunga, or lokdama). 
myaydaing  Revenue collector during the precolonial period. 
myayshin  Landlord. 
myayzupay  Lit. “giving the share of the land”, one of the main forms of 
tenancy agreement in precolonial times in our area of 
research, together with thonsutitsu, lit. “three parts one part”. 
myo  Kind or type. Applied to people (lumyo) it is close to “race” 
in American English. With a different tone, myo also means 
a town. In precolonial times, hereditary chiefs were called 
myothugyi and their area of power was called myonay, which 
is today the word for township. 
myook  Township officer during the colonial period mostly used in 
Lower Burma. 
myowun  Provincial governors during the precolonial period. 
myoza  Appanage holders during the precolonial period. 
nalehmu  An understanding, a trade-off, an agreement. 
naq Spirit, usually of an individual who died violently. 
ngwayhtein Lit. “guardian of wealth”. 
okchokhmu  Stewardship, a form of authority over a family and its 
properties. 
okhteinhmu  Guardianship, in the sense of taking care/charge of a domain 
of activities. 
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paingsainhmu  Ownership. 
pyuzu saunshauk  Obligation of care between parents and children. 
samyay  Land given as appanage. 
hsounhsaya Master of ghosts and evil spirits. 
shinbyu Buddhist noviciate ceremony. 
sittan  Royal administrative inquests. 
ta-yay  One of the names for ghost. 
taik  Frontier province during the precolonial period. 
taw  Farm field or forest, as opposed to village, ywa. 
thathena Buddha’s teachings (Pali: sasana). 
thathameda Capitation tax introduced in the early 1860s. 
thitsashihmu Trustworthiness or loyalty. 
thugyi  Old name for the leader of a village or group of villages. It 
became the name for “village headman” which are today 
called okchokyayhmu. 
thwaythauksu  Lit. “blood-drinker corp”, a regiment of servicemen during 
the precolonial period. 
tintha-ngway  Wealth promised during engagement ceremony. It is also 
called hkinwin pyitsi or the “properties (given) to enter (the 
relation) in good terms. 
tintaung  Bride price. Tintaungpwe is a name for the engagement 
ceremony, also called apyaw. 
wunthanu athin  Lay association crystallising part of the protest against 
colonialism while defending Buddhism in the early 1900s. 
yahman-ngway Lit. “the guessed price of the land”, a mortgage agreement on 
land which usually does not involve interests and lasts for 
one to three years. 
yaungsade  Lit. “eating the sale”. Sometimes expressing a 
misappropriation of wealth. 
yatmiyathpa Lit. “parents of a common dwelling place”, elders who can 
be called village spokesperson or official elder. 
yonkyi  Trusting, believing, nominalised as yonkyihmu. 
yuhsa  To believe, nominalised as ayu-ahsa. 
ywabon pyitsi  Village properties. 
15 
zawgyi  A semi-immortal human gaining supernatural powers by 
“entering the fireplace” (hpowin).  
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NOTE ON LANGUAGE, HISTORY AND CURRENCY 
 
Throughout the text, I follow Okell’s guide (1971) for transcribing Burmese words. 
I altered the writing with a dash (-) for purpose of pronunciation in a few cases and 
did not accentuate the transcribed words, which resulted in the absence of any signs 
for tones variations, but which ease the reading for Myanmar non-specialists. 
 The Burmese language uses a number of honorifics that indicate relative age 
as well as status. ‘U’ and ‘Daw’ are the male and female honorifics that are used in 
practice as a respectful ‘Uncle’ or ‘Auntie’, even when people are not related. They 
denote seniority. ‘Ko’ and ‘Ma’ stands for ‘brother’ and ‘sister’. A senior monk, 
usually head of a monastery, is called ‘Hsayadaw’. For bibliographic purposes, 
Burmese authors are catalogued by their names without the honorific. 
 People’s names have been anonymised for ethical purpose when the persons 
are still living. But villages’ names have not been anonymised as they are indicators 
of some of the ways the landscape has been shaped in the past. 
 The reference to ‘Myanmar’ rather than ‘Burma’ here reflects the fact that the 
military changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 in a 
movement of “Myanmafication” (Houtman 1999). The people of Myanmar are still 
known as ‘Burmese’ (bama). I use ‘Myanmar’ when speaking about the country 
after the change and ‘Burma’ when talking about it before the change. I use 
‘Burma/Myanmar’ when referring to the country or state in general terms. 
 Many names are used to refer to different political spaces at various periods. 
Our area of study was part of the ‘nuclear zone’ of the late precolonial kingdom. It 
became part of the Lower Chindwin District during the early phase of the 
colonisation of Upper Burma. The term Upper Burma was first used by the British 
to refer to the central and northern area of what is now Myanmar. After the Second 
Anglo-Burmese War of 1852, Lower Burma was annexed by the British Empire, 
while Upper Burma remained independent under the Burmese Empire until the 
Third Anglo-Burmese War of 1885. After the independence in 1948, the country 
was gradually divided into seven ethnic states and seven regions. Currently, our 
area of study is located within Monywa township, Sagaing Region. 
 Throughout the dissertation I quote Myanmar kyat in US dollars to allow non-
Myanmar specialists to compare the magnitude and value of amounts cited. For 
post-2011 amounts the rate has been calculated at the average market rate during 
17 
the bulk of my fieldwork between 2013 and late 2018: 1400 kyats to US$1 (with 
annual variations of +/- 200 kyats).  
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Figure 1. General map of Myanmar  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
THE HOOK 
 
At first glance, the village headmen are ubiquitous in local politics. One cannot 
really avoid them when going in the villages of the central plain of Myanmar. There 
are two kinds of discourses about village headmen in Myanmar countryside: one 
stating that they are the most hard-pressed officials of the government trying to do 
their best for their village; another saying that they are acting as local kings, 
granting access and information at a certain price, being a client upward and a 
patron downward. Officially, they have to know and acknowledge the ins and outs 
of strangers within their village tract which bonds several settlements under a single 
jurisdiction. The current name of this institution, okchokyayhmu,1 echoes this 
conception and is closed to the word ‘administrator’ in the sense of overseeing and 
being responsible for the local order. There is a state-like quality to this rather 
‘male’ office and most of the men I have met in villages today do not want to 
become headman. 
 Village headship is a vestige of the colonial encounter with the British in 
Upper Burma during the late 1880s and its official role, notably of police, has not 
transformed too much over time. What has changed are the persons embodying it 
and the forms of leadership in local politics. For instance, the most common name 
given to headmen at first was thugyi, “the great”, drawing from a search of 
traditional authorities to be used as a device to control the newly colonised 
landscape. This name conveys the imagery of men of prowess in a countryside 
organised through patron-client relations that colonialism and market forces would 
gradually erode.2 In the early 1960s, Manning Nash, an American anthropologist, 
argued that headmen have already become mere administrators, even if sometimes 
the transmission of the office still followed hereditary claims. In contrast, 
 
1 It is possible to break this term down as follow: ok means to cover, to restrain, to administer, to 
take charge or look after; chok means to hamper the free movement, to bind, confine, head or lead; 
taken together okchok means to administer, to direct; yay substantiate the compound (okchok) in 
terms of “affairs” and hmu is a marker of an office held by a person. 
2 This relates to the classical debate about the effect of colonialism that Scott framed as an erosion 
of patron-client politics, cf. Scott (1972b). 
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charismatic leadership, which he called men of hpon3 (or men of prowess, of sheer 
power, of great glory), was preeminent and it illuminated the problem of building 
modern political parties (Nash 1963).  
 When I met Ko Kyaw in 2013 in his village called Gawgyi, he has just 
become headman of Myinmilaung village tract. At that time, party politics was not 
crucial in local affairs as almost everyone was more or less covertly supporting the 
National League for Democracy (NLD) of Daw Aung San Su Kyi over the Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the umpteenth organisation set up by 
the military (Tatmadaw)4 who ran the country from 1962 to 2015, the year of the 
NLD victory in the national elections. However, today, calling a headman thugyi 
equates to scoffing at his authority. For Ko Kyaw, being a village headman was a 
matter of craftmanship and political navigation, not a simple expression of his 
achievements and karma. It meant avoiding, accepting, and creating obligations; 
dissembling, showing competency in some domains, valuing incompetency in 
others. The particular configuration of past dynamics in day-to-day life was key to 
understand that his dilemma was to align acts and words and to show 
trustworthiness while embodying a distrusted position. Thus, to make sense of local 
politics, I had to look beyond the headman and focus on the merging of the private 
and the political and on how the past shapes the present. 
 For instance, in Myinmilaung village tract, the selection of the headman in 
2016 displayed how the competition between Gawgyi and Myinmilaung proper is 
a crucial dynamic of the local polity, a rivalry resting notably on diverging 
narratives of foundation and belonging. The selection I attended in 2016 does not 
correspond to old and stable modalities of succession but is rather the result of 
successive and continuous transformations of leadership from the pre-colonial 
period to the present day. Besides, local politics today is less a question of 
charismatic leadership than a matter of how past moral ruptures, embodied by 
previous leaders and related to changes in state practices, impinged on current 
villagers. Cast in the realm of Myinmilaung politics, the towering violence the 
military government has perpetrated in the 1980s-90s while disengaging from the 
 
3 The transcription of this word changes according to the authors. Following Okell's guide (1971), I 
write it hpon. However, Nash (1965) wrote pon, Schober (1989) hpoun: and Brac de la Perrière 
(2009) 'pon. 
4 On Tatmadaw, its history and functioning as one of the main political force in the country’s modern 
history, see Callahan (2003) and Selth (2002). 
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countryside after having imposed socialism (1962-88) marks such a rupture. If there 
were men of hpon in the past, they were gone now.5 In this process, the question of 
people’s worth to some degree substituted the question of their hpon. 
 This is salient in how the local elite, a number of men called the lugyi,6 or 
bigmen, makes Gawgyi affairs a space of engagement where the worth of people is 
evaluated. Village affairs nowadays include the organisation of ceremonies, the 
management of the water and electricity supply systems, the rebuilding of roads, 
the treatment of the sick and handling of the dead, dealing with NGOs or the issue 
of enlarging the village for instance. In that sense, saying that village affairs have 
become the form and arena of politics in Gawgyi refers to how the engagement in 
collective undertakings on the model of a traditional conception of social affairs 
(luhmuyay) has been part of a moral rupture with a violent and corrupt state 
following an ideology of self-reliance.7 Gawgyi bigmen, who are entrusted to take 
care of village affairs and represent the top of a hierarchy dividing “real farmers” 
(taungthu) from “labourers” (myaukthu), gave a moral connotation to the meaning 
of lugyi as they distance with the state and combines old conceptions with new 
stakes. 
 Finally, looking beyond the headman led me to explore how authority was 
conceived within families through the issue of transmission. After having studied 
how Ko Kyaw has crafted his position as headman, investigating the transmission 
of inheritance and in fine ownership as a matter of stewardship (okchokhmu) 
allowed to understand village male leadership and the role of the lugyi in terms of 
guardianship (okhteinhmu). This semantic leaning reflects the juncture of the rise 
of village affairs as the form of politics with the reorganisation of the local hierarchy 
and the transformation of village leadership.  
 To make sense of changes in the local polity, this thesis combines history and 
ethnography, the latter being the anchor to the former, and the chapters are 
organised in chronological order. The historical chapters (from 3 to 5) explore the 
transformation of the political landscape while the ethnographic ones (6 to 8) focus 
 
5 Except for Buddhist monks who are defined by this quality and called hpongyi (“great hpon”) 
6 The term lugyi is polysemic and can refer to different scales of worth used to qualify people, such 
as fame, rank, charisma, or the embodiment of a common good. Here, it refers to the persons who 
take care of village affairs at large and legitimise a political order by making village affairs a space 
of commitment where the worth of the people is gauged. 
7 Called kotukotha and which can be translated by “rising by and defining oneself”. 
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on the current conceptions and practices of leadership. The following present the 
scene of the thesis and explore the local landscape and its temporalities. It then 
describes Ko Kyaw and the previous headmen of Myinmilaung tract to discuss the 
literature about local politics and problematise historical dynamics. The last part 
presents the concepts used to make sense of current forms of male leadership 
emerging from the ethnography. 
 
SETTING THE SCENE 
 
Past and present 
 
 Gawgyi is short for gangawgyi and means “large flat pond”. Two hundred 
years ago, it was a tiny hamlet, first settled near a seasonal pond during a 
widespread famine. Some of the elders knew of the events that had pushed their 
ancestors to move away from Ywadon village located further south. The famine 
was most probably related to King Bodawhpaya (1782–1819) increasing demands 
for corvées, soldiers and taxes leading to a great change in the kingdom’s 
demography.8 During the military campaign against Siam in 1809, “every town and 
village [were] required to produce a certain number of men” (Koenig 1990: 34). If 
the local hereditary chiefs – the gentry – failed to recruit, officials in charge of the 
conscription were ordered to confiscate villagers’ properties and to make corporal 
 
8 Koenig’s calculation of population trends based on the 1783 and 1802 record of administration 
(sittan), (1990: 241). For instance, he has shown that Alon lost about 60% of its registered population 
between 1783 and 1802. This figure is an approximation, but it appears that a large share of this 
population was either recruited for war campaigns, canals and pagodas construction, or escape state 
demands by migrating away. So Gawgyi people, moved from a local and went to “the forest” where 
there was a source of water. The greatest restructuring of tenures in the early Konbaung period 
occurred as a result of the famine of 1805–1812. This event, coupled to the widespread social 
disorder and rebellion that accompanied it, caused massive demographic instability and a 
concomitant movement toward shifting cultivation and much of the abandoned land was taken over 
by headmen during this period cf. Koenig (1990: 142–143). Thant Myint-U also highlighted the 
importance of migrations during this early modern era, when periodic wars and famines and 
attendant displacement of people led to frequent abandonment and re-colonisation of villages, 
particularly in less productive areas. In addition, the low density of population in all but the most 
intensely irrigated places, and places close to the main river-ways, meant that new communities 
were constantly being formed by immigrants. These immigrants included settlers from nearby 
upland areas such as the Maru, Jingpaw or Mizo speakers of the related Tibeto-Burma languages. 
Others were immigrants from overseas, or war captives who were settled in newly colonised land 
by the crown. (2001: 29-30). 
23 
punishment. “In the face of these exactions, many families decamped to less 
accessible rural locales” (ibid.), usually where they could find water. And the 
combination of bad rains, lack of farm labour, recruitment of soldiers, migrations 
and frequent civil strife led to the Great Famine or “Maha-thayawgyi [sic] of 1812” 
(Furnivall 1957: 39) 
 It seems that a dozen families9 converged where a large seasonal pond 
appeared during the monsoon and Gawgyi was thus named after this natural feature. 
The village is located in the “dry zone” (anya) of central Myanmar, a place with a 
semi-arid climate that became the ‘nuclear zone’ of the precolonial kingdoms 
during the seventeenth century. From its creation during the early nineteenth 
century until the encounter with the British in 1885, Gawgyi was part of 
Badon/Alon province,10 a crucial pool of soldiers for the successive dynasties.11 
The population, head of cattle, and extent of cultivated fields increased over the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and it impacted local forms of Buddhism as 
forest-dwelling monasticism increasingly gave way to village- and town-dwelling 
monasticism.12  
 The Lower Chindwin Valley regional history is relatively well documented13 
but not the very local one. When one asks about the origin of Gawgyi, one is 
invariably sent to a few elderly people living in the oldest and densest area of the 
village (figure 2). The local theory is that the main lineages14 (amyo-yo) of the 
 
9 The first census appeared in Hardiman’s Settlement Report found in the British Library archive 
file I.S.BU.35/38. Hardiman, John P. 1910. Report on the Regular Settlement of the Lower Chindwin 
District, April 1906-June 1909. Rangoon: Office of the Superintendent, Government Printing; 
hereafter referred to as Hardiman 1910. The figures appear pp.176-194 of the report which 
numbered thirty-six households, thus, following the hypothesis that the village was created in the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, the lapse of three generations over eighty years most 
probably has multiply the population by three. 
10 Alon was known as Badon until Bodawhpaya (1782-1819), sixth king of the Konbaung dynasty 
(1752-1885), also known as Badon Min (“King of Badon”), renamed it after having ruled this area 
as an appanage before ascending the throne. For a discussion about the scope and history of this 
province and the internal politics, see chapter 3. 
11 Notably since the Restored Taungoo dynasty (1597-1752) and more effectively during the 
Konbaung dynasty (1752-1885). 
12 Cf. Charney (2006, 2007 and 2011). 
13 Either directly or indirectly through historical scholarships (Charney (2006, 2007, 2011), 
Lieberman (1984), Thant Myint-U (2001), Toe Hla (1987)), colonial reports found in the British 
Library archives (cf. Bibliography) or the study of spirit cults (Brac de la Perrière (1998)). 
14 The term amyo-yo means “bone (yo) of a kindred (amyo)”. The village is thus to some degree 
imagined as deriving from a descent group. As Thant Myint-U has described, in Burmese myo (a 
term that, written differently in Burmese, also means fortified town) has come to imply a shared 
origin or a common descent. It also has come to have a more general connotation of ‘sort’ or ‘kind’. 
For instance, lumyo is usually translated as race (kind of people (lu)). In addition, descent was 
reckoned biologically, that is both the mother's and father's relations were regarded as the 
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village come from Ywadon families and were the first farmers in Gawgyi. After 
settling close to the pond, the villagers created a more permanent living space on 
the west. They organised that space around two main pathways, one going from 
east to west and the other from north to south to orient the flows of mingala 
(“auspicious influence”) in favour of the villagers. The east is the auspicious 
entrance and the south the inauspicious exit leading to the cemetery. The 
construction of houses also followed village pathways, the village naq (“spirit”) 
shrine15 on the southeast side and the pagoda founded with the monastery by its 
first hsayadaw (“head monk”), U Za Nay Ya, in the early twentieth century. 
 Gradually, Gawgyi people affiliated with the larger chiefdom of Kyawkka via 
the agency of Ywadon. The cultivated areas – mostly dry lands first farmed through 
shifting cultivation of sorghum and peas and a few rice paddies – varied with the 
growth of village population and their capacity to accumulate cattle and seeds and 
to contract loans from the local gentry. Gawgyi villagers progressively created their 
own farm fields by dealing to the north with Myinmilaung villagers and the Thazi 
chief, to the south with Ywadon village, and to the east with the Kyawkka chief 
(figure 3). The more or less formalised systems of hierarchies between crown 
servicemen (ahmudan) and commoners (athi), of taxation in kind and fees,16 and of 
land tenure emerging from the stabilisation of the settlements was always subject 
to change depending on natural hazards, wars and famine-led migrations and on the 
ability of chiefs to control manpower, harvests, cattle and land access. And when 
village headship emerged during the British ‘pacification campaign’ and 
‘settlement operations’ after the annexation of Upper Burma17 in 1885, Gawgyi and 
 
individual's amyo (Thant Myint-U 2001: 29). According to this historian, marriage tended to be 
endogamous, within the circle of one's amyo and residence mostly followed a neo-local pattern 
which means that newly-wed couples usually created their own housing area. For Nash (1965) and 
Spiro (1986), neo-local residence was still the prevailing pattern in the mid-twentieth century and 
they described kinship as a loose system in which the distinction between kin and non-kin was more 
a matter of moral obligation and entitlement. During my fieldwork, marriages were proscribed 
between close amyo. 
15 Naq are the spirits of individuals who died violently. The official pantheon of the Thirty-seven 
Lords refers to naq eliminated by the Burmese kings who then transformed them into ministering 
spirits of a domain (Brac de la Perrière 1989). In Gawgyi, the naq of the village community, called 
Bo Bo Gyi, is represented by a white horse puppet in the village altar. 
16 Cf. Mya Sein (1973: 166-171).  
17 The term was first used by the British to refer to the central and northern area of what is now 
Myanmar. After the Second Anglo-Burmese War of 1852, Lower Burma was annexed by the British 
Empire, while Upper Burma remained independent under the Burmese Empire until the Third 
Anglo-Burmese War of 1885. Upper Burma was also known as Burma proper. Historically, Upper 
Burma was predominantly Bamar, whereas Lower Burma was historically Mon-speaking until the 
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Myinmilaung were grouped in one village tract under one headman liable of 
collecting land taxes. This simple political organisation remained with little change 
throughout the twentieth century and the Japanese invasion (1945-48), the battle for 
independence (1948), the socialist insurgencies (1945-1956),18 the military coup 
and subsequent ‘Burmese way to Socialism’ (1962-1988) and the tightening of 
military rule (1989-2010). But when I first reached the village in 2013 after the 
‘democratic’ opening, the charismatic leaders described by Nash, those men of 
prowess, of power, also called the men of hpon, were gone. Hpon was still a quality 
present in individuals in varying quantities depending on their karma and 
achievements. However, almost nobody was worthy enough to be honoured in this 
way, except from monks, called “great hpon” (hpongyi) by definition. Forms of 
leadership seemed to have altered during the past century. 
 
 
early 19th century. The Frontier Areas, as designated by the colonial administration, included ethnic 
minority areas, such as the Shan States and modern Kachin State. 
18 1956 is when the White Flag Communists deserted the outskirt of Monywa. 
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Figure 2. Map of Gawgyi village  
27 
 
Figure 3. Map of the research area 
 Today, Gawgyi is a small Buddhist village of a little less than six-hundred 
Burmese people (bama) six miles from the thriving city of Monywa,19 the capital 
of Sagaing Region. This area has been relatively spared from forced displacements 
and military violence, except concerning the recent case of land-grabbing at the 
Letpadaung copper mine, compared with ‘ethnic’, borders and delta areas.20 There 
has also been no direct violence toward Muslims minorities, although it has 
occurred in the neighbouring city of Shwebo for instance. Nonetheless, the region, 
considered as a Burmese hinterland, has its own history of state violence (explored 
in chapter 5).  
 In Gawgyi, there is a public school21 and the one hundred and thirty-odd 
houses are packed into an administrative grid that groups households into ten, and 
 
19 The 2014 census states that Monywa city was populated by 207,489 inhabitants while the figure 
is 372,095 for Monywa Township (and so the number of rural population is 164,606). Cf.  The 2014 
Myanmar Population and Housing Census published by the Department of Population under the  
Ministry of Immigration and Population in May 2015. 
20 For the Letpadaung case, see Amnesty International (2007) and Prasse-Freemand and Phyo Win 
Latt (2018), on stories of ethnic construction in relation with Burmese and military domination see 
Gravers (2007) for an overview, Sadan (2013) for the Kachin case and Boutry (2015) concerning 
the Delta area. 
21 Until grade six. 
28 
one person among the heads of each house (eindaunguzi) is designated as a (male) 
representative22 of the cluster and called a “ten-houses head” (hse-eingaung). Since 
2012, they are the ones electing the headman every five years in theory. The latter 
is paid a subsidy by the Ministry of Home affairs through the General 
Administration Department (GAD; Kyi Pyar Chit Saw & Arnold 2014: 34). In 
addition to the headman and the houses’ representatives there is the tract’s clerk, 
the second government employee, who is supposed to assist the headman in his 
tasks. There is also a variety of committees, ad hoc or permanent, that are empty 
shells or crucial arenas depending on the stakes involved. There is one for the fire 
brigade, another for the management of the pagoda and the monastery working in 
close relation with Gawgyi monk, a committee for handling the repayment of the 
recent government’s development loan, another running an INGO’s microfinance 
project and a committee for implementing the government’s Greening Project 
(unsuccessful due to lack of funding) among others. The most recent and critical 
committee is called in Gawgyi the “five-person committee” or “land committee” 
and operates at the level of Myinmilaung village tract.23 It is supposed to resolve 
any issue emerging from the land titling ensued by the 2012 Farmland law, which 
aimed at reintroducing private property to enable the commodification of lands, 
reforming a ‘stack’ of laws and regulations mostly stemming from the colonial and 
socialist period.24 Ko Kyaw’s tenure as headman was intimately related to this 
reformulation of land regulation.  
 Myinmilaung tract is composed of four villages, namely Gawgyi, 
Myinmilaung, Ogon and Mingalagon. The last three villages share a common 
history of settlement and a sense of belonging. Gawgyi people have quite a tense 
relationship with the villagers from these other villages whom they often called 
“Myinmilaung people” indistinctly. Football matches and headmen selections are 
climaxes in this rivalry. They say they dislike each other. For Gawgyi people, they 
 
22 On the gendered aspect of politics, cf. the subsection on “Ko Kyaw’s political navigation”. 
23 It is known, in English, as Village Land Management Committee. 
24 On the current debates about the effect of the new land laws, see Boutry et al. (2017), Mark (2016), 
McCarthy (2018), Willis (2014), Oberndorf (2012), and Saw Hlaing (2015) among others. The stack 
of laws in question are notably the Tenancy Act (1936), Land Nationalization Acts (1948, 1953), 
Enterprises Nationalization Law (1963), Farmer Right Protection Law (1963), Tenancies Law 
Amending Act (1963), Procedures Conferring the Rights to Cultivate Land (1964, rule 64/1), Law 
to Protect the Implementation of Socialist Economic System (1964), the Farmland Law (No 
11/2012) and The Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law No 10/2012. 
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are autochthones, from the land and Myinmilaung villagers have bad morals, are 
fickle, and distrustful. For Myinmilaung people, Gawgyi villagers behave as if they 
are superior, with better morals. But they are stronger and descend from soldiers. 
During most of my fieldwork, Myinmilaung tract’s headman was Ko Kyaw, a man 
from Gawgyi, who remained in this position for about three years from 2013 to 
2016.25   
 As for 2015, most villagers were considered ‘relatively poor’ in Gawgyi by 
the NGOs operating in Monywa Township26 and less than half of its overall 
population was still composed of farming families. In Gawgyi vicinity, lands are 
mostly dry (yamyay), of average quality and rains less and less predictable. Farmers 
still grow sorghum as fodder for their cows, sesame, pulses and beans for the 
market. Rice, sometimes mixed with sorghum, is bought in various local markets 
and is the main staple food, together with a curry usually composed of a large 
variety of vegetables, soups of tree leaves or beans and chicken or pork when the 
family’s purse allows it; usually after the harvests. The households live close to one 
another and, the settlement pattern being mostly neolocal27 and inheritance divided 
equally between every child, the gradual expansion of the village ‘ate’ the 
surrounding fragmented farmlands. 
 At first glance, it seems that farming is the main activity in Gawgyi. However, 
it is not so anymore. The non-farming part of the population is growing and these 
days mostly engaging in different off-farm wage activities as skilled labourers, 
carpenters, longyi weavers, petty vegetable sellers, and poultry husbandry. In other 
words, the rural population is no longer composed mostly of farmers.28 Since the 
2000s, there is a rapidly changing economy drawing on the capital derived from 
local farming, regional trading between India, Mandalay and China and rising land 
prices. This dynamic goes in hand with the progressive political democratisation 
and economic liberalisation of the country started in 2010-11 under the Thein Sein 
government. The recent changes have been quite a lot for villagers to take on and 
 
25 The selection happened in 2012 but it takes several months before the position was handed over. 
26 Cf. GRET’s Dry Zone Project Baseline Survey by Village Profiles (unpublished). GRET stands 
for Groupe de Recherches et d’Echanges Technologiques. The other INGO operating during the 
time of fieldwork was Solidarités International. 
27 Neolocal residence is a type of post-marital residence in which a newly married couple resides 
separately from the husband's birth household and the wife's birth household. 
28 Cf. Okamoto (2018) and Thawnghmung (2018). 
30 
the benefits of modernisation are viewed ambivalently. Locally, several women 
invested in longyi weaving as an alternative to farm work, while farmers dig tube 
wells to enable the irrigation of new crops. Many men left the fields to become 
‘carpenters’ in Monywa’s construction sites and a few migrate seasonally. Rising 
inflows of meritorious donations help refurbishment of monasteries and improve 
monks’ living standards, although this does not please those who see monkhood as 
detachment. Family savings are increasingly spent on schooling (notably for private 
tuitions) and private healthcare due to the miserable state of public infrastructures 
and services. In Gawgyi, as in many other neighbouring villages, farmers have now 
troubles finding affordable labour because daily wages have risen steadily since 
2005.29 What has been a structuring divide between farmer owners (taungthu) and 
mere labourers (myaukthu) since the colonial period is now slowly changing, 
transforming the balance of power within villages, the dependency relationships 
and the type of land contracts. Cattle husbandry for instance, a crucial arrangement 
for farming, is on the decline. Artificial fertilisers, pesticides, rototillers and tractors 
gradually re-enter farm fields30 and replace oxcarts and manure. Companies visit 
villages to demonstrate the reliability of their new products and NGOs attempt to 
enlist villages to their projects while educated staffs navigate both kinds of 
institutions. Farmland plots tend to become enlarged and consolidated after several 
decades of division through inheritance. Land prices rose steeply between 2005 and 
2017, depending on the proximity with the main roads, access to water, land quality 
and speculation.31 This fed donations toward monasteries, the magnification of 
ceremonies and often resulted in the reappearance of old conflicts and new 
squabbles. Outsiders and businessmen from Monywa progressively buy land in 
places where no one would have done ten years ago. Rubber trees start to be 
harvested, and new labour groups are formed. Chinese goods of mediocre quality 
overflow local markets and villagers joke about the virtual lack of any kind of 
 
29 For instance, daily wages have rose from less than 1USD to 3.5 USD per day for men between 
2005 and 2015.  
30 The first attempts occurred during U Nu Pyidawtha Plan (on this plan, cf. Gerard McCarthy’s 
thesis section (2018) on “The rise and fall of interventionist welfare capitalism (1948-1962)”) and 
during the socialist period in the late 1960s. 
31 For instance, the price of land plots adjacent to Kyawkka road at the crossroad with Gawgyi 
pathway had multiplied by ten between 2013 and 2016, from around 2500 USD to 25000 per acre. 
The price of land plots for housing purpose in villages had also been multiplied by 5 to 10 depending 
on the remoteness of the location and the potential for development.  
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Myanmar-made commodity. The elders evoke the old days as periods of autonomy, 
hard work and hardship. Even if the government was unfair and violent, notably 
after the socialist impasse (1962-1988), some people had a sense of morality and 
loyalty. The youths now seldom work in the fields, they can be employed in 
Monywa’s industrial zone, have smartphones and play football with international 
star’s names printed on their shirt. Times have changed. Gawgyi villagers face those 
changes with a feeling of having to juggle with it one way or another. They craft 
their life and navigate the changing daily affairs. After the victory of the NLD, the 
word ‘democracy’, silently used as a banner to resist dictatorship, became an empty 
shell. People started asking questions about its meaning. If it provided a horizon of 
improvement at the national level, the working of village politics follows a sense 
of morality, referring to the evaluation of conduct in relation to esteemed or 
despised human qualities,32 that had more to do with the history of the local political 
landscape than universal human rights. And the recent economic changes are rather 
seen as a force one has to tame, as for diseases or governments,33 before translating 
into opportunities to sustain one’s life. In other words, the persons I worked with 
had particular ways of imagining and making sense of continuities and 
discontinuities, of violence, trustworthiness and contradictions. 
 
Landscape, morality and time 
 
 The landscape is an interesting metaphor for describing the sedimentation of 
history in this place, how time is lived as well as how people gauge a variety of 
forces potentially influencing their life. The landscape is about space and time but 
also about memories and ruptures. The anthropology of landscape34 has shown how 
human activities and ideas mould the landscape, giving it the character of being a 
process. Ingold defines the landscape as “the world as it is known to those who 
dwell therein, who inhabit its places and journey along the paths connecting them.” 
(1993: 156). A world that “we come to recognise and understand through fieldwork 
 
32 This perspective draws from Humphrey (1997). 
33 Cf. Maung Maung Gyi (1983) or Spiro (1997) for a discussion of the government as an 
unpredictable force. 
34 Cf. Stewart and Strathern (2003), Ingold (1993) Hirsch and O’Hanlon (1995), Hirsch, (1995), 
Bender (2002). 
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and through ethnographic description and interpretation” (Hirsch 1995: 2). The 
landscape tells multiple stories and is crowded by several entities as well as 
references to the past. Looking at – or rather in – Gawgyi, one could see and hear 
the different agricultural works depending on the seasons, the coming and going of 
villagers, the stories of foundations, the ways heat, rains, auspicious flows and dead 
bodies are dealt with, the rituals and their cycles, the changing shape of the village, 
the successions and conflicts between generations, the links between neighbours, 
relatives and how a sense of belonging (or difference) is expressed and materialised 
for instance. The list is endless. The metaphor of landscape is a way of seeing a 
place beyond institutional categories and histories to explore the persons, 
relationships and positions that have been important over time. The following 
explores the landscape in an open-ended perspective to eventually highlight how 
people evaluate their engagement with others. A second use of this metaphor is 
employed in a different section below that focuses on the fashioning of the local 
political landscape as a network of personalities, hierarchies, stakes and memories 
present in current politics.  
 
 
Figure 4. View from Kyawkka hill, looking westward toward the Chindwin river 
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 To its inhabitants, Gawgyi is a typical village of the dry zone, the heartland 
of the bama realm and its royalty. This flat countryside is dotted by many 
settlements, pagodas and a few hills, rivers and creeks about which exist a variety 
of stories combining references to the local unfolding of Theravada Buddhism,35 to 
royalty and to spirit cults (naq). Buddhism, kingship and spirit cults thus often 
merge in stories of foundation, such as the one about Myinmilaung village (chapter 
3), as it allowed people to locate and entrench human dwellings within a Burmese 
vision of the landscape. 
 In Gawgyi, they are proud Buddhists,36 cultivate dry crops, follow the 
traditions (ayoya) in terms of rituals (marriage, funerals, pagoda festival, Buddhist 
initiation, spirit festival, and so on) and see in the teachings of Buddha (thathena)37 
a simple, yet necessary, moral guide. It once has been synthesised for me in three 
sentences: do not do bad things, do not think bad things, do not kill life. The 
reference to Buddhism, manifested notably by monasteries, pagodas, texts and 
monks, offers a temporal guide too. As Turner explains: 
 
“Buddhist temporal cosmology adopts Indian ideas of cyclical 
progression of eons of decline, destruction, and renewal, termed 
“kalpas” (Pali: kappa). Kalpas are further broken down by the 
appearance of Buddhas and their dispensations. […]. The most relevant 
and orienting division of time becomes the era of each Buddha’s 
enlightenment and the duration of his teachings: his sasana. […]. The 
current era is the sasana of Buddha Sakyamuni, and time is made 
meaningful and intelligible in relation to his enlightenment and the 
continuation of his teachings.” (2014: 26) 
 
 
35 Theravada (literally “School of the Elders”) is the most commonly accepted name of Buddhism's 
oldest school the only complete Buddhist canon (dhamma) surviving in Pali language, which serves 
as the school's sacred language and lingua franca. In contrast to Mahayana and Vajrayana, 
Theravada tends to be conservative in matters of doctrine and monastic discipline while meditation 
practice was reintroduced in the 19th century and has since become popular with the laity in both 
traditionally Theravada countries (Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Sri Lanka) and in the west. 
36 On the argument around “Being Burmese is being Buddhist”, see Rozenberg (2008) and Robinne 
(2016). 
37 “Buddha’s teachings” is transcribed as thathena from the Burmese, and sasana from the Pali. 
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 This helps explain why nobody tried to convert me: because one day I will 
realise myself that Buddha was right. There is no point arguing. Everything leans 
toward impermanence. Equanimity, a valued trait of character, also relates to this 
vision of time scattered by ‘rebirth’, karma (kan)38 and merit (kuto) making. The 
dialectic between merit making and status captures this vision of time: social status 
is an evidence for previously acquired religious merit that has come to fruition in 
the present. This way of seeing time gives the impression, reinforced by discourses, 
that a timeless ethic, based on the moral framework of Buddhism, pervades 
Gawgyi, and confers upon it the quality of being a good village. Maintaining 
Buddha legacy is called ahsaung-ama. One could say that Buddha’s teachings are 
like a fire, embodied in the relics enclosed in the pagoda, that need to be maintained 
and bolstered by multiple means to protect from harmful forces (ghost, bad luck 
and so on). To attract good influences, having a pagoda to worship is essential, a 
monastery with monks to facilitate donations and merit making is even better39 and 
celebrating the annual pagoda festival is indispensable. In short, the continuous 
upkeep and worship of the incarnations of Buddha and of his teachings help 
curtaining off a human dwelling like Gawgyi. Thus, the village as a collective is at 
least maintained by Buddhism. But at another level, Gawgyi’s monastery and 
pagoda do not come from anywhere. 
 They come from an age of propriety. They were built under the monk named 
U Za Nay Ya during a period of moralisation of behaviours after the colonial 
encounter and in line with the gradual shift from forest-dwelling to village-dwelling 
monasticism.40 Turner (2014) has notably shown that in face of the sentiment of 
societal decay during the decade following the fall of the monarchy in 1885, 
laypeople became in charge of Buddha’s teaching. And U Za Nay Ya, together with 
U To Kaing, headmen of Myinmilaung tract, were the local figures for the 
moralisation of behaviours in the first half of the twentieth century. Thus, to a 
timeless vision of Buddha’s teachings is superimposed a change brought about by 
 
38 Transcribed as kamma in Pali. 
39 Donation to monks (alhu) is one of the main ways to produce merit, the monks acting as a ‘field 
of merit’ (Schober 1989). Brac de la Perrière (2009a, 2015) has also shown that religious donation 
in the Burmese context contributes to the differentiation of a Buddhist-defined ‘religious’ field 
called thathena. 
40 Itself related to changes in the region’s demographics and socio-political organisation, cf. Charney 
(2006, 2007), Lieberman (2003). 
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colonialism and a local story of men of prowess – men of hpon – who have made 
the display of propriety and the upkeeping of local affairs a crucial aspect of the 
local political landscape. 
 A village is a place where people perform ceremonies and many cycles of 
exchanges link and bond settlements and their inhabitants. In contrast with the 
normal and quiet life (except during football matches), ceremonies are moments of 
intense collective activities marking a sense of belonging as if they have been 
punctuating rural life since centuries. Among them, the ceremonies of meritorious 
donation (ahlu), notably the boys’ Buddhist noviciate (shinbyu), are central. The 
procession, the music projecting afar from faulty loudspeakers, the flows of guests 
and the offering of food make, for a time, a place like Gawgyi alive. But beyond 
celebrating a formidable trait of Burmese culture, ceremonies are also moments 
when people evaluate each other. There are two types of meritorious donations: the 
“donation without remainder” (akywinme ahlu) and the “donation with remainder” 
(akywinshi ahlu).41 The first form is rare and is a zero-sum donation, a sort of pure 
gift that does not create liabilities between people and from which the giver does 
not expect return directly. It mostly concerns donations for religious buildings and 
the ‘best’ is not to put one’s name or picture as a dedication mark on the edifice. 
And when the donor dies, this good deed will be remembered and taken into account 
for his or her rebirth. The second type of donation is the most common and happens 
during Buddhist noviciate, funerals and weddings for instance when guests make 
offerings to the donor. To some extent, people cannot escape the obligation 
stemming from this kind of gift because there is a ‘remainder’ which underscores 
the continuity of a relation between people. Given the relatively high number of 
occasions a person is invited to ceremonies during their lifetime, these transactions 
involve obligations and liabilities. They create cycles of transfer between people 
and scattered the temporality of relationships between people, neighbours and 
families within and beyond Gawgyi under an ideology of donation. 
 
 
41 On the notion of ‘remainder’ in Myanmar cosmology, notably concerning how personal names 
are calculated and the role of the remainder as a notion of randomness or freedom which minimizes 
the belief in karmic predestination, cf. Robinne (1998). 
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Figure 5. Feeding the guest during a shinbyu in 2017 
 At another level, the recent dirt path leading to Gawgyi from Monywa crosses 
farm fields dotted with palm trees. It runs along the football pitch on the left and 
finally enters the village through its southward “inauspicious gate” (amingala 
pauk). Passed the betel shop and main grocery shop, a path going east divides the 
oldest settlement of Gawgyi in two and leads to its “auspicious gate” (mingala 
pauk). East is the referent, the most auspicious cardinal point and where the village 
gate has never moved. The bamboo, thatched, and iron-roofed houses are closer to 
one another as one moves toward this old area. Gawgyi can be coarsely divided into 
three parts: the western part, the eastern-north and eastern-south parts (figure 2). 
Those intersect at the collective well in the centre of the village. The circulation 
grid is thus made of two ways branching out with smaller ones that connects tinier 
footpaths sometimes crossing house enclosures depending on the gradual expansion 
of the village and the kin and neighbour relations. Overall, the paths convey and 
orient a variety of flows: flows of auspices, processions, everyday walking, cattle-
carts, motorbikes, cars, kids going to school on oversized bikes, water pipes since 
2013 and electricity in the near future. The landscape is thus crisscrossed by a 
variety of flows which people try to accommodate and navigate. 
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Figure 6. Pathway in Gawgyi, looking westward toward the water station (in blue). 
 The houses and their enclosures delineate the village space per se, a space 
that used to be surrounded by fences and gates during periods of turmoil and cattle 
rustling.42 House foundations and alignment are designed in relations to Gawgyi 
 
42 The references to fences or stockades in the literature is interesting as it indicates the comings and 
goings of period of unrest. They were a crucial element of villages during the ‘pacification 
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pathways, as well as to the course of the sun and the moon or to the horoscope of 
the head of the house for instance. To some extent, the monastery in the north and 
the cemetery in the southwest are not part of the village, nor is the spirit altar 
situated in a tiny wood in the southeast, on the road to Ywadon village where the 
first settlers of Gawgyi came from. In a way, the paths are the main connections 
current villagers have with their ancestors, who designed them, because it shapes 
how successive generations would orient, curb or maintain a variety of influences 
by adjusting their lives according to the foundations of the village. And even if these 
ancestors are not worshiped, they link the current people to the landscape through 
a sense of indigeneity. In contrast, the pagoda, monks and spirits are worshiped, and 
the village is the human dwelling space par excellence. Those entities, together with 
ghosts, witches (seven per village in theory), spirits and other beings, set aside or 
incorporated in the Burmese Buddhist cosmology,43 are embodied in buildings, 
altars or tales and can influence a great deal of villagers’ life. Here, nothing is clear-
cut, and my point is not to stick with the Buddhist scriptures that most villagers are 
confused by. As Brac de la Perrière argued in here study of the field of religion in 
Myanmar (2009), different kinds of religiosity interact but are dominated by the 
Theravadin tradition constantly redefining a ‘pure’ Buddhism in relation with 
national politics. A flexible approach to the local landscape and a focus on one 
particular place thus allows a focus not simply on Buddhism through its texts or via 
its relation to nationalism or modernity, but as a lived experience where other forms 
of belief (such as spirit44 and weiksa45 cults) coexist, interact and contradict each 
other. 
 In Gawgyi, a household is composed minimally of a nuclear family, that is a 
married couple and their children usually building their own house following a 
neolocal pattern. Yet, among the hundred and thirty-six registered households, 
about one third is living in a hswemyotitthaik or “a nest (titthaik) of relatives 
 
campaign’ of Upper Burma for instance (Furnivall 1957), the British also imposed the fencing of 
villages (Charney 2009), but they were already there in the precolonial period, notably in period of 
warfare (Koenig 1990, Thant Myint-U 2001). Nash (1965) also indicated that the maintaining of 
fences by villagers marked their belonging the political community in the early 1960s. During my 
own fieldwork I realised that they gradually disappeared from the villages in the late 1990s, together 
with the decrease of cattle-rustling (cf. chapter 5). 
43 Cf. Brac de la Perrière (2015) and Houtman (1999) for an overview of how the Burmese Buddhist 
ideology dominates the definition of religion in Myanmar. 
44 Cf. Brac de la Perrière (1989, 2009, 2015). 
45 Cf. Brac de la Perrière et al. (2014) and Rozenberg (2015) among others. 
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(hswemyo)”. Most are only composed of two houses, but the biggest ones (I listed 
seven of them) can count up to eight. Ko Kyaw the headman is living in one of 
them. They represent the accumulation of wealth by a few farming families along 
past generations and transcribe a tendency to gather relatives when possible.46 What 
June and Manning Nash saw in the dry zone of Burma in the 1960s was still true in 
2010s:  “the richer a family is, the more likely it is to be of a compound or extended 
form, even if the several nuclear families composing it have individual living 
quarters within the compound owned by the senior generation.” (Nash & Nash 
1963: 257). The fact being that the main families of settlers were able to delineate 
larger compounds and appropriate more farmland than the persons settling later, 
coming from other locals or marrying within the village and receiving a share of 
inheritance growing smaller as it was divided equally among all the children of 
blood around the death of the parents. Hence the concentric pattern of settlement of 
the village (figure 2) and the divide between the real farmers (taungthu), with bigger 
houses and cattle, and the mere labourers (myaukthu). The shape of the village is 
thus partly the outcome of the temporality of transmission within families, of the 
monopolisation of position of power by certain layers of the local society in the past 
and of how kinship is organised.  
 It has often been argued that kinship of the bama in central Burma/Myanmar 
is a loose system “of the optional variety” (Nash 1965: 59) meaning that, beyond 
the nuclear family, relations need to be cultivated. The core was thus the nuclear 
family, defined through neolocal settlement, bilateralism in descent and equal 
division of inheritance among the children.47 Family relationships are a matter of 
entitlement and of moral and social obligations transforming through time. Beyond 
the family, kinship in a broad sense can be seen as a field of politics and 
relatedness,48 and what is interesting is how people bundle by affinity, and often 
use the vocabulary of likeness to denote a sense of belonging that could encapsulate 
a common origin or just a wish to maintain good relations.49 Spiro was already 
suggesting that kinship ties carry a moral force and 
 
 
46 Cf. notably Nash and Nash (1963). 
47 Cf. Spiro (1971, 1986), Nash (1965), Nash and Nash (1963), Koening (1990), and Kumada (2015). 
48Cf. Schneider (1984) and Carsten (2000). 
49In a similar vein, the creation of relation and obligations between people is often expressed in 
terms of friendship. Cf. Spiro on power (1997) and appendix on “How to get screwed”. 
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“are a crucial basis […] for the undifferentiated exchange of those 
rights and duties which define the village as a social (in contrast to a 
mainly territorial) group. It is their common membership in a cross-
cutting network of extended kin that constitutes the main basis for the 
villagers’ sense of trust, shared identity, and mutual responsibility” 
(1986: 99). 
 
 This sense of belonging through extended kinship is a way of thinking of and 
performing a sense of belonging, fragile as it may be. For instance, hswemyo 
(“relative”) is a building block for several expressions about belonging. We saw it 
concerning the “nest of relatives”, but there is also yathswe-yatmyo which means 
“people akin by (sharing a) dwelling” and it is for instance used by Gawgyi people 
to talk about the neighbouring village of Tozigon. It reflects a sense of mutuality 
and affiliation through extended bonds and a sense of autochthony in their case. But 
Gawgyi people will never say the same about those from Myinmilaung for instance, 
even if they intermarry and exchange snacks before and during each other’s pagoda 
festival. This expression combines hswemyo with a reference to the common 
dwelling area (yat). Such assemblage is also present in the title of village elders, 
yatmiyathpa, or “parents (mihpa) of the dwelling area”. The landscape is thus also 
imagined in terms of space of belonging, talked about in a flexible language of 
kinship and which frontiers had varied following the local history and the socio-
economic changes. 
 Gawgyi is linked to neighbouring villages and farm fields via bullock-cart 
tracks – transforming into evacuation canals during the episodic monsoon – and 
footpaths – turning into motorbike routes since the massive arrival of Chinese goods 
in the late 2000s. Outside of the village are the field (taw). The village-field division 
structures the landscape. And when one goes to one’s farm field, one goes to his or 
her taw. The field is not just a place for farm work. The social control one 
experiences in the village, with its houses planted close to each other, its gossiping 
and its rules for male-female and junior-senior relationships are also at play in the 
fields, notably when people work in groups, but in a different manner. Taw is 
foremost a place of more open sociality, where men exchange betel, talk about 
crops, where people make arrangements for the harvest, gauge each other 
techniques, debate about politics and the quality of the last ceremony for instance. 
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It is where the youth hide to drink toddy palm juice. And where they pursue their 
love stories. It is where the men50 play money games, often leading to such losses 
that some rich families had to sell their land. Taw is also a place of untamed danger. 
The old trees harbour ghosts who trick people at dusk and are only visible by the 
cattle. The fields at times spit out remains of the battle during the Japanese retreat 
in 1945 in the form of cartouches and bullets. And it is also where an old pagoda 
called shwepankhaing, dating back to pre-colonial time stands, half eroded, alone 
with its invisible guardian, enclosing gold that no one should bring home (figure 
3). 
 
50 There was an obvious gender bias in the ethnography, and I deal with this issue in the chapter 1 
on reflexivity. 
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Figure 7. Bullock cart tract leading to the field during the monsoon. 
 A last element of the landscape, perhaps the least romantic, is how it has been 
impacted by the successive governments. The making of Myinmilaung tract, the 
successive embodiment of headship and the transformation of the local political 
landscape are the subjects of the historical part of this thesis. From the precolonial 
period where there was a landscape of fragmented sovereignties tied through 
patron-client relations and competing for offices, Gawgyi later became part of 
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Myinmilaung tract during the colonial encounter which imposed a ‘village system’ 
that remained throughout the Japanese invasion, the period of insurgencies, the 
military turn toward socialism, its gradual disengagement from the countryside and 
more recently the democratic transition. The rationalisation of the political 
landscape within jurisdictions became tangible with the mapping of land and the 
enforcement of a revenue system by the British. It faded during the Second World 
War, but villagers soon saw their harvest being taken by the socialist state while 
black market and cattle rustling (re-)emerged together with village fences. The most 
enduring presence was the village headmen, whose demeanour and authority varied 
depending on how they were empowered by the government. In addition, some 
roads and dams are concrete memories of how the military tightened its grip on 
people through forced labour while disengaging from the countryside after the 
bloodshed of the 1988 crisis and the revolt of thousands of people across the country 
against the government. Locally, it opened an age of distrust embodied by an 
infamous (luhso) headman from Myinmilaung village, which increased the divide 
and animosity between this place and Gawgyi. And from that moment onward, a 
few bigmen from Gawgyi started taking care of village affairs on the model of 
previous men of propriety by combining a traditional form of sociality (luhmuyay) 
with new stakes.  
 When I arrived in Gawgyi in 2013 for the first time, I encountered this 
configuration of temporalities, places, networks and meanings at a specific moment 
with the help of Ko Kyaw. Following him was a matter of trailing his political 
navigation within and beyond Gawgyi. ‘Political time’ was suddenly moving fast 
and disproportionate to the sedimentation of Buddhism in the region or to the 
succession of generations for instance. The selection of the headman, the handling 
of factions through online games such as Clash of Clans (chapter 6) occurred in 
moments that articulate, match and contradict other temporalities, and created 
dilemmas to overcome. 
 Overall, the landscape is crowded by a large array of entities: pagodas, 
monks, the monastery, naq, memories of men of prowess, ponds, ghosts, cattle, 
trees, neighbours, the headman, online teams, mountains, creeks, administrative 
tracts, relatives, and so on. It is delineated differently depending on what one wants 
to see, remember, talk about or avoid. But such a crowd is not an overwhelming 
structure imposed on villagers’ imagination. Instead, an interesting way of putting 
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it is to think of it as relationships one engages with or not. The villagers are not 
relating at all times with all possible entities that could inhabit the area. They have 
a certain degree of agency visible in how they chose to engage with this or that 
person, monk, pagoda, spirit or belief. In a sense, people navigate the landscape and 
craft their lives. In his anthropological study of “immortal” beings in Myanmar, 
Rozenberg (2015) has made a case for distinguishing two verbs in Burmese 
corresponding to the English “to believe”. There is yuhsa (to believe, nominalised 
as ayuahsa) and yonkyi (believing, yonkyihmu). “Ayuahsa refers to a statement that 
requires no argumentation or proof. It is the expression of an opinion as to the truth 
of a phenomenon not amenable to practical demonstration […]; a collective 
representation. […].” In this vein, that Gawgyi people believe (yuhsa) in Buddha is 
unquestionable, for example. On the other hand, yonkyihmu is used when a person 
takes a personal position and “acknowledges the power of the beings in question 
and the influence they may exercise over his or her person and life course.” 
(Rozenberg 2015: 15-16). For instance, Ko Kyaw, the village headmen, often 
insisted that he did not believe in naq. That is, he did not worship them, but he did 
not deny their existence either. This distinction reflects one of the ways people 
engage or not with entities or persons. It is a matter of gauging influences and 
obligations, and thus it is part of how people navigate the landscape. The emphasis 
on experiences and agency in people’s lives indicates that a key process is the 
gauging of others. What is true for the relationships with non-human entities is also 
true for everyday interactions between villagers. You relate to and chose to act 
differently with friends, patrons, ghosts and officials for potentially multiple 
reasons. To me, what is key in Gawgyi day-to-day life is how people gauge each 
other all the time and choose to engage differently with others depending on their 
ability to curb influences and craft their position. 
 
Village affairs 
 
 This thesis aims to shift the study of politics from its focus on state and 
Buddhism51 by exploring the temporalities, practices and discourses about 
 
51 This theme is dealt with at length in the section “Contributions and limitations” below. 
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leadership in one specific place. In this perspective, village government and village 
affairs (ywahmu, or ywayay) are two distinct things. While government is about the 
formal institutions and policies ruling a village tract, village affairs is about 
collective undertakings. I approach the local political institutions (village headman, 
elders, patrons, bigmen, head of a ten houses cluster) in terms of leadership and 
contexts in which personalities, achievements and the upholding of village affairs 
reflect local understandings of authority and history. This viewpoint allows to 
explore the political landscape beyond the state while making sense of the historical 
transformation of the local polity. 
 Village government has its own history in Myinmilaung tract, as we will see 
in chapters 4 and 5. Today, it is represented by the headman, the tract clerk, the ten-
houses’ leaders, and one “official elder” (yatmiyathpa). Ko Kyaw, as headman of 
Myinmilaung tract from 2013 to 2016, was the most local embodiment of the 
government. Officially, headmen, called Village Tract Administrator, “are the 
anchor of the GAD’s52 vertical role in public administration, and they effectively 
act as an extension of the GAD’s Township administrator who supervises them” 
(Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Arnold 2014: 34). Technically, Ko Kyaw was not even a 
government employee, as he received a subsidy, not a salary, of about 100USD a 
month from the Ministry of Home affairs through the GAD. Ko Kyaw was also 
accompanied by the village tract clerk who is, however, a direct employee of the 
GAD. Nonetheless, the headman is responsible for the whole tract. In addition, Ko 
Kyaw was heading multiple committees de facto.53 He took office in 2013 but was 
elected in 2012 by the ten-houses’ heads who do not have official duties. They have 
to assist the headman in some cases – such as providing free labour for government 
projects until recently. Among them, some are economically important; others want 
to be influential. Most are just people known for being helpful in Gawgyi. But they 
are the pool of persons from which a candidate for headship can be usually found 
(chapter 2). Typically, villages in the dry zone of Myanmar also have a varying 
number of elders, also called yatmiyathpa, literally, “parents of a common dwelling 
 
52 GAD stands for General Administration Department, usually seen as the “backbone” of the 
military government which oversees local governance from the village and ward levels to the Union 
level, dealing with people’s day-to-day needs including registration of births and deaths, land 
management, tax collection and budget planning. 
53 Notably the Village-tract Land Management Committee. For a study of this committee, cf. Boutry 
et al. (2017: 250).  
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place”. They can also be labelled ‘village spokesperson’ because they are (supposed 
to be) recognised for their knowledge and balanced judgement. They can speak for 
the village because they are knowledgeable about it. And one of them is chosen by 
the headman to be the official elder for administrative purpose. When Ko Kyaw 
was headman, the official elder was U Htay, a previous headman respected for his 
honesty and loyalty. After the 2016 headman selection in Gawgyi, U Maung, 
another bigman and master of ceremony, became the official elder.  
 To some degree, village affairs became important because village government 
became violent and untrustworthy. Today, these affairs include the making of 
ceremonies, the organisation of water supply and electricity grid, the maintenance 
of roads, the expansion of the village, the relation with monks, with NGOs, the 
treatment of the sick and dead bodies for instance. To some extent, there always 
were collective issues in each village. They are permanently re-creating the village 
and scaling the scope of local politics. They are not just the things that are 
happening in one place. Thus, saying that village affairs became the form of Gawgyi 
politics means that at some point in its history – the change from an Infamous 
headman to a Worthy one at the turn of the twenty-first century (chapter 5) – local 
affairs became a domain of engagement against a backdrop of governmental 
violence and detachment. The posture and acts of the Infamous headman and 
military toward the managing of local affairs influenced how people understood 
worthiness and, as a consequence, in how they will engage in collective affairs (e.g. 
not taking or giving bribes, upholding of ceremonies, investment in schooling, and 
so on). It produced a fragile political order where patron-client politics are always 
present. In this respect, my work is just an attempt to make sense of the 
contemporary manifestation of this specific configuration of power relations and 
situate it in the history of a place where a group of men were entrusted to take 
charge of village affairs, following the example of previous men of propriety and 
building on a traditional conception of sociality. Villages affairs were nothing new, 
but its transformation as a space of engagement in relation to state violence and 
corruption was a novelty. 
In broad terms, villages in the drylands constitute spaces of collective 
dealings with religious rituals (notably novitiates and Buddhist donations), life 
cycles (births, weddings, funerals, and so on) and social affairs. The scope of this 
collective is intimately linked with how a traditional form of sociality produces a 
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landscape expressed in terms of common living space and kinship. In theory the 
luhmuyay concerns everyone and covers a wide set of relations from hospitality to 
strangers to the funerals of neighbours. But it bonds villages or exclude them. The 
collective or cohesive dimension should not be taken for granted54 as processes of 
inclusion and exclusion – related to status, descent, work, obligations, debt, 
transmission and patronage – are always at play within families and between 
farmer-owners and labourers for instance. The idea of village affairs captures an 
ethic of daily life imbued with – but not reduced to – Buddhism and visions of the 
local history where the worth of people, their engagement toward others, is the 
backdrop against which patron-client politics and charismatic leadership can be 
explored in terms of uncertain engagements.  
 By focusing on one place in particular and by exploring its long-term history, 
this thesis contrasts with scholarship linking Burmese Buddhism and politics. It 
anchors politics in the way a local landscape has been fashioned through time as a 
meaningful network of personalities, stakes and memories. It is thus distinct from 
the reinterpretations of Buddhist teachings and the moral framework that enable 
political actions thanks to a shared “moral universe” (Walton 2017),55 and from the 
scholarship about the ways in which the Burmese Buddhist worldview is actualised 
and transformed through lay, religious, or state-orchestrated movements.56 My 
perspective thus puts the emphasis on local forms of sociality rather than on 
Buddhist visions of morality. Hence the use of Burmese words instead of Pali 
idioms. It also contrasts with the ‘grey literature’ about leadership and politics in 
Myanmar.57 The latter for instance divides villagers between groups58 to understand 
 
54 There is a large body of scholarship deconstructing the village as a cohesive space. Cf. Adas 
(1998) and Mya Than (1987) for the Burmese case, Kemp (1991) for the Thai case and, concerning 
villages in the anthropology and history of Southeast Asia at large, see the special volume of journal 
Sojourn (1989, vol. 4, n° 1, “Peasants and Cities, Cities and Peasants: Rethinking Southeast Asian 
Models”) and the research note by Ruiter and Schulte Nordholt (1989). 
55 Walton defines Burmese Buddhist’s moral universe as the shared belief that the world is a place 
governed by particular moral rules allowing to reinterpret historical and political changes following 
a logic of cause and effect that remains an important lens through which Buddhist in Myanmar make 
sense of politics. This concept of moral universe allows to challenge the narrative of the 
disappearance of a totalizing cosmology through the colonial encounter and the shift from traditional 
to modern Burmese Buddhism. 
56 Cf., among other works, Braun (2013), Gravers (2012), Houtman (1999), Jordt (2007) and 
Schober (1996, 2011). 
57 On interesting example of the ‘governance’ approach is the report by UNDP Myanmar (2015). 
58 Sometimes divided between core, secondary, tertiary leaders, VERP or Village Elders and 
Respected Person, cf. Kempel and Myanmar Development Research (2012), Pursch et al. (2017), 
Kempel and Aung Tun (2016) and Kyed et al. (2016). 
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local conceptions of authority and forms of local accountability. These distinctions 
are useful to map out power relations from a transverse outlook. Another 
perspective is to look at villages as social spaces with their narratives of settlement, 
rules for cohabitation, and family histories for instance. A more holistic approach 
enables an understanding of what local politics means in a place. It shows that, in 
Gawgyi, the forms of accountability emerged in relation with state practices and 
articulate the question of the worth of people with their engagement in village 
affairs. This local unfolding of politics is also related to a wider process recently 
described by McCarthy (2018)59 as the development of an ‘authoritarian welfare 
capitalism’ in government-controlled areas. While the junta outsourced state 
redistributive functions to provincial elites since the post-socialist era, ideals and 
practices of private redistribution (charitable donations and work for other) became 
the means to achieve social equity. In contrast and complement with this approach, 
this thesis shows how the development of an ideology of self-reliance is rooted in 
an experience of state violence which produced distrust toward officials, the 
military and associated cronies, and led to the upkeeping of village affairs by locals 
themselves. And so, the ‘informal redistributive institutions’ appear as forms of 
local leadership intelligible to locals but resisting state formalisation – ‘informality’ 
then connoting a distance from the state but not completely capturing how people 
make sense of this form of leadership. 
One sign of this dynamic is the role of the lugyi, or bigmen, who make the 
village a collective by upholding local ethics in different arenas. In this light, the 
headman then appears as a sort of broker buffering officials demands while keeping 
villagers at a distance with the state. In Gawgyi, the lugyi are U Htay, U Maung and 
U Lin. Each one has a particular role and are entrusted to take care of local affairs. 
U Htay, the Worthy, is the one resolving conflicts, the one people seek advice from, 
the one needed when NGOs come to the village. In short, he is described as being 
beyond partisan politics. He embodied a moral rupture with a previous headman 
and gradually distanced himself from government positions after having been 
headman from 2006 to 2011 and official elder from 2013 to 2016. U Maung was in 
charge of the national election committee for the village tract in 2015 and he is 
regularly “master of ceremony” (beiktheikhsaya), as during pre-wedding 
 
59 McCarthy thesis is not yet published so I paraphrase his main arguments and so any error is mine. 
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ceremonies when he embodies village morality through his speeches and the 
conduct of rituals. Finally, U Lin is the teacher of Gawgyi school and assumes the 
role of “head of bachelors” (lubyogaung or kalathagaung) together with a woman, 
Daw Mya who is the “leader of virgin girls”60 (apyogaung). Their duty is mostly to 
organise socio-religious events such as weddings, Pagoda festival or Buddhist 
donations. They help activate kin networks of the donors, manage village common 
properties, and organise the completion of tasks taking place within the village 
(buying and cooking food, calling and dispatching people, renting village’s 
furniture, and so forth). Nonetheless, village affairs are monopolised by men, and 
mostly by men with credentials. Those who can be lugyi descend from the main 
farming families, those who have invested in village leadership during the twentieth 
century, and even if a woman can be described as a lugyi within her group of 
extended relatives, this qualification vanished in the realm of extra-familial politics. 
Village affairs is thus a concept encompassing a whole set of activities such 
as donations, weddings, Buddhist novitiates, funerals, schooling of children, 
coordinating developments projects, maintaining the village pond, village loan 
recovery, roads repairs, and so on. Such activities require organisation, commitment 
and networks. They are activities where the worth – “trustworthiness” or 
thitsashihmu – of people is evaluated. And the village bigmen are entrusted to 
navigate and orient village affairs as a whole. This engagement toward the 
collective creates legitimacy and authority according to local forms of 
responsibility and ethics that counter the ways government ruled the country since 
the second half of the twentieth century (bribes, coercion and violence, and so on). 
And the disengagement of the state from local affairs since the 1980s coupled with 
the worsening of living conditions in the drylands led to the rise of a self-reliance 
(kotukotha) ideology and the avoidance of officials as much as possible. 
 
 
 
 
60 Apyogaung is the only gendered equivalencies of a leadership position I was able to find. This 
person, the only women to be in charge of some collective affairs with the school teacher, is not 
considered by men for taking care of village affairs. However, some women are considered lugyi 
and their opinion respected if an issue necessitates their participation. 
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BEYOND THE VILLAGE HEADMAN 
 
 This section argues that understanding local politics requires looking beyond 
formal institutions of government and instead to focus on the transformation of 
leadership throughout the history of Myinmilaung tract. It first explores village 
headship as navigating a local landscape informed by past moral ruptures and 
reorganisation of hierarchies. It then discusses how politics have been understood 
so far in this region of Myanmar by focusing on the work of Manning Nash and his 
understanding of leadership in terms of prowess and clientelism and how this 
perspective has been used by other scholars. The relation between headship and 
colonialism is then problematised as a matter of accommodation of colonial rule in 
order to ground the study of politics in relation to the past by looking at the 
fashioning of the local political landscape. Finally, it describes the notion of 
engagement as an analytical tool capturing power relations beyond the concept of 
patronage and present the different forms of leadership explored in the ethnographic 
part of the thesis (headship, stewardship, guardianship). 
 
Ko Kyaw, headman of Myinmilaung village tract 
 
Ko Kyaw’s political navigation 
 The ethnographic part of this thesis is anchored in the relations I developed 
with Ko Kyaw. I make sense of his experience as headman as a matter of political 
navigation and craftmanship. The notion of political navigation is derived from 
Vigh’s conceptualisation of practice in terms of ‘social navigation’ (2009). For him,  
 
“we organize ourselves and act in relation to the interplay of the social 
forces and pressures that surround us, and that social navigation 
designates the practice of moving within a moving environment. Due 
to the intersection of the multiple factors constituting it, our social 
environment is always emergent and unfolding, in consequence 
requiring of the agent the capacity to ‘adapt’ and ‘read’ ‘capricious 
environments’ (Scott 1998: 331). Because navigation designates motion 
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within motion, it forces us, in a social perspective, to consider the 
relation between the environment people move in and how the 
environment itself moves them, before, after and during an act. Social 
navigation, in this manner, adds an extra dimension to practice as we 
become able to focus on the way people’s movement in their social 
environments is constantly attuned and adjusted to the unfolding of the 
environment itself and the effect this has on possible positions and 
trajectories.” (2009: 425). 
 
 In other words, people navigate the landscape and this thesis is an effort to 
explore the transformation of the political landscape through time by grounding the 
analysis in Ko Kyaw’s political navigation. The navigation is coined political rather 
than social in order to underscore the tensions at play in relationships in terms of 
obligations and uncertain engagement.61 Following Ko Kyaw was thus an 
opportunity for navigating the relations and dilemmas he encountered in day-to-day 
activities. Understanding the political landscape then required me to explore more 
deeply the history of this area through the discourses about Gawgyi and 
Myinmilaung foundations and the triangulation of a variety of historical sources. 
But the first step was to make sense of the node of relationships I encountered with 
Ko Kyaw. 
 He comes from a relatively well-established family living on the oldest 
settlement area of the village. Son of the village healer, he used to follow his father 
in his peregrinations in Gawgyi and beyond and thus his name is quite famous 
locally. Since his teenage years, he is known for being a helpful person as notably 
he collected donations for the hospitalisation of a kid from a poor family. Through 
the support and affiliation with Gawgyi lugyi, he ran for headship in 2012 against 
three other contenders who were from the other villages of Myinmilaung tract. 
Selected as headman in a context of political reformism and democratic transition, 
the bulk of his work was to remake the village-tract families' registration list and 
organise the formalisation of land titles. The implementation of the 2012 Farmland 
law was a major undertaking for him as it entitled him to settle disputes, making 
him responsible for the recording of rights after several decades during which 
 
61 The notion of engagement is explored below in the section “From patronage to engagement”. 
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people got around the law in order to transfer rights. He also had to officialise land 
agreements, to set up loan schemes, to deal with NGOs, to organise village 
‘security’, and so forth. As a broker between villagers and government agencies, he 
had to find trade-offs between them, either acting as a buffer against state demands 
or taking advantages of his position, depending on who is talking about him. 
Meanwhile, he became married and a father, implying a change in residency while 
opening a debate on transmission of inheritance. He also distanced himself from 
the local monk due to the latter's repeated demands for more donations. Eventually, 
he hosted me, acting as a gatekeeper and caretaker. Finally, in 2016, he organised 
the headman selection in which he found an exit from headship. And from that 
moment onward, he gradually reduced his involvement in village affairs.  
His experience as headman was as much a matter of one-upmanship as a 
burden. When he justifies why he became headman, he, like many others, says that 
he was pushed by his fellow villagers. Yet, he, among the pool of potential 
candidates, had credentials. In Myinmilaung tract, the transmission of headship 
stopped being hereditary since the early 20th century but coming from one of the 
main families of farmers – who monopolised positions of power and authority in 
Gawgyi – means that he was selectable. He was also educated, knew people around, 
could deal with older and younger generations and, to a certain extent, was 
supported by Gawgyi’s bigmen. For Ko Kyaw, being a village headman was a 
matter of craftmanship or bricolage. It meant negotiating obligations while abiding 
by local ethics, being responsible while dodging various issues of contention. On a 
day to day basis he had to dissemble as he was representing layer upon layer of 
individuals through the institution, and not simply his own authority. The tools at 
hand were his family reputation, his way of haranguing, smiling, being silent; of 
accepting, refusing and giving things; of forming, avoiding and manoeuvring 
factions; and also, of complying with the village bigmen and having a fair idea 
about the lines he should not cross. As one follows Ko Kyaw in his routine, it 
becomes clear that he does not represent the government as an entity. He gives 
‘arms and legs’ to an institution that has a peculiar role in a network of personalities. 
In Gawgyi, authority and leadership are about recognition and 
achievements. It is a quality embedded in the person, his life, his actions and is 
linked to the display of propriety as a gauging standard resulting from local history. 
Ko Kyaw sums up this ambiguity in a peculiar way. For him “it’s only in the 
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mouth”: what powerful people say is doubtful and should not be taken for granted. 
This sentence is a critique of what (government) power is and how it operates. As 
a counterpoint, it suggests that authority implies thitsashihmu, that is aligning acts 
and words and showing a degree of “trustworthiness”. Ko Kyaw’s craft was thus to 
embody a mistrusted position in a space where trustworthiness matters. Local 
politics today are thus gauged through a moral scale dividing what is doubtful, on 
the one hand, and what is trustworthy, on the other hand. And past personalities are 
gauging standards in local politics. The stance and actions of previous headmen and 
monks shaped Ko Kyaw’s ability to craft his own authority because they 
participated in the transformation of the local understanding of morality, headship 
and collective actions along the past century.  
The emphasis on propriety and morality stems from two men: U Za Nay Ya, 
the first head monk of Gawgyi monastery from 1910s to 1949, and U To Kaing, 
village headman from the mid-1920s to the early 1960s. They are, for our 
contemporaries, the archetypical and last men of hpon, that is, charismatic leaders 
or men of prowess, whose virtue, karma and worldly achievements justified and 
produced their power and authority. They were able to inspire people to emulation 
and embodied a renewal of propriety in the contest against colonialism. On a 
different note, U San, headman during the socialist era, was more of a negotiator 
empowered by the state to bring about socialism. Yet, his prerogatives – notably the 
control of land ownership – generated factionalism within the village tract. It 
unfolded in a period when villagers had more and more to get around the law and 
negotiate with officials. The tightening of the local polity on the village tract 
worsened when the state partially disengaged from the countryside and U Win, 
headman from Myinmilaung proper (1995-2006), embodied, for Gawgyi people, 
the figure of a corrupt man, making money out of forced labour and fake contracts. 
Finally, U Htay (2006-2011), brother-in-law of Ko Kyaw, is a counterpoint. His 
stance was to display, on the models of previous men of hpon, propriety and 
impartiality. And he gradually distanced from official positions while remaining 
central in the organising of Gawgyi affairs. 
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Headmen of Myinmilaung tract 
From Myinmilaung proper From Gawgyi Period 
U Nyunt  1890-1900s 
U Shwe  1900s-1920s 
                       U To Kaing 1920s-1964 
 U San 1964-1989 
 U Mya 1989-1995 
U Win  1995-2006 
 U Htay 2006-2011 
U Yay  2011-2013 
 Ko Kyaw 2013-2016 
U So  2016- 
Figure 8. The successive headman of Myinmilaung tract 
 Ko Kyaw is but one headman after others. Yet, the ethnographic study of how 
he crafted his position allows to see that discourses about the past carry the question 
of morality, trust and doubt that pervades the present, on the one hand. And it also 
enables to see the crafting of headship as about ambivalent engagements 
permeating daily life and relationships such as the transmission of inheritance, the 
making of ceremonies and the caretaking of village affairs, on the other hand. By 
looking at headship as a matter of uncertain engagement, political navigation and 
craftmanship, this thesis renews the anthropological study of village headship 
(chapter 6). The particular configuration of past dynamics in daily life is key to 
understanding power and authority in our context. Ko Kyaw's dilemma was to align 
actions and words and be trustworthy. In practical terms, his challenge was to shape 
the dynamics that were imposed upon him because of his position, as he did not 
simply represent his own authority through the institution. People's situations, 
positions and strategies are influenced by the way actors order the past into stories. 
In this respect, trustworthiness is a matter of time and examples. The last men of 
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hpon, the moral rupture at the turn of the twentieth century, the rise of village affairs 
are turning points. It limited Ko Kyaw in his ability to be a leader as much, if not 
more, than the legal definition of his rights and duties. While he was headman, the 
men of hpon had gone, the government had shown its violence, Gawgyi and 
Myinmilaung had been competing for decades if not centuries and village affairs 
were guided by the local elite. Ko Kyaw thus navigated a different political 
landscape than the lugyi, as they chose to keep away from the state and created 
another field of politics through village affairs. But Myinmilaung tract was not the 
sole arena for him and being a headman was about embodying a position people 
distrust while having to be trustworthy. 
 The political navigations of Ko Kyaw and the lugyi offer insights on how 
masculine identities become problematised through the lenses of power, 
obligations, responsibility, trust, and abilities for instance. However, this work 
partly achieved its potential in that regard (chapter 1) and do not push the reflection 
on gender to the maximum. This stands for a number of reasons but mostly because 
it took me time to realise that entering the field through male sociality was in itself 
a way to study gendered politics. At first, I approached it as if I should have 
something to say about women. For instance, as I was close with Ko Kyaw’s wife 
and mother, I witnessed how being married completely changes the norms about 
social distance and restraint between men and women. Married women more easily 
engage petty conversation with males, they can walk at night more freely and have 
less pressure from their family of origin as they live within a family of orientation 
acknowledged collectively through the ceremony of engagement and the wedding. 
Males, married or not, talk, joke and navigate more easily. Unmarried people are 
statutory members of ‘virgin groups’. Such groups are crucial in the making of 
village ceremonies. Once married, males are supposed to become the providers of 
their family livelihood and females to be in charge of the “household affairs” 
(eindaung keiksa) and to be the “guardians of wealth” (ngwayhtein). At Ko Kyaw’s 
place, there was, so to speak, two houses under the same roof. As a by-product of 
male domination, the scope of women’s authority can reach up to the level of the 
extended compound, as for Daw Than, the grandmother of Ko Kyaw, who was 
considered as a big woman, a lugyi, because she was knowledgeable about family 
affairs, because she has proven honesty and foresight and was a local patron for a 
few neighbours after her husband passed away. So, married women are often 
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considered as the “head of the household” (eindaunguzi) and her votes were 
collected during the selection of the ten-houses’ heads. But this is where it ends. 
None are candidates for headship or ten-houses’ head in Gawgyi. Their names 
almost never appear as “head of a household” on any official listing.62 In the process 
of publicization of politics, when certain matters are dealt as collective issues, they 
are relegated to the background. This is one aspect of the effects of the ideology of 
male domination in Gawgyi and in Burmese society. Women are most often 
excluded from what is deemed political, with the noteworthy exception of Daw 
Aung San Su Kyi who is now running the country. 
 The qualities that constitute bigness are also gendered, and hpon is a case in 
point. Brac de la Perrière (2000) has pointed out the different discourses on the 
possession or not of hpon by women. The Burmese normative version excludes this 
possibility, limiting the hpon to a male attribute located in the right shoulder, while 
many people, men and women alike, report the presence of hpon in the latter, 
especially in their bun. Women can pollute men and so Ma Khin and Daw Hlaing 
hang their longyi and underwear on separate and lower clotheslines to prevent 
people from passing their heads – the purest part of the body as opposed to the feet 
– underneath. In addition, in the Burmese Buddhist cosmology, women are by 
nature inferior to men, for being a male is the utmost rebirth, and only they are 
initiated and become monks. This conception is also articulated with the cults of 
naq (spirit), the latter being “nothing more than men who died of violent death and 
whose butterfly soul was not processed normally and so persists in a disembodied 
form.” (1989: 92, my translation). The naq are wandering souls the Burmese 
worshipped through possession and the mediums (naq kadaw) are mostly women 
or transsexual men because their butterfly souls (leippya)63 are believed to be more 
fragile than those of men, and thus more easily replaced by the naq during the 
possession. The ideology of male domination also pervades the laws and Crouch 
(2016) has shown how the Burmese Buddhist law64 has largely been defined by 
 
62 A plot of land can be registered under the name of a woman, notably if she is single, divorced or 
a widow. 
63 Leippya is a vital principle; it is the subject of many rites that mark the life cycles of an individual, 
including birth, early childhood and death. For a clarification about the butterfly soul, cf. Brac de la 
Perrière (1989) and Robinne (2000). 
64 Crouch (2016) indicates that while it derived from the dhammathat, Burmese Buddhist law was a 
construction of lawyers and judges in the colonial era and that the writings of legal practitioners 
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men, allowing polygyny until recently65 and carrying no penalty for adultery 
committed by men, although women risk divorce and the loss of property. And so, 
as Than Tharaphi has argued (2014), the image of Burmese women like Ma Khin 
or Daw Hlaing as powerful agents, free in the economic sphere and enjoying high 
status and equal rights to men is far from the reality. 
 But in Gawgyi, there are other ways women do politics. For instance, they do 
so in the way they arrange labour groups and embody connections between families 
and neighbours, creating flexible and enduring bonds that work as safety nets in 
case of bad harvests. They perform the tasks necessary to the cycles of exchanges, 
such as the offering of snacks to neighbours, relatives and patrons before Gawgyi 
pagoda festival for instance. They are also crucial actors for the making of 
ceremonies as we will see in chapter 8 and a formidable audience for the monks 
giving speeches during many rituals. And if they are evicted from the headman 
selection, they are active in the micro-finance, health, school and monastery groups, 
even though the latter are almost always headed by a man. Women are also crucial 
in the politics of transmitting inheritance, and chapter 7, developing on this theme, 
shows how performance of masculinities are also central to family relationship. In 
short, the political navigation of males and females participate in what Weiner 
(1976, 1992) has coined the ‘cultural reproduction’ of the local society, where males 
dominate the hierarchy. 
 Before describing the historical transformation of the polity in more detail, it 
is necessary to focus on how Myinmilaung tract became an uncanny arena of local 
politics. 
 
operate as a definitive restatement and source of the law, rather than as a book to help lawyers or 
judge locate the law. 
65 Cf. the Monogamy Law No. 54/2015 
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‘Myinmilaung’ 
 
Figure 9. Map of the village tracts (with villages' old names). 
 What needs to be borne in mind is that Myinmilaung is a scalable political 
space and a historical artefact. One of the plots running throughout the historical 
part of this thesis is to explore how it comes to be the name of (one aspect of) the 
local polity. This name refers to multiple spaces (a village, a group of villages 
sharing a sense of belonging, a village tract). It has been used as the name of the 
village tract after a coup de force from a man called U Nyunt who took advantage 
of the colonial operations in the late 1880s to create for himself a jurisdiction while 
composing with unsteady centres of power (chapters 3 and 4). It sometimes refers 
to a single village but is mostly used to talk about a group of villages sharing a 
common history of settlement, despite the subsequent splits due to conflicts in 
village leadership. I call that settlement Myinmilaung proper. The name 
‘Myinmilaung’ has no permanent, spatial anchoring. It became a sort of referent 
once recognised as a governmental jurisdiction. The name in itself is a 
transformation of Myinmalauq, meaning “not enough horses”, and draw from a 
foundation narrative where the royalty and the locality intersected in the middle of 
the eighteenth century. The narratives of foundation of Myinmilaung proper and 
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Gawgyi allude to the fashioning of this political space and oppose the former, 
presented as ‘genuine allochthone’, to the latter, claiming autochthony. 
 Nowadays, Myinmilaung is the name of a jurisdiction, i.e. Myinmilaung 
village tract. It includes Ogon, Mingalagon, Myinmilaung and Gawgyi villages and 
one headman is selected for the whole tract. But the history of the area shows a 
number of splits between villages. During the foundation of Myinmilaung proper 
in the 1750s, the people divided first into three corps, most probably following the 
regimental affiliation at play in the region. The map above shows the different 
names of the villages. There was the “West Corp” (Anauksu,66 now Mingalagon), 
the “East Corp” (Ashayzu, now Mogaung), and the “Middle Corp” (Alezu, now 
Myinmilaung). These are the hamlets’ old names – sometimes still in use – as 
recalled by current villagers. Myinmilaung as a single village then progressively 
referred to the “Middle Corp” (Alezu), the central hamlet which tried to encompass 
the others under its leadership in the second half of the eighteenth century. At a 
larger level, Myinmilaung proper refers to five villages claiming a common origin. 
There were pushes and pulls between villages and many distanced themselves from 
Myinmilaung with more or less success. The “West Corp” was progressively 
known as the “Auspicious Hill” (Mingalagon), taking the name given by a royal 
astrologer passing by for itself. The other two villages that split with the “Middle 
Corp” were also renamed. The “East Corp” became Mogaung, the “Good Rains” 
and affiliated with a different village tract. In the early years of colonisation, the 
northwest village known as Obo was renamed Ogon,67 “the brick hill”. A fifth 
village, today called Mayodaw, was also created in the north most probably in the 
late 1910s and also affiliated in a different tract. The villagers from these villages 
generally explain the splits as the fruits of tensions between bigmen and their 
cliques or group of relatives. Interestingly, Mayodaw also distanced itself by 
becoming independent in terms of ceremonies. They use the monastery and pagoda 
located close to Myinmilaung but have their own village properties to organise 
ceremonies. In short, the evolution of Myinmilaung proper is as much about a 
common origin as factionalism and subsequent splits. 
 
66 The word “su” (sometimes pronounce “zu”) refers to the idea of a compound and in this case to a 
corp of servicemen. 
67 Because bricks (“o”) were made out of the soil from which pilling residues formed a hill. 
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 The last key point is that Gawgyi and Myinmilaung proper have conflicting 
relationships. They do not share a common foundation history. Rather, they were 
bound to deal with one another in the same polity since Myinmilaung village tract 
was created under U Nyunt. From that moment onward, the evolution of headship 
is linked to the competition between these two imagined communities. There is no 
clear-cut event that people recall for explaining why they do not like each other. 
They just “do not get along” and football matches, pagoda festivals and headman 
selection often turn into open clashes and fights. Yet, they marry each other (mostly 
the non-farmers) and participate in gift-giving exchanges. For instance, villagers 
from both places share pre-pagoda festival presents, in the form of snacks, to foster 
certain kinds of alliance (between families, related to service exchanges, and so on). 
Formally, the villages of the tract cohabit. But animosity tends to prevail. Gawgyi 
men often express it through stories of misconduct displaying Myinmilaung people 
as corrupt or amoral. And the latter jokes about Gawgyi showcase of propriety. 
Tracing back the genealogy of this relation through oral history was sensitive as I 
was affiliated with Gawgyi. 
 The relative opposition between these two ensembles sometimes reduced the 
potential for factionalism – or segmentation – within each settlement. For instance, 
during the last headman selection of the headman in 2016, two candidates 
competed, one for Gawgyi, one for Myinmilaung proper (here composed of 
Myinmilaung, Mingalagon and Ogon). But this was not always the case, and the 
selection of headmen is a critical moment when the drama of local politics plays 
out. A look at the long-term history of this area, from the mid-eighteen century 
onward, thus allows one to explore how this opposition is expressed in terms of 
competing vision of indigeneity – autochthony vs genuine allochthony – and to 
locate how village headship, as a new form of leadership brought about by 
colonialism in the late nineteenth century, both relate to precolonial dynamics and 
transformed following who embodied it in a wider context of socio-political change 
during the twentieth century. 
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Selections 
 I choose to use the word ‘selection’ instead of ‘election’ to qualify the process 
of choosing a headman. It highlights that handpicking, electing and justifying are 
both processes of selection across particular settings and, as described above, I tried 
to contextualise the stakes and the condition of selection for each headman.  
 When Ko Kyaw was selected headman in 2012, it was, according to him,68 
the first ‘democratic’ election in the tract. Each ten-houses’ head had one vote and 
Ko Kyaw gathered fourteen, Myinmilaung candidate’s thirteen, Ogon’s two and 
Mingalagon’s also two. In other words, the relative population of villages, and the 
ability to compound votes, were the primary elements of this competition. As we 
will see in chapter 2 on the 2016 selection, there is a variety of stakes (one-
upmanship, brokerage with officials, containing factionalism, displaying bigness) 
and people (competitors, elders, clerk, ten-houses’ leaders, township officials) 
associated with headman selection. Because of the particularly state-like quality to 
the office of headship, it has typically been more in the interests of the state to have 
the institution than the local population. This is why the headman is imbued with 
particular powers of brokerage. It is important also to note that headship is not a 
position that everybody seeks out. On the contrary, many people in Gawgyi for 
instance avoid being enlisted. Yet, many are not even credited as potential 
candidates by those organising the selection. Nonetheless, most villagers want to 
have the headman coming from their village. It could attract loans, NGOs, 
development funds for electricity, water and roads. It could also smooth the 
processes for securing land rights and agricultural supports for instance. It 
facilitates relations with government agencies and adds to village prestige. Having 
a headman from one’s village – and its associated perks – is something to fight for 
to a certain extent. Even more so when such selections are climaxes in a sort of 
derby between Myinmilaung proper and Gawgyi. 
 Prior to 2012, and except for the 1960s, there was more artistry in the way 
headmen were selected. Generally speaking, they were either handpicked by the 
government (usually by a military officer)69 or elected by elders upon consensus. 
Sometimes, following precolonial practices, heredity was prevalent, the office was 
 
68 ‘Democratic’ elections of headmen were held in the 1960s, cf. chapter 5. 
69 Cf. Thaunghmung (2003: 308). 
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for life and thought of as a family duty. But, as in precolonial times, competition 
for office was paramount, and patronage and factionalism the main political 
dynamics. Often selections were justified a posteriori, emphasising the 
achievement of this or that person, his charisma, his natural authority. But the actual 
conditions in which the office of Myinmilaung headship was transmitted are always 
blurred. The only common point between the selections of most of the headmen is 
that they happened fast. In other words, there never was one rule of selection but 
only peculiar cases. And such cases depended on the history of the place, the 
balance of power, the personalities involved, the control of land, labour and taxation 
and the extra local events (such as the colonial ‘pacification’ of the countryside, the 
communist insurgency, the socialist turn, the military hardening post-1988). 
Collecting information about those succession is difficult, as shifts of headmen 
often reflect tensions in Myinmilaung tract, as for instance when U Win the 
Infamous was replaced by U Htay the Worthy in 2006. And even if the 2016 case 
could be coined an ‘election’, because all of the ten house heads had a vote, the 
actual emergence of these heads and potential candidates were controlled by village 
bigmen to some extent (chapter 2). Thus, the concept of election carries a sense of 
free choice that is too loaded with the Western idea of democracy, such that its use 
misrepresents the processes involved in choosing a headman in our case. 
 
Debating local politics 
 
 Studying village headship in central Myanmar from a particular case enables to 
locate and challenge the debates on the conceptions of power and authority, on the 
transforming of land relations and of local history. In these debates, headmen are 
described variously as usurpers of precolonial (hereditary) chiefs, as servants of a 
foreign state, as buffers against state demands, as charismatic patrons anchored in 
a local, as corrupt officials, and as political entrepreneurs. Some of these debates 
are historical in that they pertain to peculiar moments in the history of the region 
such as the colonial period. Others are about the nature of local politics in general 
but, nonetheless, they also relate to temporalities and contexts. One example is that 
of the thorough ethnography of village life in the dry zone by Manning Nash (1965). 
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Uses of Nash's work 
 “There is the sense of attachment to a victorious leader, a man who can 
get things done, who can build a clientele who will share with him and 
enjoy with him the fruits of power. The idea of aligning with a powerful, 
successful leader is old and continuous in Burma's past and much more 
operative in the shaping of political events, at any level of social 
organization, than is the recent and alien ideology of government by 
law and rule by majority.” (Nash 1965: 275). 
 
 Concerning local politics, Nash’s argument is to say that Burmese people 
have a political system based on charismatic leadership and so, party politics, which 
he witnessed during fieldwork, was bound to enter the realm of patron-client 
relationships. To do so, he combined an individual quality, called hpon and 
stemming from a person’s karma and worldly achievements, with leadership. The 
plasticity of this form and its timeless nature – kings, gentry and village leaders 
potentially justified their power as men of hpon – were helpful to make sense of the 
continuities in the political landscape. But having done fieldwork in a place where 
there were no more men of hpon and where headmen were navigating uncertain 
political spaces, I argue that this rationalisation of leadership blurs the more moral 
aspects of politics due to the ahistorical nature of this quality and its use as a 
retrospective justification. The force of Nash’s conception is that it provided an 
anthropological ground to the study of clientelism and patronage. The historical 
part of this thesis, however, shows that local contexts, ethical shifts and 
temporalities of change need to be considered to fully capture the transformation of 
the local polity. For instance, the rise of village affairs and the worth of the village 
bigmen are better understood in relation to the historical context of state violence 
and disengagement from the countryside than in terms of individual quality, even if 
the idea of achievements still plays a large part in people’s bigness. 
 Nash did his fieldwork in two villages located around Mandalay, the last 
capital of the last kings, in 1960-61, that is during the parliamentarian period (1960-
62) after the military caretaker government (1958-60), the insurgencies (mid 1940s-
late 1950s), independence (1948), and the Japanese invasion (1942-45). Nash 
highlighted the ambiguities attached to village headship by linking it to the local 
64 
conceptions about government and administration. Government is traditionally put 
in the class of “natural, unforeseeable, and uncontrollable disasters” or the Fifth 
Evils together with water, fire, thieves and enemies.70 Administration is however 
seen as a “necessary burden” and the headman is a mix of both. For Nash, “any 
concrete headman is a feature of historical and social circumstance.” (ibid.: 75). In 
his successive fieldworks in Nondwin in the drylands and in Yadaw in a rice-
growing environment, he distinguishes two political organisations. First, in 
Nondwin the headman was not a man of power. He was merely an administrator 
that inherited his position from his father-in-law while being elected following a 
‘democratic’ procedure by all household heads whose involvement in maintain 
village fences and payment of taxes to the headman marked their belonging to the 
political community (ibid.: 74). There was, however, a man of power, U Sein Ko, 
who kept a certain cohesion in the village and remained undisputed. Officials and 
political parties dealt with the village through him. In Yadaw, located nearby 
Mandalay, the situation was rather different. The contested local implementation of 
the land redistribution program in the wake of independence had created a context 
of disputes and factionalism alongside competing claims for ownership. But no one 
could claim leadership in the same way than a previous headman in charge prior to 
the Japanese invasion of 1942. In the late 1950s, there was no clear-cut man of 
power and “the election for headman turn on party membership, vote canvassing, 
and direct intervention by political agents from the cities and the capital.” (ibid.: 
276). In short, in one case a leader was responsible for a whole village in which the 
headman was but an official with no authority. In the other, the loss of a legitimate 
leader combined with a complex history of successive settlements and competition 
for land ownership drove headship control into faction politics.  
 Nash describes power relations throughout the nexus of three concepts: hpon 
(Nash transcribed as pon), awza and gon. His analysis oscillates between reifying 
the idea of power as inhabited in individuals and power as relational, flowing 
between people and situations.  
 
“The village Burman has a trinity of concepts about power, and these 
ideas are key to understanding the political organization of villages in 
 
70 For an elaboration of this view, cf. Maung Maung Gyi (1983: 154-155) and Spiro (1997). 
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Upper Burma. Three concepts pon, gon and awza [sic] define relations 
of power, influence, and authority among villagers. Pon, in its secular 
meaning, is the power to carry out plans, to bend others to one’s will, to 
move destiny to one’s advantage. Awza is the authority to command. 
Officials have awza, but this authority rests in law and must be backed 
by the coercive apparatus of the police and the courts. The awza of a 
man with pon stems from his personal powers, his marked and 
conspicuous abilities to succeed in this world. The notion of gon is akin 
to the English idea of virtue. It connotes a sterling personal character, 
special religious learning or piety, or even the trait of impartiality in 
dispute. Pon and awza are the power dimensions of social relations; gon 
is the moral content.” (ibid.: 76). 
 
 For Nash, hpon is the key concept. Defined as “power or glory” (ibid.: 52), it 
is a quality located in a person. Nash provides a list of six qualities indicating the 
amount of hpon found in a man’s “demeanour”: industry, alertness, mercy, patience, 
judgment and perspective (ibid.: 77). Nowadays, villagers hardly use hpon to 
describe a leader, and even less for a headman. This quality seems to be left for 
monks – called hpongyi or “great glory”, who by definition represent hpon as they 
are able to live a more-than-human life and embody and sustain Buddha’s teachings. 
Thus, hpon also relates to spiritual qualities and social skills deriving from a certain 
ethic of Buddhism acting as a benchmark to value people behaviours. Individually, 
a person’s hpon eventually rests on his kan, the concretion of one’s past deeds and 
misdeeds carried throughout countless lives. For Nash, the quantity of hpon is 
defined in everyday interactions and perceived through achievements and successes 
or any signs of good or bad fortune. It is a sort of force carrying a person who 
should, in return, foster it. Hpon is thus a matter of personal achievement and social 
inference. It is a person's skills and others’ recognition of such skills determine the 
possession of hpon. It is an individual quality revealed across social inference 
related to a local ethic and in tune with Buddhist precepts. 
 What Nash describes in the early 1960s fits very well the scholarship of the 
late twentieth century on power, authority and sovereignty in Southeast Asia. In the 
vein of the studies on power opened up by Anderson (1972), Wolters (1982) 
identified this kind of charismatic, achievement-based leadership with a broad 
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social type, which he called ‘men of prowess’. He argued that ‘men of prowess’ of 
one sort or another were found in all the pre-colonial polities of the Southeast Asian 
region. Kinship was for the most part bilateral, and instead of power being passed 
from generation to generation through a lineage, authority was achieved through 
the actions of charismatic leaders, and attributed to magical or spiritual potency, the 
hpon in our case. ‘Men of prowess’ needed to earn such a status during their 
lifetimes. The transmission of authority was then problematic as it was attached to 
the person, not the position. The polities that came into being around ‘men of 
prowess’ were thus highly personalised, very fragile and based on patron-client ties. 
 Lieberman, a leading historian of the pre-colonial period in Burma/Myanmar, 
used Nash’s description to support his argument on the nature of kingship dynamics. 
For him, the achievement-based leadership of kings partly explain the rise and fall 
of dynasties between 1580 and 1760. 
 
“The greater the military conquest, wealth, and religious benefactions 
of a king, the more credible his claim to religious veneration in general 
and to Embryo Buddhahood in particular. In contemporary parlance, a 
king’s hpòn [sic] (charismatic glory, innate power), let-yòn (force, 
especially military force) and a-na (domination, authority) were 
proportional to the maturity of his Perfection and to his accumulation of 
good kamma. […]. Insofar as the state was synonymous with the ruler, 
rebellion could be justified by the doctrine of kamma: by definition, a 
successful usurper had more kamma, hence was more entitled to 
religious respect, than his victim. As one never knew his kammatic 
destiny, rebels were tempted by dreams and portents to launch attacks 
and trust to fate. While such challenges were most likely to afflict newly 
ascended kings, established sovereigns were also vulnerable if (as in the 
1590s, 1661, or 1752) major catastrophes suggested that they were 
possessed of little hpòn (a reflexion of poor kamma) and were 
neglecting dhamma. [sic]” (Lieberman 1984: 75, referring to Nash 
1965: 79). 
 
 And Lieberman describes Alaunghpaya, founder of the Konbaung dynasty, as 
a man who “was able to satisfy the popular yearning for a man of great hpòn [sic], 
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to crush opposition by force of arms, and thus to reorganize the population under a 
more tightly unified patronage structure.” (Lieberman 1984: 229). The hpon 
described by Nash in the 1960s was part of the self-legitimation rhetoric of kings 
and an essential ingredient to the making of personal obligations and ties that gave 
form to the divine kingship (or galactic polity) in Burma. Heredity was a weak claim 
to office and more generally speaking, as Schulte Nordholt (2015) put it, the rise 
and fall of men of prowess can be seen as being part of the ‘longue durée’ of patron-
client relations in Southeast Asia. 
 In addition of being used to support the history of kingship dynamics, Nash 
work also served the study of patron-client politics in Burma/Myanmar. Such 
studies gained much momentum in anthropology, sociology and political science in 
the 1960s-70s as they allowed to depart from the analyse of politics through the 
concepts of class, ethnicity and religion and to focus on ‘informal’ or ‘ad hoc’ 
groupings. In the words of J.C. Scott, who influenced much of the debate 
concerning the Burmese context, patron-client politics “represent an important 
structural principle of Southeast Asian politics” (Scott 1972a: 92).71 Scott’s 
argument was to say that the traditional patron-client ties, “once viewed as 
collaborative and legitimate”, tended to break down during the colonial period due 
to processes of “social differentiation, the commercialization of subsistence 
agriculture, and the growth of colonial administration” (Scott 1972b: 6). His 
subsequent landmark work on The Moral Economy of the Peasant (1976) 
developed on this theme, showing – but contested by Adas (1998) – through the 
analysis of peasant protests how traditional system of patronage have lost their 
moral force during the colonial period. Concerning Burma in particular, Scott used 
Nash’s description of Yadaw and Nondwin political dynamics to support the view 
that “(w)here one local landowner or traditional leader had once dominated he now 
faced competitors” (Scott 1972a: 107) as the factionalism and fight for headship 
shows in Nondwin; and that “directly ruled lowland areas tended to develop 
factional competition among different patrons, while less directly ruled areas 
 
71 The studies of ‘patron-client’, ‘dyadic contract’, ‘personal network’, ‘clientelism’, ‘factionalism’ 
were not bound to Southeast Asia. As a reader on political clientelism published in 1977 shows, they 
mushroomed from the study of third-world politics but were also developed (and though to be 
applicable) in any country at various scales; cf. Schmidt et al. (1977). 
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(especially highland areas72) more frequently retained some unity behind a single 
patron who remained their broker with the outside world.” (ibid.: 107, note 47). 
 The aim of this thesis is not to reveal broad political structures but to explore 
the transformation of leadership in one specific area. To look at local politics in a 
long-term perspective requires to look beyond charismatic leadership or patron-
client relations and the figure of village headship offers an entry to analyse 
continuities and ruptures. 
 
Were there any headmen before the headmen? 
 The question at stake now is, if colonisation broke down the precolonial 
figures of authority, then what were they, and did the creation of village headship 
had a role in this? Scott’s point was to say that traditional authorities were patrons, 
buffers of state demands, who depended more on the local organisation of force and 
access to office as the sinews of their leadership than upon hereditary status or land 
ownership. Thant Myint-U (2001) and Mya Sein (1973) put forward another 
argument. For them, the creation of village headship during the ‘pacification 
campaign’ of Upper Burma in the late 1880s had a major impact on local politics. 
It did nothing less than cut off the previous hereditary gentry from their 
prerogatives: 
 
“[…] the gentry class […] governed the countryside under varying 
degrees of royal direction. Often titled and granted sumptuary 
privileges, these men served as intermediaries between the distant Court 
[…] and the thousands of villages and hamlets scattered across the 
lowlands. And yet British policy-makers, rather than attempting to co-
opt their services into the next regime, deliberately shunted them aside. 
Myothugyi quickly lost their dominant position. What had been a 
complex hierarchy of local hereditary offices dissolved into a sea of 
undifferentiated and salaried village headmanships.” (Thant Myint-U 
2001: 4–5). 
 
72 Nash does not specify this point, and it should be noted that both Nondwin and Yadaw were in 
the lowland. Yet, the point on the type of land and cultivation remained valid. 
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 Taylor, a leading scholar on state making in Burma/Myanmar, also reflects 
these views. For him,  
 
“The headmen were no longer the natural leader of their communities, 
able to defend their client interests against a rapacious state, but the 
salaried tax-collector of that state providing the funds for the policies, 
police and court […]. Bribery and corruption, the new name of clientage 
aspect of local administration, now became a major administrative 
‘problem’ for the state, as well as an additional burden upon peasantry.’’ 
(Taylor 2009: 87-91).  
 
 There are two problems here, both related to the same question: who are the 
headmen? The belief that colonialism invented headship out of the blue, 
irrespectively of what pre-existed, explain the discourse about the colonial rupture. 
However, as has been demonstrated by Berry (1993) for many African societies, the 
case for colonial invention has often overstated colonial power and its ability to 
manipulate institutions to establish hegemony. None of these institutions were 
easily fabricated and colonial dependence on them often limited its power as much 
as facilitating it according to Spear (2003). In our case, village headship was first 
imagined by Crosthwaite, Chief Commissioner of Burma from 1887 to 1890, as a 
traditional institution, “the only form of organic life which Burman society 
exhibits.”73 Discourses about headmen then display a degree of continuity between 
the precolonial and the colonial organisation of local powers. It created the narrative 
that there used to be headmen but since the colonisation headmen are of a different 
type. As Donnison, a colonial officer and historian, put it, “in the villages, matters 
remained much as ever before’’ and headmen acted like they always did (1953: 34-
35). This leads us to the second problem, namely, that there is no clear picture of 
precolonial forms of power and sovereignty.  Donnison, writing on the ‘pacification 
campaign’, is again evocative:  
 
73 This extract is taken from the British Library archive file L/PJ/6/216. A Regulation to Provide for 
the Establishment of a Village System in Upper Burma (hereafter REVSUB). This file contains 
meeting minutes, the regulation and telegraphs of correspondences. This particular extract refers to 
a letter dated 8 September 1887 and written by Smeaton, Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner 
Croswhaite who imposed the village system (cf. Interlude). 
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“one of the greatest difficulties was to make sense of the inconsistencies 
of Burmese administrative arrangements: most difficult of all did they 
find the personal jurisdiction which existed alongside, or rather woven 
through, the more intelligible, though still unstereotyped, territorial 
jurisdictions. […]. In size, authority, condition of tenure, in fact in every 
respect, it was hard to find two charges alike.” (ibid.: 23).  
 
 Challenging the legitimacy of the colonial co-optation of an indigenous 
‘village system’, Mya Sein (1973) draws a picture of the late pre-colonial period 
where the township hereditary chiefs (myothugyi) were the real rulers of the 
countryside. For her, “[t]ownships were often divided into smaller units known as 
the village or hamlet, under the Ywa-ok or Ywa-gaung [sic] appointed by the 
Myothugyi. Sometimes the village acquired a certain amount of independence and 
the head (then usually known as Ywathugyi) would receive an appointment order 
from the crown.” (1973: 44). Another issue is to understand the ambiguous 
disparities between localities. Lieberman notably shows that “township leaders 
[were] often known as myo-thu-gyi, whereas their subordinates, depending on 
departmental affiliation and local tradition, might be pyei-zòs, ywa-thu-gyìs, myìn-
zìs, kyeì-gaings, tàw-kès, myei-daings, kalans [sic], and so on.” (Lieberman 1984: 
93, note 92). In addition, the royalty attempted to impose a state-centred 
administration on top of regional fragmented sovereignties and segmented the 
society by dividing the bulk of the population between commoners (athi) and 
servicemen (ahmudan), both liable of different obligations to the crown and local 
authorities. Yet, this segmentation was not as sharp as proclaimed by the state. And 
people could change their status by moving away, shifting their affiliation from one 
authority to another. Overall, there was nothing as such as a system of village 
headmen at the time the British conquered Upper Burma in 1886. 
 Thus, the question of the nature of precolonial authority is misleading because 
it assumes, but does not prove, that there was a shift in how power was exercised 
due to the colonisation, the transition from a system of chiefs and fragmented 
sovereignties competing for manpower and wealth to a territorialised system of 
headmen. Nonetheless, village headmen, first called thugyi, “the great”, were used 
as the liminal, and thought of as the traditional, figure of power in the countryside. 
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And thus, village headship embodied a contradiction between the old, the 
traditional, office-based and personal authority; and the new, the colonial, the 
territorialised jurisdiction. Village headship is, since the beginning, an ambiguous 
figure of power. 
 
The fashioning of the local political landscape 
 The local political landscape is a metaphor referring to the networks of past 
and present personalities, hierarchies, stakes and memories that are meaningful in 
current politics; and its fashioning, the process of sedimentation of these elements 
through time. This idea stems from my encounter with Ko Kyaw and the difficulties 
to make sense of his practice of headship. Being a headman was a move for one-
upmanship, but his role was beyond a mere brokerage of government authority as 
his ability of ‘administrating’ Myinmilaung tract was constrained by past 
personalities and ethical shifts. The rise of the lugyi as caretaker of village affairs 
was certainly a rupture. Besides, Ko Kyaw became headman because of his 
credentials, but also because of the hierarchical relations in Gawgyi. And they had 
transformed. In addition, the tension between heredity and ability runs deep in the 
history of Burmese politics and so any understanding of leadership should take into 
account the realm of family inheritance and the succession of generations. In short, 
studying the fashioning of the local political landscape equalled to explore the past 
of a polity from an understanding of its present. 
 To make sense of these continuities and shifts, we need to explore the long-
term history of the local polity and analyse the creation and transformation of 
headship in a specific area. From that standpoint, and concerning Myinmilaung 
tract, it appears that the ad hoc introduction of headmanship was but another 
episode of competition for offices and traffic in affiliations that characterised the 
precolonial polity. The political dynamics in central Burma prior to the colonisation 
were marked by pulls and pushes of a centre-oriented but centrifugally fragmenting 
polity similar74 to those analysed by Tambiah (1973, 1976) in his seminal work on 
galactic polity.75 The precolonial Burmese state formed of pulsating polity with a 
 
74 Lehman (1981, 1984, 1987) concurred with Tambiah and saw the precolonial period in Burma as 
an example of galactic polity. 
75 Tambiah (1973) was reprinted in 2013. 
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cosmological centre embodied by a king surrounded by satellite principalities 
(known as taik and myo) replicating the centre and tied to the king through patron-
client relationships and oaths of allegiance.76 The political order in precolonial 
Burma was also called “patrimonial” (Lieberman 1984: 86),77 or “patrimonial-
bureaucratic” (Koenig 1990: 99),78 that is “based on a personal, traditional authority 
with obedience to the person rather than the office.” (Koenig 1990: 99). The king 
was the patron of patrons, the chief of chiefs. And even if heredity was a strong 
claim for office, it was not enough. There was no “powerful ascriptive element” 
justifying once and for all a leader, even for the king (Lieberman 1984: 83). And if 
the patron-client bonds virtually linked all authorities together, they also shifted 
continuously, hence the pulsating metaphor. The kingdom was a vast assemblage 
“of quasi-sovereign entities whose rulers were bound to the High King by personal 
and ceremonial obligations” (ibid.: 38) but because “each might metamorphose into 
the other (…) ambitious regional leaders were constantly tempted to accumulate 
sufficient strength to effect the transformation” (ibid.: 46). 
 In our case, Myinmilaung and Gawgyi settled in Badon/Alon, a principality 
gradually incorporated within the kingdom and which eventually became a key pool 
of recruitment of soldiers. Myinmilaung’s founding narrative connects the rise of a 
new king, Alaunghpaya (1752-1760), with the fall of Badon/Alon chief, known as 
Bahtukyweh, who was then turned into a sovereign spirit (naq). Myinmilaung 
founders posit themselves as retainers of that local sovereign when he fled from 
Alaunghpaya while the latter appointed new authorities in this area. In other words, 
the founding of Myinmilaung happened in period when dynastic cycles intersect,79 
when the hierarchy, “continually subject to the dynamics of pulsation and changing 
spheres of influence” (Tambiah 2013: 511), is transforming. 
 From that period onward Myinmilaung settlement divided following 
regimental and lineage links and affiliated with the neighbouring authorities 
depending on the balance of power, pre-existing territories and access to land and 
loans. So did Gawgyi which was created during a great famine in the 1810s, most 
probably resulting from the continuous demands for corvée, soldiers and taxes by 
 
76 On the conceptions of Burmese kingship, cf.  Aung-Thwin (1981, 1983, 1985a, 1990), Candier 
(2007), Lehman (1981, 1984, 1987), Gravers (1993), Koenig (1990), and Lieberman (1984, 1991). 
77 Lieberman used Weber's classification (1968: 1042-1044). 
78 Koenig used Blake’s typology (1979). 
79 Cf. Lieberman (1984). 
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king Bodawhpaya (who previously received Badon in appanage). The history of 
these settlements then shows how the countryside is a constantly changing polity 
where fragmented authorities competed for office and the associated control of 
manpower and wealth. If hereditary offices were the main form of authority ruling 
the backcountry, as opposed to the officials appointed by the crown, factionalism 
and shifting affiliations were the main processes. There was an assemblage of 
authorities constantly in the making using various resources (heredity, patronage, 
money lending, revenue collection and land control) to consolidate their position. 
Thus, those authorities were a mix of hereditary chiefs, local patrons and rising 
leaders. And when the British decided to annex Upper Burma, Alon and the Lower 
Chindwin plain were already a hotbed of rebellion against the crown and its officials 
after King Mindon (1853–1878) tried to curb local authorities by centralising his 
administration and increasing revenue at the expense of the gentry. 
 So, when British military officers like F.D. Raikes, Deputy Commissioner of 
the Central Division in Alon, ‘pacified’ the countryside and appointed 
intermediaries,80 it was another episode of competition for office and shifting 
affiliations. In our case, it was an opportunity for a local leader to build for himself 
a jurisdiction: Myinmilaung village tract. As Scott puts it, “access to colonial office 
replaced to some extent victory in the previously more fluid local power contests 
as the criterion for local patronage.” (Scott 1972a: 101).  In the same vein, the 
subsequent recording of land rights to create a system of land revenue was a means 
to challenge pre-existing forms of ownership by locals. And some gentry families 
resorted to loans, mortgages and tenancy to maintain their hold on the countryside. 
 The colonial ‘village system’ was performative in the sense that it centred 
local politics on the village level. The jurisdictions were territorialised, wealth 
gradually stemmed from land taxation instead of dues and duties, but the local 
power contests followed precolonial lines. On the one hand, headship was invented 
to have a ruling class that was legible to the system of government that colonialism 
imagined. But on the other hand, headship swept into the ongoing competition for 
power in the countryside. And the merging of Myinmilaung and Gawgyi within a 
single village tract resulted from this shift in the local political landscape. 
 
80 Cf. The British Library archive file Mss Eur B391. Campaign diary of Captain Frederick Duncan 
Raikes (1886-1887), hereafter referred to as Raikes Papers, relating to the pacification of Upper 
Burma following the Third Burmese War. 
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 Since advent of colonisation, it became more in the interest of the state to 
have headmen than for the villagers.81 The stance, or style, of the successive 
headmen of Myinmilaung tract was thus related to how governments empowered 
them in a certain extent. But it also relates to how villagers reacted to what they see 
as decline in morals or plain corruption. Along the twentieth century, headmen were 
generally described following a menu of options, as usurpers of precolonial chiefs, 
as servants of a foreign state, as buffers against state demands, as charismatic 
patrons anchored in a local, as corrupt officials, and as political entrepreneurs. In 
our case, headship is closely related to factionalism between Gawgyi and 
Myinmilaung proper as it became one of the loci of their competition. In addition, 
the styles of the successive headmen and the way they succeed one another mixes 
supralocal and local politics and is thus one angle from which to analyse the history 
of this place. 
 The first headman was U Nyunt (late 1880s-1900s) from Myinmilaung proper 
who built for himself a village tract. Officially, all villages of the tract were 
collectively responsible for any infraction and U Nyunt derived his wealth from the 
collection of capitation and land taxes for the Township government of Monywa. 
Nobody knew him directly and although U Nyunt is depicted as a strong 
personality, he is described by Myinmilaung elders as a ‘bad’ ruler. Besides, he had 
a gun and people apparently had no choice but to obey his order. They mention that 
he had ana, meaning that he was backed by an external force,82 the state, and impose 
decision through coercion. He could fine people, he tied up drunk men during 
pagoda festivals for instance and could even sentence temporary jailing. 
Interestingly, his son, U Shwe, came to office after his death (1900s-1920s). The 
hereditary transmission of offices was justified following a local theory of habitus 
in which what a man handles, his children should know how to handle. Yet, Gawgyi 
people do not even remember U Shwe, and they do not share that theory of habitus 
when applied to Myinmilaung. The one headman they know is his successor, or 
rather challenger, U To Kaing, seen as one of the last men of hpon.  
 
81 This subsection is an overview of the historical chapters 4 and 5 in which sources are documented 
and problematised. 
82 Spiro (1997) has attempted to expand Nash’s conceptualisation by focusing on ana, which he 
translated by power and used it to describe the relationships between township offices and village 
headmen. 
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 The coming of U To Kaing makes sense in a broader context of rural protest 
against colonialism and moral reform in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
As Turner (2014) has shown, lack of respect toward elders, drinking alcohol, 
frequentation of opium shops and billiards parlours, excessive gambling, 
consumption of beef, all were evidences of decay. It is in this period that a 
monastery was built in Gawgyi with an influential monk, U Za Nay Ya, involved in 
moralising in lay affairs. He, and not U Shwe the headman, was consulted by 
Gawgyi villagers for cases of divorces and apparently even for land disputes. The 
apparent decline of headmen’s authority was, for the British, one of the signs of 
contestation, along with the politicisation of local associations against taxes. The 
rural protest is associated with the idea that headmen were merely the ‘maid of all 
work’ for the government in contrast with precolonial authorities. It seems that U 
To Kaing took over U Shwe as he embodied a focus of moral upholding and was 
active in lay associations. Besides, born in Gawgyi but married and living in 
Myinmilaung proper, he is seen as the one who could hold together both factions. 
U To Kaing remained headman during the economic crisis of 193083 and the local 
unfolding of independence politics in the 1930s, the Japanese invasion and rule 
(1942-45) followed by a political maelstrom (from 1946-48) and the ensuing civil 
war – when the U Nu government attempted to secure rural support through a land 
reform – until the military ‘caretaker government’ restored order (1958-60) and 
eventually size power by force (1962). In other words, he remained the local 
authority during a period of political change. His bigness stems from this 
achievement and current villagers express it by referring to his personality: a man 
of charisma, of hpon, whose order were respected. But he is also described as a man 
of virtue who participated, and at times led, the moral reformation of villagers. 
Nonetheless, he used political changes and the growing push toward an agrarian 
reform to rearranged land ownership in favour of some farming families in the 
village tract. 
 The next headman, U San, was a man from Gawgyi who was nominated in 
1964 by the military to implement the socialist policies developed after Ne Win’s 
coup. While U San became the operator of the compulsory procurement of harvests 
and the head of the land committee empowered to organise a ‘land to the tiller’ 
 
83 See Brown (2005, 2013) for how the economic depression hit Myanmar at large. 
76 
policy, U Than from Myinmilaung proper became head of the tract cooperative. In 
the following two decades, factionalism between Myinmilaung and Gawgyi and 
patronage by Gawgyi’s main farming families were the mechanisms through which 
socialism operated. The latitude to negotiate depended on connections, on the 
bureaucratic functioning and, for the farmers, on the stance of the headman, the 
relations developed with him, his ability to ‘forum shop’ between institutions and 
the power balance in the tract. U San and U Than were either described as fine 
negotiators buffering state demands for crops and delivery of consumables or as 
corrupt men who took advantage of the system and fuelled the black market. By the 
mid-1980s, the authoritarian functioning of the bureaucracy and the failure of the 
economic reforms worsened the conditions of life for villagers. Making a living 
was more and more about finding trade-offs with village authorities to get around 
the law. The institutionalisation of socialism through local men made Myinmilaung 
tract a more tightened polity because villagers depended more on arrangements 
with these persons for their living. 
 U San was replaced by U Mya, also from Gawgyi, in 1989 after the bloodshed 
of 1988 once the military government, renamed SLORC (State Law and Order 
Restoration Council 1989-1997), reasserted its hold over the region of Monywa. U 
Mya came from a large family of farmers and was already a member of the previous 
People’s Council of Myinmilaung village tract. The villagers remember his time as 
a moment when the headman had to maintain order by any means necessary. The 
military was disengaging from the organisation of local affairs and economy. In 
addition, the degradation of economic conditions stiffened the complex hierarchy 
and dependency relations between farmers and daily workers. While the 
government partially withdrew from the agricultural chain, village elites were able 
to accumulate more wealth. In this context of disengagement of the state a new 
headman emerged in 1995. This man is U Win, from Myinmilaung proper, and he 
is described as an infamous person. How and why he became headman is uncertain. 
Forced labour for the construction of dams and roads started to be used at a larger 
scale after he took office, and people's movements were increasingly controlled. A 
general sentiment in Gawgyi is that this man embodied corruption: a greedy and 
immoral official who worked for a militarised government which relied on violence 
and pushed people to cheat. Under U Win, the villagers of Myinmilaung tract 
experienced a new kind of state violence. Stories of people being beaten, women 
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abused, and pagoda relics and treasures stolen by soldiers spread across the whole 
township. In Myinmilaung tract, he is notably linked with multiple land disputes 
and cases of embezzlement. 
 U Win was succeeded in 2006 by U Htay from Gawgyi and the shift from the 
former to the latter crystallised a rupture in local politics. The violence of the state 
and its partial disconnection from Gawgyi farmers has resulted in the 
disengagement of village leaders from official positions in favour of engagement in 
village affairs along the lines of previous men of power (the last men of hpon). U 
Htay is described as a counterpoint from U Win and embodied a notion of 
trustworthiness based on earlier model of propriety. During this transition, the 
organisation of Gawgyi affairs has been monopolised by the villagers, drawing 
from a more traditional form of collective sociality called luhmuyay and an ideology 
of independence (render in the expression kotukotha, “rising by and defining 
oneself”). The idea of trustworthiness become represented to and lodged in subjects 
through the influence of this exemplary person.84 U Htay did not create a new 
political order all by himself but has contributed to a larger movement that saw 
village affairs becoming the form of Gawgyi politics. And this is when the lugyi 
came to represent a new kind of authority in Gawgyi. U Htay maintain involvement 
in Gawgyi affairs after deciding not to be candidate for the 2011’s round of 
selection following the announcement of a democratic transition under Thein Sein’s 
government. This selection was chaotic, and it underscores the crisis and moral 
rupture brought about by the change from U Win to U Htay. U Yin from Ogon 
became headman, but only for one year. In 2012, a new selection round was 
organised which saw the coming of Ko Kyaw as headman of Myinmilaung tract. 
Ko Kyaw was selected thanks to his personal credentials, his reputation and 
affiliation with Gawgyi bigmen at a specific juncture of local and national politics. 
The state was apparently changing radically its stance toward democratisation and 
the moral rupture in Myinmilaung leadership was over.  
 The ethnographic focus on Ko Kyaw’s time as headman provides an entry 
point to make sense of this particular configuration of personalities, ethical shifts 
and transformation of the local polity. The fact that there were no more men of hpon 
 
84 This perspective refers to the literature on politics and morality and notably to Humphrey (1997) 
and Robbins (2015). 
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indicated that a changed occurred in how people conceptualise the politics of the 
past versus the present. Any reading of current practice of leadership in terms of 
patron clients would not have yielded the same result than a focus on how people 
engage with one another. And the next section presents this conceptual transition. 
 
From patronage to engagement 
 
 Clientelism, factionalism and patronage are loose systems of affiliation that 
help explaining shifts in local politics. But the flesh of actual relationships remained 
blurred and I found patronage too vague a concept for an ethnographic description 
of day-to-day power relations. The same stands true for the concept of hpon as an 
individual quality and merit making as a way to enhance one’s standing. Yet, both 
ideas have partly structured how leadership and hierarchy were produced in this 
part of the country: Nash proposed a secularist perspective while Schober (1989), 
after Lehman (1984), offered a version attuned with Buddhist conceptions. Yet, in 
an everyday perspective, the vocabulary of help, of good and bad behaviours, of 
family obligations, of hierarchy, and of collective affairs is central and the 
evaluation of peers in daily encounters shows how local ethics is produced and 
frame politics.  
 The perspective adopted in the ethnographic parts of this thesis is to look at 
how people craft their position, how family leadership is conceived and how the 
worth of people is evaluated in relation to village affairs. And these political fields 
are analysed by exploring how people engage with one another. Before presenting 
the conceptions and practices of leadership as processes, the following section 
discusses the limits of the concept of hpon. 
 
Limits of the concept of hpon 
  When I arrived in Gawgyi, there were no more men of hpon. But the 
functioning of patronage that stems from this concept deserves close attention to 
better anchor my analysis in terms of engagement. Translated as charisma, glory, 
or grace, hpon has been analysed in several ways. For Nash (1965: 76), hpon 
belongs to a triad: hpon (or sheer power), awza (or authority, ability to impose 
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judgement) and gon (or virtue, morality). These concepts are all qualities lodged 
into a person and inferred by his or her peers. My perspective is, however, to study 
leadership and authority as processes articulating past dilemmas and current stakes. 
Nash’s approach is secularist in the sense that he shows that a person's power is 
more closely linked to his performances, achievements and their recognition by 
peers throughout life than to Buddhist cosmology. A person's hpon is function of 
one’s engagement with others in daily life through trials, failures and successes. 
Nash deduces from this that a man of hpon does not build an organisation, but a 
clientele: 
 
“The presence of pon [sic] cannot be institutionalized. It always is the 
possession or attribute of a concrete, living person. When he loses it, it 
is gone, when he dies, it dies. In the political sphere a man of pon does 
not build an organization: he builds a clientele. The power structure of 
Nondwin is a series of dyadic, interpersonal relationship having its 
center in U Sein Ko. His clientele shares in part his success; they bask 
in the aura of his pon.” (ibid.: 79) 
 
 To this, two elements must be added. First, a person creates a clientele 
because he or she distributes (merit, benefits, equipment, a network of knowledge, 
advice, services, loans, and so on), thus creating chains of dependence or privileged 
relationships. But these transactions are negotiated, challenged, accepted, requested 
or refused and potentially create social and moral obligations. Second, one person's 
responsibilities and obligations toward another is at the heart of the patron-client 
relationship. For instance, if we conceive that the lugyi are lugyi because they take 
charge of village affairs, then the question becomes: can the worth of the lugyi result 
from clientelist relationships? This is the path Nash has taken and it can be quite 
relevant to understand the local political arena. But we saw that their worth is rather 
linked to how they make the realm of village affairs a space of commitment during 
a specific moment in village history. Thus, clientelism could partially explain what 
keeps people together in Gawgyi. On the one hand, a recognised man of power may 
keep people together through dyadic relationships, on the other hand, power is said 
to be consensual, with the authority of people rarely rising beyond their nuclear 
family (Nash 1965: 58). Nash ruled out the possibility that taking charge of village 
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affairs can be a form of engagement used to evaluate people and thus produce their 
worth. For him, it is only the man of power who makes a collective hold (ibid.: 85). 
In local conceptions, the ideal type of a patron is called kyayzushin, a term 
loosely translated as benefactor and which literally means “master of gratitude”. 
There are three kinds of benefactors: the parents because they sustain life, the 
Buddha because he provided the means to end suffering, and the teachers because 
they transmit knowledge. People are not indebted to them because they cannot call 
off the relation.85 Gifts – in the form of care, presents, donations – to these 
benefactors are acknowledgement of an obligation to be grateful. This kind of 
hierarchical relationship pervades many other domains of social life and has been 
described as what could be called a social structure of patron-client relationships. 
For instance, Lieberman showed how patron-client relations with kings were 
formulated as personal obligations, to the point that remembering “one’s debt of 
gratitude to the king and one’s oath of royal allegiance (…) became a stock phrase 
used to explain virtually every act of service.’’ (Lieberman 1984: 73). In a different 
context, Boutry (2011, 2015) showed how the patron-client links between an 
individual and his kyayzushin served to legitimise Burmese presence in frontiers 
areas and articulate their interactions with locals of different cultures. Schober 
clearly articulated the relations between transactions, obligations and hierarchy: 
 
“Offerings are made to beings who belong either to the sacred domain 
beyond the social hierarchy of lay people or to individuals thought to 
be superior to the person making the offering. They are viewed as an 
acknowledgement of gratitude and as a repayment of moral or social 
debt rather than as an attempt to create new obligations. On the other 
hand, food given to those below one’s own station in life, even if it is 
given in a ritual context, is considered an expression of one’s loving 
kindness (metta) and compassion (karuna) for less fortunate ones and 
dependents. In return for this kindness, obligations must be repaid. On 
account of the dependency thus created, the recipient comes under the 
influence and power of his benefactor whom he owes gratitude (kyei: 
 
85 Cf. Graeber (2007) for a distinction between debt and obligation. 
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zu: shin) [sic] and in whose dominion of power he now exists.” 
(Schober 1989: 105). 
 
 The relation between a person and his benefactor is clearly hierarchical and 
stems from Buddhist cosmology. From this standpoint, Schober expands Lehman 
argument for whom “to make merit is to increase power” (1984: 241). Linking a 
person's power to his hpon, Schober defines the relations between meritorious 
donation (ahlu) and power through the concept of ‘field of merit’: 
 
“Through giving, he [the giver] becomes the patron of a field of merit, 
however extensive or insignificant. Burmese designate such patron in 
ritual contexts as ku.thou shin, ‘owner of merit’. […]. Honorifics like 
owner of merit designate a patron over a particular domain of power 
and influence or a field of merit. [A patron] redistributes the benefits of 
his hpoun: to all who share in his deed (kamma) and merit (ku.htou) and 
thus create obligations among his clients. […] Those who share in the 
patron’s merit and hpoun: owe him gratitude and obligation [sic]. These 
are difficult to repay as redistribution of merit establishes a status 
hierarchy separating patrons from clients.” (Schober 1989: 122-123). 
 
 The sharing of merit by a ritual of consecration at the end of a donation creates 
obligations for those who enter the ‘field of merit’. This explanation of power 
relations, and the economy of merit in general, is an idiom for thinking and 
expressing authority and hierarchy. I obliged others through my ability to make 
donations. My ability to share merit comes from my hpon – intimately linked to my 
karma – and reinforces it. Donations give concrete expression to my power. The 
people present during donations become stakeholders in my ‘field of merit’. And 
this typical situation is found in the most celebrated donation ceremony called the 
shinbyu, the boys’ initiation ceremony to monkhood. In short, the Burmese 
Buddhist gift is a case of how giving obliges and creates hierarchy. 
 But a close analysis of how a shinbyu is made, how it is organised, not in 
terms of ritual activity but through its kitchen, through the tiny acts that make it 
possible, shows that hierarchy is not straightforward (chapter 8). Gifts oblige to a 
certain extent, but they are also negotiated. And most importantly, the making of 
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ceremonies needs a collective organisation to happen. It is therefore necessary to 
describe these practices in context, to know when such ceremonies take place, who 
is invited and who is not, if there is a difference between a donation made by a 
stranger to the village, by an influential farmer or by an ordinary worker. In 
addition, while village ceremonies involve formalised transactions between people 
(money, merit, food), they also take place in specific social spaces where many 
exchanges take place all the time in the form of work, mutual help, gifts, loans, and 
so on. The merit shared with the participants flows in many networks of people 
engaged in countless exchanges that structure a local hierarchy open to negotiation. 
Inviting people, helping, giving food, not coming to ceremonies are all choices that 
show how much people want to get involved. In short, the ‘field of merit’ approach, 
while indicating how exchanges, transactions and gifts between people produce 
order, uses the Buddhist idiom of patron-client (gratitude) to explain the flesh of 
social asymmetries but without making sense of the tensions between actors. 
 Thus, neither the secularist version of hpon, nor its articulation with merit are 
adequate to study day-to-day politics in an open-ended perspective because they 
convey an idea of socio-political structures from which time and contingency are 
virtually absent. They crystallise meanings but obscure actual processes.86 Our 
perspective is different as it focuses on one place in particular. 
 
Engagement and leadership as process 
 To account for those tensions, I chose to see people’s interactions as forms of 
engagement, ridden with ambiguity and uncertainty, and “contained between the 
poles of violence and friendship.” (Naepels 1998b: 328, my translation). To put it 
simply, there are differences in how someone deals with his family, with 
neighbours, with friends, with employers, labourers, patrons, monks and so on. 
Among these relationships, seniority, gender, religious status, intra-family 
obligations and friendship are the core ingredients of sociality. They are nonetheless 
arenas where people have to craft their position. Family is for instance a group 
where relations between parents and children are quite straightforward. As the 
 
86 Schober has since expanded the scope of her research and notably considers the transformation of 
Burmese Buddhism since the colonial encounter and throughout the succession of political regimes 
(2011).   
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transmission of inheritance shows (chapter 7), what makes a family (hierarchy, 
blood, commensality, gratitude, care) and the mutual obligations between its 
members create entitlement to property. And yet, for one of the children, who 
usually receive more, it also means tacking upon oneself parental patrimony and 
liabilities. The temporality of family relations is then crisscrossed with uncertainty 
because the transmission entangles multiple generations, moments (marriage, 
adoption, death) and strategies to access wealth that requires one to redefine 
liabilities and responsibilities between people. Thus, the family, even if conceived 
through a set of rules and status, is a space where people adjust their position. 
 One can say the same for Ko Kyaw in his quality of village headman. This 
position for him meant navigating social and moral obligations while abiding by 
local ethics, being responsible for a whole tract while dodging situations where he 
could become obligated. He was never sure of his authority in this or that arena and 
had to dissemble as he was not solely representing his own authority via the 
institution. He used his family reputation, adjusted his speeches, at times remained 
silent, received or gave things, help, pieces of advice, he formed a faction of 
youngsters through an online game, avoided the monk and previous headmen, 
complied with the village bigmen and was careful not to cross the lines between 
individual, familial and collective responsibilities. In short, he crafted his position 
within a variety of social settings where the worth of what circulates, and in fine, 
the worth of people, are constantly evaluated. 
 This is where the anthropology of uncertainty joins the anthropology of 
morality. To reflect the tensions at play in relationships I see them as engagements. 
Thévenot has renewed the notion of engagement by moving away from its meaning 
in the sense of a will to change things. At the sociological level, engagement 
 
“[…] emphasises a dependency with the world that the person cares 
about and seeks to secure benefits from by having the appropriate 
guarantees [or gages]. In this, engagement aims at mastery, at power 
understood in a more open sense than the current meaning of the term 
power in social and political sciences. Engagement is about turning 
dependency into power.” (Thévenot 2007: 238, my translation). 
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 For instance, offering food can either be an act of hospitality (to a guest), of 
sharing (with friends and close relatives), of making merit (in ceremonies), of 
obliging somebody (sort of potlatch) and it can be most of those at the same time. 
How people act can be approached in a flexible way, leaving room for uncertainty, 
evaluation and strategy without eroding the value of the idioms used to describe 
relations, such as patronage, friendship or family solidarity for example. The 
interesting part of the word engagement is that it combines the ideas of evaluation, 
of pledges and of fight. In English, to en-gage expresses the act of evaluating a 
something (a length, a weight, a stake) through a scale (to gauge) and acting upon 
that evaluation. It highlights a process where someone gauges and can commit or 
defy. It is Exit, Voice and Loyalty in one word. In the sense of “to deposit or make 
over as a pledge’’ (Oxford English Dictionary), engaging refers to the idea of 
involvement, being part of. And ‘something’ (a bride price, a promise, a bonding 
gift, an inheritance, a service, a loan, a ritual exchange…) marks this commitment 
which transform the responsibilities between the persons. Engaging in this or that 
kind of relation thus creates obligations between the person and the gist of that 
relationship is materialised in what circulates between them (help, services, money, 
patrimony, protection…) and how it is qualified. Putting oneself ‘under’ a patron is 
for instance turning a dependency into a power (giving something out to be sure to 
get something back). In this sense the notion of engagement relates to the debates 
about gift-giving, about the value of people and of what circulates.  
 The question now becomes how people in Gawgyi engage with their parents, 
friends, partners, family (of blood, in-laws), workers, employers, ritual exchange 
partners, government officials? And, at a larger level, does engagement toward the 
village has a collective makes sense, and how is leadership conceived today? To 
answer these questions, the ethnographic chapters explore the conceptions and 
practices of leadership through the crafting of headship by Ko Kyaw (chapter 6), 
the transmission of land within families (chapter 7) and the caretaking of village 
affairs (chapter 8).  
 Following Ko Kyaw’s political navigation in a day of his life shows that being 
a headman meant dealing with the old and new in multiple social spaces where 
obligations and memories influence how he engaged with others. Ko Kyaw’s craft 
was to be at the juncture between past and present dynamics and he was evaluated 
according to how dealt with the local understanding of worthiness. The question of 
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leadership is then expanded to family relationships through the issue of transmitting 
inheritance. The latter appears as a process of redefining authority and 
responsibility over things, and obligations between people. Within the realm of 
family relations, authority is conceived as a process of stewardship (okchokhmu): 
taking care of a patrimony and of the persons attached to it. It appears that the field 
of family relations was a matrix for thinking about rightful filiation (continuity) and 
by extension about leadership. The emphasis on personal abilities goes beyond 
family relationships. The combination of, and tension between, heredity and ability 
(achievements, hpon, karma) are at the core of the theory of politics in the Burmese 
context.87 Thus, the idea of ‘taking charge of’ as a form of authority related to 
personal abilities and mutual obligations between ‘parents’ and ‘children’ to some 
extent pervades other conceptions and practices of leadership. And this idea echoes 
the rise of village affairs as the form of Gawgyi politics in the past decades as a 
political field enacted by worthy leaders described as guardians who “take charge 
of’ village affairs” (ywayay okhteinhmu). In other words, exploring Ko Kyaw 
crafting headship as a process ridden by uncertain engagements allows to transform 
the question of transmission of property within families into a study of family 
leadership conceived as stewardship which, in turns, enables to qualify the 
leadership of Gawgyi bigmen in the political field of village affairs as a matter of 
guardianship. 
 The question of the worth of the bigmen deserves further consideration. At 
one level, what keeps people together in Gawgyi is a sense of shared blood, that is 
the existence of several cores, or lineages, called amyo-yo, and a sense of difference 
with other villages, notably Myinmilaung proper. In that sense, Gawgyi is not a 
“mixed” (yaw) village. At another level, what bonds people is the upholding of local 
ethics. Those ethics, often described as timeless, are nonetheless a produce of 
history. For instance, the self-reliance ideology, the fact that people took care of 
their own affairs since few decades, is related to how the government engaged with 
villagers. But local ethics also insist on family responsibilities and obligations, the 
code of morals for making a good marriage as explained during premarital (or 
engagement) ceremonies, or the need to help for donations and weddings for 
 
87 Koenig (1990) has been the most explicit about the linkages between leadership and heredity 
present in numerous texts concerned with the Burmese Buddhist law. 
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instance. To some extent, a sense of morality (a ground to trust and distrust) 
pervades most forms of transactions between people from mutual help to repair 
houses to how sharecropping is organised. However, engagement toward the 
collective is not straightforward. The challenge is to make it happen, to organise 
ceremonies, the delivery of water, the extension of the village, the building and 
maintenance of roads, the selection of candidates for village headship and so on. As 
stated above, a few people are entrusted to organise and orient the village collective. 
And their worth stems from their engagement toward village affairs to some extent. 
But it is never assured and has to be reaffirmed all the time.  
 Thus, by analysing the moments where the worth of the lugyi is produced 
(chapter 8) it is possible to see the upholding of village ethics and the making of 
authority. By making village affairs a space of engagement where the worth of the 
people is evaluated, the lugyi legitimise a political order within the village and are 
entrusted to do so. In this sense, the lugyi are worthy because they each operate a 
“process of generalizing” to promote a common good by taking charge of village 
affairs (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 7). Boltanski (2011) emphasises that 
‘generalising’ is a process that tends to lower the weight of a particular justification 
in specific situations over a more general principle.88 This process is how the lugyi 
assert a village political order in specific situations where the prevalence of 
individual, family, intergenerational, and clientelist relations is reduced in order to 
highlight a common good. 
 Overall, the variety of forms of leadership at play in Gawgyi are all processes: 
headship as craftmanship, family and property stewardship, and village 
guardianship. There must be other forms. But these ones in particular are clearly 
articulated with past dilemmas and ways to organise the local society. 
 
 
 
 
 
88 Boltanski (2009) emphasises that the process of generalising is about disseminating a particular 
justification (what we aim here in terms of engagement in village affairs) in specific situations where 
disputes occupy a central position. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
 The main contribution, and at the same time the main limitation, of this work, 
is that it is an ethnographic and historical engagement with one particular place. To 
some degree, it aims at answering Charney’s call for more local history “upon 
which the historiography of other regions, such as Europe, has been built” (2007: 
227) even if this work is not related to one specific period and is thus open to 
critique on this basis. The narrative choices made through the writing, based on my 
will to develop a personal style, and the effacement of Burmese through 
transcriptions as well as the reliance on almost exclusively English sources have 
the potential effect of distancing the reader from the more ethnographic data and 
thus represent another ground for legitimate criticism (chapter 1). In addition, the 
thesis is not directly concerned with current debates about ethnicity, religion, state 
building, and resource politics nor about the democratic transition but proposes a 
unique contribution drawing on political anthropology and history to explore the 
transformation of a specific political landscape and to expand our understanding of 
politics in the Burmese context. Considering that the literature on Burma/Myanmar 
is intimately linked with its national or regional political history and on the relations 
between religion and politics, and that my work explicitly focuses on a small place 
within it and does not centre on Burmese Buddhism, I shall start by expressing the 
fields which my thesis does not make direct contributions to as a second limitation.  
 Walton has convincingly argued that a wide range of actions, from “electoral 
politics to civil society activities to proper moral conduct in daily social 
interactions” (2016: 129) are forms of political participation for many Burmese 
Buddhists. But this thesis intentionally takes a different angle and draws more from 
how politics and leadership unfold in rural society through time. Therefore, it 
discusses and connects works that are mostly concerned with the anthropology and 
history of central Burma/Myanmar and engages a close discussion with Manning 
Nash’s old-fashioned ethnography. This thesis is not directly concerned with how 
the moral framework of Burmese Buddhism has been used in politics over time,89 
but it attempts at capturing how moral ruptures and local dynamics have shaped the 
 
89 Cf., among other works, Braun (2013), Gravers (2012), Houtman (1999, 2000), Jordt (2007), 
Schober (1996, 2011) and Walton (2016). 
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political landscape by looking at narratives of indigeneity, forms of hierarchy and 
debates about worthiness, giving ‘arms and legs’ to these shifts by tracing the 
succession of village leaders while following local temporalities and meanings. 
 By looking at the fashioning of the local landscape in these terms, this thesis 
contrast with state-centric approaches90 and offers a way to make sense of how 
people articulate past and present. For instance, the focus on the precolonial period 
shows that dynamics of affiliations, competition for leadership and fragmentation 
of authority were the main dynamics in the countryside and endured during the 
colonial period. It emphasises the ability of people to negotiate their position in 
society and the multiple means by which authorities competed for and strengthened 
their leadership. In addition, Gawgyi and Myinmilaung’s founding narratives claim 
specific links with the landscape and show how the fluid system of precolonial 
status groups (servicemen vs commoners) still pervades the political landscape in 
the form of differentiated entitlements to indigeneity. It enjoins seeing local legends 
and myths, often combining references to spirit cults, kingship and Buddhism, as 
historical sources and discourses about contemporary issues and challenges the 
understanding of ‘the gentry’ as a monolithic group and the imposition of village 
headship as a change in the nature of authority.91 The colonial period should thus 
not be configured as an historical rupture and the introduction of village 
headmanship was not as traumatic and transformative. It did not completely 
destabilised traditional authority by removing traditional elites and reorganised 
space and land around new lines. This work suggests that the operation of 
traditional elites was less homogeneous than the ‘rupture’ narrative requires, and 
that the local conflicts around who possessed authority, its limits and operations, 
was a pre-existing framework onto which village headship became attached rather 
than was displaced by. This thesis proposes to look at the emergence of the village 
system as a process of accommodation of colonialism which provided the means to 
challenge the obligations regulating access to land and wealth and opened onto a 
reorganisation of local hierarchies around the ability to farm and to monopolise 
 
90 Notably embodied by the works of Aung-Thwin (1990), Koenig (1990), Lieberman (1984), Mya 
Sein (1973), Taylor (2009), Thant Myint-U (2001) or Tinker (1967). 
91 An argument notably found in Mya Sein (1973), Iwaki (2015), Taylor (2009) and Thant Myint-U 
(2001) and discussed in the section “Where there any headman before the headman” in the general 
introduction. Concerning the gentry, Saito (1997) has also described how it gradually became a 
landed group in one rice-growing areas of the dry zone. 
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village state institutions. The fact that some leaders became exemplary figures of 
the moralisation of behaviours engaged in lay affairs during the contest of colonial 
rule marks a gradual shift in the form of authority from charismatic leadership 
toward worthiness and propriety. It allows us to put Nash’s work in perspective and 
make sense of how the more recent rupture in Myinmilaung leadership furthered 
the connection between the lugyi and village affairs and the latter disconnection 
with headship. 
 Another limitation of this work is that, at times, it deals with the government 
as if it was a single or uniform entity. Thawnghmung has demonstrated how it could 
blur any understanding of legitimacy in the Burmese context and I should add that 
a thorough study of the multiple articulations between the layers of government, 
regional elites and villages would greatly enhance our comprehension of the 
country. In my defence, I can only say that the people I have met along the course 
of fieldwork quite often did not distinguish the military from more local officials 
for instance,92 notably when expressing their grievance or talking about collusion 
and corruption. In addition, I might have reflected more on the role and perception 
of the current head of Gawgyi monastery, as it would have yielded a more detailed 
account of the local political arena. 
 Another limitation rests in the difficulty I encountered in translating my 
positionality into a research device concerning the issue of gendered politics. As 
stated in the introduction, this work partly achieved its potential in that regard as I 
did not fully realise that entering the field through male sociality was in itself a way 
to study gender. My first reflex was to approach gender as if I should have 
something to say about women. This stance partly relates to the current climate in 
academia where gender studies are almost deserted by male scholars. As for 
sexuality in the field, it remained in the research’s black box.93 I think this work is 
clearly yearning for being something else than this alone but I must recognise that 
I was not yet completely able to articulate how masculine identities are performed 
through the lens of power, obligation, responsibility, ability and achievement. To 
make the best out of this limitation, acknowledging it opens a new field for future 
 
92 Except when talking about specific individuals. 
93 Cf. Clair (2016). 
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research, for which I will reorient my understanding and analysis in relation to 
positionality and reflexivity and transform my research devices. 
 On a different level, the country has a long history of intense ethnic and armed 
conflicts, the Rohingya situation94 being one of the most recent and dramatic 
examples, and so, a large body of texts has been devoted to studying ethnic 
politics,95 more or less in relation with state building,96 shifts in the military97 and 
the political economy of resources.98 The following does not draw from these 
debates, notably because the field site is free from major disputes (apart from the 
neighbouring case of Letpadaung copper mine). However, this study expands our 
understanding of the socialist period and the scope of politics to new fields, such as 
the practice of headship, family relationships, the making of ceremonies and the 
caretaking of village affairs, by underscoring the forms of engagement and 
evaluation at play in day-to-day life. 
 Following a village headman in his daily life allows to understand the weight 
of the past in current politics and to renew the anthropological debate about 
headship. By looking at it as a matter of uncertain engagement, political navigation 
and craftmanship, this thesis argues that it is not just an intercalary position 
hamstrung between the state and the villagers99 that gives room for manoeuvre.100 
My work rather shows how the particular enactment of past ruptures and memories 
of previous leaders and current forms of engagement impinged on Ko Kyaw’s 
practice of headship and translated into the moral dilemma of being trustworthy 
while taking a position that most people do not trust. Furthermore, the issue of 
transmitting inheritance is conspicuously missing from many discussions on 
wealth, debt, and gender in the current context of rapid re-commodification of land 
and so, this thesis attempts to address some of the gaps in recent scholarship by 
focusing on the role it plays in kinship, in the history of land tenure as well as in 
 
94 Cf. Boutry (2014), Holliday (2014), Leider (2016), McCarthy and Menager (2017), de Mersan 
(2016), Prasse-Freeman (2017). 
95 Cf. Gravers (2007) for an overview. 
96 Taylor (2009) is a central example. 
97 See Callahan (2003), Selth (2002) and Skidmore (2004) among others. 
98 For instance, cf. Kramer et al. (2013), McCarthy (2018), Transnational Institute (2013, 2014) and 
Woods (2011, 2015). 
99 The idea of intercalary position comes from Gluckman et al. (1949) and has been developed in 
Gluckman (1955, 1963). Nash (1963, 1965), Lubeigt (1975) and more recently Thawnhmung (2004) 
proposed a similar description of headmen’s position in Burma/Myanmar. 
100 Kuper (1970) criticised Gluckman’s idea and proposed to see headmen as individual with room 
for manoeuvre and empowered by colonial states with new powers. 
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'development' issues like debt, access to credit, and land registration.101 In addition, 
studying transmission allows us to better understand the temporality of family 
relationships and how the idea of stewardship pervades the conceptions about 
ownership and leadership, but it fails to account for the dynamics of transmission 
outside farming families for instance. Finally, by arguing that village affairs became 
the form of Gawgyi politics where bigmen build their authority, as during the 
selection of the headman, the making of ceremonies and the resolution of disputes, 
this work offers an insight on the nature of politics that might be missed if only the 
formal institutions of government are studied. An ethnographic approach combined 
with history uncovers the fact that local politics is a matter of excluding some 
individuals and entrusting others (the bigmen) to ‘take charge’ of local affairs102 
while being the elite sitting at the top of a local hierarchy that has transformed 
during the past century. This helps explaining why ‘participatory approaches’, 
flourishing since the beginning of the democratic transition, might miss the fact that 
the voices – of dependents, of women, of those NGOs want to empower – are 
channelled, delegated and often excluded through, to and by this type of leader. The 
last and perhaps the most difficult limitation to overcome is related to my 
positionality as a man engaged mostly with other men often coming from the main 
families of the village. I tried to reflect other views, multiply interviews, use these 
limitations as methodological devices, but failed to some extent in translating it into 
a productive research device and resorted to deal with these issues at the margins 
in different parts of the thesis. 
 Many questions remain, but one eclipses the others, that is, how to link 
dynamics of leadership from a particular place like Gawgyi with larger politics, as 
Nash did by showing how party politics were imbued with patron-client 
relationships? A next step would be exploring politics within Monywa region at 
large, but it already exceeds the scope of the present study. 
 
 
 
 
101 Cf. Andersen (2015), Faxon (2017), McCarthy (2018), Oberndorf (2012), Srinivas Shivakumar 
and U Saw Hlaing (2015), Su Phyo Win, (2017), and Willis (2014) among others. 
102 In Gawgyi, it was notably because they exemplify propriety through their engagement toward 
the collective, but in many other places, such as in Myinmilaung proper or many villages of the 
Ayeyarwady delta, such engagement did not occur at all. 
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OUTLINE 
 
 This thesis shows how village headship became an ambiguous position of 
power through an ethnographic and historical engagement with a village of central 
Myanmar. It departs on a journey through history leading to the ethnographic 
present. The intention is to trace the development of village headship over time 
before introducing the reader to the social and moral forms of leadership 
underpinning day-to-day life in Gawgyi village. By the end of the thesis, I hope to 
have shown that local politics is not seen simply as a series of institutions, but is 
rather understood as the latest episode in a long history of ideas, practices and 
personalities in which a particular sedimentation of the past is present. 
 The above has introduced the reader to the scene of fieldwork and the 
specificities of the research area. Two points emerged from debating the literature 
on village headship, power and authority. First, historical dynamics of headship 
reflect political changed to some degrees (in terms of personalities, patronage, and 
morality). Second, looking beyond village headship means focusing on a large array 
of relationships. To that end, I moved the focus from patronage to engagement, the 
latter understood as how people craft their relationships in day to day life.  
 The first chapter (On reflexivity and methods) outlines the details of my 
methodological stance in order to anchor the reader in the process that produces the 
thesis. It provides an account of my entry into the village, including a discussion 
about the transformation of my position from an INGO intern to a ‘son’ of the 
village. While engaging with positionality and the relations between ethnographic 
and historical methods, it describes how I came to focus on headship and leadership, 
on village affairs, and on how people engage with one another. 
 Chapter 2 (The 2016 selection) is an ethnographic opening on the threads 
running through the thesis. It describes two crucial days in the selection of the 
village headman of Myinmilaung tract in 2016 from Gawgyi perspective. It is a 
description of a specific situation that anchors the study of the local polity through 
history and ethnography by showing the intertwinement of competition, hierarchy, 
worth, obligations and engagement. The rest of the thesis is divided between 
historical chapters (3 to 5) and ethnographical ones (6 to 8) following a 
chronological order for clarity purpose. The history explores the fashioning of the 
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local political landscape and the ethnography extends the study to the current forms 
of leadership. 
  Chapter 3 (Traffic in affiliations, 1750s-1880s) first traces the precolonial 
history of the fieldwork area from the time of the creation of the villages in the mid-
eighteenth century to the verge of their integration under a village tract during the 
early colonial period in the late nineteenth century. It investigates the shifts in 
political affiliations that governed this part of the kingdom and the role of land 
tenure, money lending and Buddhism in the making of local authorities prior to the 
direct annexation by the British (1885). By narrowing the scope on the villages and 
exploring their narratives of foundation and local legends as sources and claims 
condensing historical references, this chapter shows how the divide between 
Gawgyi and Myinmilaung is framed in terms of competing narratives of indigeneity 
(autochthony versus genuine allochthony). This chapter relates to major works on 
Burma precolonial politics but contrast with their state-centric approaches and 
avoid reifying ‘the gentry’ as a monolithic group to challenge the understanding of 
the imposition of village headship as a change in the nature authority.  
 This chapter is followed by an interlude (The emergence of village headship, 
1880s-1890s) thought as an incursion within the making of a colonial policy. It 
describes the context of warfare during the ‘pacification campaign’ (1886-89) to 
then explores the ad hoc appointments of headmen in our area of study and focuses 
on the content of the ‘village system’ – a cheap bureaucratisation of the countryside 
based on villagers' joint responsibility under a headman acting as a police officer 
and revenue collector – as it centred local politics at the village level.  
 Chapter 4 (The last men of hpon, 1890s-1950s) examines the colonial 
encounter and the fashioning of Myinmilaung tract and headship from its inception 
until the socialist insurgency (1946-56), using the succession of headmen as 
reflecting changes in the political landscape. It explores the worth of two leaders 
by connecting oral memories with political and cultural history and illustrates how 
they became exemplary figures of the moralisation of behaviours and engagement 
in people’s affairs during a moral rupture when villagers reimagined their role as 
Buddhist and challenged colonial rule. This perspective allows us to rethink Nash’s 
concepts by showing the relations between past and present contexts with the 
evaluation of the worth of leaders and enables to see this period as a phase of 
reorganisation of political authority along new lines where large farming families 
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became the new local elites and where colonial devices enabled to challenge the 
social obligations that allowed access to wealth and land. 
 Chapter 5 (The rise of village affairs, 1960s-2010s) explores the 
transformations of the local polity from the early years of the socialist period (1962 
onward) to the democratic opening of the early 2010s to locate how village affairs 
became the form of Gawgyi politics. It describes how the socialisation of society 
reinforced the control on peasants and opened in an age of distrust while the main 
farming families kept monopolising village leadership. The failure and the 
authoritarianism of the successive regimes resulted in the worsening of living 
conditions that ultimately led to the 1988 uprising, a rupture which had its own 
temporality in Myinmilaung tract and a more moral dimension in relation to 
corruption, collusion, forced labour and violence. The rupture was embodied by the 
shift from an Infamous headman to a Worthy one at the turn of the twenty-first 
century and this chapter argues that the violent character of the state and its 
disengagement from the countryside since the late 1980s provided space for an ethic 
of independence to hold grounds, and for a group of men – the lugyi – to give 
consistence to village affairs as a fragile political order. 
 Chapter 6 (Crafting village headship) describes a day in the life of Ko Kyaw 
when he was headman. It follows him through different parts of that day and 
highlights how setting up a family was a matter of negotiating obligations and 
investing in kinship, how creating a small faction with an online game eased the 
handling of some affairs and helped in dodging potential obligations by shortcutting 
hospitality rules and how he is not just a mere embodiment of the state. Being a 
headman for him meant navigating multiple socio-political spaces, from a 
ceremony to a land sale and the farm field, being an official, an employer, a relative, 
a patron or a husband, in situations where obligations and memories affect how he 
engaged with others. Ko Kyaw's craft was to be at the junction between past and 
present dynamics and this perspective allows see headship beyond its classical 
understanding as an intercalary position constrained by bureaucratic and village 
demands and with room for manoeuvre, but as a process of crafting the dynamics 
that are put upon a person due to his position. 
 Chapter 7 (Transmitting land) then explores the transmission of inheritance 
to account for the temporality of family relationships and shows how the idea of 
stewardship (‘taking charge of’) pervades the conceptions about ownership and 
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leadership. It draws on the history of land relations described in the historical 
chapters to show through a case study how ownership is constantly redefining due 
to the overlapping of generations, claims and obligations. Transmission thus 
appears as a process where the tension between heredity and ability in the realm of 
filiation is intimately linked with the issue of rightful leadership in the Burmese 
context. 
 Chapter 8 (Guarding village affairs) investigates what makes the worth of the 
village bigmen. It draws on the understanding of leadership as craftmanship and 
stewardship and link the rise of village affairs as the form of Gawgyi politics to the 
question of the worth of the lugyi. The chapter describes three lugyi in specific 
situations (two ceremonies and one dispute) and argues that, by making village 
affairs a space of engagement where the worth of the people is evaluated, the lugyi 
legitimise a political order within the village. It argues that entrustment and 
exclusion are central processes of local politics in which the voices of villagers are 
channelled through, delegated to and often excluded by the lugyi.  Finally, the 
concluding chapter provides a summary of the findings and implications of the 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1. ON REFLEXIVITY AND METHODS 
 
 The heart of this thesis stems from the relationship I developed with Ko Kyaw 
from 2013 onward. The understanding of the local political landscape this work 
attempts to make is strongly entangled with this relationship. I arrived at a specific 
moment in Gawgyi and Myinmilaung tract history and entered networks of persons 
and knowledge to a large extent through this encounter. It does not mean that I was 
looking over his shoulder to collect data but rather that almost all the lines of 
enquiry I explore have their origins in a particular situation. The curiosity for the 
kind of authority displayed by the village bigmen in contrast with the headman, the 
reconceptualization of ownership on Burmese terms, the reconstruction of local 
history since precolonial times; all these fields of research find their roots in a 
peculiar configuration of interests, personalities and contexts. Ko Kyaw’s voice 
thus informs a lot of the data collected and I tried to organise my data following the 
main dilemmas he and others expressed while balancing their points of view with 
those of others. 
 Another person was key: Manning Nash, an anthropologist now deceased 
who wrote one the most extensive monographies about rural life in Myanmar. I took 
his book as a guide and as something to challenge. My first interests for land and 
governance were counterbalanced by a blunt wish for not to study ‘religion’ or 
spirituality as I thought – wrongly – that most of the anthropologists I knew103 were 
already working on it in some way or another. I came across all the categories once 
typified in ethnographic monographies (religion, political system, economy, and so 
forth) but found myself more intrigued by how ethical dilemmas and incertitude are 
key in understanding contemporary politics. I had a strong inclination to bring in a 
glimpse at politics from angles overlooked in Myanmar where political studies, 
notably in relations to the ‘military dictatorship’, the ‘democratic transition’ and the 
‘rule of law’, to ‘Buddhism’ and more recently to the ‘Rohingya crisis’, represent a 
large part of the work published.104 Thus, this work attempts to show how local 
 
103 Among others: Boutry, Brac de la Perrière, Kumada, Lehman, Nash, Schober, Spiro, Robinne 
and Rozenberg. 
104 Among the growing scholarship on Myanmar politics, I refer here to a few works: Cheesman 
(2015), Cheesman et al. (2013), Egreteau and Robinne (2016), Fink (2009), Gravers and Ytzen 
(2014), Jones (2014), Kyaw Yin Hlaing et al. (2005), Leider (2016), Lintner (1994), Pedersen et 
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politics can be explored in the day-to-day, in how people think of and frame their 
own affairs, in how male leadership is concerned with issues of worth and in how 
the family is also a political arena when seen in terms of dilemmas, responsibilities 
and obligations.  
 One of the main difficulties was to make history and ethnography talk to each 
other. It resulted in the fact that this thesis has two voices, one more historic, the 
other more ethnographic. Harmonising that divide impacted the use of sources and 
data and I had, for instance, to make choices about the use of Burmese language. I 
attempted to limit the divide once I became able to articulate how the understanding 
of local politics I gathered while living in the village could orient the historical 
analysis. The link between past and present is captured in the idea of the local 
political landscape, defined in introduction as a network of past and present 
personalities, hierarchies, stakes and memories fashioned through time and 
meaningful in current politics. This idea of the local political landscape is large, 
inclusive and flexible enough to study the relation between history and ethnography 
through 1) the changes in how time was experienced and how people embodied 
rupture and continuities; 2) the relations between myth and history and the influence 
of contemporary stakes in the enunciation of historical narratives; and 3) the 
sedimentation of layer upon layer of history in a ‘longue durée’ perspective. 
 This chapter addresses these challenges by describing how I accessed the 
field-site and became a person (first section), the plurality of research operations 
(second section), some of the limitation of my work and how I partly overcame 
them (third section), and finally by explaining how I connect anthropology and 
history (fourth section). 
 
ARRIVING AS AN INTERN, LIVING AS A GUEST, LEAVING AS A SON 
 
 I first arrived in Gawgyi on the 31st of October 2013. As a master student and 
an intern for the French INGO called GRET, my work consisted in researching land 
issues in Myanmar. I had to choose between Dry Zone or the Ayeyarwady Delta. 
 
al.(2000), Prasse-Freeman (2014, 2015), Selth et al. (2002), Simpson et al. (2018), Skidmore (2005), 
Skidmore and Wilson (2007, 2008), and Steinberg (1981, 2010, 2015). 
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The heat of the Dry Zone was more appealing than humidity. In the city of Monywa, 
the staff of the INGO helped me to get authorisations from the Township 
Immigration Department on a weekly basis in order to visit the villages105 where 
development projects were under way. As soon as I arrived in Monywa I started 
travelling to villages whenever it was agreed that a member of the farming 
development project’s team could take me on a trip. Most of the time, the people 
welcomed me as a guest and were ready for focus group discussions. It took me 
several weeks to undo the effects of this kind of interaction which ultimately ended 
when I chose to do an intensive research in a few villages rather than an extensive 
in many. That village was Gawgyi because its headman, Ko Kyaw, became a friend 
and, later, an older brother.  I first arrived there on a Thursday in the month of 
October 2013, at the rear of the motorbike of a field agent, driving side by side with 
the INGO officer in charge of Monywa Township. I now know this road by heart, 
having looked at all the details I could grasp alongside the way, the storefronts, the 
renowned teashops, the betel stalls, the concrete and wooden houses, the recently 
refurbished monasteries, the slow progress of the city eating the countryside. And 
then come gradually the changing farm fields. 
 We did not have to scramble on the tiny path of Gawgyi to meet him. He was, 
with few other men, at the new water station located right in the middle of the 
village, on the main south-north way, past the betel shop. I first performed a typical 
self-presentation and, pretending to be serious, checked the water pumping system 
and the tank providing water to all the houses at once, asking about the depth of 
wells, underground water levels, pumping capacities…as if I knew technical issues. 
As an INGO member and apprentice ethnographer, I often thought I ought to 
investigate tiny details that we might call ‘technical’. It gives vocabulary and show 
interest in what people do, may it be in the oil of an engine or the mud of a farm 
field. For instance, understanding the basic engineering of the water system helped 
me to get an idea on how villagers mitigated water scarcity during recent history. 
More, it provided clues on how village affairs are dealt with. In short, to construct 
this water system they had to be on the target list of several NGOs, collect money 
from villagers (fees and donations), organise a lottery, activate networks of external 
 
105 These villages were Hnawpin North, Hnawpin South, Inte, Ayadaw, Kyawka, Thazi, Ywadon, 
Budaungkan, Kyawsipon, Booba, Minzu, Zeehpyubin, Salingyi, Nyuangpinthar, Kothan, Hledar 
and Aungchanthar either located within Monywa, Yinmabin and Budalin townships. 
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donors, and set up a committee administrating water delivery and money collection. 
‘They’ were the local big men, or lugyi, who assembled efforts, knowledge, money 
and donations. In other words, investigating the water system ultimately enabled to 
question power relationships, what responsibility is made of, how it is perceived, 
and how collective affairs are performed. Yet, nothing was such when I first looked 
at the pump with a green eye while they started the engine to show me how it works. 
 For about half an hour we watched and talked about the pumping system. 
Eventually, we were invited for tea, coffee and snacks – basic elements of 
hospitality – in two houses before reaching the headman’s place. To reach it, we 
first turned eastward at the crossroad that marks the middle of Gawgyi. This road 
leads to the eastern entry of the village, the mingala pauk or auspicious gate. By 
entering Gawgyi on the recent main road in the south, we in fact arrived through 
the amingala entrance via which deceased bodies exit the village boundaries for 
burial after three days of mourning. When I heard of it, I thought it was a mistake 
to enter the village through this gate, but it was not a problem for flows of auspices 
are relevant in certain situations, as when people died, but it did not concern daily 
journeys. Finally, we engage in one of those tiny tracks going up and down the east 
road to reach the place where the headman is used to welcome visitors. I later found 
out that it was not his own place, but rather his grandmother’s, Daw Than, and that 
Ko Kyaw at times accommodated guests there to keep face as his house was messier 
and of a lower standing. Daw Than is an old widow respected as a lugyi by her 
extended family who lives, for the most part, within the same compound.106 
The living area is delimited by fences made of trees, spiky bushes, cactus, 
wooden barriers and an old gate, blasts of the times when villages were surrounded 
by fences against ‘bandits’ – in British archives, they call them ‘dacoits’ – and cattle 
thieves. Standing at the gate, one can see the houses grouped in two ensembles, one 
on each side of the path continuing the track southward. This compound is actually 
inhabited by the descendants of a couple whose two sons settled on each side of the 
compound. And, within the last three generations, most of the sons settled here with 
their wives, building new houses or taking over their parents’ place. The 
sedimentation of history is part of the landscape.  
 
106 In their study on kinship and demography, Nash and Nash (1963) already insisted on the idea 
that gathering relatives was a sign of bigness. 
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Our arrival triggered a redeployment of bodies around the table at Daw 
Than’s house. All the women, except Daw Than, stood at once to give their place 
on the benches. While fetching new plates filled with snacks, they bowed their 
heads when passing in front of me. Even grown men, uncles of Ko Kyaw, insisted 
that we take their seats. The formality of seat attribution varies greatly from one 
context to another. Sometimes people emphasise the honour to welcome a guest, 
some other times the matter is trivial. The familiarity with hosts, the context of a 
meeting, the organising of space according to auspices are basic elements for 
understanding hospitality. The field agent was familiar with Gawgyi. He helped 
placing us around the table. I was a visitor of an unusual kind: a white, foreign, 
English-like male who also happens to be an INGO representative and a researcher. 
Finally, we sat in front of Daw Than and her visiting son, the Township officer next 
to me, accompanied by Ko Kyaw and some of his uncles, while Daw Than’s 
daughter sat on a chair and the field agent on another. 
The movement of bodies around tables when newcomers arrive shows, in 
my case, that people made sense of my presence as an honourable guest. The very 
reason of my presence was not very important at first. In the Buddhist cosmology, 
welcoming people is ultimately a meritorious act. Feeding them is even better. It 
connects to an ideology of donation. However, treating people as guests sets a scene 
that enables one to decide how to deal with the person, as host or guest. Who is 
coming? Where do they sit? How fast do they sit on this or that side of the table? 
How modest is this person? Is he feigning modesty? What kind of language does 
he use? What does he actually do, want? And the same goes backward. Who are 
those people? Where shall I seat? Shall I be quick, and show that I master the codes, 
or wait a bit longer, and display forbearance? Am I feigning modesty? Why no one 
is moving for me? These are retrospective questions. During that very moment, I 
just followed what people told me to do and tried to perform as well as possible the 
gestures and words deemed respectful before asking any questions.  
As we were starting to map out the family tree of the people living in the 
compound on a large sheet of paper, my interlocutors asked me to occupy the place 
left vacant by Daw Than who went for a rest. “The light is better here,” they argued. 
I sensed a growing degree of familiarity between us and an effort to satiate my 
curiosity. We moved from genealogy and village history toward inheritance 
(amway). Here is a glimpse at the notes I took during this encounter: 
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Inheritance: 
They say “equal share of land allocation by parents to sons and 
daughters after dying” = oral agreement for this transfer (“in the past”) 
and now contract with the authority person (AP) on paper. AP can be 
the eldest brother, an uncle, the widow of the former AP, i.e. no rule in 
the sense of kinship but this person must be a part of the family (i.e. 
family compound? Family staying in the village?) otherwise it’s not 
possible. 
Why an uncle?  He can be influent in the family, it’s him if he is “fair 
and square”, trustworthy. 
When does the AP is chosen? It is not clear. It seems that it is the person 
with the most authority who will influence the other member of the 
family. Then what are the boundaries of a family? Criteria: to be a 
relative and to have authority, i.e. a knowledge and influence proved 
through time, combining a knowledge of family matters as well as an 
ability to make decision to orient the group. Not chosen by vote, they 
say it is “natural”. It is generally a man but can also be a woman too, 
depending on personality and intra-family history. Father/uncle/elder 
brother: it can be contentious, but they also always say there is no 
problem with them. 
AP fields of competence? 
- can choose land allocation 
- can choose who will take care of the parents 
- …??? 
 
 From the distance, I can see now my main mistakes, reminiscences of 
anthropological readings (why do uncles have to represent a sort of authority? Why 
kinship should only be a set of rules?) and an oversized interest in land issues. “AP” 
or authority person was the translation the field agent kindly gave me for 
eindaunguzi, which is commonly coined as head of a household. The fact that there 
is a name for such a position led me to think about power as if already 
institutionalised. And yet, there was no selection process formalised in a set of rules. 
This category might also be the product of decades of administration by a 
government trying to make reality legible in order to regulate it. Or just a tradition. 
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The interest of the extract lies where the questions remain unanswered and where 
nuances come to the forefront. When is an AP chosen? This question received no 
answer because there shall be no election. It is both a conjectural – for instance 
when the head of a household died suddenly – and a long-term decision – people 
prove themselves through time – shaped by malleable social norms and a 
cosmology favouring mostly men. I first translated that seemingly fluid way of 
building authority as something ‘natural’, i.e. normal for them. I now think that 
what is relevant are the processes: in how people reach a consensus for instance; in 
how local ethics are maintained in collective undertakings, in how trust is said to 
have changed (paper better endorsed decisions now while words were bonding ‘in 
the past’), in how people blow hot and cold when talking about the past. 
 From that first encounter onward, I became close with Ko Kyaw. Until the 
end of the fieldwork for the master thesis in March 2014, I came every other week 
with an interpreter, dividing my time with another village.107 
  When I came back to Gawgyi in October 2015, Ko Kyaw agreed to have me 
living with his family. Once the authorisation from the Immigration Department 
had been secured, I joined them. Ko Kyaw was now married with Ma Khin and 
they were living, with their daughter, in the west part of the village in the house of 
Ma Khin’s mother, Daw Nu. The first weeks of this second stay were full of 
mistakes, laughs and rice. I slowly learned what I could do, should do and cannot 
do. In particular, I realised that I was a guest again. Loosening this status became a 
sort of goal once Ko Kyaw, his wife, daughter and myself moved to settle at his 
parents’ place two months later. Being a guest means being at a specific distance 
from others, and this could be quite formalised. In some ways, you can and cannot 
participate at the same time. Take an evening meal at Ko Kyaw parent’s place for 
instance. After following Ko Kyaw in his village pilgrimages, we arrive at home 
around 6pm. ‘Usually’, people have their meals in turns in the kitchen. At first, I 
hardly got to enter this kitchen and only ate at that table after a couple of weeks. 
We arrived at sunset and sat in the living room on the benches circling the table. 
“Shall we serve the meal?” asks Ma Khin. Ko Kyaw nodded with a “sweet smile”, 
a smile that became his nickname in his childhood. At once, the table is washed, a 
 
107 I choose not to describe this village (Hnawpin) further as I did most of the PhD fieldwork in 
Gawgyi only. 
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large tray filled with dishes of vegetables, eggs, peas, chili, tree leaves and bitter 
soup arrives, and several plates are placed around the table with the rice's pot 
standing in the middle. Daw Hlaing, Ko Kyaw’s mother who already had dinner, 
watches out for any missing items. They ask me to change bench and sit on the 
‘better’ one. Rice is served in turns and guess who has to be served first. I 
awkwardly try to delay my turn. Ko Kyaw serves eggs directly in my plate and 
apologises because the “dish is not good” tonight, meaning that there is no meat, 
no force-giver ingredients such as fish, chicken or pork. Tonight, like every night, 
I am supposed to get the best dish first, a situation I try to alter with little success 
so far. “Eat slowly”. “Eat to fill your belly”. Feeding me is their responsibility. Yet, 
I would like to do something, at least clearing the table. They finish their plates 
quite quickly, remove them and engage small talks while I painstakingly finish the 
rice in mine. As soon as my plate is empty, Ko Kyaw takes it from me and give it 
to Ma Khin. I stand up and start clearing the table but am asked to remain seated, 
one more time. It took me several weeks before I could help clearing the table and 
even more to wash my plate and yet, I always had to argue to be allowed to do so. 
 My dinner dramas exemplify what being a guest is like.108 It is a dilemma for 
who wants to ‘participate’, as ethnographers surely do. When, dinner after dinner, 
someone takes your plate off your hand, what do you do? How do you make sense 
of it and, more personally, how do you reciprocate? If you harden up your stance, 
show perseverance for cleaning the plate, will this be assumed to be a ‘caring’ 
gesture, showing your desire to be treated as a normal person, or an attack, a move 
that transfers your ethical dilemma onto your host? Because, if I was not at ease in 
being a guest, they were not either when I tried to be something else. It was only 
with time and through a variety of situations and events where my status has 
become blurred that the fine lines between being a guest and being something else 
faded. And sometimes, when I felt close, I became a guest again. 
 I realised later on that the persons I was very close with treated me as a guest 
to avoid situations where I would become obliged. The kind of distance provided 
by this status was a sort of social shield. While accompanying me in the village, 
they taught me how to decipher the potential liabilities stemming from accepting or 
 
108 For another aspect of the guest dilemma, cf. the essays on the forms of engagement in Appendix 
B. 
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refusing presents, food or services. It mostly depended on the relations between the 
persons, their personality, the stakes at hand and the ramifications of their 
relationships alongside past generations, kinship, service giving, griefs, 
accountability, debt and so on. This understanding led me to look at transfers (of 
things, words and services) as the way relations and hierarchies are produced but 
also, and mostly, negotiated. Even the most ritualised transactions which punctuate 
cycles of exchanges then appeared as part of a complex web of more day-to-day 
transfers between people. Being a guest minimised the potentiality of being obliged 
by putting most of the things that circulated toward me under the umbrella of 
hospitality to a certain extent. And thus, I started to conceptualise transfers as 
engagements (a pledge, a commitment and a fight) producing specific temporalities 
between people. In other words, the evaluation of what circulates, and the history 
of these exchanges became a field of research stemming from whom I became. 
 As I evolved into a member of one family, I was able to participate in other 
domains. To participate and give ‘something’, I became the football trainer of the 
village team composed of about fifteen boys from 14 to 27. In the meantime, I 
became a member of the bachelors’ group. It multiplied our encounters and showed 
me how they engage with elders, parents, monks, girls and peers. With them, I 
slowly realised that I embodied the role of a ‘teacher’ (hsaya), who provides 
knowledge and know-how. This was a direct entry into the realm of hierarchy 
coupled with friendship and fruitful misunderstandings, such as when, for training 
purpose, I bought too many balls and by doing so embarrassed the captain of the 
team who called me for dinner straight away (Appendix B).  
 Village ceremonies were another field of village life that opened up. It was 
easier to wash dishes and serve plates during weddings and donations than when 
invited as someone’s place. And this involvement in collective tasks further 
transformed me as a son of Gawgyi. In ceremonies, I was not a guest, but part of 
the collective organising the hosting. A member of the bachelor group, I had a place 
and tasks were assigned to me. Engaging myself toward the collective made sense. 
This is how I realised the difficulties of putting a collective at work, but also how 
dense relations between families unfold in help or defiance and how ‘common 
properties’ and leaders of bachelor/spinster groups were crucial to hold ceremonies. 
Washing dishes in a way marks an engagement toward those who organise the 
event, but it also shows a commitment toward the village. And this is where village 
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ethics come to the forefront, as well as during pre-wedding meetings, for organising 
water delivery, maintaining roads and so on. That level of engagement was not 
straightforward, and a few persons – Gawgyi bigmen – took care of upholding 
village ethics, making village affairs as space where the worth of people is 
evaluated. I met them first at the water station two years ago. I met them during 
INGO meetings. I followed them during the collection of water fees or during the 
selection of the headman. And it slowly became clear to me that engaging in 
collective affairs was fragile. Even if it was a reason behind the claim that Gawgyi 
was a ‘good’ village, these undertakings stemmed from the recent history while 
drawing upon older forms of sociality.  
 My progressive entry into a variety of groups and networks – Ko Kyaw’s 
family, the football team, the bachelors’ group, the bigmen – allowed me to more 
easily appropriate the landscape and found a place that was meaningful for the 
villagers and for me. Yet, it constrained my ability to research more dominated 
groups for instance. It is also clear that my encounters were foremostly constrained 
by gender politics. I was constantly with boys or men and had more intimate 
relations only with my friends’ wives and older women who may have been a 
mother or a grandmother. With others, my status as a bachelor overwhelmed my 
stance as a researcher. I was a potential husband. Ceremonies (Buddhist noviciates, 
weddings, pagoda festivals) were the acknowledged moments for more romantic 
encounters in the village, the ‘outlaw’ meetings happening outside, in the field, 
behind bushes when young people come back from school or work. The more I 
became a sort of local, the harder it became to shortcut the norms of encounters and 
the less I could talk to women without being teased. Even when working in the 
fields, it was hard to get beyond jokes to be able to acquire knowledge of how the 
daily workers (almost always women from twenty to forty years old) conceptualise 
their life and local politics. This is one of the main limitations of my work which 
focuses on and discusses mostly men and farmers and failed to tackle issues of 
sexuality for instance.109 One mistake was to confine the issue of gender politics as 
something about ‘women’s affairs’ and to partially remain blind to the fact that I 
could make a contribution to the study of masculinities for instance. 
 
109 Cf. Clair (2016). 
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 Finally, there was also a more spiritual reason for me being there. Even if I 
was neither Buddhist, Christian, nor anything, me being in this village, coming back 
and showing commitment, were but credentials of a meaningful and pre-existing 
relationship. As Ko Kyaw once told me, if we get along so well, we must have lived 
together in our previous lives. I did find this perspective appealing and it showed 
me that for my interlocutors, friends and family, it did not matter if I was Buddhist 
or not. Ultimately, I will become one, in this life or any other. Thus, my stance as a 
researcher was overshadowed by the simple fact that I was just a person living with 
them, with my habits, tastes, flaws and sense of humour. This had implications in 
my ability of ‘doing research’ because the more I knew the people, the harder it 
became to ask questions I knew were difficult to answer. So, I had to abandon 
certain projects, such as the genealogy of the whole village coupled with a mapping 
of the transmission of inheritance, because it became too sensitive and was 
reopening old disputes. 
 
A PLURALITY OF RESEARCH OPERATIONS 
 
“If texts are to be more than literary topoi, scattered shards from which 
we presume worlds, they have to be anchored in the processes of their 
production, in the orbits of connection and influence that give them life 
and force.” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 34) 
 
 The process of production of this thesis was a plurality of research operations 
and of moments combining in its core an ethnographic and a historical perspective. 
Fieldwork was not just a matter of ‘participant observation’ but rather a series of 
processes carried out to understand the socio-political dynamics and the variety of 
‘regimes of historicity’110 at play in a place at a specific moment. 
 In my case, the pre-fieldwork period for this thesis was obviously influenced 
by an earlier work of six months in the same area for a master’s degree. Thus, the 
 
110 The concept of regimes of historicity is a heuristic tool, conceived by the historian François 
Hartog (2015), and designating the modes of articulation of the past, present and future.  It raises 
the question of how societies, or individuals, think about their relationship to time, particularly about 
moments of crises. 
107 
‘pre-fieldwork’ already included several research operations. During this first work, 
I was accompanied by an interpreter, May Myo Oo, and collected a large body of 
data through semi-structured interviews, life histories, mappings of villages and the 
collection and translation of documents mostly concerned with land tenure.111 The 
methodology for enquiring headship during the first fieldwork consisted mostly in 
gathering information systematically about land agreements, disputes and previous 
and current headmen: what they did on a daily basis, what kinds of affairs did they 
deal with, when and how they were selected, for how long, and so on. Ko Kyaw 
was clearly helpful for that matter. His help was the main reason for focusing on 
Gawgyi. From this experience stems my will to avoid ‘focus group discussion’ and 
to live with villagers. I wrote the thesis in Marseille, submitted it,112 got funding for 
a PhD at UEA in Norwich and started reading more extensively about the history 
of the country and learning its language.113 
 When returning in Myanmar for the ‘real’ fieldwork, I stayed a month in 
Yangon to get intensive lessons in Burmese and went alone to Gawgyi right after. 
Living in Gawgyi was to some extent becoming a child again due to a lack of 
proficiency at first. Semi-structured interviews were not really feasible during the 
first couple of months. I depended on the persons close to me, who knew what I 
meant with my questions, to gather information. So, I focused a lot on gestures, on 
what circulated between people and how they moved in and out of the village. The 
method was to be curious about almost anything on a day-to-day basis, questioning 
the functioning of petty activities (shops, weaving, brick making…) and learning 
the agricultural and ceremonial cycles while following and helping my hosts in the 
farm fields for instance. In addition, I filmed many ceremonies and did video editing 
for the donors when they wanted it, or for the monastery after the pagoda festival 
in Gawgyi. This activity taught me what was deemed ‘acceptable’ to film, what 
people wanted to display (the donation), and what was deemed uninteresting, such 
as the cooking of food in the back kitchen or simply the daily life. 
 When I felt confident enough about making in-depth interviews, I resorted to 
extensive note-taking and recorded a few life histories. It was clear with Ko Kyaw 
that we will not record our discussions, more for a reason of practicability – I was 
 
111 Sales contracts, procurement booklets, adoption agreements, tax receipts, and so on. 
112 Huard (2014). 
113 Okell (1971), Okell et al. (1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1994d). 
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with him a large part of my time – than for an ethical issue. Overall, the more 
‘formal’ interviews most often concerned village histories and occurred generally 
at people’s home, where hesitations, inflexions in voices, offerings of food, silences 
and jokes mattered sometimes more than the actual content of speeches. Gradually, 
I followed a former friend working for the INGO – who was as good in English 
than me in Burmese – in other villages and towns such as Thazi, Kyawka, Innte, 
Budalin and Yinmabin and thus was able to compare their history, see the 
differences and test my hypotheses about village affairs. We also managed to access 
cadastral maps (Appendix A) thanks to the courtesy of the former head of the 
Township State Land Record Department.114 And when I came back in February 
2019 for a last fieldwork dedicated to gather more historical information thanks to 
a fieldwork grant funded by the French School of Asian Studies, I tried to frame my 
questions in an open-ended way and let my interlocutors visions of history unfold. 
My attempts to collect data in the national archives were quite unsuccessful due 
mostly to geographic and time constrains and to the state of the collections even if 
the archivists were really helpful in many matters. Therefore, I rely on the material 
I gathered along the years at the History and Geographical Department of the 
University of Monywa and Mandalay, making copies of the master’s and PhD’s 
thesis115 whenever they contained interesting information. Thus, this work rest 
almost exclusively on sources written or translated into English and so there is still 
a need to apply more rigour to the historical data if the weight of the revisionist 
argument in relation to colonial rupture is to stand the test of scrutiny by historians 
of the period and of the region. Discussions with local historians (from the 
universities and beyond) were fruitful as I learned how history was produced116 
while they introduced me to ‘knowledgeable’ persons about Monywa history. I also 
navigated a variety of places during daily trips for football matches, the delivery of 
harvest in town, and visits to Ko Kyaw’s friends and relatives for ceremonies. 
 The bulk of the ‘ethnographic’ chapters of the thesis rests on day-to-day 
discussions and observations which were the basis for questioning the history of the 
place. I chose to use and describe specific situations which show the blur between 
 
114 Now called the Department of Agricultural Land Management and Statistics (DALMS). 
115 Notably Aung Aung Hla (2013) and Than Hlaing (2013) unpublished dissertations. 
116 Most of the historical work I was able to consult concerns the late precolonial period (Konbaung 
dynasty) and, as a state rule stemming from the military regime, historians were forbidden to explore 
the last fifty years, that is, most of the socialist period and subsequent militarisation of the country. 
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the private and the political, such as during a day of the headman, when transmitting 
inheritance or during the making of ceremonies. I was progressively able to deepen 
my understanding of specific subjects (the transaction of goods, help, services, and 
money between people, this or that person’s reputation, the tenure of previous 
headmen, the agricultural policies of the state, the relations with officials, the 
animosity between Gawgyi and Myinmilaung) while evening discussions with Ko 
Kyaw and his family and the usual ‘night meeting’ of village bigmen were 
occasions to enter fully the stories running between people, generations and 
villages.  
 The process of compiling notes from interviews, discussions and description 
together with papers, maps, testimonies and the exploration of networks were 
completely interwoven with a progressive understanding of what was becoming the 
subject of this thesis. It was a constant work in progress scattered by periods of 
clarification, reorganisation of notes and definition of new lines of enquiry when I 
was not ‘lost in translation’. In short, it was an endless comings and goings akin to 
what Passeron (1991) has described as the process of creating knowledge in social 
sciences and humanities. 
 In the same way that the fieldwork had not started in Myanmar, he continued 
afterwards. In late 2016 I came to Paris and integrated the Southeast Asia Centre 
and started working on my ‘ethnographic’ data. At that time, I found Ingold’s 
argument appealing (2014). Challenging the classical division between 
ethnography and anthropology, his point was that ethnography was the moment 
anthropologists write about people and thus, it occurs when they have left the site 
of research. But quickly I realised that I was already writing about the people when 
in Myanmar, it was just a continuation at distance with more books and colleagues. 
The thing was that now the data were texts shaped by my ideas, experiences, and 
personality. I had the chance to enrol into Burmese lessons as well at INALCO and 
test out if my knowledge of local, or peasant, sociality and language was attuned 
with more formalised teachings. The ‘ethnographic’ chapters of this thesis – on 
headman selection, on crafting headship, on transmitting land and on the worth of 
the lugyi – were framed during this period, in an academic atmosphere, and the 
voice deployed in them echoes this context of production as well as my will to 
develop my skills as a writer. It was a moment of textual analysis and comparison 
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with others’ work117 allowing to find a way of producing my own approach and 
style. Quite traditionally, I wrote them as extended case studies, drawing from 
Gluckman and the members of the Manchester School118 development of this 
method during the 1950s in an attempt to elucidate and explain processes of social 
change that could not be captured through the functionalist methodologies. It 
allowed me to put the focus on events and situations while connecting them up to 
wider social life and acknowledging its processual nature. The problem was to link 
case studies and situational analyses with the history of transformation of the local 
political space and the variety of perceptions about it. I chose to use specific parts 
of life stories and situations as examples of the uncertainties, continuities and 
ruptures at play in a place. I almost unconsciously left the problem of connecting 
history and anthropology for later. It was clear for me that there were long-term 
continuities and changes in how leadership was performed and perceived for 
instance, but I was not yet able to articulate clearly my ideas. So, I engaged in 
archival research at the British Library in November 2017 and focus on the colonial 
encounter. This was a fieldwork experience per se, as it took time to get accustomed 
to the inner workings of the Library and even more time to finally find information 
relevant for a study at the village scale. I then started a dive into historical works to 
immerse myself successively in the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial periods, 
writing the chapters successively. To do that I reviewed books and articles, took 
notes, compared with my own data and chronologies, and adjusted my argument 
incrementally while seeking to avoid my own voice being subsumed within the 
scope of other scholarships or the “interpretative communities” (Aung-Thwin 2008: 
188) that emerged since the colonial encounter and how the ‘political’ (Taylor 2008) 
has been studied in the past.119 Most of the discussion of the literature is included 
 
117 Notably Boutry, Brac de la Perrière, Chambers, Houtman, Lehman, McCarthy, de Mersan, Nash, 
Prass-Freeman, Robinne, Rozenberg, Sadan, Schober, Spiro, and Walton among others. 
118 Notably Mitchell (1956, 1983), 
119 Maitrii Aung-Thwin (2008) has described how scholarship about Burma/Myanmar has been 
shaped through different ‘interpretative communities’. The strong interest in the political future of 
the country has fostered an important, but sometimes restrictive framework that has not only 
contributed to how we write about Myanmar / Burma, but how we read and interpret the wide range 
of scholarship that is being produced about it, notably concerning issues of military violence, past 
rebellions and democracy. In the same volume, Taylor has argued that the ‘political’ was approached 
in two ways, either externally, in comparison with other countries and situations sharing 
commonalities with Myanmar and often related to the difficulties to access the country, and 
internally, giving the priority to endogenous political logics. In this thesis, each chapter explores the 
work it relates to and debate the relevant literature in an attempt to delineate a personal voice for the 
study of politics and history in a specific area of the country. 
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in the chapters, in the introductions or within the sections. The final step was the 
articulation of anthropology and history, a process that I explore below.  
 But first I would like to explain how my language journey, the collection of 
data as well as my narrative and personal choices intersect in this thesis. This work 
is an exploration in developing a distinctive style which can distance the reader 
from the data. The sense of distancing is the product of choices emerging at different 
stages of the research. A critical question was how to harmonise the data while 
considering its diversity, my personal choices, the practicalities of fieldwork and 
the issue of audience?  
 One of the main questions is that of language and concerns notably the 
comings and goings between Burmese, English and French (my mother tongue) in 
data collection, transcription, analysis and in the writing. I gradually reached a 
certain level of fluency in Burmese and was able to transcribe interviews related to 
local history for instance. But the bulk of my ethnographic data rests on day-to-day 
note taking. Because I lived in a village, with ‘my’ interlocutors, I chose not to 
record their speech too much. I did not want to ‘extract’ information; that was a 
personal feeling and a decision that can be called into question if one makes other 
methodological choices, which are, incidentally, quite legitimate.120 People in 
Gawgyi were already accepting me. I could be accused of not properly rendering 
their voice. In the same vein, I was encapsulated within one group – a relatively big 
family – and was less able to capture the points of view and practices of the most 
dominated. But this positionality allowed me to get an understanding, among many 
potential others, of local politics. As explained above, I chose to frame my 
ethnographic data into case studies and used Burmese language – transcribed into 
English – sporadically, bearing in mind that the audience attention can be lost easily. 
And because places and their names (villages, pagodas, and so on) are part of the 
landscape, I could only anonymised people’s name to mitigate the risk of exposure. 
My aim was not to use private lives to make a point, but to anchor any 
understanding of their dilemmas in their own terms rather than putting on a 
voiceover. The scarce use of audio recordings is a main limit in this regard. But I 
think that using specific examples drawn from Ko Kyaw and other persons’ lives, 
 
120 For critical reflexions around ethnography as a subjective and scientific methodology, cf. Weber 
(2001), Naepels (1998a, 2006, 2011). On the ethnographer as author, cf. Clifford and Marcus (1986) 
and Rabinow (1977) among many others. 
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with their consents, was a way of producing an understanding of local politics that 
could not have been achieved otherwise. In addition, selecting case studies also led 
to make decisions concerning the level of details and information about time, place 
and people as well as about balancing the use of past and present tenses121 in order 
to develop a descriptive language that would fit my exigencies while trying to avoid 
subsuming people’s voice under the umbrella of ‘the villagers’. I have only partly 
achieved my goal in that matter and used the category ‘the villagers’ when my 
interlocutors did; i.e. when they did not refer to a person in particular, notably when 
talking about local history. This is also a legitimate ground for criticism and can 
again unfold in a sense of purposely distancing the reader. 
 Concerning the more historical enquiry, I rely extensively on oral sources 
translated into English and written accounts mostly produced by English speakers 
if not translated into English.122 The difficulty was to get an understanding about 
one specific locality throughout a variety of data and eventually to combine it with 
my ethnographic fieldwork. Again, harmonising those sets of information requires 
to make choices. Grand sweeps of history demand rigorous attention to historical 
source material that goes beyond the mere identification of narrative. Therefore, 
relying mostly on data written (either first-hand or translated) in English remains 
problematic. Similarly, rendering micro-studies of ethnographic detail into a 
framework where they either speak more broadly to the understanding of places 
and peoples beyond the local microcosm and to the disciplinary literature that 
extends beyond that of a region requires creativity, intellectual rigour and tenacity. 
I tried to achieve both objectives in this work but remained at risk depending on the 
audience. For example, I chose to prioritise English at the expense of Burmese 
while highlighting how key ideas (e.g. headship, stewardship, guardianship) make 
sense if understood on local – Burmese – terms. This decision came in pair with my 
will to develop a novel-like writing style, accepting my stance as an ethnographer 
and as an author who tries to unveil a located and fragmentary understanding of one 
locale and its politics. 
 Acknowledging these choices is a first step toward objectifying the conditions 
of this research. Reflecting more about the fieldwork and its aftermaths – how it 
 
121 On the politics of time and the variegated uses of present and past tenses in anthropological 
writings, see for instance Fabian (1983) and Tsing (1993). 
122 Cf. Bibliography. 
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impacted me as a person, how I had to become somebody in Gawgyi and in 
academia, how I became a writer, someone supposedly expert of the Burman 
society whose fluency in Burmese is challenged differently depending on the 
audience, how my positionality as a white male, youngish scholar, like Manning 
Nash some sixty years ago, influenced my work – would provide future avenues of 
enquiry and require methodological reorientations. Thus, this thesis is to be read as 
something to think with and to challenge in order to get a better understanding of 
local politics in contemporary Myanmar. The next section presents how I overcome 
one limitation of my initial project by accepting the particularity of my experience 
as an ethnographer. 
 
#ERROR 404. GOVERNANCE NOT FOUND 
 
 I came to Gawgyi to study land governance, that is, the configuration of 
actors, arenas, norms and practices in relation to land and “how interests are pursued 
and countered, authority exercised and challenged, and power institutionalised and 
undermined” (Le Meur and Blundo 2001: 2). The village tract headman was 
obviously a key actor of local land governance because of how he was empowered 
to organise land titling (Farmland law 2012) and to resolve the disputes stemming 
from it: 
 
“This power can be explained by the central role of the village headman 
in organizing land management: by liaising with different departments, 
and by transforming informal practices […] into formal ones (such as 
changing the name in SLRD’s registers)123 through different 
arrangements. […]. Finally, the headman is the chairperson of all 
village tract committees […]. Among those committees, the Village 
Tract Farmland Management Body (VLMB) created after releasing the 
new Farmland Law 2012, is in charge of regulating land use, land 
transfers, registration, land use rights and related conflicts, and 
 
123 SLRD stands for State Land Record Department. 
114 
Scrutinizing requests for changing from prescribed crops to another, 
among other responsibilities […].” (Boutry et al. 2017: 249-250). 
 
 In other words, the headman was at the centre of local land governance. One 
problem was that, in Gawgyi, people did not talk about governance. The same 
problem occurs when translating English words used to describe political dynamics 
occurring within the country (democracy, federalism and so on). Besides, many 
Burmese concepts that are key to depict social relations, such as a-na-de124 or 
luhmuyay,125 remained marginally used. So, going back to land governance, the 
question became what the scope of local politics and land relations is, and how do 
people talk about and conceive it. 
 Starting from an ethnography of land relations, the methodology was to look 
at how land is entangled with other relationships. To that end I studied the 
transmission of inheritance within farming families. That was a biased approach as 
I lived with one of the main ones and thus, my account does not integrate the cases 
of other types of families. Nonetheless, it allowed me to see how land was 
articulated with family obligations and to question ownership in Burmese terms. 
For instance, as we were walking by his betel garden, Ko Kyaw told me that 
“nobody owns” this land (behdhuhma mapaingbu). How to make sense of it in a 
context of formalisation of land rights? Saying that nobody owns the land did not 
mean that no one can claim ownership, or that no one had secured land rights on 
paper. It rather means that it is uncertain who will own this or that piece of land. It 
indicates that at one level, ownership is not a right, but a process requiring one to 
become the steward of a family, and thus of a patrimony. It emphasised the 
temporality of family relationships, of inheritance, and of how obligations and 
responsibilities entitle to property. 
 Following Ko Kyaw in his daily routine led me to the conclusion that the 
language of governance does not adequately reflect how he embodied the position 
of headman. If he was so central in land governance, then why was he unable to 
solve an important land conflict involving previous headmen? Why did he had to 
manoeuvre with youngster from his village to perform petty tasks and avoid being 
 
124 Cf. the text titled “Football misunderstanding” in Appendix A. 
125 Often translated as “the social”, the scope of this concept is however rarely studied, except by 
Gerard McCarthy (2018). 
115 
obliged through hospitality? Why did he comply with Gawgyi bigmen? It became 
clear that he did not represent the government as an entity. As stated in the 
introduction and explored in chapter 6, he rather gave ‘arms and legs’ to an 
institution that has a peculiar role in a network of personalities. Being a village 
headman was a matter of craftmanship or bricolage. Thus, my aim was to describe 
the flow of life of a village headman, the weight of the past, and show the 
ambiguous ways a person in this position is crafting his authority. On the one hand, 
authority appears to be about recognition and achievements. It is a quality 
embedded in the person, his life, his actions and is linked to the display of propriety 
and trustworthiness as a gauging standard resulting from local history. On the other 
hand, what powerful people say is doubtful and it should not be taken for granted: 
“it’s only in the mouth” (bezathehmabè). Thus, local politics is more adequately 
described as a space where behaviours are evaluated through a moral scale dividing 
what is doubtful, on the one hand, and what is trustworthy, on the other. And village 
affairs seemed to be an important scale where people engagement toward the 
collective is evaluated and where worth of the bigmen is conceived in terms of 
guardianship (okhteinhmu). 
 
ANTHROPOLOGY AND HISTORY, BACK AND FORTH 
 
“History is never sure” (de Certeau 2000: 1). 
 
 There is a long debate on the relationship between anthropology and history. 
The historical approach in anthropology was present during its inception as a 
discipline with the evolutionist movement. The functionalist and culturalist schools 
reacted to the speculative histories exposed in the evolutionist theories by 
producing ethnographic researches emphasising synchrony. Temporalities and 
social dynamics came to the forefront later within political anthropology, with 
researchers such as Evans-Pritchard (1950) or Edmund Leach (1954). In the 
meantime, the notion of ‘situation’ allowed Gluckman (1940) and the Manchester 
School126 to differentiate synchrony and static in order to emphasise the need to 
 
126 Notably Turner (1981) and Mitchell (1983). 
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look at the history of African societies to understand the present. Nonetheless, 
anthropology often built itself against history, “like its residue” (Naepels 2010: 
876). The subsequent scholarships127 which criticised the ahistorical character of 
classical ethnographic descriptions were crucial in articulating ethnography with 
the type of research developed by historians: 
 
“More than simply considering the past, it is taking into account, on the 
one hand, the internal social dynamics of the groups under 
consideration and, on the other hand, the variable regimes of historicity 
that then becomes possible and necessary.” (Naepels 2010: 877, my 
translation). 
 
 The subaltern studies on colonial knowledge128 were also critical in the 
historical inflexion of anthropology while also rearticulating the position between 
the anthropologist and his/her interlocutors and the practice of anthropological 
writing.129 The postcolonial perspective stemming from this evolution took note of 
the critics about colonial categories130 while proposing deep descriptions of specific 
societies within a broader context.131 
 In this thesis, there are several ways anthropology is closely linked with 
history. As stated above, the plurality of research operations derived from a practice 
that did not seclude an ‘ethnographic’ fieldwork from and a ‘historical’ one but was 
rather a constant coming and going between notes, documents, ideas, scholarships, 
contexts and recordings. Three perspectives concerning the transformation of the 
political landscape in Gawgyi and Myinmilaung, and related to the articulation of 
ethnography and history, are assembled in the final text: one about a change in how 
time was experienced and how some persons embodied rupture and continuities, 
another about the relations between myth and history and the influence of 
contemporary stakes in the enunciation of historical narratives, and a last one about 
the sedimentation of layer upon layer of history in a ‘longue durée’ perspective. 
 
127 Especially Fabian (2014), Thomas (1996), and Sahlins (1981, 1995, 2004). 
128 See, among others, Asad (1973), Edward Said (1989), and a perspective by Pouchepadass (2004). 
129 Notably Clifford and Marcus (1986). 
130 As the thesis seeks to do for the category of headship (cf. Interlude). 
131 For instance, see Comaroff and Comaroff (1992) and Jean Comaroff (1985). 
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 The first perspective relates to an argument running through the chapters 
entitled The last men of hpon, The rise of village affairs and Guarding village 
affairs. The argument is that if contemporary politics in Gawgyi is conceptualised 
in terms of village affairs upheld by worthy leaders, it is related to the moral rupture 
that happened during the first decades of colonialism and which saw the rise of new 
leaders described today as the last men of hpon. If there are no more men of hpon 
now, it is also related to how the shift was experienced from the socialist regime 
engaged in village economics and politics to the military regime disengaging from 
them, resorting to physical and symbolic violence. These experiences are framed in 
terms of the diverging morality of local leaders who came to exemplify and embody 
corruption or trust. Engaging in village affairs and embodying local ethics, that is 
being worthy, are how actors made sense of their past while it shapes the 
contemporary scale of politics on village welfare, drawing upon memories of past 
‘exemplary’ men and the more traditional form of sociality called luhmuyay. There 
are thus multiple moments of rupture – colonial encounter, change of the role of lay 
people, socialism in practice and violent militarism – that are reflected in leaders 
and which are the means to articulate change in how time was experienced. 
 The second perspective concerns the foundation narratives of Myinmilaung 
and Gawgyi studied in the chapter Traffic in affiliations. It triangulates myths, oral 
testimonies and archives to locate the foundation of Myinmilaung and Gawgyi. This 
chapter is where the context of speech is notably problematised in relation to the 
animosity between Gawgyi and Myinmilaung. Attention was paid to “(h)ow the 
story is told, what is told of the story, by whom, to whom, and for what purpose, 
what is landmark or not” (Naepels 2010: 881). When narrated certain events come 
to serve as a matrix for subjective experiences and for the historical consciousness 
of the actors.132 The argument is that the foundation narratives of both villages are 
intimately linked to them being enclosed within a single jurisdiction and competing 
for leadership. They present opposing stories of foundation to claim their 
differences and legitimate their presence in the landscape. ‘Myinmilaung story’ 
features its people as the junction between the royalty, the regional sovereign spirit 
and to religious patronage to support their claim as genuine and legitimate 
allochthones. ‘Gawgyi story’ posits its people as autochthones with intimate 
 
132 Cf. Bloch (1998). 
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relationships with some neighbouring villages. It also anchors villagers’ knowledge 
of the region in pre-royal times. These claims to some extent exclude one another 
by drawing a line that can only be understood in relation to the current atmosphere 
of violence and bitterness between the two villages. And if we further the 
connection with village affairs, the current opposition, as displayed in stories of 
foundation, is the backdrop against which the inclusion or exclusion of 
neighbouring villages within a collective make sense.  
 The last perspective borrows to the vocabulary of geology (‘sedimentation’) 
to describe how the local political landscape sits on top of and is shaped by layer 
upon layer of history. This outlook is broad, influenced by the Annales School,133 
and not contained in one specific part of the thesis but rather runs within it in an 
open-ended way. It concerns the shaping of the landscape and the different type of 
temporalities as described in introduction; but it also relates to the coming of 
Buddhism and its evolution and, more directly, to the transformation of local 
hierarchies as depicted in chapter 4. Ultimately, this flexible approach is central to 
the thesis because it nuanced the question about the reasons and the effects of the 
merging of villages under a single polity. 
 These different forms of history get mobilised in the text and subtext of 
village politics during collective undertakings and moments of competitions for 
instance. It was present when selecting the headman in 2016 (chapter 2): each side 
– Myinmilaung vs Gawgyi people – were silent and tension was tangible, almost 
physical. When operating the water station and collecting the fees from villagers, 
the lugyi produce and enact a sense of collective and at times compare it to the poor 
handling of village affairs in Myinmilaung. Or when they help organising 
ceremonies in Tozigon, it emphasises a sense of common belonging. If we do not 
account for the history of this place, then we would see these bigmen as mere 
patrons, the headman as a petty broker and its selection as a trifling competition. 
And yet, an ethnographic approach combined with history reveals that local politics 
consists of excluding some individuals and entrusting others (the lugyi) to ‘take 
charge’ of local affairs while being the elite at the top of a local hierarchy that has 
evolved over the past century and that the village tract is but one arena of politics 
with its own history of moral ruptures.  
 
133 Cf. Bloch (1961, 1973), Le Goff (1964) or Braudel (1958). 
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CHAPTER 2. THE 2016 SELECTION 
 
 This chapter introduces the main conundrums that will be dealt with 
throughout the thesis. It describes two crucial days during the selection of the 
village headman of Myinmilaung tract in early 2016 from a Gawgyi perspective.134 
It is not an extended case study, but a situational analysis presented in an open-
ended perspective. The reader should pay attention to how the main characters 
behave, notably Ko Kyaw the headman and the Gawgyi bigmen: U Htay the official 
elder, U Maung the master of ceremonies and U Lin the school teacher and leader 
of the bachelor group. Their actions guide the understanding of the local polity in 
2016 as a product of both the past and the present. Overall, the description of a 
specific situation serves the purpose of anchoring the study of the local polity 
through history and ethnography. The first three sections portray the unfolding of 
events and the last one presents a series of questions stemming from the description. 
These questions are the red threads organising the rest of the thesis. 
 
PREPARING THE SCENE 
 
 At the end of December 2015, after the landslide victory of the NLD during 
the national election in November, the village headmen from the Township of 
Monywa gathered at an official meeting and received instructions from the 
Township GAD administrator to organise an election of new headmen. To that end, 
the Ko Kyaw had to arrange the selection of new ‘ten household leaders’ for each 
village because, as it was the case in 2012, they will be the ones voting. It is a double 
process of selection because candidates for headmanship should be at first selected 
as ten-houses’ leaders. Ko Kyaw went to Myinmilaung, Ogon and Mingalagon to 
meet and inform their elders, current leaders of ten households as well as the clerk 
a few days later. The politics of headman selection was thus put into motion. In 
Gawgyi, the word was spreading by nightfall. The headman was about to change. 
 
134 This selection happened on the 23rd and 24th of January 2016. 
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 The eve of the vote is upon us when Ko Kyaw begins the selection of the ten 
house leaders. The lapse of time is short, so alliances cannot be built up easily. To 
win, they have to gather the votes for only one candidate. The problem is that 
nobody really wants to be that man, at least at first. Around 4 pm, Ko Kyaw and I 
go together to U Maung’s house. There, they discuss the listing of household heads 
with a list prepared in advance. It is incomplete. They call on two other people: the 
village teacher, U Lin, and the official elder, U Htay. The reason they are in charge 
of the selection is because of their role in local politics and it displays their bigness. 
After discussing petty issues, they start making another list of the village houses by 
groups of ten. The school teacher is the main reference for the listing, due to his 
extensive knowledge about villagers and his proven ability as an organiser. The 
other three men help filling in missing names. “Oh, and on that side, near U Thu, 
what is her name… yes, yes, Daw Yee”. The grouping of houses on the list reflects 
the mental geography of the village. The latter is split into three main parts, 
following the main roads created during settlement times (figure 2). These include 
the northeast, the southeast and the western parts (the latter being the last settled 
area).  
 U Maung and U Lin become vote collectors for the next few hours while U 
Htay and Ko Kyaw remain at distance. I stay with the first two and we walk from 
the furthest east side down to the west part to finally reach the north-east the 
following morning. The distribution of houses by group of ten is quite natural for 
the southeast side of the village but more difficult in the last settled area. It is easier 
to group people that are closer, akin and neighbours in this area settled long ago. It 
is rather less natural in the western part, notably the northwest because it is mostly 
composed of recent individual houses, where affiliations and descent are not as 
clear. In the northeast, collecting votes is also complicated. Most of the lugyi are 
living on the southeast side of the road. In the northeast live few important families, 
notably big land owners. They often stay out of official representation but have their 
say in village affairs.  
 As we collect the votes, people are amused by my presence and many are 
surprised to have to publicly choose a ‘responsible’ man for a more-or-less virtual 
group of ten houses. In practice the collection goes as follows: the vote collectors 
visit every house, one by one, asking to see the house head. They quickly explain 
the process to their host and show them the group to which they belong on a list of 
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paper displaying the names of the household heads that they choose from. The 
collection is quite easy in the southeast part. Votes are generally influenced by 
collectors, notably when the head of the house is absent. I try to be transparent as 
much as I can. Often a child who knows how to write inscribes the ‘selected’ name. 
Sometimes the collector writes it himself after getting the agreement of the family. 
Slight changes of intonation while speaking out names from the list emphasise the 
‘good’ one. Direct indication in favour of the person that is suitable is also 
commonplace. Villagers often ask who to vote for, most of them showing little 
interest in the process, wondering why they are involved. This is not the case for 
the persons that are already ten-houses’ leaders, those seen as important villagers 
or families, such as big farmers or respected elders, and those active in village 
affairs. With them, the collectors spend more time to show the list and explain the 
situation while sharing a moment to chew betel nut and drink tea. Women are quite 
often asked for their vote, but even if many were, in practice, considered as 
household leaders, none are part of the list. They are inevitably excluded from local 
politics, apart from credit, health, school and monastery groups, because men 
monopolise the formalisation of politics. Overall, it seems that villagers are not used 
to this ‘democratic’ process. It seems it is the first time they have to express such a 
choice. And even though this is an unimportant issue for most, votes are collected 
in a hurry with great skill. 
 As I wake up the following morning, I realise that I am deliberately set aside 
from vote collection in the northeast part of the village. The person who then 
emerged as Gawgyi’s candidate comes from this area and is from an old lineage of 
large farmers. The history of the settlement of this village, from a central node 
divided in three, is woven together by kin and neighbour networks with room for 
dissension due to old conflicts concerning land disputes, gambling, donations and 
money lending. These elements are critical in the listing of people. But most of the 
individuals who were projected to be ten-houses’ leaders were already known 
before the vote collection. At one level, their selection is an administrative formality 
to be achieved by vote collectors. At another level, there are reasons why this or 
that person is selected. Six out of the fourteen ten-houses’ leaders are from the 
southeast part due to high density of population, but also to a stronger hold on 
village politics by the fringe of people living there (where the current village leaders 
are mostly from). Thus, the whole process is about filling as many positions 
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composing the social hierarchy of the village and acknowledging or pressing people 
to select the number of ten-houses’ leaders required by the government. But then, 
who are they? 
 Most, but not all of them, are people known for taking collective 
responsibilities such as managing water delivery and fee collection, gathering 
people for road repairs, helping for events related to the monastery, and sometimes 
resolving small disputes if they are influential enough. A typical example is 
someone who engages in village affairs. But most do not want to take official 
responsibilities. Ko Kyaw summarises the selection of those leaders with a 
metaphor: “if you press, it will spring out”, in other words, to put their back up 
against the wall.135 They do not bear much formal duties; they assist the headman 
in some cases such as providing free labour for government projects in the past or 
electing him today. All of them are not well-known for being helpful. Some are 
economically important such as big farmers that stay involved in village affairs by 
keeping an eye on local politics in Myinmilaung tract because it is at this level that 
state institutions empowered to channel access to land can be controlled. Others 
want to become influential and climbing the government ladder is one way of 
achieving it. A few are backed by a portion of influential villagers interested in 
having a headman that could be compliant. In Gawgyi, most are just people known 
for being helpful and good, accepting to be somehow responsible for the village to 
a certain extent. Therefore, while the vote collectors have to fill out the numbers, 
the chosen persons are a blend of important, involved or interested men that are 
able to be a ten-houses’ leader.  Overall, this group is the sublayer of the local elite 
which takes care of village affairs at large. The most stable and important ones – 
the men organising the vote collection like U Maung, the school teacher and U Htay 
– are keeping their distance with government agents and bodies while being 
entrusted by most villagers. And this distance is a result of how local affairs (beyond 
state interest) became the form of local politics at the turn of the twenty-first century 
after decades of disengagement of the military regime. 
 At this stage of the selection process, Gawgyi lugyi act as checks and 
balances, reinforcing their authority by taking care of the process. They make the 
selection by taking into consideration the main elements of local politics: the mental 
 
135 He gave this expression on the 31st of January 2016. 
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geography of local hierarchy, the interests of the main villagers, the degrees of 
involvement of potential leaders and the issue at stake: controlling headship against 
Myinmilaung. What one should bear in mind is that having a ‘good’ headman is 
advantageous to access officials, to avoid extra fees for land registration, to be 
included in development projects (water, electricity, roads, loans…), to have a 
buffer against government policies if the headman knows how to deal with officials, 
and so forth. But there is also a long history of successive headmen whose 
personalities (or memories of their personalities) reflect how villages coped with 
various levels of power.  There is an apparent contradiction between the fact that 
the selection of the ten-houses’ leaders was experienced by most as an unimportant 
matter and the fact that it was crucial to handle it properly for these lugyi. It shows 
that because lugyi is an achieved rather than an ascribed status, such handlings 
become important ways of demonstrating one’s skill or bigness. 
 
COMPETING FOR CANDIDACY 
 
 It’s D-Day. The second list is finished. U Maung and the school teacher arrive 
at Kyaw’s house. They make a third list because U Htay does not want to be on it. 
They erase his name and choose another person instead. They ask me to write the 
latter’s name on the new list. It feels like cheating for an exam. The final version is 
now completed and polished. Among the fourteenth names on paper, one is going 
to be Gawgyi’s candidate. Overall, the ten-houses’ heads selected today are mainly 
the same as those chosen in 2012 by U Htay. But no one has emerged yet as THE 
candidate. And no one has openly campaigned for it in the past days. 
 The group of men is called to the headman’s house at noon to agree on one 
name. They arrive little by little. Discussing who could be headman is something 
of an issue. The school teacher and U Maung are not present anymore, as for U 
Htay. The ten-houses’ leaders check the list. The discussion goes from jokes to 
complaints about the difficulties in finding a good person: someone able and willing 
to take on such responsibility. Those who want to are often discredited as unfit, 
lacking personal skills or untrusted by others. The required skills range from 
literacy, ability to appreciate general and specific issues, capacity to understand new 
and old generations, good knowledge about the intricacies of life outside the village 
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and in the region, and finally negotiating skills with everyone, officials and 
commoners alike.  
 Two main stakes matter the most. First, it is clear for all, and U Htay insists 
upon it, that the fourteen votes should be grouped under a single candidate. Because 
the selection is based on the number of ten-houses’ leaders per village, as in 2012, 
they must vote corporately to keep controlling headship. Yet, Ko Kyaw sensed that 
this time, unlike 2012, the villagers from Myinmilaung, Ogon and Mingalagon are 
going to compound their votes too. Second issue, the candidate should not be too 
rigid. In Gawgyi, the inner factions could push a man over another if he is 
manoeuvrable to some extent. And this was what Gawgyi bigmen did when 
patronising the emergence of candidates. They prepared the scene before the show.  
 Candidacy emerges either from an individual’s will or from collective 
coercion. While it is possible to impose this charge on some people, it is impossible 
for others due to their ‘bigness’. And this shows that headship is but one level of 
local politics. For instance, concerning the 2012 selection, Ko Kyaw says that he 
was half-forced to be candidate and half-willing to become headman. Yet, people 
like U Htay (who had been headman and who withdrew his name from the list) 
cannot be pushed forward. U Maung (who agreed to be ten-houses’ leader) never 
positioned as runner. These lugyi chose to stay away from official positions as much 
as possible. And the school teacher also stays out of the competition because he 
already occupies a government job. During the meeting at U Kyaw house, two men 
stood up as candidates for Gawgyi. 
 The first one is U Han, a man in his late thirties known for being always 
helpful in village affairs, notably for road repairs or managing water distribution. 
He is also the head cook for ceremonials; the person entrusted to control the 
handling of food pots136. A relative of Ko Kyaw, he is always giving a hand for 
preparing weddings and donations. Furthermore, he is the village hsounhsaya, or 
“master of ghosts”. Despite his rather small influence against underground magic 
he protects villagers’ life to some extent. But he is however not considered a lugyi 
yet. Why? There is no clear-cut answer. He is one of the largest farmers of the 
village, but he allegedly has poor negotiating skills, especially with officials, and 
lacks writing proficiency and general knowledge. Ko Kyaw backs him anyway. 
 
136 This is important considering that most act of witchcraft are allegedly done through food offering. 
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They have developed and entertained mutual trust and support for several years in 
the management of some village affairs. But he supported him principally because 
he does not want to become a candidate again. He wants to exit headship. Therefore, 
he stands for U Han even if he doubts that he could be a ‘good’ headman. During 
that meeting at Ko Kyaw’s, U Han is set a little aside and subject to a profusion of 
jokes (“the lugyi only like chili so don’t eat French pork!”, “go away we need to 
discuss serious matters!”, and the like).  
 U Thein is the second candidate. He runs a shop in the southeast part of the 
village and is also related to Ko Kyaw. Son of a big farmer that is absent from most 
of the village events, he is not known for being helpful or involved in village affairs. 
On the contrary, he is rather notorious because he bribed a woman to avoid having 
to acknowledge the paternity of their child even though he was already married.137 
He is nonetheless literate because his parents invested in his education. In addition, 
he has been a ten-houses’ leader for many years. The thing is that U Thein did not 
come to the meeting at Ko Kyaw’s. For the bunch of ten-houses’ heads, it is a clear 
move: U Thein will run for candidacy. His absence could be perceived in two ways. 
Either he will accept whatever the group decided, or he disagrees. It is obvious for 
everyone that it is the second option, but no one says a word. While eating the 
cheese and dry sausages I brought, they gradually agree unenthusiastically on U 
Han’s name. But the game is not over.  
 On our way to the office in Myinmilaung, we cross U Thein arguing loudly 
with fellow villagers near the shelter at the north edge of Gawgyi, pass the housing 
area before reaching the monastery and the school. We stop our motorcycle. The 
real negotiation for candidacy is about to begin. The location is interesting. It is at 
the edge of Gawgyi, but still within it. The shelter is outside any house’s jurisdiction 
and thus free from personal obligations. In comparison, the house of the headman 
was not a neutral area and U Han got support there due to his affinity with Ko Kyaw. 
U Thein chooses to wait at the shelter. It offers no hold for personal affiliation, 
except that of being from Gawgyi village. The discussion138 lasts for about ten 
minutes and is a rare moment of politics being openly discussed in the village. 
 
137 Being engaged does not forbidden to have another ‘wife’ for Burmese males but having other 
children without being married and not assuming the responsibility of being in charge of the children 
(pay for his food, schooling, Buddhist noviciate) is seen as immoral and indicates the kind of the 
person. 
138 The reconstruction of the dialogue and its main themes was done through the recollections and 
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*** 
 “I don’t want to do it” says U Thein as we reach the shelter, answering the 
few men already there. After we park our motorbikes, some other men insist on the 
fact that the future headman must improve the development of Gawgyi. Ko Kyaw, 
entering the debate, acknowledges U Thein’s candidacy as he tells him directly: 
“We need to choose a person that is capable. Can you do it? You will lead as you 
want”. And U Thein replies that he does not claim to be candidate. I realise that I 
assist, almost incredulous, to a political squabble. Another man in the background 
says that, actually, the latter does want to and can do it. U Thein then starts a 
vehement couplet about his worries of being stuck between his own business, his 
family and headship.  
 The candidacy of U Thein is now official. He positions himself as if under 
the coercion of his peers. U Han does not interfere at any point in the discussion. 
He has just lost his chance and I can see on his face that he resigns from being a 
candidate. U Thein monopolises the discussion, but he has yet to be entitled. 
 A debate starts on whether or not the chosen candidate will have to select the 
leader of bachelor groups and official elder (which are pivotal positions in 
organising village affairs, ceremonials and accessing collective properties). One 
group argues that if “the one who wants to be headman” does not state his choice 
now, then his word would not be respected later on. That group wants U Thein to 
position himself, to garner support among the villagers, his faction, and to see if he 
will follow the directions given by the main lugyi that occupy such positions. Other 
men reply that such questions could be tackled later, insisting that U Thein answer 
clearly if he wants to be candidate or not. But U Thein does not clearly acquiesce. 
Not yet. The standstill falls when a man said that “if you (U Thein) don’t want to 
do it, then we will send a report (to the Township authority) and we will choose 
again later.” Everybody starts talking at the same time, the voices melt into each 
other. I feel almost invisible among them. Finally, a consensus is reached. They will 
back U Thein: “ok you do it, you do it. You can do as you want (i.e. select the leader 
of bachelors and official elder that suits you), we choose you.” 
 
discussions about this moment with some participants and from my field notes. 
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 Ko Kyaw’s phone rings. The men stop talking at once – the village-tract clerk 
in Myinmilaung is asking when they will arrive – and they do not want him to 
overhear what is happening. Once he gets off his phone, they start arguing about 
whether or not the headman will have to make decisions collegially. The debate is 
now if and how the ten-houses’ leaders can have a say in village government. An 
old man reminds the group that they had already chosen U Han and, addressing him 
directly, tells him that he can govern alone. Others, and notably the younger men, 
argue for negotiations to take place. “But it can’t happen” retorted another. Ko 
Kyaw intervenes to smooth things over. He says that the headman can change 
things, that from his own experience it is difficult to make decisions, it is not as 
simple as people think. And to round up the debate he declares that “you guys don’t 
want to lead and don’t want to follow”. The argument also focuses on the critical 
balance between getting money from headship and being unpopular for taking it. 
This directly refers to past experiences with different headmen and officials, some 
such as U Win, ‘the Infamous’, being well-known for taking bribes and U Htay, ‘the 
Worthy’, for refusing any payoff while in office. But Ko Kyaw reorient the 
conversation to avoid this issue, saying that a headman salary is not high, that U 
Thein could try it. 
 “We now have a candidate, chosen by me” shouts an old leader. U Thein’s 
candidacy was backed. But the backers seem to form a different group than those 
who supported Ko Kyaw. The authority of the current bigmen might change in the 
future. But that is not a main issue for now. The rest of the group discusses loudly 
for a time. One man expresses that the impending situation (the change in national 
government) will be difficult to handle. But Ko Kyaw answers that it is not as bad 
as he thinks. He says that what a headman does is a little more than taking care of 
the village and that responsibilities are even less than before. Another man loses 
patience: “we don’t care about this. The important point is to get the headman in 
Gawgyi”. From that moment onward, the need to compound the 14 votes merges 
their opinions. The same person then directly asks U Thein: “will you do it? If yes, 
say it! I am tired of doublespeak”. Silence reigns for a few seconds and finally U 
Thein says: “I will do!”.  
 The name of the candidate has changed. U Thein is now entitled. He said it, 
so he is engaged toward the others. We all get back on our motorbikes and headed 
toward the office in Myinmilaung proper. As we were about to leave, a man shouts 
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from behind “Ko Thein! When we arrive, don’t change your mind. If you do, we’ll 
beat you.” 
*** 
 
AGAINST MYINMILAUNG PROPER 
 The government office in Myinmilaung proper was built in 2005 on a 
previous cemetery at the crossroad of four villages (figure 9). The boundaries of the 
tracts are not visible but are intimately related to the evolution of these settlements. 
The building is the ‘front’ of the Myinmilaung tract as a jurisdiction, but the content 
of politics lies in people’s relationships, not in the building which is almost always 
closed. Concerning the cemetery, there is a rumour that a previous headman, U Win, 
wanted to take this land for himself and sell it but then changed his mind and built 
the office. Gawgyi villagers spread around the office as we arrived. I follow some 
of them inside the nearby teashop. Sitting there, some men exchange courtesies 
with the locals, whom they often dislike. U Win is there, sitting in the back, 
watching the scene at a distance. Most of Gawgyi men do not dare going inside the 
teashop. Only confident enough persons walk in. U Maung, U Lin and Ko Kyaw 
are among those. There, we wait for the arrival of Township officials, staying semi-
silent, sharing edgy smiles and chewing betel compulsively.  
 Three officials finally arrive in a big black truck. As they walk in the teashop, 
everyone stands up. I stand and cross their gaze. My presence is not expected, but 
my companions are not worried about it. Bit by bit, it all becomes formalised. The 
two main officials, a chairman from the Township General Administration 
Department and a person from the Education Department, sit and talk with Ko 
Kyaw and the clerk. The latter is showing off. He sits – is seen sitting – at the 
‘biggest’ table during this interlude. Ko Kyaw, my host and the one organising this 
election, is rather pleased. He is finally about to give up the position to another man. 
The government representatives drink their tea very slowly. Everyone is glancing 
warily in their direction every now and then. Their drinking pace is like running 
sand in an hourglass. It measures the time of the meeting. Once the cups are empty, 
everything is ready. The village headman pays the bill quickly – officials are always 
paid for when they come to villages. The election is about to start. 
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Figure 10. Pictures of the 2016 selection at Myinmilaung office  
  
 Under the thatched roof of the office, the Township chairman stands behind a 
table, facing voters. Those are the ten-houses leaders from their respective villages 
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included in Myinmilaung village-tract. They sit on a plastic tarp spread out on the 
floor, a common position adopted during meetings, teaching and preaching. On the 
left side sits Gawgyi men, with people of Myinmilaung, Ogon and Mingalagon at 
their right. Both groups face the table. Around that table are posted an assistant, the 
clerk and the official elders. Among the latter, the absence of U Htay is felt. The 
chairman talks about the elections process, asking who cannot write. Polite and 
respectful during this occasion, he allows a foreigner to assist in a democratic 
election while looking at me some ten meters behind the scene. 
 The election goes on. The clerk calls the voters one after the other. The person 
stands, takes a piece of paper, writes down the name he wants on another table, 
folds the paper, gives it to the chairman who puts it in a bowl. Finally, the latter 
picks up all the papers one by one, reads the names aloud, shows them to the 
audience to prove that there is no cheating, and makes a chalk line on the 
blackboard. Only two names appear on it. U Thein, from Gawgyi, gathered fourteen 
votes while U So, from Myinmilaung, got seventeen. The ten-houses’ leaders from 
Myinmilaung, Ogon and Mingalagon have compounded their votes against 
Gawgyi, as predicted by Ko Kyaw. The last time, there were four candidates and 
Ko Kyaw won. The men on the right side applaud. On the left, Gawgyi villagers 
growl about the situation. Anger rises, but they remain semi-silent. We quickly go 
back to the motorbikes. A stone flies in our direction. A young man, allegedly a 
fool, threw a rock at us. In seconds, members of our faction armed with stones and 
sticks ask the offender to come closer. But nothing goes further. The atmosphere is 
tense, Gawgyi has been defeated. The sound of roaring engines fills the scene. Once 
back in the village, we quickly stop at the shelter to comment on the defeat. They 
have the feeling of having been screwed. “They must have been paid for it”, 
exclaims one of them, referring to the previous election when votes were divided 
in four camps. They ask each other if there is a way to change the repartition of 
voters, or they will always lose if it stays this way. And then everyone goes home. 
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THE RED THREADS 
 
Competition, hierarchy, worth, obligations, engagement. 
 
 To some degree, in Gawgyi, this election was a matter of choosing a broker 
by manoeuvring electoral rules and village factions under the watch of bigmen who 
guide local affairs and keep their distance with the state. Let’s start with a blunt 
question. Why does the selection of the headman turn out to be a competition 
between Gawgyi and Myinmilaung proper? It may be related to the stakes 
associated with the control of headship. At large, it facilitates access to government 
officials and projects which in turn help channelling access to wealth. There is a 
particularly state-like quality to the office of headship, as it has typically been more 
in the interests of the government to have the institution than the local population.  
This is why the headman is imbued with particular powers of brokerage. But each 
village tract has its own stories and history. In our case, anger outbursts are signs of 
contained disputes. It is something else rather than a simple fight for an institution, 
and to understand why the 2016 election happened this way, we need to explore the 
past of this polity. How does each village justify its presence in this landscape? Is 
there a relation with the fact that both settlements have competing narratives of 
village foundation? What can we learn from them about the past and the present? 
In the same vein, if headship is a position of power within a village tract, then when 
was it created in this particular place and why were those villages bound under a 
single jurisdiction? 
 Another point relates to the positioning of Gawgyi bigmen during the 
election. They engage in village affairs and monitor the emergence of a Gawgyi 
candidate as a way of achieving their bigness. They also represent the elite of village 
farmers, the top of the local hierarchy. But has it always been the case? Are there 
ways in which controlling institutions help consolidating the hierarchy in a certain 
direction? These questions relate to the long-term past of the local polity, and more 
precisely to the twentieth century. Looking back at them during the election, why 
do they keep a certain distance with the state? Why does a person like U Htay, the 
main leader in Gawgyi who has been headman in the recent past, stay away from 
the ‘scene’ of the selection but is present in its background? If village headship is 
but one part of local politics, then what is the rest? Can we learn something about 
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how it is conceived and practiced by exploring the positioning of these bigmen? To 
do that, we need to locate the moment when village affairs became the main form 
of Gawgyi politics and how certain personalities in specific contexts embodied 
trustworthy leaders. This allows one to think about current politics, such as how 
current ceremonies are performed or how conflicts are settled, in terms of 
engagement toward the collective, that is, in terms of what became a critical stake 
in daily life. And so, the positioning of Gawgyi bigmen during the 2016 selection 
opens up into an exploration of the worth of leaders and of the transformation of 
the local hierarchy. 
 The last point concerns Ko Kyaw’s demeanour. This selection was for him a 
way to exit village headship. He was tired of it. Of course, becoming headman was 
for him an avenue for one-upmanship. But he was content with the idea that he will 
soon stop coping with multiples personalities and obligations. So, what does his 
exit tell us about being a headman? On a daily basis, it means adjusting one’s 
position according to a series of situations and stakes. During his time as headman 
he was notably empowered to implement a new land law which brought to the 
forefront old disputes for instance. But he was never sure of his authority in this or 
that arena and had to adjust his stance, dissemble, and engage with the previous 
headmen, Gawgyi bigmen, officials, neighbours and family in a dense social 
landscape. His demeanour opens up the question of everyday politics beyond 
headship and the kind of obligations and power relations organising it. 
 It is now time to explore the fashioning of the local political landscape by 
focusing on Myinmilaung and Gawgyi’s narratives of foundation. 
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CHAPTER 3. TRAFFIC IN AFFILIATIONS (1750S-1880S) 
 
“NOT ENOUGH HORSES” 
 
 It was quite natural for me to visit Myinmilaung proper with Ko Kyaw when 
he was the headman of the whole village tract. We met several times with elders, 
previous headmen and the current clerk of the tract. On the 5th of December 2013, 
we met with U So139 at the teashop tucked in the middle of the village at the 
crossroad between three village tracts.140 U So was described to me as the local 
expert on village history. During this encounter, I was fully aware of the deep 
resentment between Gawgyi and Myinmilaung villagers. Relating back to this 
moment, it appears that the context and the content of speech are clues enabling to 
question both current and past local politics. Here is a part141 of the text written after 
this interview: 
 
During the period of the Pagan dynasty, the king Anawrahta, founder of 
the Bagan empire (eleventh to thirteenth century), gave Alon142 to 
Bahtukyweh. The foundation of the village is related to a conflict 
between these two persons. At that time Alon was a royal city and 
Monywa a simple village. Because people complained about 
Bahtukyweh‘s handling of the region – he was a jealous and unjust ruler 
– Anawrahta chased and killed him in 1111 B.E. (1749-50 C.E.). Having 
heard of his imminent death, Bahtukyweh fled with his soldiers and hid, 
for a time, in a forest. But when the royal troops approached, there was 
not enough horses for the whole cavalry to escape. Bahtukyweh ran 
away but eventually drowned himself in the Chindwin river. But a part 
of his followers stayed in this hideout. This is how the village was 
founded and its first name, Myinmalauq, means “not enough horses”. 
 
139 This person is not the same man who became headman during the 2016 selection. 
140 The division of Myinmilaung proper into three tracts will be analysed in chapter 4. 
141 The following is drawn from the notes taken during our interview and is thus not a transcription. 
142 Alon is the name of the city given by U So, but it was known as Badon until Bodawhpaya (1782-
1819), renamed it before ascending the throne. I keep the name given by U So to respect the context 
of speech. 
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As time passed on, the pronunciation of Myinmalauq was altered to 
finally be voiced as Myinmilaung. In 1147 B.E. (1776 C.E.) the village 
was renamed by U No, a royal astrologer, who stopped by when 
returning from the capital. He founded a pagoda (the current one) on 
the eastern limit of the villages and named the settlement Mingalagon, 
meaning the “Auspicious Hill”. 
 
 U So told me that teachers at the University would confirm this story. But 
even if the Konbaung dynasty is a central focus of studies at the Historical 
Department of Monywa University, my questions about Myinmilaung were too 
specific and they could not answer them. Later on, I tried to question U So and 
others about the reasons that led to the division of the ‘original settlement’ into a 
collection of villages (Mogaung, Ogon, Myinmilaung, Mingalagon, Mayodaw) 
which were further divided into different village tracts following the British’s 
‘settlement operations’. But nobody was able or willing to tell me. After all, I chose 
to live in Gawgyi, and they do not get along well. In Gawgyi’s case, there was not 
such a narrative of village foundation. The best hypothesis – congruent with the 
genealogical depth of its main lineages – is that it was founded during the first 
decades of the eighteenth century by about ten families who fled the neighbouring 
village of Ywadon to escape state requests (corvées, soldiers), as well as a famine. 
The question is, what to do with these stories? 
There are at least two ways to understand them: as key chronological 
markers that help reconstruct the history of the local polity, and as current 
discourses about history. This chapter uses both approaches co-currently. For 
instance, in U So’s narrative, only the founding date is accurate (1749/1750 C.E.). 
The other historical references shed light on how people imagine time and space. 
First, the village establishment could not have taken place during King Anawrahta 
because he reigned from 1044 to 1077 C.E. Nonetheless, he is referred to as founder 
of the first Burmese dynasty, introducer of Buddhism in his realm during the 
eleventh century, and tamer of animist spirits called naq by incorporating them in 
the royal pantheon of the Thirty-Seven Lords.143 As such, he appears in many 
 
143 Cf. Brac de la Perrière (1989) or Robinne (2000). Brac de la Perrière defines the cult in honour 
of the Thirty-Seven Lords as an institutionalised spirit possession cult addressed to guardian spirits 
(the naq) of particular domains in Upper Burma that once formed the core of the classical Burmese 
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myths, stories and chronicles as the founder par excellence.144 Second, Bahtukyweh 
is central in the history of the region, even if he is not part of the official pantheon. 
Also known as “Alon’s Grandfather” he was transformed into naq by the royalty 
and since represents local indigenousness and sovereignty.145 Thus, U So produced 
a narrative of foundation that posits Myinmilaung at the intersection of the royalty 
and the locality. He used stabilised elements – Anawrahta’s founding gesture, 
Bahtukyweh as the local sovereign, and the ineluctable fight between them – to 
graft the settlement within a metanarrative that makes sense locally.146 
 But oral memories draw out connections to the past at the expense of others. 
It displays layers upon layers of history linking Myinmilaung people to a founding 
king, to a local sovereign, and to religious patronage that, eventually, make these 
villagers indigenes in the sense of genuine allochthones. But it fails to mention the 
fission of the original settlement and the dynamics of leadership which are crucial 
to understanding how Myinmilaung and Gawgyi were grouped under a single 
(uncanny) polity at the beginning of the twentieth century. In a different way, 
Gawgyi people posit themselves as people from the land, with thick connections 
with neighbouring villages; in short as indigenous people in the sense of real 
autochthones. To some degree, these two sets of claims underscore the current 
animosity between Myinmilaung and Gawgyi and relates to how contemporary 
village affairs in the latter exclude the former. 
 At another level, this chapter lays the first stone in the study of how 
Myinmilaung village-tract came to be and explores below, how the political 
dynamics of the late precolonial era shaped the colonial encounter and the creation 
of village headship. Headship was established in 1887 as a device to crush the 
‘guerrilla warfare’147 encountered by colonial officers during the annexation of 
 
Buddhist kingdom. This cult is organised around the pantheon of the Thirty-Seven Lords who are 
honoured in annual public festivals and with whom individuals engage in privately-organised spirit 
possession ceremonies. 
144 Brac de la Perrière (1996: 40) has argued on the necessity for the Burmese dynasties to make the 
first Burmese king the founders par excellence. Anawrahta is also the archetypical founders of 
religious edifices creating a Buddhist landscape while integrating such territories within the royalty. 
For instance, in his study of the entrepreneur monks in central Myanmar Rozenberg (2002) shows 
how their constructions of spectacular religious buildings are modelled on the ‘founding gesture’ of 
Anawrahta who, according to the Burmese chronicle, built such edifices as symbols of his 
sovereignty in all the regions he submitted. 
145 Cf. Brac de la Perrière (1996: 49-50). 
146 This accounts for a strong tendency to anchor establishments (of places, of naq rituals, of pagodas 
and so on) as if time folds in on itself. 
147 Charney argues that warfare was normal condition of rural life in precolonial Burma, as well as 
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Upper Burma (1885-86). As an institution, it swept into local politics and became 
the office to compete for, a means to negotiate pre-existing political affiliations. At 
large, the precolonial period offers a landscape of fragmented sovereignties148 
competing for offices following a ‘galactic polity’ pattern. Furthermore, the history 
of Myinmilaung and Gawgyi is that of villages learning how to deal with shifting 
centres. I call it a “traffic in affiliations” to reflect how they engaged with preceding 
and incoming authorities. Both settlements were created in times of unrest: the rise 
of a new king (Alaunghpaya 1752-1760) leading to the appointment of new office 
holders concerning Myinmilaung; the migrations and famines under Bodawhpaya 
(1782-1819) concerning Gawgyi. The fragmented authorities competing for office 
were usually gentry leaders – hereditary office holders – and royal officials making 
the most of migrations, warfare, money lending and changes in the crown ability to 
govern the countryside to compete for power.149 Yet, the royal revenue inquests, 
called sittan,150 and notably those undertaken under Bodawhpaya (1783 and 1802) 
describe a rather fixed countryside where timeless arrangements and customs 
regulated a society divided by ranks. In contrast, scholars151 have long insisted on 
the fact that factionalism and shifting affiliations were the underlying processes of 
the precolonial polity. The gentry may appear as a monolithic group, but it was 
rather an assemblage of powers constantly in the making using various resources 
(heredity, patronage, money lending, revenue collection and land control) to 
consolidate their position through a continuously changing political landscape.152 
And when the last two Burmese kings tried to create a more modern bureaucracy 
and introduced new taxes in the second half of the nineteenth century, the ensuing 
warfare was a renegotiation of unstable agreements between the state, local 
sovereignties, officials and rising ‘bandits’. These dynamics shaped the political 
 
in other Mainland Southeast Asian polities, in which competition for offices and resources was a 
cause for squabbles. Cf. Charney (2004) and Charney and Wellen (2018). 
148 The concept of fragmentation is borrowed from Lund (2011) and the dynamics are mostly drawn 
from Lieberman (1984) and Koenig (1990). 
149 I chose to draw attention mostly on hereditary offices because they were the main form of 
authority ruling the backcountry, as opposed to the officials appointed by the crown. One of the 
avenues for the gentry families was to base their claim for power on heredity, on customs and on 
crown and local patronage. 
150 They represent the main historical sources on rural life during the Konbaung period. Cf. Trager 
and Koenig (1979) or Toe Hla (1987) for instance. 
151 Such as Furnival (1957), Koenig (1990), Lieberman (1984, 2003), Scott (1972a, 1972b, 2009) or 
Thant Myint-U (2001) 
152 Cf. Saito (1997). 
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landscape surrounding Gawgyi and Myinmilaung, but they also influenced how the 
British imagined the functioning of society in Upper Burma.  
This chapter adopts a chronological approach and combines first-hand 
data,153 colonial archives154 and secondary sources to reconstruct the political 
dynamics of the precolonial polity in Badon/Alon province at large, and of 
Myinmilaung and Gawgyi in particular. Throughout the following sections, a 
stronger emphasis is placed on Myinmilaung because its oral history is denser and 
because the evolution of this settlement – key to understanding the creation of the 
village tract – was easier to trace in colonial records. Thus, I use a sedimentary 
approach in which the current terrain – the politics in Myinmilaung village tract as 
described in the epilogue – sit on top over and is shaped by layer upon layer of 
history. In that sense, the foundation narratives condense key chronological markers 
that help reconstruct the history of the local polity while showing how people reflect 
on their own history according to present stakes. By looking at history through the 
lenses of a particular place, this chapter relates to major works on Myanmar 
precolonial politics and argue that dynamics of affiliations, competition for 
leadership and fragmentation of authority were the main dynamics in the 
countryside and endured during the colonial period. As argued in the general 
introduction, the local perspective also allows for a contrast of state-centric 
approaches by showing the ability of people to negotiate their position in society 
and the multiple means by which authorities competed for and consolidated their 
leadership. In this vein, I attempt to avoid reifying ‘the gentry’ as a monolithic 
group to challenge the understanding of the imposition of village headship as a 
change in the nature of authority.155 The ideas of charisma, hpon, patronage, and 
rightful succession were part of the landscape, but authority was fragile, never 
really achieved, and thus the competition for and fragmentation of leadership 
pervaded local politics beyond the colonial encounter. Finally, it appears that local 
legends – usually placed outside of the Buddhist-centred narrative of Myanmar 
 
153 Gathered in Myinmilaung proper, Gawgyi, Budaungkan, Tozigon, Ywadon, Kyawkka, Thazi, 
Zaloke and, concerning the the Grandfather of Alon, with the guardian of the spirit palace in Alon. 
154 Presented in the bibliography. 
155 Cf. the section “Where there any headman before the headman?” in the general introduction for 
a long development of this issue. 
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history because they relate to the spirit cult – are crucial sources condensing 
historical references156 and discourses about contemporary issues. 
 The first section describes the political dynamics of the precolonial period 
and focuses on the Badon/Alon province. The ‘galactic’ metaphor is used to locate 
the context of creation and installation of Myinmilaung and Gawgyi. This allows 
for questioning the nature of local authorities (notably the gentry) and shows that 
one of the main dynamics is the competition for and consolidation of offices in a 
fragmented countryside via different means (succession, bribery, mortgage, force, 
money lending). The second section narrows the scope to the villages and explores 
their foundation narratives. They are key chronological markers that make it 
possible to write a history from below while also taking on current politics because 
they justify the raison d’être of Myinmilaung and Gawgyi. Framed in terms of 
allochthony and autochthony, these discourses also reflect how a common area is 
imagined and thus relates to how Gawgyi came to imagine its village affairs by 
excluding Myinmilaung. The third section looks at how these villages dealt with 
their neighbours after settlement. It focuses particularly on the logic that pushed 
Myinmilaung to divide into several hamlets. I then analyse the reconfiguration of 
political affiliation with local authorities before the coming of the British. 
 
 
156 See Brac de la Perrière (2009) for a call in this direction concerning the domination of Buddhist 
narratives, and an example of how spirit cults reflects regional history (1998). 
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Figure 11. Timeline of the precolonial period 
 
DYNAMICS OF THE PRECOLONIAL POLITY 
 
 Myinmilaung was founded at a turning point in late precolonial history,157 
when U Aung Zay Ya, a village chief and warrior from Shwebo, rose as the founder 
of the last Burmese dynasty (Konbaung, 1752–1885) under the name of 
Alaunghpaya. The previous dynasty, the Restored Taungoo (1597-1752), was on 
the decline after having crafted its hold over the kingdom by placing the royal 
family in the capital, by subjecting appanage holders (myoza) and provincial 
governors (myowun) under closer supervision, by reorganising the servicemen 
(ahmudan) and non-servicemen (athi) populations in the nuclear zone, and by 
 
157 One of the turning points of the politico-administrative cycles that shaped the politics of Burmese 
kingdoms according to Lieberman (1984). 
1750s
• Myinmilaung’s foundation
• Fall of the Restored Taungoo
dynasty (1597-1752) – creation of 
the Konbaung dynasty (1752-1885) 
by Alaunghpaya (1752-1760)
1783 & 1802 Royal inquests (sittan) by King 
Bodawhpaya (1782-1819)
1800s-
1810s
• ‘Great Famine’
• Gawgyi’s foundation
1850s-
1860s
Thathameda reform by King Mindon (1853-78)
1885 Fall of the Kaunbaung dynasty – Annexation of 
‘Upper Burma’ by the British
1887 Enforcement of the ‘village system’
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structuring the administration into territorial158 and departmental159 jurisdictions160. 
This dynasty was slowly collapsing since the early eighteenth-century, facing 
dissidences among the king's relatives, ministers and the local gentry who either 
retreated to their localities or allied with the Peguan’s kingdom of the south 
spreading north.161 My area of study was part of the nuclear zone which 
represented: 
 
“[…] the northern sector of the dry zone. It resembled an ellipse with 
the four outer points at Myedu, Madaya, Yamethin, and Kani. Residing 
at Ava, roughly in the centre of the ellipse, the king and his chief 
ministers exercised direct authority over hereditary local headmen 
throughout this region. It was here that the early seventeenth-century 
monarchs obliged most appanage holders to reside, that they 
concentrated the military service population, and that the body of 
appointive officials was most numerous and variegated.” (Lieberman 
1984: 64) 
 
 The nuclear zone is thus a political construction of the landscape made by the 
Burmese kingship. Myinmilaung, today in Monywa Township, was then in Badon 
(Alon) province near the fortified town (myo) of Badon. The history of this area is 
that of a province gradually becoming the northwest outpost of the nuclear zone. 
Badon province was first a frontier area (taik) integrated into the kingdom during 
the expansion of the Pagan dynasty in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
(Lieberman 2003: 96). Such areas were usually entrusted to men of lesser rank, 
perhaps from powerful local families, known as “taik-leaders” (taikthugyi) living 
off apanage grants and local gratuities, and having within their territories 
“concentrations of royal servicemen (kyundaw or ahmu-dans)” (Lieberman 2003: 
113). In the stories about Bahtukyweh, the latter is an Indian prince defeated by his 
brother and entrusted by Anawrahta to rule Badon. In one version of the legend, 
 
158 This relates to the princes and officials who were allocated appanages or specific revenues over 
one or several townships in quality of myowun or myoza. 
159 The departmental jurisdiction refers the charges concerned exclusively with specific groups of 
population regardless of their location, such as the servicemen. 
160 On this distinction see Lieberman (1984: 63-112). 
161 Along with Tai and Manipuri raids in Upper Burma. See Lieberman (1984: 188-194). 
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Bahtukyweh was to “assume the privilege of a minor king”.162 In pre-Konbaung 
vocabulary, this is called a bayin. Modelled after the king, a bayin is the “cosmic 
pivot”163 (Lieberman 1984: 35) of the local society and usually of royal blood. 
Bahtukyweh, who was not a relative of the royal family, is nonetheless positioned 
as the founder of a local lineage (amyo-yo) that became the rulers of Badon through 
heredity. This is how imagery of continuity is produced by the legend: the leader of 
Badon was anchored in a province which was gradually integrated into the kingdom 
until local sovereignty was broke down by the royalty (and the local sovereign 
became a spirit). 
 As it was progressively incorporated within the successive Burmese 
kingdoms,164 Badon was “traditionally awarded” to a prince as appanage165 
(Lieberman 1984: 181) on top of having a provincial sovereign (called myothugyi, 
that is the “leader” (thugyi) of a “fortified town” (myo)). In addition, Badon became 
a central pool of recruitment of soldiers for the royalty as early as the 16th century 
and a place where elite military garrisons were stationed,166 notably the “blood 
drinker corps” (thwaythauksu). This kind of garrison was employed as royal guards 
during the heyday of both the Restored Toungoo and the later Konbaung dynasties. 
And in their foundation narrative, Myinmilaung people claim to be the descendants 
of this elite guard. After chasing Bahtukyweh from Badon, Alaunghpaya (1752-60), 
the founder of the Konbaung dynasty (1752-1885), designated another chief167 and 
specific revenues of the province were redirected in 1764 to one of his sons called 
“Badon prince” (whose posthumous name is Bodawhpaya). The latter changed the 
name of Badon to Alon when he became king in 1782. 
 
162 Cf. British Library archive file V/6606. Scott, James G., and John P. Hardiman. 1900-1901. 
Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States. 2 parts, 5 vols. Rangoon: Office of the 
Superintendent, Government Printing; hereafter referred to as GUBSS; the extract is taken from 
GUBSS, vol. 1, part 2: 7. 
163 This may relate to why the spirit worship of Alon Grandfather focussed on Bahtukyweh. 
164 According to the Royal Orders of Burma translated by Than Tun (cf. Than Tun 1983-1990. 
The Royal Orders of Burma, A.D. 1598-1885. In 5 volumes. Kyoto: Center for Southeast Asian 
Studies; hereafter referred to as ROB vol.) Alon (Badon) is one of the main towns controlled by Ava 
in the early fifteenth (ROB, vol. 2: ix) and was considered as a royal town in the seventeenth century 
(ROB vol. 2: xv). Alon boundaries seems to have been measured and fixed as an administrative unit 
following a royal order in 1692 (ROB vol. 2: 61). 
165 For instance, “specified revenues” were alienated by King Taninganwei (1714–1733) when he 
came to power to his brother known as the Badon prince who died around 1728 (Lieberman, 1984: 
78, 187). 
166 This trend was strengthened once Badon King rose to the throne in 1782. 
167 The historian Mya Sein makes a reference to Thamata Schwe Sanda who was Alon myothugyi 
in 1811; cf. Mya Sein (1973: 52). 
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 Badon is part of the Lower Chindwin Valley which “by the end of the 
precolonial period, [has become] the second largest population center and was the 
chief center in contributions to the royal pool of servicemen.” (Charney 2007: 228). 
This rise in population, cattle and expansion of agriculture happened in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Raids against Manipur, forced migrations, 
grants of land and reorganising of the population within groups of servicemen 
stabilised this frontier area during the rise of the Konbaung dynasty (1752 onward).  
 
 “From the 1780s and well into the 1820s, the Lower Chindwin Valley 
shouldered the heaviest burden in providing royal servicemen to the 
royal court. Only the royal capital rivaled the Lower Chindwin 
governorships of Alon (Badon) and Tabayin in numbers of settled royal 
servicemen and Alon was the single largest population center in the 
kingdom (including the royal capital). The Lower Chindwin, with Alon 
at its center, thus amounted to a special royal bastion in the Konbaung 
state. […] Alon was the kingdom’s busiest trading center outside of the 
royal capital.” (ibid.: 231) 
 
 It had an important impact on local agriculture,168 animals, and religion 
notably because forest-dwelling monasticism increasingly gave way to town- and 
village-dwelling monasticism, and thus “contributed to the spread of popular 
Buddhism, while a dwindling number of orthodox-minded monks used the royal 
court to assert state protection” (ibid.: 228). That group of monks, that Charney has 
named the Lower Chindwin literati as they drew their authority of both Pali and 
Sanskrit texts, used their connections with the King Bodawhpaya  (also known as 
King Badon) to attempt to assert control over religious and lay knowledge in the 
kingdom as a whole.169 The spread of Buddhism went in hand with the expansion 
of towns and villages and the rise of village monastery up to today. Gawgyi 
monastery is a case in point as it was founded during a moment of reformulation of 
Buddhism along new lines at the turn of the twentieth century, notably through the 
influence of Ledi Hsayadaw who, representing a middle ground between forest- 
 
168 Notably resulting in the production of dry crops used as fodder for cattle and horses on large 
scales. 
169 Cf. Charney (2006). 
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and village-dwelling monks, made Buddhism understandable to the general lay 
audience, through poems and stories and the presentation of Buddhism in less than 
traditional ways, while simultaneously producing scholarly work on Buddhism and 
influencing the contest against colonialism. 
 From the seventeenth to the late nineteenth-centuries, Badon hinterland 
included villages ruled by a more-or-less independent and hereditary gentry such 
as the Monywa, Kyawkka and Thazi village chiefs. The Badon chief did not rule 
undisputed over the others. The latter controlled different kinds of village leaders, 
revenue collectors and the like depending on local settings and customs. Even if the 
gentry “held important offices of rural government by hereditary right and provided 
the critical connection between royal courts and the general population” (Thant 
Myint-U 2001: 35), there was always a competition for office and wealth. From 
a longue durée perspective, the state attempted to organise the society by dividing 
the bulk of the population into ranks. Simply put, there were the royal relatives, the 
local hereditary gentry and the commoners. The latter were subdivided in three 
main groups, namely the “crown servicemen” (ahmudan), the “free commoners” 
(athi) and the “bondmen” (kyun), liable of different obligations to whom they are 
affiliated with. Yet, this segmentation was not as strict as proclaimed by the state. 
And people could change their status by moving away, shifting their affiliation from 
one authority to another and through mortgaging themselves or their family.170 
Kings acted as the ultimate patrons (“Lord of Life”, Lieberman 1984: 10) over all 
subjects alongside chains of patron-client down to the villagers, following multiple 
lines of territorial and departmental (or regimental) affiliations. In this view, the 
local polity was shaped by a tension between shifting patronage dynamics and 
attempts at structuring the administration (creating and reforming various layers of 
offices, charges, taxes, status groups, and so on).  
 
“From wun-gyi171 down to village headman, the relationship between 
ruler and official was based on the delegation of authority and 
concomitant rewards by the former in exchange for the total fidelity and 
service of the latter. The nature of this relationship was personal, as 
 
170 Cf. Aung-Thwin (1984). 
171 Governors appointed by the king. 
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opposed to legal or contractual, and was formalized at least once a year 
for all officials on ceremonial occasions known as kadaw, an 
untranslatable172 term.” (Koenig 1990: 138). 
 
 Seen from the crown’s point of view, the political structure was “patrimonial” 
(Lieberman 1984: 86), or “patrimonial-bureaucratic”, that is “based on a personal, 
traditional authority with obedience to the person rather than the office.” (Koenig 
1990: 99). The king was the patron of patrons, the chief of chiefs. The political 
dynamics can however be coined ‘galactic’ or ‘solar’ in analogy with other 
kingdoms of mainland Southeast Asia. Lieberman describes the typical Southeast 
Asian realm as a solar polity, that is “a system of quasi-sovereign satellites in orbit 
around a central sun whose gravitational pull, in lieu of fixed borders, ebbed with 
distance. Insofar as each planet had its own moons, which in turn had their 
dependencies, each satellite replicated in miniature the organization of the solar 
system as a whole.” (Lieberman 2003: 22). This description is, to some extent, a 
replication of Tambiah’s concept of galactic polity describing the Southeast Asian 
kingdoms as “center-oriented but centrifugally fragmenting polities” based on a 
collective representation of the cosmos as a mandala design where satellites are 
arranged around a centre and duplicating it (Tambiah 2013: 509). Tambiah insists 
on the pulsating quality of such a polity because, “if we introduce at the margin 
other similar competing central principalities and their satellites, we shall be able 
to appreciate the logic of a system that as a hierarchy of central points is continually 
subject to the dynamics of pulsation and changing spheres of influence.” (ibid.: 
511). 
 Cast in the realm of Burmese precolonial politics, the royal capital was the 
centre and fortified towns (myo), the satellites.173 The link between powers were 
oaths of allegiance (kadaw), and these alliances followed patron-client chains 
between persons. And even if heredity was a strong claim for office, it was not 
enough. There was no “powerful ascriptive element” justifying once and for all a 
leader, even for the king (Lieberman 1984: 83). Heredity, personal prowess and 
religious notions were claims to access or to justify access to office. For instance, 
 
172 A possible translation could be a homage or tribute ceremony. 
173 For analysis of the terms relating to power and territory (notably myo, nay, and taik) see Lehman 
(1981). 
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Alaunghpaya, the founder of the Konbaung dynasty, used this rationale to legitimise 
his position as new king. Because of his low hereditary credentials and after he 
vanquished the Peguan forces which destroyed the Ava Kingdom, he claimed that 
his achievements were stemming from his hpon (“charismatic glory”), itself 
reflecting his kan, the concretion of past meritorious deeds (ibid.: 229 & 240). 
Furthermore, personal patronage was conceptualised as a “debt of gratitude” 
(kyayzu) enacted through an oath of allegiance (ibid.: 73).174 On the one hand, 
personal ties were thus the main political link between authorities. But on the other 
hand, gentry chiefs were the “backbone of Burmese Administration” (Thant Myint-
U 2001: 34–35) because they controlled revenue collection, office succession and 
were the ultimate judges within their jurisdiction. 
 The local rising leaders represented a constant threat of fission and shifts of 
spheres of influence; hence the ‘pulsating’ character of this kind of polity. One 
interest of the ‘galactic’ or ‘solar’ theories is to show that tensions, fragmentation 
and reaffiliations are as important as moments of consolidation and structuration. It 
allows one to see leadership and the hereditary principle giving legitimacy to office 
holders as fragile and never achieved. But the pulsating metaphor also helps 
describe periods of unrest and political changes as moments of traffic in affiliation, 
such as when a new dynasty is founded or when the British ‘pacified’ Upper Burma. 
This is interesting because the founding of Myinmilaung happened during the 
transformation of the larger polity and, later, village headship was imposed after the 
collapse of the Burmese kingdom. 
 In Myinmilaung’s case, during the fall of the Restored Taungoo dynasty 
during the first half of the eighteenth century, Badon’s countryside looked like a 
patchwork of existing and in-the-making hereditary chiefs, appointed officials, and 
rising leaders: 
 
“As the court lapsed into impotence, a medley of cult figures, bandits, 
and gentry headmen established unchallenged control over the rural 
population. […]. Headmen and platoon leaders transferred their 
ambitions from the court to the locality […]. Ministers lost contact with 
 
174 Koenig has shown that this bond was notably enacted by drinking the water of allegiance (1990: 
138). 
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their departmental charges, while princes became isolated from their 
appanage population.” (Lieberman 1984: 194). 
 
 At the local level, hereditary chiefs focused on their own area of influence 
when the kingdom collapsed. A rising leader could reinforce its sway over a 
territory – and ultimately became a new chief – by consolidating his number of 
followers either through territorial expansions (taking royal land and revenues),175 
money lending and protection to farmers, alliances with other leaders or by 
marshalling crown servicemen as their own guards. This was, as we will see in the 
next sections, the context in which Myinmilaung was settled. 
 Gawgyi was founded later, when the Konbaung dynasty reached the apex of 
its strength under King Bodawhpaya. One of the tools the crown employed to 
control hereditary offices and revenues was to make the countryside legible through 
inquests.176 The most well-known were conducted under King Bodawhpaya in 1783 
and 1802 – from which were derived many of the documents called sittan or record 
of life and administration.177  A sittan was a “statement by the official in charge of 
a particular jurisdiction” (Trager and Koenig 1979: 5) of his duties, dues, the 
boundaries of his jurisdiction (a town or group of villages mostly), the population 
and status groups living within it and the taxes he collected by custom. The inquests 
thus produced a number of documents used “for all cases of disputed inheritance of 
local office and boundary disputes.” (Koenig 1990: 162). Based on these – overall 
incomplete – inquests, the legitimacy of hereditary office holders to rule the 
countryside was sanctioned by the distant crown. In other words, the inquests 
stabilised for a (short) time the distribution of power and authority in the 
countryside as if deriving from the crown. Thus, a sittan is like a snapshot 
displaying the state of local ‘traditions’ in one place. Let’s take a look at the 1783 
sittan of Taya village, located on the west of Alon, presented by Hardiman:  
 
 
175 See Koenig (1990: 31), Lieberman (1984: 165). 
176 Koenig indicates that these inquests may existed as soon as the fourteenth century, but we lack 
any record of those. The earliest records date back from the seventeenth century and notably of the 
inquest ordered by king Thalun in 1635-38 to reorganised crown administration. Alaunghpaya also 
attempted to make such inquest, but it failed (cf. Koenig 1990: 161). 
177 Cf. Trager and Koenig (1979). 
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“After reciting the boundaries of Taya village-lands, it continues: 
“From rice land bestowed as a gift on the Church,178 the Church dues 
are one tenth of the outturn, and there are, in addition, the writer's fee, 
the grain-dealer's fee and the village headman's fee, one basket of 
unhusked rice to each. On lands cultivated with dry crops, the Church 
dues amount to twice the amount of the seed sown, and there are similar 
additional dues. The State revenue is collected from Royal lands at the 
same rates, and there is a customs duty, on all food-grains sold, one-
hundredth part of the value. The mortgage money payable for a slave is 
one viss of silver: the purchase-money is three times that amount. For 
every ox and buffalo sold the customs due is one-eighth and one-fourth 
of the value respectively. Raw cotton pays one viss for every cart-load 
sold, and earthenware is mulcted in the fine of one pot for every cart-
load. For every basket of pickled tea sold, the headman claims half a 
viss of the leaves as his due. One-twenty-fifth of the value is the duty 
leviable on all other sales, and half the receipts go to the captain of the 
militia regiment which recruits from Taya village. When a head of cattle 
dies, the headman's share is one rump and one rib. In litigation over 
cattle, half the court-fee goes to the headman and half to the captain of 
the regiment. Within the jurisdiction are the villages of Nyodon, 
Mwedon, Tane, Hlawga, Inmati and Ngayaukthin, and all criminal 
cases from all these villages are triable by the Taya headman, to whom 
are payable fees for his presence at the taking of the oath, or at trial by 
the ordeal of eating rice, or of immersion in water.” (Hardiman 1912: 
25) 
 
 The general picture offered by this sittan displays a locality where customs 
slowly emerged from local history and settings in an area ruled by a hereditary chief 
who coexisted with crown units, Buddhist authorities and appointed officials. 
Villagers’ dues to various offices (chief, Sangha, clerk, crop broker, crown) are 
clearly recorded and the chief is central in judicial affairs. It corresponds to a static 
 
178 What Hardiman call a Church is in reality the Buddhist Sangha or congregation of monks which, 
unlike a Church, is not organised as an institution per se. 
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image of local governance. Stable provinces gathered groups of villages ruled by 
the same families for decades. The latter approved the succession of smaller 
hereditary offices in their countryside and judge or report cases, organise the 
collection of revenues through nominated revenue collectors, buffer the crown’s 
demands and report to crown appointed officials. Nonetheless, many of these 
‘traditions’ reflect a hierarchical organisation of the local society that was imposed 
through force and which became customary over time. 
 If we reduce the scale down to village government, the question of the control 
of land and harvest come to the forefront. For instance, Toe Hla (1987: 51) 
reconstituted the land distribution of Thayet-taw, a village of servicemen located 
near the royal capital of Mandalay, from the patent of land allotment issued by 
Royal Council (Hlutaw) in 1801. The bulk of the land was cultivated by the 
villagers. The families of servicemen worked on the land granted by the crown 
which, once inherited, became bobuapaing myay, that is “father’s and grandfather’s 
land” (Thant Myint-U 2004: 41). In the nuclear zone, most of the land was known 
as bobuapaing during the nineteenth century. People could mortgage and sell those 
lands, but they were not privately owned because they were primarily an inheritable 
asset (cf. Chapter 7). The Thayet-taw headman held a substantial estate and 
apparently controlled the allocation of land to newcomers as well as the extension 
of farmland to uncultivated areas included within the village territory. Such 
extensions were known as dama-u-gya myay meaning land owned by right of first 
clearing. Later these lands became inheritable. Some other land parcels, called 
samyay, were given as appanage to a member of the royal family and to appointed 
or hereditary officials. Some villagers were tenants179 on those lands and the crops 
became revenue – due to the crown, the gentry and to the estate holders – when 
collected by the chief or by a land surveyor180 after harvest. 
 But for Toe Hla, the local gentry was not a landed class. Labour control was 
essential because “land was plentiful [but] labour was scarce” (1987: 58).181 
 
179 There was a large variety of tenancy agreements, see Toe Hla (1987: 75), GUBSS (part 1, vol 2: 
351), for the early colonial period in the Lower Chindwin, see Hardiman (1912) and more recently 
Boutry et al. (2017) and Huard (2016). 
180 Often called myaydaing. 
181 Ferguson (2014: 197) insisted, after a long tradition of scholar, on that Power was not derived 
through ‘territory’ per se but rather through controlling labour as well as relations with regional 
powers and central authority waxed and waned. 
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Nonetheless, his study clearly shows that some gentry families182 near Alon 
accumulated large estate through money lending as a way to consolidate their hold 
over the countryside. At large, 
 
“local hereditary officials appear to have used the wealth derived from 
such sources as tax and sales commissions to acquire private control of 
substantial tracts of land through mortgage. […]. Headmen sometimes 
claimed private status for other lands under their control as well […]. 
Thus, there was some tendency for headmen to use their offices to build 
up what might be termed “estates,” which were farmed by a tenantry.” 
(Koenig 1990: 143) 
 
 And Myinmilaung and Gawgyi had to deal with this kind of power to normalise 
their settlement (cf. next section and chapter 4).  
In the early nineteenth-century, once the gentry families were recognised or 
created via the inquests, there were fewer avenues to accessing political office. One 
could be recognised by another authority, inheriting the office or buying it. These 
practices were not mutually exclusive and often combined. The first option relates 
to the custom ‘‘for the local authorities to decide collectively on the succession to 
a local office’ (Trager and Koenig 1979: 41). If the office is inherited, it passes on 
through lineal descent, usually via primogeniture – to the eldest son called auratha 
in legal literature183 – but not always (this have implications in how leadership in 
farming families is conceived and practice, chapter 7 on inheritance transmission). 
Rapidly, bribery and the formation of factions around disputing claimants made the 
competition for hereditary office “the essence of local politics” (Koenig 1990: 146) 
in the nineteenth century: 
 
“in almost every town and village in Burmah [sic] there are two parties 
of conflicting interests: the local officers for the time being, and some 
individuals, or the heirs of descendants of some who had been in office 
 
182 Notably the Lezin Family. 
183 Crouch (2016b) has shown that the Burmese word auratha (also transcribed as orasa and 
awaratha) comes from the Sanskrit aurasa (a legitimate son, literally “from the breast”); For an 
explanation of the law concerning the status and rights of the auratha according to Burmese 
Buddhist law, see Lahiri (1957). 
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at some former period. The latter closely watch the proceedings of the 
former. By setting one against the other, the Burmese government 
generally contrives to elicit the truth.” (Burney 1842: 338). 
 
 In other words, and to paraphrase the title of Berry seminal book (1993), no 
condition was permanent in the countryside. Another way to access office was to 
buy it. Competition for office also stemmed ‘‘from the practice of mortgaging these 
posts’’ (Trager and Koenig 1979: 41). The more the crown lost its hold over the 
countryside, the more offices were mortgaged, the easier it was to buy it.  This also 
led to increasing conflicting claims for offices in many locales. In the last decades 
of the Konbaung dynasty an increasing number of offices passed from hand to hand, 
to the great displeasure of the crown who attempted, in the meantime, to reform the 
administration. As Mya Sein noted, “[c]onsiderable amount of confusion and 
dispute resulted from this alienation of office and in 1245 B.E. (A.D. 1883), 
Thibaw's government issued instructions to Myothugyis and Ywathugyis 
forbidding the mortgaging and selling of the hereditary offices such as Myothugyi, 
Ywathugyi, Myingaung, Myinsi, Daing-gaung, Ahun [sic] etc.” (1973: 49). 
 Thibaw (1878-85) became king after Mindon (1853-78). The latter’s 
administrative reforms184 encountered a strong resistance in the countryside 
precisely because they tried to change the configuration of power at the expense of 
the gentry: 
 
“Between 1853 and 1878, and especially in the late 1850s and early 
1860s, Mindon and his ministers set in motion a series of policies 
which, taken together, amounted to a vast change of political power. 
Administration was centralised, royal agencies were bureaucratised, 
and a completely new system of taxation was constructed. Underlying 
these reforms were efforts to rationalise government, to do away with 
vagueness, haphazardness and local variation, to construct clear lines 
of authority and more definite boundaries of 
jurisdictions. Centralisation of administration meant increasing the 
power of appointed provincial officials over the many and varied chiefs 
 
184 For another perspective on these reforms, cf. Candier (2014). 
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of the rural office-holding class […].” (Thant Myint-U 2001: 115, my 
emphasis). 
 
 Mindon attempted to curb local authorities by centralising and modernising 
his administration in order to increase crown revenues and to cope with competing 
powers like British India. For instance, he tried to reduce local court jurisdiction 
and to fix judicial fees given to the local or higher court judges for various cases. It 
also planned to rationalise the gentry by creating “a single category of local 
hereditary officer in the place of the enormously confusing and varied patchwork 
of local magnates which still existed” (Thant Myint-U 2001: 116). This plan failed 
but the crown became more active in regulating succession of hereditary office and 
sometimes dismissed people for “not being of the chiefly family” as listed in the 
1783 and 1802 inquests (ibid.: 117). By introducing a single and more systematic 
tax – the household tax or thathameda – in the early 1860s, the crown struggled to 
suppress the old fiscal system ‘‘divided between the granting of appanages, 
collecting rent on crown lands and receiving a portion of the various gentry-
controlled customary fees and obligations, as much in kind or specialised 
manpower as in cash’’ (ibid.: 121). The thathameda tax was in theory an income 
tax amounting to one-tenth of household income and progressively stabilised at a 
rate of ten rupees. But it proves to be more of a property tax based on people's 
wealth and activities. In Alon, the tax impacted mostly the people farming the best 
irrigated lands and added to the debt burden of many peasants. Instead of 
undermining the revenue position of hereditary office-holders – yet this tax was a 
key complaint during later armed rebellion against the crown – they were left in 
charge of its collection with all the lability for requiring long-standing dues. 
Besides, Mindon, and later Thibaw, increased the powers of the appointed 
provincial officials (myowun) and introduced new institutions modelled from the 
British administrative apparatus of Lower Burma like the township officer (myook) 
around Mandalay.185 Yet, the reforms were unable to profoundly transform the most 
local level. Coupled with a succession crisis, these reforms partly led to warfare in 
the countryside: 
 
185 The post-1878 government also created ten district commissioners (hkayaingwun) or 
decentralised agents of the kingdom. 
152 
 
“This neglect of the gentry encouraged the increasing penetration by 
outsiders of still important hereditary offices as well as much infighting 
among local elite families over chiefly positions. The last proper 
accounting of local hereditary offices and office-holders had taken 
place in 1805. By the early 1880s, in many areas two or more persons 
were claiming the same chiefly position. […]. By annexation, British 
sources said that some rural offices were changing hands as often as 
every few months.” (ibid.: 168) 
 
 Overall, the battle for office turned into political turmoil during the few years 
prior to colonisation. Warfare, pervasive in the countryside,186 was a renegotiation 
of unstable agreements between the state, local authorities, officials and ‘bandits’. 
At the crown level, the fall of Konbaung dynasty in the late nineteenth-century 
looks like the political crisis of the mid-eighteenth century. But instead of a new 
dynastic cycle, the royalty was replaced by a direct colonial administration. At the 
local level, the variety of officials, of bands of ‘bandits’, and the remaining 
hereditary gentry leaders were the ones competing for shifting political spaces. The 
pre-existing and shaky balance between various local authorities and powers was 
strongly challenged during more than a decade before British arrival. This state of 
affairs eventually shaped how the British conceived administrating the countryside 
and led, in our case to the grouping of Myinmilaung and Gawgyi under the same 
jurisdiction under a single headman. 
 
COMPETING FOUNDING NARRATIVES 
 
 This part of history has been mostly forgotten by villagers. But a few myths 
and legends are still alive and cast into the politics of the Myinmilaung village tract. 
They underscore the atmosphere of animosity between Myinmilaung proper and 
Gawgyi. This section explores both villages’ founding narratives as current 
discourses about history and as key chronological markers that help reconstruct the 
 
186 Cf. Charney (2004, 2018). 
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history of the local polity. As stated earlier, oral memories draw out connections to 
the past at the expense of others. It displays layers upon layers of history linking 
Myinmilaung and Gawgyi residents to two different sets of references. The 
Myinmilaung founding narrative links them to a founding king, to a local sovereign, 
and to religious patronage to support their claim as genuine and legitimate 
allochthones. But it fails to mention how Myinmilaung and Gawgyi were united 
under a single polity at the turn of the twentieth century. In contrast, Gawgyi people 
posit themselves as autochthones, from the land, with thick connections with 
neighbouring villages and anchoring their knowledge of the region since pre-royal 
times. These claims, legitimising each other’s presence in the countryside, are 
mutually exclusive. People from Myinmilaung and Gawgyi are not the same. And 
this is a backdrop against which the rise of village affairs as the main form of 
politics in Gawgyi – disregarding Myinmilaung but integrating Tozigon village – 
can be understood. 
 
The genuine allochthones 
 
 In U So’s narrative, the creation of Myinmilaung occurred when the local 
sovereign, Bahtukyweh, was chased by a king in the mid-eighteenth century and 
eventually killed himself. But who was Bahtukyweh? And what was he in charge 
of? In the villager’s narrative, Bahtukyweh was the lord of Badon. He may have 
become the Badon chief during this period. But he may also descend from the 
gentry family that ruled Badon for decades. The best hypothesis is that he embodies 
the figure of Badon sovereignty before the rise of the Konbaung dynasty (1752-
1885). What is sure is that he is at the centre of the regional spirit cult.187 As such, 
he is known as the ‘Grandfather of Alon’, the local sovereign spirit. The legend of 
this deity follows a typical narrative where kings submit local sovereigns and turned 
them into spirits. In his 1912 Lower Chindwin Gazetteer, J. P. Hardiman, Deputy 
Commissioner of the Lower Chindwin District and Settlement Officer, gave the 
first account of this legend: 
 
187 Alon festival is part of the annual cycle of the main naq festival performed in central Myanmar, 
see Brac de la Perrière (1998). 
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“Much of the tradition of the district centres around Bodaw-gyi, or 
Batha-gywè, and introduces the Buddhistic revival of the eleventh 
century A.D. Bodaw-gyi was the son of the king of the island of Thitala 
and, on their father's demise, he and his brother contested the 
succession. Batha-gywè was defeated, and the younger brother, Patai-
kaya, ascended the throne. The elder entered the service of Anawrahta, 
King of Pagan, won his way into favour, and was allowed to assume 
the prerogatives of a king under suzerainty and to choose his own 
capital. He proceeded up the Irrawaddy and arid Chindwin; captured a 
white elephant, Nga-yan-aung, at Sinbyu-gyun; landed at Kinmun, now 
on the Sagaing side of the Lower Chindwin border, and was presented 
with the skin of a lizard, out of which he made a drum. It was on this 
occasion that he met a maiden selling cakes and made her his queen, 
after the fashion of Cophetua and the beggar maid. Mônywa means the 
village of cakes and commemorates the incident. Continuing his march, 
he fixed on Kyibadôn (Badôn or Alôn) as the site of his palace. Every 
three years Batha-gywè paid tribute to Anawrahta and, after that 
monarch's death, to his successors up to the time of Sawmunit, when he 
refused tribute. Sawmunit marched on Kyibadôn and surrounded the 
place, but Batha-gywè mounted Nga-yan-aung, beat on the magic drum, 
and routed Sawmunit and his army. Sawmunit then employed 
Brahmans to win the ear of Batha-gywè. They came to his court and 
persuaded him to cover the drum with another kind of skin and to cut 
off Nga-yan-aung's tusks. Sawmunit again attacked Kyibadôn, and this 
time with success. Batha-gywè fled to Salun, a few miles north of Alon 
on the Chindwin, was closely followed, and threw himself into the river, 
where he and his company, thirty-seven in number, perished [sic].” 
(Hardiman 1912: 27-28).188 
 
188 Hardiman Gazetteer was found in the British Library archive file I.S.BU.147. Hardiman, John P. 
1912. Gazetteer of the Lower Chindwin District, Upper Burma. Rangoon: Office of the 
Superintendent, Government Printing; hereafter referred to as Hardiman 1912. A version of this 
legend can be found in GUBSS vol.1, part 2: 7-8. Another version of this legend can be found in 
Brac de la Perrière (1998: 313-316). I also collected a version on the 20th of January 2015 with Alon 
palace’s guardian. 
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 Drawing from an interview with the guardian of Alon’s spirit palace in the 
1990s, Brac de la Perrière specifies that when Sawmunit found the dead bodies on 
the Chindwin bank, two centuries after Anawrahta gave an office to Bahtukyweh, 
“he beat them with his sceptre, and they appear in a position of homage. 
Transformed into naq, the king installed them in a palace in Alon and appointed 
guards.” (Brac de la Perrière 1998: 313, my translation). The typical elements 
included in the tales related to the creation of naq by the royalty are presents: the 
regalia and their magic, the ruse, the wrath of the king, the violent death, the 
transformation into spirit through royal agency. Simply put, the Grandfather of Alon 
fled, with his dependents, a king he deceived to eventually perish in violent 
circumstances. Even if the ‘Grandfather of Alon’ had and still has a particularly 
strong cult and even if it was a key event in the succession of possession ceremonies 
delineating the core area of the kingdom, it was not integrated in the royal Pantheon 
of the Thirty-Seven Lords.189 Nonetheless, he is a recognised figure of local power 
integrated within the narrative of the founding of kingship.190  Bahtukyweh may not 
be a person in particular.  As naq, he represents both “indigenousness, […] an 
emanation of the local communit[y]” from which he derives his powers and “the 
local sovereignty that the king is forced to recognise” (Brac de la Perrière 1996: 49-
50, my translation). Thus, Bahtukyweh cult was integrated into the narrative of 
kings as naq’s tamers and was the figure of local sovereignty. He may be the first 
ruler of Badon/Alon but also potentially any of the successive chiefs. But he can 
also be seen as a prominent local person191 who became Badon/Alon chief de facto 
when royal control declined.  
 In the Myinmilaung version, Bahtukyweh is a sort of timeless ruler of 
Badon/Alon. But he was allegedly chased in 1111 B.E. (1749/1750 C.E.), and this 
is the moment when Alaunghpaya, the founder of the Konbaung dynasty, marched 
 
189 There is no well-established history of how this Pantheon was created and how spirits were 
selected. It seems to be a state artefact for self-legitimacy and the first official list of naq known for 
the kingdom of Ava dated from king Pindale’s reign (1648-1661) and does not include Alon 
Grandfather, cf. Brac de la Perrière (2005: 231). Spirit cults can be an entry to study specific regions 
without focusing on state-centred narratives as naq stories condense and reconstruct elements of 
local history within relatively standardised narratives. 
190 Cf. Brac de la Perrière (1989). 
191 Bahtukyweh literally means “the wealthy one’”, a title referring to his position in a society largely 
divided between status groups organised by the crown.  According to Thant Myint-U, thu-kyweh 
stands for an inferior grade of the hereditary money lending class (Thant Myint-U 2001: 43-44). 
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in this region to fight the forces which supported the more southern kingdom of 
Pegu. This period marked the collapse of the Restored Toungoo dynasty (1597–
1752) after it lost its sway over local administration and chiefs from the late 
seventeenth century onward: 
 
“At Mônywa, Kin-u, Mok-hsò-bo, Okpo, Pegu [sic], and other locales, 
people consulted omens and prophecies to identify the new ruler that 
they might quickly attached themselves to his cause. […]. Unable to 
retard the growth of local autonomy, Maha-dama’-ya-za-di’-pati’ [the 
last Toungoo King from 1733 to 1752] bestowed titles and insignia on 
the most successful headmen and bandit chiefs in an attempt to assert 
nominal control over their forces. Thus in 1745–1746 he rewarded local 
leaders, while authorizing them to amass arms and men in their own 
districts. Of the six names listed in this order, five were on the north 
shore between the Chindwin and upper Irrawaddy, where famine and 
invasions were least debilitating and where in consequence headmen 
could marshal the largest following.” (Lieberman 1984: 195) 
 
 Two villages traditionally under Badon chieftainship, Thazi and Kyawkka, 
were listed in the 1745-46 king’s order.192 In other words, Thazi, Kyawkka and 
Badon chiefs affiliated with the Peguans, the then rising enemy of the declining 
Restored Toungoo dynasty, while the “Lord of Monywa” did not.193 Thus, local 
chiefs affiliated with the camp they deemed successful. In the same vein, the usual 
independence faded between the servicemen – governed by a hereditary regimental 
chief194 – and the chief of the area195 they are living in. The tale about 
Myinmilaung’s creation intersects with Alaunghpaya’s campaign in the Lower 
Chindwin “where he vanquished Pegu’s most loyal northern supporters” 
(Lieberman 1984: 236). He targeted the descendants of the Talaing (also called Mon 
or Peguan) people, garrisoned in Upper Burma as military servicemen, and the 
 
192 Cf. Lieberman (1984: 195, note 231). 
193 Cf. Lieberman (1984: 236, note 31). Monywa was still under a myothugyi, the ‘Lord of Monywa’, 
who followed Alaunghpaya because of his network of relatives. 
194 Cf. Mya Sein (1973: 42). 
195 Cf. Lieberman (1984: 97) also indicates that the leaders of departmental or territorial jurisdiction 
located within a township were subordinate to the myothugyi. 
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members of the local gentry who supported the Peguan kingdom. In Myinmilaung’s 
story, Bahtukyweh was in charge of Badon and, according to Hardiman and 
Lieberman, Badon chief was in Pegu’s side: 
 
“At the beginning of Alaunghpaya’s reign, in 1752, Kyaukka, Thazi, 
Alôn (Badôn), Amyin (in Sagaing), and Tabayin in Shwebo, joined 
Talaings196 who had escaped from the Talaing garrisons in Upper 
Burma on Alaunghpaya’s accession to power, and rose against that 
monarch. […] Alaunghpaya despatched a flying column in their rear, 
burnt Alôn, Ngapayin and Kinzan, both east of Kudaw, the Burmese 
contingent deserted, and the Talaings in the garrison were easily 
overcome. Some of the Talaings fled to Kyaukka, but were massacred 
by the Burmans of that place. Alaunghpaya left garrisons in the villages 
east of the Chindwin, appointed headmen, and took oaths of 
allegiance.” (Hardiman 1912: 20)197 
 
 In other words, Alaunghpaya rose as the founder of a new dynasty and the 
ruler of Badon perished violently in his flight. These events have a striking 
resemblance with the legend of the Grandfather of Alon and may have been the 
historical material from which it was crafted. It means, for Myinmilaung people, 
that their village was created when Bahtukyweh (embodying Badon sovereignty) 
tried to escape the king’s wrath. And some of his followers stopped during the flight 
because there was “not enough horses”. 
 If Myinmilaung was founded by Bahtukyweh’s followers, who were they? 
Since at least the sixteenth century, Badon had to marshal a substantial military 
population while keeping a tradition of independent sovereignty in its hinterland.198 
Badon was early on recorded as a fortified town which had to provide hundreds of 
 
196 ‘Talaing’ is a name sometimes use to describe either Mon people or their language. In this 
citation, it refers to the people taken as war captive and then transformed as servicemen under the 
Restored Toungoo kingdom when it vanquished the southern Peguan kingdom. Colonial 
administrators and early historian often assimilate Talaing, Mon and Peguan in their narrative, using 
ethnic lenses to explain political affiliations. However, as Lieberman (1978) explains, it is far from 
obvious that ethnicity was used as a political tool at that time. 
197 Hardiman’s account draws from Maung Tin’s History of the Alaunghpaya Dynasty⁠ (1905). 
Maung Tin was Sagaing Township officer at the early stage of British settlement operations in the 
1890s. 
198 Lieberman (1984: 32), Charney (2006: 62-69). 
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soldiers to the king’s army.199 Some of them belonged to a specific group of a 
society organised in ranks according to their closeness with the king. From the 
1780s and well into the 1820s, the Lower Chindwin Valley assumed the heaviest 
burden in providing servicemen to the court and Alon was the single largest 
population centre in the kingdom.200 Badon/Alon harboured an important number 
of servicemen during the eighteenth century201 and notably202 a group called the 
“elite crown service unit” (Koenig 1990: 305) whose members were bond by blood 
drinking oaths (thwaythauksu). This kind of platoon usually lived on irrigated lands 
granted by the crown near the fortified town of Badon. In other words, Myinmilauq 
founders were potentially Bahtukyweh’s close retainers. During the period of 
‘unrest’ of the late 1740s, and the decline of royal authority, Bahtukyweh was the 
patron of Badon’s elite crown service unit de facto. It also means that those who 
stayed in a hideout and founded Myinmilauq were theoretically hereditary 
servicemen of high status.203 This is at least the underlying claim of the current 
villagers who, by narrating and connecting the founding of their village to an event 
of importance, legitimise their presence by underscoring their link with the 
sovereign of the region and imagining themselves as descendants of a prestigious 
group of the crown’s servicemen. 
 In addition to the affiliation with a chief who became the subject of the most 
important cult in the region, and to the royalty, U So’s narrative also emphasises a 
more religious legacy. In 1776 (1147 B.E.), that is thirty-seven years after its 
foundation, the village received another name. This time it was U No, a royal 
astrologer,204 who stopped by on his way home from the royal capital of Ava. He 
allegedly founded a pagoda, called Shwepanhla (figure 3), on the eastern side of 
the village and named the settlement Mingalagon, the “Auspicious Hill”. Name 
 
199 Cf. Toe Hla (1995: 37-38), cited from Than Hlaing (2013: 8). 
200 See Charney (2007). 
201 In 1783, according to Koenig’s evaluation of population’s trends during the Konbaung era, about 
56% of the people in Badon Township were crown servicemen who represented 9,684 persons out 
of 17,418 (Koenig 1990: 241). Among the large variety of servicemen (soldier, boatman, horsemen, 
gardeners, astrologers…) the type of servicemen living away from the capital area, as for Badon, 
were mostly soldiers (Lieberman 1984: 94). 
202 Personal communication from U San Tiha, senior associate professor of history at Monywa 
University. 
203 The thwaythauksu platoons were, according to the listing of over 200 types of servicemen made 
in 1691, the elites guards enjoying the highest social standing among the servicemen (Lieberman 
1984: 174). 
204 Astrologer does not correctly render the Burmese ayudawmingala amatgyi but relates to how this 
person read omens. 
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changes are a quite common practice for villages but also for people and reflect a 
layering of histories in a person’s or a place’s trajectory. A person may change his 
or her name when he or she deems it useful. “This is especially the case when a 
person considers himself “unlucky”, literally “not having good karma”. However, 
one does not change one's name only when things go wrong, but also when the 
person is at an important turning point in his life and one must place this new 
beginning under the best omens.” (Robinne 1998: 92, my translation). In our case, 
from “Not Enough Horses”, denoting Bahtukyweh’s debacle, the name became 
“Auspicious Hill” and the village received a pagoda, which became at this period 
an essential element in the making of a human settlement. In other words, the 
discourse about the village’s early years displays how Myinmilaung literally put 
itself under better auspices through the agency of a royal official. 
 But overall, Myinmilaung’s founding narrative condenses layers upon layers 
of history connecting it to a regional sovereign, to a group of elite soldiers, and to 
a royal official making the landscape more Buddhist. Such connections serve to 
legitimise the very existence of the settlement. Myinmilaung story is thus not about 
autochthony, but about being genuine allochthones with enough credentials to give 
legitimacy their presence in the landscape. In short, they play the servicemen's card 
(ahmudan), as it refers to royalty, soldiery and sovereignty, in order to justify their 
place and position in the current landscape. 
 
The autochthones 
 
 But Gawgyi people have a different story about the foundation of Shwepanhla 
pagoda, even if the village was created after. For them, U So failed to mention that 
it belongs to a series of three pagodas which were not created by U No, but by an 
alchemist long before Badon became a fortified town. There is Shwepanhla near 
Myinmilaung (recently renovated), Shwepanhswe near Budaungkan (also 
renovated), and Shwepankhaing located in the farm fields north of Gawgyi (figure 
3). The three pagodas dot an old road between Kyawkka and Badon/Alon. On the 
31st of August 2016, we visited Shwepankhaing with Ko Kyaw and his brother. 
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Figure 6. Shwepankhaing, the abandoned pagoda 
 It is a ten-minute drive from Gawgyi, followed by a five-minute walk. 
Nowadays, nobody really goes there anymore. We get off the bikes and stop by a 
small pond. Both of them repeatedly told me that they were just Buddhist, that they 
do not believe205 in naq. Yet, as we approach the abandoned pagoda, Ko Kyaw’s 
 
205 Using the verbe yongyi, which means, following Rozenberg argument (2015), that they do not 
personally and actively engage with naq. 
161 
brother plays recitations of Buddha’s teachings on his phone, to ward off bad spirits 
he says. When we reach the edifice, my companions quickly kneel and pray. 
 The alchemist who founded the pagodas knew how to make gold. He was 
travelling in this area with five hundred carts full of gold in a search for a place 
where he could perform a ritual to become a zawgyi, that is, a semi-immortal human 
with supernatural powers. On the way, whenever a cart’s wheel hub broke down, a 
pagoda was established. The persons who helped building them, putting the gold 
(shwe) inside before sealing it, died (maybe sacrificed) and became hsoun (a sort 
of ghost acting as the guardian spirit of the pagoda) that can catch you with their 
gaze. Nobody, however, can see them, except for cows. This pagoda is now almost 
abandoned, for only a few persons from Budaungkan celebrate a festival for this 
pagoda. People are afraid of coming here. People used to go there one generation 
ago, but when somebody took gold and brought it home, that person suffered from 
severe itching until the gold was restored. The alchemist eventually reached a hill 
on the other side of the Chindwin river and there, after meditating and eating 
magical food, he “entered the fireplace” (hpowin) and was reborn206 as a zawgyi. 
That hill is called Powintaung207 and the legend about the zawgyi is said to have 
happened before the advent of Theravada Buddhism in the country,208 and even 
before Bagan Kingdom (9th-13th centuries C.E.). Some even think that the alchemist 
story happened before the Tagaung dynasty209 (9th century B.C.E). In other words, 
Shwepankhaing, the pagoda north of Gawgyi, is part of a landscape shaped during 
the ancient history of the region, where chronology does not matter, and is an early 
trace of Buddhism. By reading the landscape in this terms, Gawgyi people anchor 
their settlement in continuity with this history. 
 They, however, do not have a narrative of foundation comparable to 
Myinmilaung’s. Gawgyi was most likely established by settlers fleeing a nearby 
village during the reign of Bodawhpaya (1782–1819). Some of Gawgyi elders said 
that a famine pushed their ancestors to move away. The most important famines in 
 
206 The local legend says that he was reborn directly as an adult. 
207 Powintaung is a major archaeological site harbouring a complex set of caves displaying mural 
paintings and status dating from as early as the fourteenth century (cf. Munier-Gaillard 2010) and is 
now one of the most visited places in the region, attracting tourists and pilgrims. 
208 Theravada Buddhism was allegedly introduced under the King Anawrahta (1044-78). 
209 The Tagaung Kingdom is a semi-legendary state officially proclaimed to be the first Burmese 
Kingdom by the Royal Chronicle (Hmannan Yazawin) of the Konbaung dynasty which links this 
dynasty to the Sakya clan of Buddha himself. 
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this area were related to King Bodawhpaya’s increasing requests for corvées, 
soldiers and taxes which led to a great change in the kingdom’s demographics in 
the early nineteenth century.210 For his campaign against Siam in 1809, “every town 
and village [were] required to produce a certain number of men” (Koenig 1990: 
34). If the local hereditary chiefs failed to recruit, officials in charge of the 
conscription were ordered to confiscate villagers’ properties and to carry out 
corporal punishment. “In the face of these exactions, many families decamped to 
less accessible rural locales” (ibid.), usually where they could find water. The 
combination of bad rains and the systemic lack of farm labour, due to state 
recruitment and people migrations, led to the great famines from the 1800s to the 
1810s. 
 Gawgyi settlers went a few miles away from Ywadon (figure 3) and the 
village’s spirit shrine is located on the way between these two places, on the verge 
of Gawgyi. It seems that a few families joined where there was a “large flat pond” 
(gangawgyi) appearing during the monsoons. The village was named after this 
pond. Today, most of the villagers are part of loosely structured lineages evolving 
through descent and marriage. The local political theory is that the main lineages of 
the village come from Ywadon families who became the first farmers in Gawgyi. 
After settling close to the pond, the villagers created a more permanent living space 
to the west. They organised that space around two main pathways going from east 
to west and north to south. Since that time, these ways orient the flows of mingala, 
or “auspicious influence”). The east is the auspicious entrance and the south the 
inauspicious exit leading to the cemetery.211 The construction of houses also 
followed village pathways. Gawgyi pagoda and monastery, the other elements 
delineating village space, were founded later in the north by an influential monk, U 
Za Nay Ya, who lived there since the early 1900s (chapter 4). This matrix of 
settlement influences how village space is imagined and, as we will see in chapter 
6 and 8, negotiated.  
 
210 Cf. Koenig calculation of population trends based on the 1783 and 1802 royal inquests (1990: 
241). For instance, Koenig shows that Alon lost about 60% of its registered population between 
1783 and 1802. This figure is an approximation, but it appears that a large share of this population 
was either recruited for war campaigns, canals and pagodas construction, or escape state demands 
by migrating away. Cf. Koenig (1990: 142-143) and Furnivall (1957: 39). 
211 Cf. the general introduction and the section on landscape. 
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 In the Gawgyi narrative, the idea is thus that they are indigenous locals. They 
come from the land and, as many villages, settled near a waterhole. They do not 
justify their presence with a narrative connecting their presence with the royalty or 
a local sovereign. With the shape of the village, the concentration of houses in the 
village core, the story about farming families becoming the main lineages, all these 
elements contribute to defining them simply as autochthones. Gawgyi, in contrast 
with Myinmilaung, play the commoner’s card (athi), whose strict definition – 
“landowners living permanently in one locale’’ (ibid.: 114) – supports their claim 
for indigenousness. 
 This is also obvious in how they talk about the neighbouring village of 
Budaungkan. Inhabited later than Gawgyi, most likely in the 1920s-1930s, they see 
it as “mixed” (yaw), where populations were merely a blend of migrants that settled 
near an old pagoda, Shwepanhswe. However, during the same period, more families 
from Ywadon also moved and settled near Gawgyi to create Tozigon village. And 
today, Tozigon villagers depend upon Gawgyi for conducting ceremonies (as we 
will see in chapter 6 and 8) since its main families were integrated within Gawgyi 
lineages. The scope of what is common in village affairs (chapter 4 and 8) was thus 
extended to Tozigon, but never encompassed Myinmilaung proper nor 
Budaungkan. 
 Therefore, the different narratives of foundation also reflect the long-term 
relations between neighbouring villages. In this perspective, the opposition between 
Myinmilaung proper and Gawgyi is expressed, at one level, in divergent, if not 
competing, narratives of indigeneity: one emphasising its legitimacy as genuine 
allochthones, the other as autochthones. These stories are as much an entry into the 
study of the political landscape at the time of the creation of villages as they are to 
local understandings of their history and current relationships. It shows how the 
precolonial organisation of status groups became a register of claims about the 
relations people have with their landscape. 
 
COMPOSING WITH LOCAL POWERS  
 
 This section explores the evolution of the political landscape in Myinmilaung 
and Gawgyi after their settlement. It first looks at Gawgyi’s case and then at the 
164 
internal logic that pushed Myinmilaung to divide into several settlements before 
finally analysing the reconfiguration of political affiliation with local powers. This 
area is located between two old routes linking Monywa with Thazi and with 
Kyawkka (figure 3). Both Thazi and Kyawkka chiefs traditionally ruled areas of 
dry lands of more or less good quality while the “Lord of Monywa” looked 
southward toward irrigated soils mostly (Lieberman 1984: 236). 
 Gawgyi was created when King Bodawhpaya tried to stabilise regional and 
local authorities through revenue inquests while at times entire villages evaded his 
requests for manpower. If we follow the spirit of these documents, we can imagine 
how Gawgyi was integrated the local political landscape. During the last years of 
the reign of this king, the village was integrated into larger political spaces through 
the patronage of the Kyawkka chief and the agency of Ywadon, Gawgyi’s ‘home’ 
village. Gawgyi may have had a man nominated as a revenue collector (myaydaing) 
or some villagers were recognised as ten-houses’ leaders. But this is not certain. 
Gawgyi villagers, approximately a dozen families, were not a special corps of 
servicemen and thus tended to be commoners who could always be mobilised if 
affiliated with a local chieftainship. Koenig points that the sharp administrative 
division between servicemen and non-servicemen produced by state policies was 
rather “a continuum running from total service without local labour commitments 
and land taxes at the far end of the crown service sector to mostly dues and little 
local labour at the far end of the athi sector.” (Koenig 1990: 115). In other words, 
and in the context of the Badon province at the turn of the 19th century, there was 
not many differences between servicemen and commoners: almost every 
commoner was a serviceman. The difference laid mostly in the kind of agreement 
they were able to negotiate with the neighbouring chiefs.  
 The cultivated areas – mostly dry lands first farmed through shifting 
cultivation and a few rice paddies – varied with the growth of the village population 
and their capacity to accumulate cattle and seeds as well as being able to get loans 
from the local gentry. Gawgyi villagers progressively created their own cultivation 
area by trading to the north with Obo and Myinmilaung villages under Thazi gentry, 
and to the south with Ywadon village under Kyawkka chieftainship. Control of 
land, manpower, harvests and the establishment of dues and duties between villages 
and local authorities was gradual. The more or less formalised system of tenure – 
and taxation – emerging from the stabilisation of the settlements was always subject 
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to change depending on natural hazards, war, famines, migrations and on the ability 
of leaders to control land access to build up their territory.  At first glance, the 
evolving property relations mixed shifting cultivation – turning to inheritable 
permanent holdings (bobuapaing) through right of first clearance (dama-u-gya) – 
with dues to local authorities on many kinds of production, especially on harvests 
of millet and beans. The making and stabilisation of villages then integrated the 
larger fiscal system of the royalty ‘‘divided between the granting of appanages, 
collecting rent on crown lands and receiving portion of the various gentry-
controlled customary fees and obligations, as much in kind or specialised 
manpower as in cash’’ (Thant Myint-U 2001: 121). Thus, Gawgyi’s case seems 
rather conventional: its affiliation with Ywadon makes it possible for Kyawkka 
gentry (appointed in the mid-eighteenth century) to integrate Gawgyi within its 
domain. And the local forms of patronage were recognised by the royalty. For 
instance, according to an order dated on 7 February 1758, people under a chief “may 
carry out whatever service is required of them, be it the carting of bricks, timber or 
stone, other miscellaneous jobs, the building of temples and monasteries, social 
work such as marriages, funerals, etc. together in unison.” (Yi Yi 1968: 110). On 
top of the dues to the gentry was also the paying of taxes.212 Local chiefs like the 
Kyawkka leader gathered more wealth and fixed manpower while villagers like 
Gawgyi people were recognised as legitimate occupiers of the land. This eventually 
reinforced the claim for autochthony which, a few decades later, would be based on 
the idea that they are “real farmers” (taungthu). 
 Myinmilaung’s case is again more complex and we need to return to the time 
of its foundation. The settlement split into three hamlets which, as a whole, 
affiliated with a neighbouring chief and took over a pre-existing village (Obo). A 
better understanding of the political dynamics of that period can be drawn from the 
study of how this settlement was standardised. To look back on the unfolding of 
events, a question needs to be asked: if the founders of Myinmilaung were elite 
servicemen previously fixed on land granted near Badon, why did they not go back 
there once Bahtukyweh was defeated?  
 
212Cf. Mya Sein (1973: 166-171). 
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 In the late 18th century, servicemen like the Myinmilaung founders commonly 
lived with their families in the same village under a low-ranking chief responsible 
for the regiment: 
 
“Along with their wives and children, these men commonly inhabited 
the same village. Thus the village headman was also the platoon leader 
[…]. [P]latoon members commonly received lands as a conditional 
grant from the crown. […]. In return for these tokens of royal favor, a 
fixed proportion of each platoon was required to be on duty, usually at 
the capital, to execute those hereditary tasks in which the platoon 
specialized. […]. On-duty ahmu’-dàns [sic] had to perform private 
chores for their superiors and to give them periodic gratuities that were 
quite distinct from their responsibilities to the crown.” (Lieberman 
1984: 96–101) 
 
 If we assume that Myinmilaung founders were living under almost similar 
conditions near the fortified town of Badon before Alaunghpaya chased them, then 
why did they not go back to their homeland afterwards? Let’s get back to what 
Hardiman stated about Bahtukyweh’s flight as a start: 
 
 “[…] the Burmese contingent deserted […] Alaunghpaya left garrisons 
in the villages east of the Chindwin, appointed headmen, and took oaths 
of allegiance.” (Hardiman 1912: 20). 
 
  The neighbouring chieftainships (Badon, Thazi and Kyawkka) were 
fragmented and competing when Myinmilaung was founded. One scenario is that 
Myinmilaung founders were recognised through their former military status. But 
instead, the village was established near another one called Oo Bo and then divided 
into several hamlets when the logic of village leadership and recognition gained 
momentum over the necessity to hide. Myinmilaung was divided into three hamlets 
following regimental and/or kin affiliations. There was the “Western Corp” 
(Anauksu), the “Eastern Corp” (Ashayzu), and the “Corp of the Middle” (Alezu). 
These are the old names – sometimes still in use – recalled by current villagers and 
they clearly denote a regimental organisation (su or zu). (figure 9).  
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 Even if Bahtukyweh was ultimately their chief, the servicemen gathered in 
the flight may not have all been from the exact same village and/or under the same 
leader. Hence, the division into several villages reflects either a scission in 
leadership and/or a split based on kin ties. What we know is that servicemen 
villages, which were often kin groups, tended to be closely governed by either an 
appointed headman or a hereditary chief because they were essential manpower for 
the royalty213 and local sovereigns. Leadership – usually at the royal and gentry 
levels – was legitimated in terms of charismatic power, of patronage and of rightful 
filiation. As seen in the general introduction, a chief was chosen either because of 
his achievements, his affiliation with supra-authorities through patron-client 
relationships, and because he posits himself as the head of founding lineage. That 
is not to say, far from it, that every village had a chief – sometimes people living in 
the same locality were dependent upon different chiefs. The nature of the local 
polity was fundamentally fragmented. Nonetheless, Myinmilaung’s past regimental 
organisation and/or affiliation on kin ties shaped the making of this new political 
entity. 
 But what did they become? Were they still servicemen or did they become 
athi, that is commoners solely liable of taxes? The most probable assumption is that 
they were both (or none per se) and that they reaffiliated within a new regiment 
through the agency of a local chief. According to Lieberman,214 one of the main 
avenues for a serviceman to change his hereditary status was debt bondage,215 by 
mortgaging himself and/or his family to a patron. But our case may be different. 
Myinmilaung founders gradually entered under the authority of the Thazi chief who 
expanded his territory. We assume so because there is no evidence – neither in 
 
213 The servicemen population was notably expanded and reorganised in the mid-seventeenth 
century under the Restored Taungoo dynasty, notably under the king Thalun (1629-1648) who 
ordered the recording of servicemen appanages’ acreages and boundaries, taxes and obligations due, 
population statistics and precising the role of village ‘headmen’ in recording population’s 
movements in 1635-1638 (cf. Lieberman, 1984:104). This prefigures a larger reorganisation of 
servicemen under the Konbaung King Bodawhpaya (1782-1819). 
214 Cf. Lieberman (1984: 102, 107, 166). Lieberman also relates to Adas (1981: 226-228) and Hanks 
(1962) in his discussion of whether debt-slavery was an act of protest or a way to accommodate a 
deteriorating situation. 
215 There were broadly three categories of bondmen: the religious ones donated to a monastery for 
its upkeep for instance; the hereditary ones, usually prisoner of war; and the debt-bondmen who 
were the most numerous. Debt bondage covers a large array of situations ranging from people unable 
to pay their taxes, such as servicemen, or those willing to change their status to escape the obligations 
ascribed to it. Cf. Lieberman (1984: 107). 
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historical accounts nor in early colonial reports216 – showing that land was allocated 
to military servicemen where Myinmilaung was created. 
 So, what was the (political) landscape around Myinmilaung? The hideout was 
in a partly uncultivated forest. Close to Myinmilaung in the north was a village 
called Obo (the “old-man’s pot’’). The elders in Myinmilaung agreed that U Bo Bo 
is the name of the oldest chief they can remember, and it seems to be, like 
Bahtukyweh, the generic name of a local authority. Obo village also appears in the 
first cadastral map produced by the British around 1887-90, but it later disappeared 
in favour of Ogon (the “Pots’ Hill’’) in Hardiman’s Report of the Regular Settlement 
of 1909. My hypothesis is that U Bo Bo217 was the Obo chief, or head of the local 
lineage and the person Myinmilaung settlers had to negotiate with. In addition, this 
village was surrounded by small plots of rice paddies, the only one in the area, and 
those plots were recorded in the same map under the name of what seems to be the 
descendants of a certain U Bo.218 Thus, U Bo Bo is a generic name for the head of 
the lineage populating Obo when Myinmilaung was settled. Obo village was too 
small219 to be the loci of a gentry family sovereign over a large group of villages 
(the usual form of local office). It was, however, a small village chief who could 
have facilitated the affiliation of these newcomers with a gentry family on a 
territorial and regimental basis. 
 The families of the three hamlets forming Myinmilaung (“West Corp”, “East 
Corp” and “Middle Corp”) were probably considered as outsiders (katpa) by local 
authorities who granted them land a posteriori. For Koenig, “kat-pa were migrants 
from other communities and were only allowed to work athi land with the 
permission of the local authorities. Such permission was contingent on the 
migrant’s agreement to share the community’s dues and service obligations” 
(Koenig 1990: 114). In other words, people creating a village sooner or later faced 
 
216 Cf. Hardiman (1909, 1912). Yet, people could have under-reported land given through Kings’ 
orders as it was considered ‘state land’ by the British and those were the first lands surveyed and 
taxed (cf. chapter 4). 
217 As for Bathukywe, U Bo Bo is a generic term used to name an authority of the past. It means the 
“old man” and most probably refers to the person who gave his name to this village specialised in 
the making of pot (“O”). 
218 Those names (U Bo Shwe, U Bo Nyunt, U Bo Hla and so on) covers the best land surrounding 
the village. And the adjunction of an ancestor name in the one of the children, rare in the Burmese 
context, indicates a common lineage when it happens to such an extent. 
219 Composed of 33 households in the late 1810, while Thazi was the home of 622 households (the 
figures correspond to the number of households assessed for the payment of tax in the late 1910s). 
Cf. Hardiman (1909: 179-180). 
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different types of authority. And the customary dues and duties owed to each other, 
as they appear in the sittan, stemmed from the agreements settled during the first 
encounters.   
 In Myinmilaung case, it became gradually encapsulated within the expanding 
village territory of Thazi chief appointed by Alaunghpaya in the early 1750s. Such 
office holders were crucial political players who could act as patrons or protectors 
trying to maintain or gain power. Competition, the main dynamics at the gentry 
level, depended on the recognition from royalty, the affiliation with other local 
rulers, and the establishment of dues and duties with villages (under a territory) 
and/or people associated with a chief (status group). Yet, another means to expand 
one’s hold over the countryside was money lending. In the Thazi-Myinmilaung 
case, this relationship lasted (chapter 4) and it questions the place of land tenure in 
the making of local politics as, eventually, Myinmilaung villagers became a sort of 
tenantry under the Thazi gentry.  
 In the Badon/Alon countryside, the crown became a relatively distant power 
and the town and village chiefs buffered against its requests while defending their 
prerogatives according to local customs freshly renegotiated. Aside from traditional 
dues and duties between rulers and subjects, money lending was crucial leverage 
for the local gentry and may have led to the creation of landed estates. Villagers 
became indebted to avoid military conscription, to afford burials, weddings or 
Buddhist noviciate ceremonies, to rent draft cattle, to buy seeds, pay labour and 
sometimes taxes, and to finance court fees in case of inheritance dispute.220 
Sometimes, a village chief also took loans to pay crown taxes. Loans were mostly 
contracted from April to July,221 that is before and during major agricultural 
work.222 “Peasant proprietors, whenever they were faced with economic hardship 
due to failure of rain, political unrest, natural calamities or epidemics, used to 
mortgage their land. Thus, they became tenants. People who did not possess land 
or other valuable property resorted to the sale of their children, wives, or 
themselves.” (Toe Hla 1987: 78). While mortgages were commonly usufructuary223 
during normal periods, in times of hardship, the local money lenders, usually the 
 
220 For a discussion of the impact of money lending on commoners, see Toe Hla (1987), and notably 
chapter 6 “Money lending and the common people” (pp.186-230). 
221 Cf. Toe Hla figures on distribution of loans on a monthly basis in Lezin village (1987: 221). 
222 A trend that is still prominent today, cf.  Boutry et al. (2017). 
223 It means that the mortgagee was the one farming the land. 
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gentry families, provided money to the mortgagor who often kept working on the 
same land. The local gentry, as the main money lenders in the countryside, 
progressively accumulated the land peasants mortgaged to pay their debts. For 
instance, Thant Myint-U, using Toe Hla’s data224, shows an incremental 
transformation of some local gentry families as land owners near Badon in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 
“An example is the Lèzin [sic] family, who were the hereditary myinsi, 
or cavalry officers, of villages near the town of Alon in the lower 
Chindwin basin. […]. The Lèzin family, together with two other related 
families, dominated much of the countryside, holding all the important 
administrative and judicial offices and slowly building up sizeable 
landed estates. The three families were in turn related to nearby chiefly 
families. Through money-lending and the buying of land from indebted 
farmers, this gentry family acquired more than 600 acres outright 
during the early nineteenth century and controlled the land over one 
hundred other families in the area who had mortgaged their holdings.” 
(Thant Myint-U 2001: 39). 
 
 Thus, the local gentry was also establishing its hold over a fragmented 
countryside through money-lending since the second half of the eighteenth 
century.225 We lack the same data concerning the Thazi family, but the period is 
contemporaneous and money lending from the Thazi family had a lasting effect on 
Myinmilaung politics. One descendant of that family, drawing from his family’s 
contractual relations with many villages, became an infamous money lender during 
the colonial period. And Thazi’s successive chiefs are called, a posteriori, 
myayshin226 (literally “landlord”) by the elders in and around Myinmilaung. And 
thus, if the new gentry of the Badon/Alon polity did not own very large estates per 
se, they controlled large estates through money lending and debts.227 In the case of 
Myinmilaung, this was done by first making the new settlement liable to them. Over 
 
224 Cf. Toe Hla (1987: 156-160). 
225 Cf. Saito (1997) for a study of this process in a rice growing area. 
226 A name denoting control over land, harvests, debts and manpower rather than ownership. 
227 This is something that Hardiman, as Settlement Commissioner, will attempt to analyse when 
devising a system of taxation taking the various forms of tenancies into account. 
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time, Myinmilaung people were initially also able to clear new lands through 
shifting cultivation. But they hardly matched the strict category of commoner 
because of their dependency toward the Thazi family. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Overall, the precolonial period in the Badon/Alon area displays a landscape 
of fragmented sovereignties competing for offices following a galactic polity 
pattern. Myinmilaung and Gawgyi had to deal with unsteadying centres by 
engaging with preceding and in-the-making authorities. Both villages were created 
during times of ‘turmoil’, either during the fall of a royal dynasty, when different 
powers and authorities centred on their locales (1750s), or during migrations related 
to a widespread famine ensuing crown demands for labour and soldiers (1810s-
20s). Internally, village settlement followed lineage or regimental affiliations, 
depending on their previous experiences. Externally, villagers had to engage in 
multiple and shifting political affiliations. They notably had to face gentry leaders 
using migration, warfare and change in royal ability to govern the countryside to 
increase their jurisdiction. People’s status and positions were often negotiated, and 
the gentry’s hold over the countryside was transformed. This ‘traffic in affiliations’ 
at the local level shows that the gentry was not a monolithic group, but rather an 
assemblage of powers constantly in the making using various resources (heredity, 
patronage, money lending, revenue collection and land control) to consolidate their 
position through a continuously changing political landscape. In this perspective, 
the history of the countryside is that of a competition to access office either by force, 
by claiming entitlement via familial succession, local customs and individual 
ability, or by buying mortgaged offices. The renewed attempts by the kings to 
control these fragmented sovereignties from 1850s onward led to a renegotiation of 
local leadership and to warfare. This was the very situation the British encountered 
when colonising Upper Burma and they, for a complex set of reasons, created 
village headship to control the countryside. One effect of early colonialism was to 
centre local politics on the village arena. Furthermore, Myinmilaung and Gawgyi 
were eventually bound under the same jurisdiction when Myinmilaung’s first 
headman used village headship to craft his own jurisdiction. In other words, along 
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this period of more than a century, the stakes of the competition for leadership 
changed, but the competition remained. 
 This chapter also showed that, cast in the realm of contemporary politics, 
Gawgyi and Myinmilaung’s founding narratives are tales about their differences in 
terms of indigeneity anchored in precolonial socio-political organisation. They each 
have a specific link in the landscape and the fluid system of status groups 
(servicemen vs commoners) thus still pervades the fashioning of the political 
landscape in the form of differentiated claims toward indigeneity. Myinmilaung’s 
story is not about autochthony, but about being genuine allochthones with enough 
credentials to legitimate their presence. Gawgyi’s is about autochthony. This 
difference, to some degrees, reflects the scope of possible commonalities between 
both settlements. They had to live together under the same village tract since the 
early nineteenth century, they intermarried, and exchanged ceremonials presents. 
But they are not in solidarity. 
 The question now is to look at how village headship has been imagined and 
imposed during the British’s ‘pacification campaign’ (1886-1889) of Upper Burma 
in order to then explore the merging of Myinmilaung and Gawgyi within a single 
village tract at the turn of the twentieth century.  
173 
INTERLUDE. THE EMERGENCE OF VILLAGE HEADSHIP 
(1880S-1890S) 
 
“THE IDEAL THUGYI…” 
 
“[T]he ideal thugyi is a man who possessed influence and has good 
family connections in the circle in which he presides. […] He must 
possess a good knowledge of land measurement and surveying. He 
should be able to exercise his influence for good in any way that affects 
the welfare of his circle without concentrating on revenue only; more 
particularly in matters relating to crime, and he should aid police 
enquiry by affording information of bad characters, by procuring 
evidence, by putting police in possession of those detectives agencies 
with which his long residence and local experience on the spot will have 
made him familiar.” (Colonel Sladen 1883, cited in Mya Sein 1973: 
79). 
 
“[…] the gentry class […] governed the countryside under varying 
degrees of royal direction. Often titled and granted sumptuary 
privileges, these men served as intermediaries between the distant Court 
[…] and the thousands of villages and hamlets scattered across the 
lowlands. And yet British policy-makers, rather than attempting to co-
opt their services into the next regime, deliberately shunted them aside. 
Myothugyi quickly lost their dominant position. What had been a 
complex hierarchy of local hereditary offices dissolved into a sea of 
undifferentiated and salaried village headmanships.” (Thant Myint-U 
2001: 4–5, my emphasis). 
 
“The object of the Regulation is to establish on a legal basis the existing 
village system in Upper Burma. The Government of India is aware that 
the chief characteristic of Burman society is its inorganic nature. There 
is no hereditary aristocracy and no tribal or caste system. The only rank 
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which is recognised is official; even the differences in wealth between 
man and man are insufficient to give any preponderating influence to 
individuals. It is therefore of the greatest importance that the only form 
of organic life which Burman society exhibits, namely, the village 
system, should be maintained and strengthened.”228 
 
*** 
 
 The above citations question the type of governmentality British colonialism 
has been willing to create in Upper Burma. For Colonel Sladen, a British army 
officer with a long experience in British India and in Burma,229 the ideal headman 
(thugyi, meaning “the great”) should be a local with personal influence; a sort of 
patron with moral authority, incline and able to implement British policy. For Thant 
Myint-U, historian, colonialism destructed the precolonial hierarchy that organised 
the countryside based on the gentry. For Smeaton, voice of the Chief Commissioner 
of Upper Burma Charles Crosthwaite (1887-1890) who imposed the village system, 
the latter was the most stable feature of local government and so, it should be the 
first level of colonial administration. 
To some extent, these citations relate to many debates, one has just to think 
of Scott’s arguments, partly related to the peasantry in the rice frontier of Lower 
Burma, that the erosion of patron-client bonds (1972b), the subsistence crisis and 
peasant rebellions (1976) were intimately linked to the practice of colonialism. 
Iwaki (2015) has already argued that the establishing the village system reveals the 
differences of opinion between Crosthwaite and other officials over how 
precolonial society should be conceptualised, but that in spite of a big difference in 
the local situation from one region to another, the colonial government went ahead 
with the legislation, in the assumption that Burmese society had been homogeneous 
and that one administrative system had been prevalent throughout. The purpose of 
this chapter is to show how the village system and headship have emerged in our 
area of study in order to connect it to a major transformation of Myinmilaung and 
 
228 Cf. REVSUB, letter dated 8 of September 1887 and written by Smeaton. 
229 Sir Edward Bosc Sladen (1831-1890) was a British army officer who worked in India. He served 
as the organiser of provisional government in Upper Burma and oversaw the surrender of King 
Thibaw (1885). From 1876 to 1885, Sladen was commissioner of the Arakan division and he 
accompanied the force sent against King Thibaw as chief political officer. 
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Gawgyi political arena in the next chapter. Following scholarship that challenge the 
idea of colonial invention,230 I chose to talk about the ‘emergence’ to give room for 
continuities, ruptures, reinterpretations, reforms and reconstructions. In this vein, 
the chapter supports a narrative that underscores the historical part of this thesis, 
namely that the creation of headship was but an episode of competition for 
leadership understood as a longue durée dynamics of the local polity. Thus, the 
question of whether or not the British have broken the ‘“moral and administrative 
control” of local Burmese elites (Thant Myint-U 2001: 198) is set aside to the 
benefit of studying how village headship became a central institution of colonialism 
in order to explore how it actually evolved in Myinmilaung village tract. 
The village system imposed that each village was responsible for police 
matters under a headman. Its implementation lasted for decades, the villages being 
segregated, grouped, divided and regrouped depending on revenue and land 
administration mostly. Yet, its inception happened in a context of warfare during 
the ‘pacification campaign’ (1886-89) following the annexation of Upper Burma in 
1885. The fashioning of this policy stems from a search for local tradition231 but 
also derived from the experiences of government in Bengal, Punjab and Lower 
Burma. On the ground, colonial administrators tried to work out who to work with, 
giving a lot of space for entrepreneurs to fashion themselves as clients of the new 
regime. The gathering of intelligence about the local authorities showed a rather 
diverse political landscape. Nonetheless, village headship was devised as if an 
indigenous institution. This policy was a legal bricolage that used local customs 
fitting colonial purposes. For instance, the supposed joint responsibility of villages 
concerning cattle rustling – already found in Punjab – was then transformed into a 
collective responsibility of villages for denouncing and fighting those ambushing 
British forces. And even if headship, as a new type of leadership, was swept into 
precolonial dynamics, the village system created a climate of suspicion and 
promoted the insulation of villages, now responsible for their own affairs within a 
village tract and under a centralised government. As we will see in the following 
chapters, it had a lasting effect as a matrix of local government. It insulated villages 
 
230 Notably Berry (1993) and Spear (2003). 
231 See the archive file REVSUB. 
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within groups, or village tracts, and became the subject of protest against 
colonialism (chapter 4) and will remained the base of local governance.232 
This chapter has a specific voice as it draws from archives research233 and 
secondary sources234 but not from field data per se. It is an incursion within the 
making of a policy and relates to scholarship that studied colonialism as a non-
monolithic enterprise.235 While first section describes the context of warfare during 
the pacification campaign, the second explores the ad hoc appointments of headmen 
in Alon subdivision and the third focuses on the content of the village system. 
 
  
Figure 12. Timeline of the emergence of village headship and map of colonial Burma 
 
232 For instance, once the socialist regime collapsed in the 1970s, the ensuing military government 
will use headman to control people’s movement, enforcing forced labour; cf. chapter 5. 
233 Cf. notably REVSUB, GUBSS, Hardiman (1909, 1912) and in the British Library Archive file 
I.S.BU.35/42/2. Hughes, T. L. 1932. Report on the First Revision Settlement Operations of the 
Lower Chindwin District, Season 1928-31. Rangoon: Office of the Superintendent, Government 
Printing; hereafter referred to as Hughes (1932). 
234 Notably Aung-Thwin (1985), Charney (2004, 2018), Cheesman (2015), Crosthwaite (1912), 
Iwaki (2015), Mya Sein (1973), Thant Myint-U (2001) and White (1913). 
235See notably Berry (1993, 2000) for a general approach, Saha (2012, 2013) and Saito (1997) for 
the Burmese case and Spear (2003) for a literary review. 
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WARFARE AND PACIFICATION 
 
 Since the late 1870s, Alon, and the Lower Chindwin plain, were a hotbed of 
rebellion against the king and its officials. “By 1883 the situation had become so 
bad that no district commissioner could be posted to either Sagaing or Alon because 
of the complete breakdown of government authority. […]. Three hundred of the 
North Marabin regiment together with the elite Natshinyway (“chosen by the 
gods”) were sent to Alon.” (Thant Myint-U 2001: 173).  The revolt gathered gentry 
leaders, their followers and ‘bandits’ rallying against the crown. But the warfare 
also included local squabble between villages over resources and leadership. There 
was not one unified ‘rebellion’ against the crown with a clear-cut agenda and 
temporality but rather many dynamics. The gentry leaders who maintained their 
position like Monywa and Thazi chiefs fought openly or covertly against the king. 
They gradually stop transferring the revenue and maintained appointed officials out 
of local affairs. They also retained as much as they could their claim over judicial 
jurisdictions, used once again servicemen and soldiers as private retainers, 
expanded their territory and accumulating enough wealth to maintain their position. 
When the kingdom’s sway diminished, the gentry leaders previously deprived of 
their office also fought to regain it and local settlements fought each other’s over 
resources236 in the midst of large migrations toward the forests and the British-
controlled Lower Burma. 
 At the close of 1885, the British started conquering Upper Burma, that is the 
falling Burmese kingdom, its tributary regions and areas that were not even under 
the crown’s influence. British troops went nearly unchallenged to Mandalay, the 
then capital. The reigning King Thibaw was sent in exile in India and overnight the 
Burmese kingship disappeared. The Chief Commissioner first attempted to rule 
through the Royal Council and the few officials and ministers not openly in 
rebellion. Soon the British decided that the Burmese state could not be transformed 
as a protectorate due to his weak hold over its former empire. They chose to rule 
directly most of the kingdom’s ‘nuclear zone’ and indirectly for most of its prior 
tributaries.237 The imposition of a direct rule was gradual. The first step was the 
 
236 Cf. Charney (2018). 
237 Gradually becoming, among others, the Shan (cf. GUBSS), the Kachin (Leach (1954), Robinne 
and Sadan (2007), Sadan (2013)), the Chin (Lehman (1963)) areas. 
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‘pacification’ of the countryside during which precolonial turmoil often turned into 
guerrilla warfare, in continuity with the precolonial period.238 Throughout the 
‘pacification’, colonial administrators gathered and shared diverging information 
about how to and through whom it would be possible to rule the countryside at a 
low cost. Champion of this search for traditions, Sir Charles Crosthwaite devised 
the ‘village system’ to break down local rural warfare when he became Chief 
Commissioner in 1887. His view was that villages were the only functioning 
institution in Upper Burma and so the village headman was an ideal – yet imagined 
– customary position able to administer the countryside and to crush rebellions. 
 The formal annexation of Upper Burma by British India was followed by 
more than two years of violent fighting with “at its peak in 1886-7 over 40,000 
British and Indian troops and military police” (Thant Myint-U 2001: 198). Alon 
subdivision was quickly ‘pacified’ during the first months of 1886. In many other 
areas there was a more or less organised fighting against colonial rule. It started at 
the fringes of pre-existing political spaces under the leadership of crown unit chiefs, 
rising leaders, gentry chiefs, ex-officials (including myowun and myoza), prominent 
monks and “malcontent Princes, or persons calling themselves Princes”.239 Of these 
leaders, “the most prominent was Hla U, who persistently eluded attack and held 
his own on the borders of Ye-u, Sagaing, Shwebo, and the Chindwin district.” 
(Thant Myint-U 2001: 120). For Crosthwaite, warfare was not mere brigandage but 
a “a system, a long-established system, of government by brigands”. People were 
helping the “bandits” and “paying tribute to the leaders, who did not need to use 
coercion” (Crosthwaite 1912: 103, 83). And the kingdom officials recently 
appointed were a prime target. 
 To some extent, ‘social banditry’,240 outright looting and resistance were 
conflated into one picture of endemic rural violence that required colonial rule.241 
Cheesman argues that there was a deliberate misuse of the term rebel and dacoit (or 
‘bandit’) by the colonial administrators as it allowed to ignore the grievances that 
 
238 Cf. Aung-Thwin (1985b). 
239 Cf. GUBSS vol.1, part 1: 119 
240 Eric Hobsbawm (1959, 1969) defines social bandit or social crime as a popular form of lower-
class social resistance involving behaviour characterised by law as illegal but supported by wider 
(usually peasant) society as being moral and acceptable. 
241 As Ranajit Guha (1997) has argued concerning India where rural violence (crime and resistance) 
had been homogenised by the colonial administration. 
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could explain the violence (2015: 194-195). In addition, Charney shows that the 
Burmese sources “make clear that the fighters were made up of entire rural 
settlements and the fighting was often between one settlement against another. […]. 
One can easily imagine a heritage242 of violent conflicts between rural settlements 
in competition for water, trade, or other resources.” (2018: 169-171). Village 
headship became a resource to fight for in Alon region. And so, it is easy to imagine 
how some people turn out to be clients of the new regime and sought opportunities 
locally by becoming headmen. 
 
THE SEARCH FOR TRADITIONS 
 
 Crosthwaite’s village system was born out of an ideology of pacification,243 
of colonial officers’ experience in British India, of their knowledge about society 
and of their helplessness to make local government legible. On the ground, the 
creation of a working administration was gradual and office holders were “replaced, 
sometimes by members of the same family […], sometimes by myo-ok  […], or 
sometimes by other “influential men” or “men elected by the people” who were 
hastily selected on the spot” by touring officials (Thant Myint-U 2001: 213). 
In February 1886, F. D. Raikes was established as Deputy Commissioner of 
the Central Division in Alon, which later became the headquarters of the Lower 
Chindwin District. “The country in the immediate neighbourhood of the post was 
first settled, and in April a garrison arrived, and was followed in July by the 
Chindwin Military Police.” (Hardiman 1912: 24). Myinmilaung and Gawgyi244 
went rapidly under colonial rule within Alon subdivision and later in Alon 
 
242 Smith (1991: 88-101) argued for seeing banditry as a social fact in the longue durée of the country 
history, as small groups of armed men, called tat, or pocket armies, were always present as during 
Alaunghpaya conquests, before and during the British ‘pacification’, in the 1920s-1930s, after 
British departure (from 1946/47 to the 1960s) and then it became located mostly in the hills area 
with ethnic minorities. 
243 Aung-Thwin (1985b) argued for a different understanding and temporality of the ‘pacification’ 
between the British and the Burmese. The former seeing it as the eradication of rebels and the 
territorialisation of revenues in a rather short time (1886-89), while the latter’s idea of pacification 
relates to a different temporality, in which only after Ne Win coup in 1962 was the country pacified, 
marking an end to the revolts and the restoration of order since the departure of the King. 
244 They were too small to appear in the records yet. 
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Township.245 Raikes’ diary,246 written during the ‘pacification campaign’ in the 
Chindwin District, shows that the nomination of local intermediaries was an ad hoc 
process. It involves the need to find pre-existing authorities or reliable candidates, 
to fight dacoits, to secure supplies routes and to include population and territories 
within legible jurisdictions whenever possible – jurisdictions that could be 
transformed afterward. The gradual creation and delimitation of political spaces 
such as Divisions, Subdivisions, Townships, and Village Circles followed this ad 
hoc process. Locally, this dynamic was also dependent on the pre-existing 
experiences of colonial officers and on the accuracy of information gathered via 
interpreters. In short, when pacifying and laying the foundations of a colonial rule 
around Alon, Raikes focused on military needs, on submissive and stable authorities 
following pre-existing colonial practices. 
 But the creation of the Village System also resulted from the compilation of 
information on the local political systems. From this search for traditions emerged 
the picture of a messy countryside. On the 22nd of March 1887, Crosthwaite gave 
instructions and asked for reports from all Commissioners and Deputy 
Commissioners “on the subject of the organization of village police”: 
 
“It is believed that nearly every villages in upper Burma has its thugyi 
or headman; that these men collect taxes, for which they are paid a 
percentage; that under the Burmese Government they had powers of 
dealing with small offences and were held responsible for the police of 
their villages; that they were often, if not usually, hereditary; and that 
the villagers were consulted more or less in making such new 
appointments (and) that in some cases they held land by virtue of their 
office. […]. The village thugyi should be a person of some rank and 
position (and) ought to occupy a position similar to that of the police 
patel in Bombay. […]. The villages will then be grouped for police 
purposes in circles under some post or outpost […]. If there are circles 
 
245 Once the Division was split into three townships. 
246 Cf. Raikes Papers. 
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for revenue purposes, the police circles should coincide with them so 
far as may be.”247 
 
 This abstract reflects the main purpose of Crosthwaite’s Regulation to provide 
for the Establishment of a Village System in Upper Burma. This policy was 
presented as a double-edge sword: a weapon for crushing the revolts against the 
British and a tool for administrating the countryside following the practices 
developed in British India and Lower Burma. What was clear for Crosthwaite – that 
there existed a timeless and indigenous village system in Upper Burma – was, 
however, slightly unclear for most of the colonial officers on the ground. They 
rather encountered a large variety of office holders. First, there was the so-called 
thugyi which became a general category for naming a local authority. But there was 
also crown service chiefs like myin-gaung and thwaythaukgyi, hereditary or 
appointed officials like myothugyi, myowun, myook, ywaok, myaydaing, shwayhmu, 
ngwayhmu, and so on. As Donnison, a colonial officer and historian, puts it, “one 
of the greatest difficulties was to make sense of the inconsistencies of Burmese 
administrative arrangements: most difficult of all did they find the personal 
jurisdiction which existed alongside, or rather woven through, the more intelligible, 
though still unstereotyped, territorial jurisdictions. […]. In size, authority, condition 
of tenure, in fact in every respect, it was hard to find two charges alike.” (1953: 23). 
These had “to be fitted into a “regular” system” (Thant Myint-U 2001: 212). The 
challenge for the officers was to define who is subordinate to whom, who can 
appoint whom, what revenue existed, how is it shared and why is a position 
legitimate against another. In his answer to Crosthwaite’s call for information, 
Raikes provides the following statement concerning Alon:  
 
 “In Alôn subdivision, 5 Myothugyis and 213 Thugyis have been 
appointed; in Alôn township there is 1 Myothugyi and 66 Thugyis. In 
the Alôn subdivision, 113 Thugyis administer more than one village. 
[…]. In the Alôn Township the average number of villages in a 
Myothugyi’s circle is 23. […]. The remuneration received by Thugyis 
 
247 Cf. REVSUB, Telegraph n° 949, my emphasis. 
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varies considerably and depends very much on individual influence. 
The recognised fees are - 1) ten per cent. commission on the thathameda 
collection; 2) fees in petty civil and criminal cases; marriage-fees […]. 
Many Thugyi hold land which was granted to them by the Hlutdaw, 
others have simply annexed lands on their own account without 
permission. As soon as land taxation is introduced, exemption might 
with advantage be allowed up to a certain extent to Thugyis who own 
and cultivate land. I am informed that the majority of the Thugyis in 
Lower Chindwin are not landholders; […]. Maps248 showing proposed 
grouping of villages for police purposes under posts or outposts are 
submitted for the Alôn, Kindat, Legayiang, and Kubo Valley 
subdivisions. […]. Sé-eingaungs exist in most villages in the Chindwin 
[…] they hold no official position; they act as assistants to Thugyis and 
help getting in thathameda collections and in carrying out of orders of 
officials in their villages; they receive a small remuneration from 
Thugyis and are exempted from payment of tax.”249 
 
 Raikes does not depict a uniform countryside dotted with independent 
villages, each under one thugyi. His laconic report – like those of his cohort – is 
rather an attempt at making a political maelstrom legible through averages and 
generalisations. Only thugyi and myothugyi are described. They are numbered, their 
jurisdiction is assessed according to how many villages they control to produce 
trends and their revenue is standardised as much as possible.250 Matching local 
jurisdictions with police posts meant recognising authorities emerging out of 
warfare. Raikes fought, judged ‘dacoits’, appointed office holders, dismissed 
others, reinstated few, fought again, looked for informants to kill ‘dacoits’, issued 
certificates for some office holders, secured telegraph lines, had his administration 
listing local authorities, villages, potential boundaries… It became clear for colonial 
officers on the ground like Raikes that localities were very different from one 
 
248 I have not been able to find these maps. 
249 Cf. REVSUB, Telegraph n°53-8 by Raikes dated 24 June 1887. 
250 This relates to the questions concerning headmen’s remuneration (whether based on a share of 
the thathameda they collected or through tax exemptions and land allocations), concerning the 
potential usefulness of the ten-houses’ heads and the matching of police posts with village 
groupings. 
183 
another (“thugyi remuneration depends on individual influence”) and that in the 
past there was much in-fighting to control land and wealth (“land was annexed by 
force”). In fact, the British were another player in the competition for power and 
wealth as the main political dynamics of the countryside. But the village system 
was imagined in a different perspective. 
 
THE VILLAGE SYSTEM 
 
 On the 28th of October 1887, Crosthwaite’s regulation was enacted: 
 
“The Deputy Commissioner shall appoint a headman in every village 
or group of villages. In appointing a headman, the Deputy 
Commissioner shall have regard, so far as circumstances admit, to any 
established custom which may exist respecting the right of nomination 
or succession or otherwise and to claims based thereon. […]. When in 
any village or group of villages there are two or more headmen one of 
whom by custom exercises authority over the other or others, the 
Deputy Commissioner shall decide which of them shall be the headman 
for the purpose of this regulation, and  […] may make rules to define 
and regulate their relations to each other.”251 
 
 The regulation was a ‘how to’ organise the countryside and appoint 
authorities. It gave a high degree of flexibility for colonial administrators. But also 
for local leaders and political entrepreneurs who could built for themselves a 
jurisdiction. Let first look at how the imposition of the village system was justified 
by Crosthwaite himself in his memoirs published in 1912 under the title The 
Pacification of Burma: 
 
 “The Village Regulation […] established on a legal basis the ancient 
and still existing constitution of Upper Burma. While emphasizing the 
responsibility of the village headman, it […] also enacted the joint 
 
251 Cf. REVSUB, Art. 3 of the final regulation. 
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responsibility of the village in the case of certain crimes; the duty of all 
to resist the attacks of gangs of robbers and to take measures to protect 
their villages against such attacks. In the case of stolen cattle which 
were traced to a village, it placed on it the duty of carrying on the tracks 
or paying for the cattle. It gave the district officer power to remove from 
a village, and cause to reside elsewhere, persons who were aiding and 
abetting dacoits and criminals. This enactment […] was framed in 
accordance with the old customary law and with the feelings of the 
people. […]. Without the Village Regulation, the military police would 
have been like a ship without a rudder.” (Crosthwaite 1912: 82-83) 
 
 First, throughout Crosthwaite’s writings village headmen are portrayed as a 
timeless indigenous institution, the only form of organic life in a society with “no 
hereditary aristocracy and no tribal or caste system.”252 There were, as we have seen 
above, gentry leaders and a system of status group more or less organised by the 
crown. And, as stated in the previous chapter, this system was fragile and always 
shifting. Rural warfare and the diversity of leadership in Upper Burma resulted from 
a traffic in affiliation and contributed to the argument that a standardised system 
was needed. But the imagery of the Village System also draws from the past 
experiences of administrators. 
 Crosthwaite’s solution for the problem of local government first comes from 
the situation in Lower Burma – constituted after the first (1824-26) and second 
(1852) Anglo-Burmese wars. In Lower Burma, “the village headman generally style 
kyedangyi, has degenerated into a kind of village watchman and drudge; he is 
described as a person who has no influence in his village and whose orders no one 
will obey.” (Crosthwaite 1912: 82-83). Mya Sein, in her book about Burma 
administration (1973), points out how the British created an Indian-like 
bureaucracy in Lower Burma. They established District officers (called myook), 
who had little or no anchoring within localities. Headmen of village circles were 
appointed, but gradually lost their police and judicial powers and since the Police 
Act of 1861 they became mere revenue collector when government’s “attention was 
called to revenue matters, surveying and land-measuring” (1973: 77). Instead, 
 
252 Cf. incipit. 
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lesser officials such as ywagaung, ywaok, and kyedaingyi became the rural police 
officers. In short, Mya Sein supports Crosthwaite's argument by saying that local 
officials in Lower Burma lost their original authority because police, judicial and 
revenue powers were separated, thus further decreasing their political foothold.253 
They were said inefficient, “unable to detect, capture, and bring to punishment the 
numerous disturbers of the public peace who have, for some years past harassed 
many of the districts in the lower province. A similar system of treatment will very 
soon reduce the Thugyi of Upper Burma to the level of kyedangyis of the lower 
province.”254 To defend his policy, Crosthwaite postulated that headmen’s authority 
was still alive in Upper Burma and needed a legal basis. 
 But there were other motives: being able to crush ambushing dacoits and 
especially pressuring those who help them with a cheap system that “will work to 
some extent irrespective of the personnel of the officers administering it” (quoted 
by Thant Myint-U, 2001: 215). Before going back to Burma as Chief 
Commissioner, Crosthwaite explained his ideas to Lord Dufferin, Viceroy on 
British India, about how to fight effectively banditry in Upper and Lower Burma. 
His idea comes from his first appointment in Burma few years before255  and is 
broadly to give officials the “power of summarily removing persons who, while 
they themselves appeared to be living harmless lives without reproach, were 
enabling the insurgent or brigand gangs to keep the field”. (Crosthwaite 1912: 23). 
The Viceroy supported for the draft Regulation which was circulated to district 
officers even before Crosthwaite arrived in Burma in 1887. In the regulation, the 
latter’s view is found in two key measures: the joint responsibility of villagers under 
their headman for crimes committed in the village and the power to deal with people 
who “intent to commit crime”.  
  The headman then had to assist every higher official for any purpose, to 
investigate and report cases happening in his jurisdiction and to pass on information 
related to dacoits. He was to arrest “any person whom he has reason to believe to 
have been concerned in the commission […] of offences”,256 to report new comers, 
 
253 This argument also relates to Scott’s idea about the erosion of precolonial patrons due to the 
multiplication of offices during the colonial period (1972b). 
254 Cf. REVSUB, letter dated 8 September 1887 and written by Smeaton. 
255 He replaced the then Chief Commissioner on a year’s leave in 1883-1884. 
256 Cf. REVSUB 1887, art 5 of the regulation. 
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resist bandits’ attacks and to stockade his village.257 A headman also had to supply 
“food or carriage for troops or police”, to furnish workers for “public works” and 
to register population demographics (ibid.). Finally, he was responsible for tax 
collection and for allocating ‘unoccupied land’ within his jurisdiction. In return, 
villagers were to assist the headman in the execution of his duties or else being 
fined or imprisoned. In other words, the headman became the new armed wing of 
the colonial government. But the joint responsibility of all villagers was also a 
crucial element. One can find it in the art. 9 and 13 under the rubric “Fine on 
villagers accessory to crime” and “Power to require residents to remove from 
villages” respectively. The Deputy Commissioners were able to impose fines on all 
or any villagers “if they have colluded with or harboured or failed” to prevent the 
escape of criminals. People could be removed “when the Deputy Commissioner has 
reason to believe, on the report of headman or otherwise, that a person [is] in the 
habit of harbouring, aiding or abeitting dacoits, robbers or cattle thieves.” Villagers 
and headmen were thus responsible for the political order the British wished to 
create in the countryside and which turned suspicion into a legitimate tool for 
regulation. 
 In the same way they imagined the headman as if an indigenous institution, 
colonial officers did support the enactment of village joint responsibility by using 
‘local customs’. This is important because the ‘joint responsibility’ had the lasting 
effect of centring village government on small groups of villages, as the 2016 
selection also shows. The thing is that the custom unearthed from locales was 
related to stolen cattle. Soon it was associated by the British officers coming from 
Punjab with a ‘similar’ law adopted there. The supposed joint responsibility of 
villages concerning stolen cattle was then transformed into a general responsibility 
for denouncing and fighting those ambushing British forces. In 1886, while 
‘pacifying’ the countryside, the Deputy Commissioners were asked for their views 
about the existing laws that should be passed to better govern the country. One 
proposition from Ava Deputy Commissioner intersected with the drafting of the 
village system. For the latter, a “custom was that a village into which the traces of 
stolen or dacoited cattle led was bound either to produce the cattle, to trace them to 
 
257 This is interesting to put in perspective with Nash’s account, some fifty years later, that fence 
repair was a sign of belonging to a village polity (1965: 74). 
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another village […], or to pay the value of them”.258 Reporting this custom to the 
Chief Commissioner in January, the Commissioner of the Central Division added 
that “[t]his custom has received the sanction of law in Punjab”.259 For another 
officer these suggestions “are based on well-known national custom […] and if we 
borrow a page from Burmese law and embody it with our own, a very powerful 
instrument for the detection and absolute suppression of dacoity will have been 
found”.260 The alleged purpose of the custom – to avoid cattle rustling – was thus 
replaced by the need to fight dacoits. What is left is only a supposed joint 
responsibility of each village to maintain order: “The holding of each village 
commune responsible for the acts of its members is not only politic, but is […] in 
accordance with Burmese ideas of equity”.261 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 What was actually devised through the village system was a new form of 
governmentality: a cheap bureaucratisation of the countryside based on villagers' 
joint responsibility under a headman acting as a police officer and revenue collector. 
But the appearance of change did not quite match the lived experience of it. It was 
messy and the continuities were a better guide as to what was to come, than the 
apparent changes. This chapter has shown that, beyond the debate about whether or 
not colonialism eroded the patron-client relationships based on moral and 
administrative control by the gentry, the emergence of the village system was but 
another episode of competition for leadership. During the ‘pacification campaign’, 
colonial officers encountered wide differences between offices and were enjoined 
to report on solutions that could help systematising a bureaucracy based on local 
customs whenever possible. But at that time, the gentry was far from being a 
corporate group and competition for leadership – through warfare, office buying, 
claim to heredity – was a main political dynamic.  
 
258 Cf. REVSUB, Telegraph n°89-2 by Gates dated 27 December 1886. 
259 Cf. REVSUB, Telegraph n° 801 by Fryer dated 3 January 1887. 
260 Cf. REVSUB, Telegraph n° 60 by De La Courneuve dated14 February 1887. 
261 Cf. REVSUB, Telegraph n°212-1-20 by Eales dated 19 February 1887. 
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 The large variety of office holders were then amalgamated under the thugyi 
rubric. Yet, this gradual change of meaning is not entirely consistent with the 
Burmese concept and echoes the will to extract offices of personal influence for the 
sake of effective administration (while postulating the need for personal anchorage 
at the same time). Thugyi refers generally to a hereditary leader member of the 
gentry and is close to the concept of chief in British colonial thinking. A headman 
is more of an appointed person, by definition the head of a group of people 
governing in the name of an administration. Of course, there never was a clear 
division, and the late pre-colonial period exemplified how offices could blur into 
one another. Some colonial officers such as Sladen pushed to co-opt thugyi because 
of their anchorage within their locality. In theory, headship was created to have a 
ruling class that was legible to the system of government that colonialism imagined. 
But in practice, headship swept into the ongoing competition for power in the 
countryside. And the merging of Myinmilaung and Gawgyi within a single village 
tract resulted from this dynamic. 
 The chapter also made a case for approaching the early colonial period in 
Upper Burma in relation with previous experiences of colonialism. The search for 
traditions, through the collecting of reports for instance, was part of a broader 
process linking experiences from Bengal and Lower Burma with the situation in 
Upper Burma while the imminent agenda was to ‘pacify’ of the countryside. The 
colonial village system was performative in the sense that it centred local politics 
at the village level. It imposed a villagization of governance and led to the islanding 
of the countryside by enforcing the joint responsibility of groups of villages under 
a single head. In that sense, the colonial village system became the matrix of 
headship as an institution. Depending on their will to organise directly or indirectly 
the local society, the successive government made use of the village system, may it 
be for implementing the socialist policies or organising forced labour under direct 
military rule (chapter 5). It created a cheap system to control people movement and 
extract wealth through land taxes mostly. The following chapters explore how 
village headship was accommodated in our area of research, how it was embodied 
by different persons, and how local stakes transformed this institution. 
 If we now relate back to Myinmilaung and Gawgyi in the late 1880s, they 
were grouped within the same village tract during the first decades of the 
colonisation under the village system policy. In the previous chapter, we saw that 
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Myinmilaung was most probably dependent upon Thazi chief and Gawgyi upon 
Kyawkka’s before the pacification campaign. These links endured the colonial 
encounter to a certain extent. Many of Myinmilaung farmers were still tenants of 
Thazi chief in the aftermaths of annexation. As noted by Raikes, Alon still had a 
myothugyi ruling over 23 out of the 66 thugyi recognised within the township. Thazi 
and Kyawkka chiefs were probably among the 43 remaining ones in 1887. But 
Myinmilaung became a village tract under its first headman, a man from 
Myinmilaung proper.  
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CHAPTER 4. THE LAST MEN OF HPON (1890S-1950S) 
 
THE BIRTH OF MYINMILAUNG TRACT 
 
 The reader shall take a look back at the map of the village tract (figure 9). 
This map is part of a theme developed throughout this thesis centred on how 
Myinmilaung became the name of the local polity. The current repartition of the 
villages in different tracts, with their respective headmen, relates to the 
implementation of the village system during colonial times and of the mapping of 
the landscape to create a system of land revenue. But then why was Myinmilaung 
proper, the settlement founded in the mid-eighteenth century, divided, right in the 
middle, going through three village tracts? Why did Gawgyi became part of 
Myinmilaung tract? Who were the first headmen, and, beyond village headship, 
how did local forms of authority and hierarchy evolve?  
 Since the emergence of the village tract, Gawgyi and Myinmilaung have been 
fighting over its control and the 2016 selection of the headman exemplifies this 
dynamic (chapter 2). Not much is remembered about the first headmen U Nyunt 
and his son U Shwe. Villagers draw a rather sleazy picture of them, even in 
Myinmilaung where they came from, notably because they were (allegedly) 
responsible for the split of the settlement. U Nyunt became a leader during a 
moment of colonial violence when control from the bureaucracy over the 
countryside was far from complete. In the Lower Chindwin District, the general 
context was that of an increasing population who competed more and more for 
land.262 People who fled the fighting gradually came back. When harvests were bad, 
seasonal migration – to the rice fields of Lower Burma, and Shwebo, or as daily 
workers in Mandalay – filled the income gap and only decreased in the 1920s.263 U 
Nyunt and his son ruled during these decades, a moment when the institution of 
headship crystallised the protests against colonialism264 in an atmosphere of moral 
breakdown.265 The moral universe was shifting as laypeople came to think about 
 
262 Cf. Hardiman (1909, 1912) and Hughes (1932). 
263 Cf. Hughes (1932). 
264 Cf. Cady (1960: 271) 
265 Cf. Turner (2014). 
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their role as protectors of Buddhism now that the king was gone. And the 
moralisation of behaviours in daily lives intersected with the contestation of 
colonial authority.  
 The next headman, U To Kaing, is described as a strong and a good man who 
embodied a new authority and appeased the dissent between Gawgyi and 
Myinmilaung. For people in Gawgyi, he was, together with their first monk U Za 
Nay Ya, the archetypical and last man of hpon. In short, both embodied a moral 
renewal coupled with an engagement in local affairs and, thus, are examples to draw 
upon for present-day villagers. U To Kaing remained headman during the economic 
crisis of 1930,266 the local unfolding of independence politics in the 1930s, the 
Japanese invasion and rule (1942-45), followed by a political maelstrom (from 
1946-48) and the ensuing insurgencies and civil war – when the U Nu government 
attempted to secure rural support through a land reform – until the military 
‘caretaker government’ restored order (1958-60) and eventually seized power by 
force (1962 coup). To some extent, the worth of U To Kaing stems from how he 
embodied a new kind of authority based on his achievements and social belonging. 
And yet, his authority is expressed today using the vocabulary of charismatic 
leadership: a man of hpon, thought to be one of the last. And U To Kaing, as a 
descendant of a large farming family, also represents a longer-term change that 
occurred in the first half of the twentieth century. From a landscape of people 
organised in status groups affiliated with a variety of patrons (chiefs, hereditary 
office holders, money lenders, and so on), the main farming families gradually 
became the top of the local hierarchy as they were able to challenge and control 
access to wealth by monopolising leadership.  
 This chapter explores the history of local politics267 from the 1890s to the 
early 1950s in three parts. The first two follow a chronological order and the last 
covers the whole period. The first section looks at the colonial encounter as well as 
the framing of the village tract and headship based on a triangulation of oral 
memories, colonial archives and cadastral maps.268  It shows that village headship 
 
266 See Brown (2005, 2013) for how the economic depression hit Burma at large. Hughes (1932) 
provides information of the economic trends in the Lower Chindwin region prior to the depression. 
267 This chapter does not directly address economic changes/agricultural transformations at larger 
scale, nor is it concerned with the impact of the economic depression at the turn of 1930s, nor about 
the rebellions and the anti-government movements. 
268 The archives are presented in the bibliography and a cadastral map is displayed in Appendix A. 
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was as much a product of local politics as a colonial device while Myinmilaung 
tract became the locus of politics and land tax a main means to accumulate wealth. 
It also shows that beyond the institution, headship became a matter of individuals 
as successive leaders have embodied different postures reflecting local political 
issues.  
 The second section explores the worth of two leaders by connecting oral 
memories about them with the political, economic and cultural history269 of the 
early decades of colonial rule. It illustrates how these personalities became 
exemplary figures for the moralisation of behaviours and engagement in people’s 
affairs when villagers reimagined their role as Buddhists and challenged colonial 
rule. This perspective allows for the rethinking of Nash’s concepts270 about power 
and authority by showing how past and present contexts are critical in evaluating 
the worth of leaders. It also enables us to think about this period not only as a 
moment of social disintegration,271 but as a phase of reorganisation of political 
authority along new lines.  
 The third section presents the way in which large farming families 
progressively became the new local elites. It focuses on how colonial devices – the 
village, the revenue systems and the courts – are all simultaneously concerned with 
‘localised’ politics within the village tract and enabled the challenging of the social 
obligations that allowed access to wealth and land – in terms of family relations and 
tenancies agreements. The remnants of the precolonial gentry were not entirely 
uprooted from the landscape, but their hold was reduced as the families of large 
peasants were able to buffer state and armed group land reform projects by 
monopolising local leadership as well as organising the hierarchy between “real 
farmers” (taungthu) and mere “labourers” (myaukthu). Thus, U To Kaing sits at the 
 
269 Cf. Aung-Thwin (2011), Brown (2013), Cady (1960), Charney (2009), Donnison (1953), 
Furnivall (1957), Mya Sein (1973), Smith (1991), Steinberg (1981), Taylor (2009), Tinker (1967, 
1968), Turner (2014). 
270 Cf. the general introduction, more precisely the section on the uses of Nash’s work, and Nash 
(1963, 1965). 
271 There are, at least, two discourses about the effects of colonialism embodied by two scholars. For 
Aung-Thwin (1985b), the colonial order lack meanings for Burmese subject, and Ne Win restored 
order after decades of conflicts. For Furnivall, the Burmese society became a ‘plural society’, the 
produce of colonial rule and the introduction of market force without regulation which atomise 
individuals within a society composed of racial groups that are divided into separate sections, where 
each racial group is an aggregate of individuals rather than an organic whole. Cf. Furnivall (1948) 
and Guan (2009). 
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juncture between the colonial headman, the man of hpon and propriety on the one 
hand, and the representative of the new local order on the other. 
 
 
Figure 13. Timeline of the colonial and post-independence periods 
 
THE FIRST VILLAGE HEADMEN 
 
Headmen of Myinmilaung tract 
From Myinmilaung proper From Gawgyi Period 
U Nyunt  1890-1900s 
U Shwe  1900s-1920s 
                     U To Kaing 1920s-1964? 
Figure 14. The successive headmen of Myinmilaung tract (1890 to the 1960s) 
 
“Unlike the thugyi of the Burmese regime, the new headmen were 
moulded after a pattern – an influential man, agreeable to the village 
1886-
1900s
• 1886-89: Pacification campaign
• 1886-87: Pre-summary Settlement
• 1888-89: Survey of Royal Lands
• 1906-09: Regular Settlement
1900s-
1920s
• Grouping of villages in tracts
• Protests against headmen
• Creation of lay associations 
(defence of Buddhism)
U Nyunt headman
1890s-1900s
U Shwe headman
1900s-20s
U Za Nay Ya 
monk of Gawgyi
1910s-49
U To Kaing headman
1920s-64
1921 Burma Rural Self Government Act
1930 Economic crisis / Peasants’ Revolts
1942-45 Japanese Invasion and Rule
1945-48 • 1945: Return of British Rule• 1948: Independence of Burma
1948-60
• 1948-58: Parliamentarianism (U Nu)
• 1948 & 53: Land Nationalisation Acts
• 1946-56: White Flag Communist 
insurgencies near Monywa
• 1958-60: Military Caretaker Government ü 1960-61: Nash’s fieldwork
ü 1961-62: Spiro’s fieldwork
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(elections were always held) with hereditary claims if possible.” (Mya 
Sein 1973: 152). 
 
 U Nyunt was the first headman of Myinmilaung village tract. Was he an 
influential man? Undoubtedly yes, as he managed to have a village tract of his own. 
Was he agreeable to the village? Maybe. The making of Myinmilaung tract at the 
turn of the nineteenth century entailed another split of this settlement, allegedly due 
to U Nyunt’s greed. Was he elected? Elections were not held at the beginning. The 
first headmen were appointed during the ‘pacification campaign’ based on military 
and revenue needs. And when U Nyunt died, his son, U Shwe, took over thanks to 
his hereditary credential according to the Myinmilaung elders I have met.272 Later 
on, appointments by higher officials, elections by locals (elders, big men or lugyi), 
and heredity claims became the ingredients for the politics of headmen’s selection 
between Myinmilaung and Gawgyi. Thus, this section explores how the fashioning 
of the village tract became a matrix that partly shaped local politics by merging 
Myinmilaung and Gawgyi together. 
 The ‘pacification campaign’, as seen from the British perspective, did not last 
long in what became in 1888 the Lower Chindwin District (Hardiman 1912: 157). 
Most of the fighting happened in the Kudaw circle,273 in the north-east part of the 
region. The main pre-colonial circles, or governorship (nay), in the District – Alon, 
Kani, Kudaw, Ayadaw, Pagyi, Amyint, Kyaukmyet – then served as a basis for 
administration, with later transformations in subdivisions and boundary 
modifications. Revenue collection started by retrieving the capitation tax’s 
(thathameda) rolls provided by local authorities (mostly myothugyi and ywathugyi). 
The administrative and military centre of the District was quickly transferred from 
Alon to Monywa, and our area of study also included the Monywa Township 
created in 1894. 
 At the village level, the aim of the colonial policy in Upper Burma was ‘one 
village one headman’. But, as stated in the previous chapter, local situations were 
far from this ideal and room was left at the officers’ discretion to achieve it. 
Headmen were first appointed during the ‘pacification campaign’ and the Pre-
 
272 They notably insisted on the idea of heredity during the interview held on the 20th of March 2019. 
273 This circle will be transformed into Budalin subdivision in 1894 (Hardiman 1912: 157), and is 
located within the Lower Chindwin region, in the northeast of Monywa 
195 
Summary Settlement (1886-87), either directly by the Deputy Commissioner of the 
Central Division (Raikes), or indirectly by Alon’s myothugyi. Then, headmen were 
used as land surveyors recording land types, land owners and estimating the 
thathameda tax within their circles up until the late-1890s. Hardiman, in charge of 
the Regular Settlement of the District (1906-09), gives a picture of the situation 
twenty years later: 
 
“There are over 1,000 hamlets, or self-contained groups of houses, in 
the district, and these are controlled by 671 headmen. […]. But 
whereas, in Burmese times, many of the headmen's charges comprised 
a large area of country and twenty or thirty villages, each under a 
subordinate village headman, who in many cases received no 
remuneration at all, the existing policy is gradually, […], to rearrange 
the component villages in several smaller groups, and within each 
small group to appoint a single headman, drawing the full commission 
on the revenue collections. Thus one independent village headman will 
take the place of all the old subordinate village headmen within the new 
group; there will be a single remunerated official, instead of several 
unremunerated.” (Hardiman 1912: 159-160, my emphasis). 
  
 The creation of village headship was a moment of competition and 
negotiation for political recognition. It covered battles for power and revenues 
within localities as local government transformed. For instance, until the 1920s, 
village tracts were often fragmented “to such an extent that even hamlets began to 
have a headman of their own.” (Mya Sein 1973: 152). In the District, the number 
of headmen of large circles of villages decreased from 127 in 1902 to 88 in 1908, 
while the headmen of small groups increased from 152 to 239 (ibid.: 157). The 
person of local influence (heads of village lineages, chiefs of a circle of villages, 
rising leaders, amnestied dacoits) were far from being simple clients of the 
coloniser. Once accustomed to the British presence and ways of dealing with 
revenue and jurisdictions, they sometimes challenged authorities and once again 
competed for, and created, offices. The successive tractings of the landscape – tax 
tracts, soil tracts, cadastral tracts, village tracts – were opportunities to redraw 
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territories, channel revenues and challenge pre-existing affiliations between 
villages, families and leaders. Myinmilaung village tract is a case in point. 
 It is most probable that U Nyunt became headman between 1887 and the late-
1890s when the pacification was over and the territorial segmentation of 
countryside under way. The consecutive tractings of our area of study reveal two 
processes. First, there was the rise of Myinmilaung as the leading village of a new 
tract under U Nyunt and its absorption of Obo (renamed Ogon) and Gawgyi under 
its command. Second, Mogaung distanced itself from Myinmilaung by successively 
affiliating with two other village tracts (first in the 1900s, then again in the 1920s), 
adding another layer of fragmentation within the original settlement. As a result, 
the old settlement was divided, right in the middle of it, into three village tracts 
(figure 9, 11, 12 and 13). 
 
 
Figure 11. Timeline of the changes of villages’ names and creation of village tracts 
 
Villages Kwin Village tract Soil Tract 
Gawgyi 659, Gawgyi kwin 
Myinmilaung n°5 Eastern Black 
Mingalargôn 660, Myinmilaung kwin 
Ogôn 661, Obo kwin 
Myinmilaung 660, Myinmilaung kwin 
Mogaung 408, Mogaung kwin Kyaukka west 
n°4 Eastern Red 
Ywadon 658, Yawadon kwin Ywadon 
 
Figure 12. Summary table of the organisation of villages tracts, kwin and soil tracts for the 
1900s 
1750s 1800s 1890s
Obo
Myinmalouq
Ashesu
Anawsu
Alesu
Mogaung
Mingalagon
Myinmilaung
Gawgyi
Ogon
Kyawkka West tract
Ywadon tract
Budaungkan tract
Myinmilaung tract
Mayodaw KyauksitponSouth tract
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Figure 13. Sketch of the divide between cadastral, soil and village tracts for the 1900s 274
  
 The first surveys by the Land Record Department275 (1897-1902) created 
cadastral units called kwin, “a survey unit corresponding roughly to village in India 
and measuring about a square mile’’ (Furnivall 1957: 90). This unit had to fit a 
standardized 11-inch map276 and was crafted alongside new jurisdictions – the 
village tracts – and the new local office – the village headman. “Village boundaries, 
where known, might be adopted as boundaries of kwin” [sic], but in most cases they 
 
274 This sketch and the following (concerning 1920s) were created by analysing the successive 
tracting of the landscape (soil tracts, thathameda tracts and village tracts), by comparing the two 
successive settlement reports (1910, 1932) and by exploring the old cadastral maps collected during 
fieldwork. The names of localities in the sketches and the table are written as they appear in the 
records. 
275 Known as the Land Record Department in the archives related to the Lower Chindwin Disrict, 
this institution was first created in 1879 (Revenue and Survey Department) to streamline the 
implementation of an agricultural and property registry. It was reorganised in 1883 and became the 
Land Revenue and Agricultural Department (LARD). In 1905, it became the Settlement and Land 
Records and Agricultural Department (SLRAD), then in 1906, the Settlement and Land Record 
Department (SLRD), making room for an independent Ministry of Agriculture. In 2017, it became 
the Department of Agricultural Statistic and Land Management (DALMS). 
276 Cf. The British Library archive file V/10203. The Burma Land records Manual. 1928. Rangoon: 
Office of the Superintendent, Government Printing. These surveys have been done in continuation 
with the Great Trigonometrical Survey started in India. Cf. Furnivall (1957: 206) for the Burmese 
case and Sarkar (2012) for a more global overview. 
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were either undermined or could not be ascertained by the Indian surveyors and so 
kwin” boundaries were determined by convenience of survey […].” (Furnivall 
1957: 207). But because the kwin maps “should coincide with a village headman's 
jurisdiction or a subdivision of it”277, these boundaries were also determined 
according to what was convenient for local political entrepreneurs. On the sketch 
(figure 13), Myinmilaung appears as a village tract composed of three kwin (n°659, 
660, 661). 
 The division between soil tracts278 4 and 5 was drawn between Myinmilaung 
(tract V “Black Eastern”) and Mogaung (tract IV “Easter Red”). The records also 
show that in the 1900s, the grouping of hamlets within village tracts again secluded 
Myinmilaung and Mogaung. Myinmilaung became the chief village of an 
eponymous tract that included Ogon (previously Obo), Mingalagon (the “West 
Corp”) and Gawgyi, but not Mogaung (the “East Corp”). Instead, Mogaung became 
part of Kyawkka West village tract, the western portion of the previous Kyawkka 
territory.279 A simple hypothesis is that the split between these two villages – which 
share a common history – was the outcome of a rivalry between their leaders. This 
is, at least, the local explanation and the “West corp” took for itself the name of 
Mingalagon and moved a little further west. The demographics are also telling. As 
shown in the figure 13, Myinmilaung – 17 households – was the least populated of 
its own tract, while Mogaung – 41 households – had a relatively high population in 
comparison (the average for the tract being 27 households). The Myinmilaung 
leader U Nyunt was influential enough to get a village tract of its own. But another 
faction led the Mogaung leader to affiliate with other authorities to avoid his hold. 
At the same time, Obo was renamed Ogon and, even if it was the oldest settlement 
with a recognised lineage, it came under U Nyunt’s sway. In addition, Gawgyi 
partly severed relations with Ywadon, its home village. Overall, the creation of 
village tracts and headmen were both a confirmation of local dissensions and 
another way to negotiate affiliations. The striking feature of this area is the divide 
 
277 Cf. The Burma Land records Manual. 1928. Rangoon: Office of the Superintendent, Government 
Printing. 
278 The soil tracts were realised during the Regular Settlement (1906-09) and created divisions within 
the District according to soil qualities. 
279 Kyawkka West included at first fives villages (Tanaungwin, Pamèdaw, Ywathit, Mogaung, 
Sindè) and its population represented about 188 households. Kyawka East covered the rest of the 
territory and was divided between two villages, Kyawka North and South. 
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into three village tracts (Myinmilaung, Kyawkka West, Kyauksitpon) right in the 
middle of where soldiers hid and settled about one and a half centuries ago.  
 Further changes happened in the following decades. Gradually, “the revenue 
circles had to be broken up” (Mya Sein 1973: 152.) to adjust headmen remuneration 
– a portion of the taxes collected in their tract – according to the size of their 
jurisdiction. “The subdivision of village tracts was carried out drastically for some 
time till it was realized about 1909–1910 that undue and excessive subdivision 
weakened the authority of headmen. […]. Steps were taken in 1912–1913 to revise 
such subdivisions as were thought too minute, and where the amount of commission 
did not justify the retention of separate headmen, the small charges were 
consolidated.” (ibid: 157). Yet, in the 1920s, the split in three tracts remained, and 
Myinmilaung’s unchanged. Kyawka West tract was broken down and Mogaung 
integrated Ywadon’s. In addition, two new villages were created between the 1900s 
and the 1920s. First, Mayodaw settled in Kyauksitpon tract. This allegedly resulted 
from a new split, either within Myinmilaung or Mogaung depending on the 
villagers, and Mayodaw chose to settle at their gate but under a different headman. 
The second one, Budaungkan, settled east of Gawgyi, in a kwin named after an old 
pagoda (Shwepanhkaing, chapter 3), was composed of several migrants coming 
from several places. Overall, and beyond the details of the splits and reconfiguration 
of the village tracts, the creation of Myinmilaung tract shows how local power 
dynamics permeated the village system. 
Villages Kwin Village tract Soil Tract 
Gawgyi 659, Gawgyi kwin 
Myinmilaung n°5 
Eastern 
Black 
Mingalargôn 660, Myinmilaung kwin 
Ogôn 661, Oo Bo kwin 
Myinmilaung 660, Myinmilaung kwin 
Mayadaw  341, Kyauksitpon South kwin Kyauksitpon South 
Mogaung 408, Mogaung kwin 
Ywadon 
n°4 
Eastern 
Red 
Ywadon 658, Yawadon kwin 
Budaungkan 407, Shwepangaing 
Figure 14. Summary table of the organisation of villages tracts, kwin and soil tracts for the 
1920s. 
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Figure 15. Sketch of the divide between cadastral, soil and village tracts for the 1920s 
 Officially, U Nyunt had to protect his village from banditry and cattle theft, 
maintain village stockades and organise night watches. To do so, an “old Burmese 
institution,” the ten-houses heads (hse-eingaung) – crucial in the 2016 selection – 
was grafted on to the village system. The villages were divided “into a number of 
blocks, each under a se-ein (ten house) goung [sic] who was subordinate to the 
headman. He was usually elected by a group of 10 or so houses which he 
represented and was mainly responsible for police matters.’’ (Mya Sein 1973: 161). 
In theory, U Nyunt also had to promote sanitation, education, and improve 
communication. He was also supposed to control people’s movement, that is to 
report newcomers, emigration and villages demographics. His income was now 
limited to a share of the taxes he collected within the tract, first the capitation tax 
and, as the Settlement Operations devised a new tax system, from land revenue as 
well.280 Villagers were to assist him or else being fined or imprisoned. And, as we 
will see in the next section, high taxes became a central issue in the first decades of 
the twentieth century leading to rebellion against the colonial state and, among its 
officials, primarily the village headmen. 
 
280 Hughes (1932) show how the decrease of thathameda collection was more than compensated by 
the rise of land revenue. 
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 Yet, when asked about U Nyunt, Myinmilaung elders grin. They call him 
thugyi (the “great one”, the “chief”) and smile because there is no thugyi anymore, 
at least not in Gawgyi or Myinmilaung.281 Nobody knew him directly and although 
U Nyunt is depicted as a strong personality, he was a ‘bad’ ruler. He was bad, 
allegedly because he was responsible for the fragmentation of what was once a 
common settlement: his ambition and activities as headman led to the split with 
Mogaung. Besides, he had a gun (most were confiscated during the ‘pacification 
campaign’ and distributed to headmen only), and people apparently had no choice 
but to obey his orders. They mention that he had ana, meaning that his orders were 
backed by an external force, that he was empowered by the state to impose decisions 
through coercion. He could fine people, tie up drunk men during pagoda festivals 
for instance, and sentence temporary jailing. In other words, it seems that he used 
the creation of headship to build an office for himself. Apart from his gun, the 
fragmentation of Myinmilaung proper and the punishments, not much is 
remembered about U Nyunt. 
 His successor was his son, U Shwe, also born in Myinmilaung. Again, he had 
a gun and that is pretty much it. But when asked why U Nyunt’s son became 
headman, the answer is interesting. Myinmilaung elders have a local theory of 
habitus. They say: montso nani montso; tenga nani tenga, meaning “he who lives 
close to a hunter becomes a hunter; he who lives near a fisherman becomes a 
fisherman”.282 For them, before 1988, the position was for life and, if at all possible, 
transmitted to a male within the same extended family. A nephew, a grandchild or 
a son-in-law could be the successor, as long as he gathers experiences by living 
close to the one in charge. This is a justification based on principle, not a statement 
about what actually happened. The legitimacy of the hereditary transmission of 
offices (or of skilled occupations) comes from the fact that experience and practice 
ease the acquirement of the necessary skills by someone in this or that position. 
What a man successfully handles during his mandate, his children should 
consequently know how to handle it too. The pace of life – the succession of 
generations – channels potential achievements. The ways village headmen could 
succeed one another apparently follow how precolonial hereditary offices were 
 
281 In Hnawpin, a village close to Thazi where I worked from time to time, the headman was still 
called thugyi at times by his fellow villagers. 
282 This expression was given to me during the same interview held on the 20th of March 2019. 
202 
transmitted. The office was tied to a family, ensuring a degree of continuity, even if 
it was created by force. The connection between the transmission of property within 
families and the transmission of leadership will be explored further in chapter 7. 
 Thus, this section demonstrated that village headship was, on the ground, as 
much of a product of local politics as it was a colonial device. Myinmilaung tract 
became the locus of politics which took the form of a competition between villages 
for controlling headship. But beyond a mere institution, it became a matter of 
individuals. The successive headmen embodied different postures reflecting what 
was at stake in local politics. For instance, Gawgyi people do not even remember 
U Shwe, and they do not share the theory of habitus when applied to Myinmilaung. 
The one headman they know is his successor, U To Kaing, presented as one of the 
last men of hpon who participated in the moralisation of behaviours. 
 
THE LAST MEN OF HPON 
 
 In Gawgyi, the first half of the twentieth century is often remembered as an 
age of propriety and morality. A few elders remember it vividly, and villagers in 
their thirties today talk about men of this period with respect. Recollections of the 
past reflect how current villagers view the present, that is, a potential shift toward 
corruption, low morals and military rule (chapter 5) with the advent of democracy. 
Such memories, when triangulated with other historical narratives, enable one to 
picture some of the changes that happened during the early colonial period. 
Propriety and morality were embodied, and two persons stand out: U Za Nay Ya, 
the first head monk of Gawgyi monastery from 1910s to 1949, and U To Kaing, 
village headman from the mid-1920s to the early 1960s. These men are remembered 
as being strict, intransigent, but reliable and influential. They were, for our 
contemporaries, the archetypical and last men of hpon involved in village affairs. 
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U Za Nay Ya 
 
 This section explores how local personalities became exemplary figures of 
the moralisation of behaviours when villagers were rethinking their role as 
Buddhists after the colonial encounter. Turner (2014) shows that in face of the 
sentiment of societal decay during the decade following the fall of the monarchy – 
the king being the traditional supporter of Buddhism and of the community of 
monks called the sangha – laypeople became the protectors of Buddhism in charge 
of Buddha’s teachings (thathena). These teachings, embodied in texts, chants and 
rituals “is the conditions for making merit and liberation, but it is also impermanent, 
and it is in the decline since it was revealed by Buddha.” (Turner 2014: 1). After 
King Thibaw was sent into exile in 1885, “a rhetoric of decline” (ibid.: 81) 
developed, as if the Burmese society was on the fringe of a moral breakdown. 
 
“The monks no longer held the same respect. Some were lax in their 
practices, but the authority of even the most esteemed appeared to wane 
in the face of a new set of experts: those trained in the bureaucratic 
sciences of colonial rule. Precepts that had guided moral life were 
ignored. Burmese drinking and gambling, precipitating a crisis of 
morals. Dress, comportment, manners, respect for elders – examined in 
the light of this moment – all offered up evidence to confirm the uneasy 
feeling that their world was sliding into decay.” (ibid: 1) 
 
 Hardiman also echoes that sentiment of decline when he wrote that, in the 
Lower Chindwin, Buddhism became “little more than a name” (Hardiman 1912: 
34). Yet, from 1890 to the 1920s, lay Buddhists created hundreds of associations in 
the main cities, but mostly in smaller towns and villages. They campaigned for 
Buddhist education, moral reform and engaged in conflicts with the colonial state. 
The efforts of the multiple voluntary associations brought waves of publishing, 
preaching, and organising, and forged a “moral community” out of a “common 
ethical project” (Turner 2014: 2, 77). Most associations were concerned with the 
behaviours of Buddhists which became the barometer of the decline of morals. Lack 
of respect toward elders, drinking of alcohol, frequentation of opium shops and 
204 
billiards parlours, excessive gambling, consumption of beef meat, all were evidence 
of decay. However, as Turner suggests, such evidence does not “come from a single 
register of tradition, but from a range of actions, new and old […].” (ibid.: 85). The 
condemnation of beef consumption was of a new type for instance. It stems from a 
beef boycott that takes its roots in the Lower Chindwin region and was articulated 
in one of the first texts (The letter on cows) of Ledi Hsayadaw (1846-1923), the 
most famous monk of the first decades of colonisation.  
 This monk was born in a village close to Monywa, in the middle of our area 
of study where the network of influential literati at the court emerged (chapter 3). 
As Braun puts it, “[h]is approach depended on the localized development of an elite 
Buddhist tradition that stressed the use of texts […] as the way to answer societal 
and religious problems.’’ (Braun 2013: 7). Ledi wrote The letter on cows in the late 
1880s when he came back from Mandalay to settle in Monywa when the British 
arrived. This call for a boycott originated in the intersection of dynamics specific 
to the region, namely the effects of the demographic increase and agricultural 
expansion since the eighteenth century as well as the influence of “Hindu 
revivalism, along with admonitions against eating fish and beef, emanating from 
Manipur and moving down the Lower Chindwin.” (Charney 2007: 235). Beyond 
that, The letter on cows, written in a simple style accessible to all, “is a lesson about 
the communal dimensions of kamma [karma].” (Braun 2013: 37). In short, the 
consumption of beef is associated with immorality. Prohibition against intoxicants 
was nothing new. It was the last of the five precepts laypeople were expected to 
follow. But for Ledi, “the Burmese had brought about their own national destruction 
by engaging in immoral behavior. […].” (Ledi quoted from Braun 2013: 37). For 
Ledi, decay is thus about karmic justice. And accumulating merit through donation 
is not enough. Behaviours should be changed. When on tour giving sermons, Ledi 
asked to substitute pledges of morality – avoidance of intoxicants and festivities 
mainly – instead of offerings. In addition, for the new Buddhist journals and 
lecturers, the “need for morality and its potential benefits had overtaken the karmic 
benefits of donation […].” (Turner 2014: 87). Thus, lay Buddhist associations and 
influential monks developed a pedagogy of introspection teaching individuals “to 
police themselves” (ibid.: 101) and to uphold moral behaviours.  
 So, how do memories about U Za Nay Ya relate to these transformations? In 
the same vein as Ledi, U Za Nay Ya (1889-1949) was involved in the moralisation 
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of daily lives, but, unlike him, he stayed in one locale. He became the first monk in 
the first monastery of Gawgyi, right after his full ordination around the age of 
eighteen in the nearby monastery of Zalok. His arrival thus coincides with the 
creation of Gawgyi monastery and pagoda283 in the late 1900s. The Zalok and 
Gawgyi monasteries were and still are part of the same parish (gaing)284 linked with 
another monastery in Sagaing. For their construction, a piece of land north of the 
village was donated, a few donations were given by individuals from and outside 
Gawgyi. Villagers mostly gave time and labour and received merit for it. In the 
meantime, a pond, north of monastery was enlarged and deepened to avoid flooding 
during the rainy season. The complex monastery-monk-pagoda enabled the 
promotion of Buddhism to a certain extent. Buddha's teachings were like a 
diminishing fire, embodied in the relics enclosed in the pagoda, maintained and 
bolstered by multiple means to protect from harmful forces (ghosts, bad luck, 
immorality). Having a pagoda to worship, a monk who facilitates donations and 
merit making, and a monastery to send one’s child as a novice were critical in 
Gawgyi life at large. The ability of this monk to build up this monastery is still 
praised sometimes. Yet, what is more important is that he was also involved in the 
lives of lay people and his “area of influence’’ (gawthagan) extended miles beyond 
Gawgyi.285 And such memories contradict how monkhood was seen by Hardiman 
during the same period: “The practical interference in affairs, which was a right of 
the priesthood in Burmese times, has also disappeared and, with it, some of their 
hold on the people.” (Hardiman 1912: 34). At that very moment, it was quite the 
opposite in Gawgyi.  
 The language used to describe U Za Nay Ya matches the emphasis on morality 
in village life – in line with Turner’s argument – and his engagement in secular 
affairs. Gawgyi elders sometimes talk about that period as “an age of rule by 
monks” (hpongyi ouqdeh kheq).286 He, and not U Shwe the headman, was consulted 
by villagers for cases of divorce and apparently even for land disputes. Mostly, he 
enforced prohibitions to rectify behaviours: he forbid anybody to put their feet in 
 
283 The pagoda was achieved in 1910. 
284 Thus, the senior monk (the one with the most wa, that is with the higher number of years as monk 
after full ordination) was the head (hsayadaw) of the whole parish. 
285 This is the expression used by Ko Kyaw brother when we spent time at the grave on the 22nd of 
May 2016. 
286 This expression was notably used by U Maung on the 18th of June 2019. 
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the pond to avoid pollution, women could not walk from there to their house with 
the same longyi after bathing, he beat anyone drinking alcohol in public and did 
night watches in the village. This is how my interlocutors condensed nearly fifty 
years of experience living under U Za Nay Ya. He took care of villagers’ morality. 
But he was also a man of knowledge. He knew Pali script and was competent to 
perform all necessary ceremonies. He also provided medicine for villagers, notably 
by introducing small amounts of gold in their veins from time to time (making the 
bodies resistant to blade cuts.).  
 Thanks to the monastery and the pagoda, Gawgyi people could more fully 
integrate ritual exchanges between villages and the aura of U Za Nay Ya radiated 
miles away and attracted donations that enabled to enhance the buildings. In 
1964, five years after his death, U Za Nay Ya’s body was removed from the 
monastery and put in a grave outside once the villager had collected enough money 
to build it. 
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Figure 16. U Za Nay Ya’s grave 
 Overall, the work of U Za Nay Ya as the caretaker of behaviours in Gawgyi 
is how the more general emphasis on morality unfolded in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. He is seen as a man of virtue who strictly followed Buddhist rules 
and whose knowledge was extensive. While talking about him, I tried to draw a 
parallel with the concept of hpon notably developed by Nash. He was, by definition, 
a “great hpon” because this is the Burmese word for monks. But the stories about 
him showed that he had achieved a certain level of greatness. So, I asked if he had 
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ana (the power to impose decisions) and awza (authority or influence).287 My 
interlocutors were a little taken aback because I knew these words even though 
nobody had really said them to me before. And they agreed. U Za Nay Ya was a 
man of hpon, but nobody could say the same for anybody living today in Gawgyi. 
To some degree, the vocabulary used to depict the worth of U Za Nay Ya matches 
Nash’s framework (1965). But it also shows that beyond the concept, the 
achievements of a person are related to a context and U Za Nay Ya’s authority stems 
from him promoting the good and embodying morals, propriety and Buddhist 
teachings at a specific time. In Nash’s work, morality is set aside, and relegated to 
the influence of elders (called lugyi lugaun, a question that is raised in chapter 8). 
In a different way, the worth of U Za Nay Ya stems from the conjunction of the 
transformation of Buddhism, his engagement in secular affairs and his personal 
qualities. His worth, viewed by present-day villagers, relates to the moralisation of 
behaviours and is expressed in the vocabulary of charismatic leadership. In short, 
he set an example to follow. The general cultural transformation highlighted by 
Turner thus impacted the local polity as U Za Nay Ya eclipsed the then village 
headman to some extent. In addition, the successive headman U Shwe, the son of 
U Nyunt, was eventually replaced by the other man of hpon in the late 1920s. 
 
U To Kaing 
 
 That person is U To Kaing, a man born in Gawgyi who eventually married 
and settled in Myinmilaung. He too is depicted as a man of hpon: he participated in 
the moralisation of daily life, was involved in village affairs but also dampened the 
tension between Myinmilaung and Gawgyi. We saw above that the previous 
headman accessed the office by succession in the 1900s. So why did U To Kaing 
became headman before the latter’s death? How did he handle headship and why 
did he become an exemplary person for current villagers? 
 He became headman quite young in a context of rural protest against 
colonialism when headmen were often targeted as ‘maids of all work’ for the 
 
287 This interview was conducted during my first fieldwork, on the 6th of February 2013 after a 
shinbyu. 
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government (1910s-20s). He remained headman during the economic crisis of 1930 
and subsequent political turmoil for independence, the Japanese invasion and rule 
(1942-45), which was followed by a period of parliamentarianism, civil war and 
insurgencies until the military ‘caretaker government’ took over (1958-60) and 
eventually seized power in the 1962 coup. In other words, he remained the local 
authority during a period of great political change. His bigness stems from this 
achievements and current villagers express it by referring to his personality: a man 
of charisma whose orders were followed. Again, Nash’s concepts fits the 
description. But he is also described as a man of virtue who participated in, and at 
times led, the moral reformation of villagers by forbidding distilleries, money 
games and controlled the handling of donations in local Buddhist festivals. As we 
will discuss below, we can compare him to another headman of this period 
described by Nash. 
 The coming of U To Kaing makes sense in a broader context of rural protest 
against colonialism. The apparent decline of headmen’s authority (Cady 1960: 271) 
was, for the British, one of the signs of such contestation, along with the 
politicisation of local associations against the thathameda and land taxes in the late 
1910s. One movement in particular, called wunthanu athin,288 gained momentum 
in in this period and, by 1924 “there were wunthanu athin organised in almost every 
village in Burma.” (Taylor 2009: 194). These organisations,289 along with other 
associations,290 empowered villagers in their conflicts with officials and, in our 
case, were a means to challenge local politics. Indeed, the village system was based 
on the joint responsibility of the villagers in a tract. And the “Government policy of 
forbidding headmen to participate politically in the Wunthanu Athins in effect 
isolated them from the sympathy and co-operation of a majority of the villagers, 
who were expected to accept joint responsibility under headman leadership.” (Cady 
1960: 272). We can imagine that because Myinmilaung tract was forcefully created 
by U Nyunt, the authority of his son, U Shwe, was challenge at that very moment. 
 
288 Taylor translates it as “organisation supporting own race” (Taylor 2009: 193-194) in a nationalist 
or patriotic sense. 
289 The wunthanu athin were promoted and supported by the General Council of Burmese 
Associations (GCBA) in 1921-1922, the general council of the Young Man Buddhist Association 
(YMBA) that came to the forefront of the contest against colonialism on nationalist terms after the 
Yangon university strike of 1920. 
290 Cf. Charney (2009: 12). 
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The joint responsibility of these two settlements under that man may have been 
problematic in this case. U Shwe could not have been part of wunthanu athin, and 
thus could not embody the upholding of morals. He was the one collecting taxes 
when farmers’ conditions deteriorated, and the thathameda “became a greater 
source of grievance because the headmen were no longer able to adjust it on an 
informal basis to fit changing economic conditions.’’ (Taylor 2009: 190). 
 The government's answer was to reform local governance and support 
headmen to ensure that the villagers participated in local government.291 Most of it 
failed. The Burma Rural Self Government Act of 1921 created elected village 
committees conferred with special criminal and civil powers to assist the 
headman.292 But it never was operative.293 The Crime Enquiry Committee even 
recommended in 1923 that the selection of headmen be by election. But while the 
1924 Amending Act authorised the election of village committees sharing the 
headman's judicial powers, he remained the armed wing of the state. His powers to 
“requisition services and supplies were reduced, but he still could fine villagers 
refusing to do public duties.” (Cady 1960: 273). Finally, all the reforms were 
reversed in 1927.294 At large, villagers did not invest in the committees, but rather 
in a shadow organisation duplicating the official administration. The wunthanu 
athin “set up their own with a hierarchy of village, circle and district boards’’ and 
“encouraged the people and monks to refuse services, including food and religious 
ceremonies, to non-European officials.” (Taylor 2009: 195). They also organised 
their own court, protested against the Village Act, and, with the help of monks, 
restored arbitration techniques to settle disputes. We now have a better 
understanding of why U Za Nay Ya is said to have been involved in secular affairs 
and settled disputes. Beyond that, we can imagine that the political context in 
Myinmilaung tract was that of a growing contest against U Shwe. 
 I do not know if U To Kaing was the leading figure of the local branch of the 
wunthanu athin or of another association. But he certainly could have been. There 
was an escalation of tension against headship and by extension against U Shwe. If 
another man rose up, he most likely was politically active and these associations 
 
291 Cf. Cady (1960: 236-237, 272-274). 
292 Cf. Mya Sein (1973: 162). 
293 Cf. Cady (1960: 273). 
294 Cf. Cady (1960: 274). 
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were avenues for such a trajectory. In any case, he was a man of compromise 
because his personal trajectory reconciled Myinmilaung and Gawgyi to some 
extent. He was from Gawgyi and thus linked to one of its main lineages. This was 
important because leaders in Gawgyi are never outsiders. And he married and 
settled in Myinmilaung proper, with his parents-in-law, before becoming headman. 
He thus navigated both spaces and it shows that, even if the villages did not like 
each other, they had to live under the same “roof” somehow. They inter-married, 
participated in each other’s ceremonies, but now Gawgyi has its own monastery 
and a monk upholding morals. The balance of power between the two settlements 
changed in the first decades of the twentieth century. By becoming headman when 
village headship was castigated, U To Kaing must have gathered enough backing 
and had a degree of trust from villagers. In other words, moral reformism and the 
contestation against the state were the ingredients for the transformation of the local 
polity in the early twentieth century. 
 The Pax Britannica was eventually disrupted due to the repression of peasants 
leading to the so-called Hsaya San rebellion of 1930295 as well as student protests, 
which produced a generation of national leaders fighting for independence.296 The 
historiography usually presents the following decades as a period of political 
experimentation, factionalism, conflicts, insurgencies and wars across the country, 
ultimately leading to Ne Win’s military coup in 1962. Villagers, however, recall this 
period, from late 1920s to late 1950s, as the age of U To Kaing's rule, presenting a 
degree of stability in local politics against a background of “corruption” (Cady 
1960: 410) and “warlordism” (Smith 1991: 127). To a certain extent, he did upkeep 
village affairs. But he mostly buffered and/or took advantage of multiple forces. 
There was the “corruption” of low-ranking officials (Cady 1960: 410-411) and then 
the Japanese battalions, invading Burma in 1942 before fleeing in 1945, which 
monopolised the little infrastructure left intact during the war, leading to food and 
goods shortages. They forcefully recruited labour297 through headmen who, 
relabelled okkhata, organised it with the village ten-households heads. One positive 
aspect beyond the exactions on civilians was that in our area the cultivators, “who 
 
295 On this rebellion and the different narratives about its origins and effects, cf. Aung-Thwin (2011), 
Herbert (1982), Scott (1976) and Solomon (1969). 
296 For an overview of this process, see Charney (2009: 41-44). 
297 Cady (1960: 452). 
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were relatively prosperous because of their diversified output, were able to pay off 
accumulated debts in cheap Japanese currency.” (ibid.: 459). This might have 
impacted money lenders like U Po Shi.  
 Those with no livelihood sought employment in the labour battalions298 
created by the Japanese-controlled Burmese independent government. People also 
enrolled in underground militia, often affiliated with communists and other armed 
groups fighting the Japanese. In early 1945, the British forces came back to Burma 
to fight the Japanese. Near Monywa, they gathered in the monastery of Zalok. In 
retaliation, the village was half burnt to the ground by the Japanese concentrated in 
the city. Immediately after the Japanese retreat in March 1945, these armed groups, 
traditionally called tat, gained prominence while the British came back into power 
(1945-48). The Communist Party of Burma was notably influential in our area after 
being expelled from the main political coalition299 and began negotiating the terms 
of British departure. By 1947, there was at least eight militias300 operating in the 
countryside. It was not clear for locals which group had authority over the 
government. Ultimately, the White Flag faction of the Communist Party of 
Burma301 took over our area of study302 shortly after independence in early 1948. 
The railway east of Monywa became the demarcating line between the pro-
government forces concentrated in the town and the White Flag soldiers in the 
countryside. For about eight years, villagers say that they had to pay a “contribution 
fee” (hsehkyay) to this armed group coming back and forth during periodic 
intervals. U To Kaing, as did other headmen,303 became a de facto member of the 
White Flag CPB after pledging allegiance. Villagers kept growing their usual cash 
crops and went to Monywa markets freely. Finally, the White Flag was driven out 
of Monywa Township around 1956, and U To Kaing reintegrated the state 
administration. Around 1958, when the Army took over U Nu’s government to 
 
298 Called “Let yon that”, Cady (1960: 459). 
299 The Anti-Fascist People Freedom League, notably under the leadership of Aung San, hero of the 
independence. 
300 Smith (1991: 66). 
301 On the Communist party, see Litner (1990). 
302 One of the White Flag leaders, U Hla Maw, controlled the “Monywa-Shwebo-Mandalay 
districts” during this period, cf. Smith (1991: 126). 
303 In Yeigyi village, Spiro explains that the insurgent chose another man to be their representative 
and collector of the fee. During the day, the central government ruled, and at night it was the 
insurgent. This story is one of the explanations given to Spiro to explain factionalism in this village 
(Spiro, 1997). 
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officially restore order and organise national election, he was dismissed. When the 
U Nu’s government won the 1960 election, he was re-elected headman. Finally, 
after the 1962 military coup of Ne Win, another person was appointed to implement 
the socialist policy of the Revolutionary Council (1962-1974). 
 Beyond the influence of national politics on the village, people remember U 
To Kaing as a leader in terms similar to Nash’s when he wrote about the men of 
hpon who have “those special traits of leadership, that run of luck, that visible stamp 
of being the recipient of benign fate and auspicious destiny that makes a man a 
leader in the village” (Nash 1963: 198). But, when we talked about U To Kaing’s 
greatness, unlike the monk U Za Nay Ya, my interlocutors acknowledge that the 
context, his engagement in daily affairs, how he displayed propriety, and his ability 
to buffer state or armed group demands are key components of his worth. It made 
him exemplary in people’s memories. And this affects the current polity because U 
To Kaing became a reference, a standard that allows for the evaluation of the worth 
of leaders as we will see in the next chapter. 
 We can now step back and reflect on Nash’s argument as we have reached 
one of its limits. It is clear that the worth of the last men of hpon is related to the 
context they lived in and how they embodied propriety and engagement in local 
affairs. Nonetheless, as described by Nash, the terminology used to talk about 
leadership is centred on hpon, even if it has nearly disappeared for present-day 
villagers. Expressed in the vocabulary of charismatic leadership, the worth of 
leaders is in fine, detached from any context. My hypothesis is that Nash’s man of 
hpon was described to him by an individual – U Sein Ko from Nondwin village – 
who used for himself the timeless attributes of leadership detached from any 
historical reality. Nash had two examples of men of hpon: U Sein Ko and U Htun. 
The first was his main informant concerning Burmese conceptualisation of politics, 
allegedly the bigman of Nondwin. U Htun, headman (until 1948) of Yadaw village 
near Mandalay, “was reputed to have driven out local distillers, to have forbidden 
playing cards, and to have curtailed the number of pwes the village sponsored or 
donated money to, but, since this man of pon, no headman has exercised authority 
or power on a project he himself initiated.” (Nash 1965: 277). U Htun and U To 
Kaing lived and ruled during the same period. Nash has clearly shown how context 
(moral reformation) relates to bigness (man of hpon). But this relation was eclipsed 
by his will to think of power as a quality lodged into an individual explaining 
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patron-client politics, even if it is almost always, for both kings and commoners 
alike, a quality attributed a posteriori.304  What can be taken from this is that the 
worth of leaders is intimately linked to the context they live in and to the memories 
of their predecessors. This point will be useful in the next chapter for understanding 
how village affairs were reconceptualised in the late twentieth century, but also how 
Ko Kyaw crafted his position as headman in the local political landscape. 
 
TRANSFORMING HIERARCHIES (1890S-1950S) 
 
 This section is more impressionistic by nature. It argues that while it 
fashioned new structures of land revenue and tenure, colonialism offered 
opportunities to renegotiate the obligations channelling access to wealth and to 
ownership, allowing the main farming families to become the local elites 
monopolising state institutions and local leadership (1900s-1930s). And during the 
period of insurgencies, war and independence (1930s-1950s), they were able to take 
over various projects of land reform, either supported by the state or by armed 
groups. Throughout this period, the local hierarchy transformed from a landscape 
of status groups affiliated with multiple patrons to a divide between farmers 
(taungthu) and labourers (myaukthu). It created a world where claim to authority 
through social identity – belonging to the main farming families – became more 
important. And the remnant of precolonial hierarchy, such as U Po Shi, an important 
money lender descending from the Thazi gentry, disappeared when land tenure was 
internally ‘reorganised’ in the middle of the twentieth century. 
 
Land titling and Court 
 
“In codifying and enforcing a system of land revenue based on a 
division of state and non-state land and on a thathameda assessment, 
British policy-makers [created] for the first time a structure of 
genuinely private ownership, entirely free of the gentry or aristocratic 
 
304 Cf. general introduction, notably the section titled “The uses of Nash’s work.” 
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control or involvement. The result was a decade of confusion and 
competition. The new colonial courts were quickly put to work.” (Thant 
Myint-U 2001: 231) 
 
The Settlement Operations were gradual.305 First, the officers tried to collect the 
thathameda taxes according to what they understood of the Burmese system.306 
British knowledge about land was rudimentary and a revenue system able to sustain 
direct rule was needed quickly. Based on previous experiences, the Upper Burma 
Land and Revenue Regulation was enforced in 1889.307 Two master categories were 
officialised: state and non-state lands. The key test was to ask whether the land was 
inheritable (non-state) or not (state). “This twofold division of land was made on 
the understanding that state land in ‘Burmese times’ paid rent to the royal treasury 
above and beyond any ordinary assessment.” (Thant Myint-U 2001: 229). No 
doubt, this division did not correspond to any kind of tenure that existed in Upper 
Burma. It was rather “made in line with the long-standing British Indian concept of 
the state being the ultimate owner of the land or was justified in part by citing the 
Burmese notion of the king as the ‘lord of water and earth’ (yé-myé-shin).” (ibid.: 
229). In Alon territory, state lands308 were taxed first but represented only 1.7% of 
the circle in 1906.309 Besides, decades of in-fighting and competition over offices 
had largely blurred what could have been a revenue system. Thus, revenue was 
firstly drawn from the capitation tax. This inflow entered both the District coffers 
and the headmen’s pockets – the latter ascribing individual household shares. Soon, 
non-state lands were targeted. This is where the Summary (1900-03) and Regular 
Settlement (1906-09) stepped in. Quite conveniently, non-state land became 
 
305 Hardiman distinguished the Pre-Summary Assessments (1886-87), the Survey of Royal Lands 
(1888-89), the Summary Settlement (1900-03) and the Regular Settlement (1906-09). 
306 First a rate of Rs.10 per household was imposed, but it was often paid in kind and channelled via 
the headmen. It has to be remembered that this capitation tax was introduced some years before the 
annexation participated in the upheaval of regional and local authorities – that depended on local 
fees and tax based on customs – against the King. For a summary of revenue collection, cf. Hardiman 
(1912, p38). 
307 The division between state and non-state already in place before the Act, it was present in the 
instructions given to people like Raikes. For instance, in the Lower Chindwin District, the survey of 
royal lands started a year before the enforcement of this regulation, cf. Hardiman (1909: 39). 
308 Thant Myint-U (2001: 228-229) gives the following list of what was declared state land in the 
1889 regulation: Ahmudan-sa [sic] or “crown service lands”; Si-sa [sic], or “cavalry lands”; Thugyi-
sa [sic], or “headman’s lands”; Wun-sa [sic], or “senior official’s lands”; Min-mye [sic], or “royal 
lands”; waste land and abandoned land. 
309 Cf. Hardiman (1909, statement IV “Regular Settlement statistics” in Appendix). 
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synonymous with private ownership. They covered mostly what is called dama-u-
gya and bobuapaing lands. Both terms refer to how a person justifies his relations 
to land: through clearing (dama: knife, u: first, kya: fall) or inheritance (bobua: 
grandparents; paing: ownership). These expressions are claims.310 Yet, the creation 
of the land revenue system meant that claims could become rights, that is 
recognised (written) by law (“Records of Rights”).  
 
“The general tenure enquiries made it clear that the bulk of the occupied 
land was, in Burmese times, held on a tenure which included full rights 
of transfer, whether to a resident in the same village-tract or to an 
outsider; of inheritance, whether by a resident or a non-resident heir; 
and of letting, whether by a resident or a non-resident owner and to any 
tenant he pleased. The right of sale was everywhere asserted, though 
sales seldom took place. […]. Except in a few instances in out-of-the-
way parts of the district, the exclusive proprietary right of the first 
clearer was found to be strongly asserted […].” (Hardiman 1912: 41, 
my emphasis). 
 
 Burmese land ownership apparently displayed, almost verbatim, the feature 
of individual private ownership. The cadastral mapping and recording of rights 
started on these premises. The cadastral survey took place from 1897 to 1902. In 
the meantime, the register of rights and tenancies were compiled. Officially, the 
registration of rights on cadastral maps was done by an officer of the Settlement 
Department when on tour, asking villagers “to walk round the boundaries of the 
land that he claimed to possess in company with the claimants to adjacent 
holdings.” (Furnivall 1957: 209). Plots became ‘permanent holdings’311 recorded 
 
310 And if we translate them in the European vocabulary of “land rights’’, it gives something like: 
right by first clearing and right by inheritance. But both categories blurred into one another because 
‘non-occupied’ land quickly became rare and thus gradually the claim by first clearing became 
rhetorical reference, insisting on that the land came from one family through inheritance mostly. 
311 If the demarcations were accepted by the persons involved, the official would delimit the plots 
on the kwin map. Otherwise, he would refer the dispute to a senior official. At the end of this process, 
the parcels (called upaing) were assigned a serial number referencing the name of the person who 
now owns it, and who then became liable of the land tax. The rate was determined following land 
types dividing drylands (ya - recorded Y) and rice lands (leh - recorded R). The land type of every 
plot was then indexed as per soil quality (Y1, Y2… R1, R2, R3). Impermanent holdings include 
spaces for which it was difficult to assign affiliation. This includes land subject to annual 
reallocation, parcels for which boundaries are indefinite because of their use for shifting cultivation 
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under the name of a land rights holder. In theory, people also had to indicate the 
origin of their rights, whether it was by inheritance, purchase, or lease in order to 
establish whether it was state land or not. If the person declared himself a tenant, or 
a usufructuary mortgagee, it was the name of the landlord or of the mortgagor that 
was recorded on the registers. Although this process seems straightforward in 
theory, it was messier in practice. 
 In Upper Burma, unlike Lower Burma, “conditions were much more 
complex, estates remained long undivided, outright sales of land where rare and it 
was the exception rather than the rule for the person in occupation of land to be the 
sole person interested in it.’’ (ibid.: 211). But who was interested in land? People 
bypassed others’ claims thanks to the land titling process.  The first register “was 
set aside en bloc […] for faulty procedure, and was commenced de novo by the 
Regular Settlement.” (Hardiman 1912: 40). In other words, the Record of Rights 
became a “Record of Wrongs” (Furnivall 1957: 92), and the registration started over 
in 1906. During this period (1890s -1900s), the courts saw a growing number of 
land cases: 
 
“The Reports on Civil Administration of the 1890s tell a story in which 
Burmese people, realising that all land was in effect becoming ‘private’, 
became quickly familiar with the colonial judicial system, and then 
fought intensely through the courts for ownership of land. Throughout 
the reports, the British expressed repeated surprise at the amount of 
litigation and the extent to which members of sometimes quite small 
communities were challenging one another in court.” (Thant Myint-U 
2011: 216) 
 
 Thant Myint-U listed more than 7,000 land cases judged in 1889 and more 
than 9,000 for 1890, particularly for breaches of contract on land all over Upper 
Burma. In the Lower Chindwin District, the courts also witnessed a rise in 
litigations.312 For Hardiman, this was mostly because the “Settlement operations 
 
or as an agricultural experimentation area 
312 There was the court of the District Judge, two courts of Subdivisional Judges, and six courts of 
Township Judges. There also were, at the end of 1908, thirty-one village headmen empowered to 
try civil suits of a petty nature. Cf. Hardiman (1912: 162). 
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lead to the investigation of titles to land and the discovery of points of dispute as to 
ownership” (1912: 162). To the great surprise of colonial officers, the contests 
occurred mostly within communities (which were supposed to be ‘organic’). The 
cases were broadly of two types: suits for the division of ancestral property and for 
the redemption of mortgaged land. It seems that the courts were dealing with 
conflicts where confusion prevailed as per who had rights over what. Three levels 
were entangled, namely occupancy on, ownership of, and jurisdiction over land. 
The courts were a means to contest local customs, or more precisely, to renegotiate 
or bypass the obligations that enabled one to access land. The following subsection 
explores the question of ownership – through family relations – and occupancy – 
via tenancies – by looking at how colonial administrators attempted to create a 
system of land revenue. The next one takes up the problem of jurisdiction to show 
how precolonial authorities were gradually challenged. 
 
Families and tenancies 
 
 In early twentieth century (Hughes 1932: 40), as for today (Boutry et al.: 101-
103), the two main avenues to access land and to become a farmer were by 
inheritance or through a variety of tenancies. Land was mostly attached to nuclear 
families and tenancies often occurred between kin until, for instance, the family 
patrimony was divided at the death of parents. But the colonial administrators tried 
to match a system of land tenure anchored in kinship with their idea of private 
ownership. Furnivall, critical about colonialism,313 says that during the titling 
process “the occupant was usually taken as the owner, although probably in a large 
majority of cases the family property had not yet been divided and the occupant 
was cultivating as the tenant or the mortgagee of the family as a whole” (Furnivall 
1957: 92). This is a key point. Up until the present day, there is the idea that land is 
individually owned but the arrangements regulating land use and access remind us 
of a system of joint tenure.  
 Ownership was and is a process intimately linked with the temporality of the 
transmission of inheritance (chapter 7). As it was the case in other Southeast Asian 
 
313 Cf. Guan (2009). 
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precolonial polities, forms of “hereditary private tenure” (Boomgaard 2011: 448) 
existed in the Lower Chindwin Division.314 The bulk of the land was cultivated by 
the villagers. The tenure was hereditary because it was inherited, and thus the term 
“private” is merely a reflection of the temporary authority a person had over a 
family estate that could be sold, rented or mortgaged. When one cleared a plot, it 
became part of the things one had to transmit to his children in equal shares.315 It 
means that a person was recognised as the main authority over an estate quite late 
in life. Before that, he might farm plots as tenant (for his parents, coheirs, 
neighbours, local landlord, and so on), or as usufructuary mortgagee for instance. 
“Outright” sales were rare (Furnivall 1957: 211; Hardiman 1912: 48) and a right of 
pre-emption on sale and mortgage by “relations” (Hardiman 1912: 52), that is by 
kinsmen, heirs and even neighbours, was often asserted (Hardiman 1910: 41). 
Migration did not erase potential claims.316 Even “[l]and obtained by inheritance 
and held in joint ownership may be worked before division either by each heir in 
turn or by one heir as tenant of all the heirs” (Hardiman 1912: 52).  And colonial 
officers were confounded by how what they called a “sentimental” relation to land 
(Hardiman 1910: 35) could influence its value and the conditions of transfer. All 
these elements converge toward the conclusion that there was a difference between 
working on a plot of land and the potentials claims upon it. 
 Yet, the occupants could claim ownership because land titling was made as if 
“most of the land is held in private ownership, on what is practically a full freehold 
tenure, and in small estates” (Hardiman 1912: 150). On the ground, ownership was 
more a matter of stewardship because entitlement to property was (and is) created 
through family relationships between parents and children: living together entitled 
one to property because of the mutual obligations between people317 created claims 
over things. This will be explored further in chapter 7. Thus, if ownership had to be 
linked to a single person, it was more of a temporary recognition of the 
 
314 Which has been an important trading centre since at least the seventeenth century, cf. Charney 
(2006, 2007). 
315 Hardiman, explained that the prevailing customs was to divide land equally to all siblings, male, 
female, eldest and youngest children alike, cf. Hardiman (1909:27). In some places, the eldest son, 
known as the auratha, could take the biggest share, cf. chapter 7. And today, the principle of equal 
division is everywhere asserted but varies in practice, cf. Boutry et al. (2017: 101s) and Huard 
(2018). 
316 Cf. Cady (1960: 49). 
317 For instance, giving inheritance vs taking care of parents. 
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responsibility and authority of that person over a household (usually by a man but 
not always): a steward. And there was a complex web of obligations between 
generations, offering opportunities but also entailing more obligations.318  
 Thus, what structured ownership were the customs organising the dynamics 
of kinship (alliance, descent and the succession of generations) and the moral 
obligations between family members (transmission to children, taking care of the 
parents). But the titling created owners on paper and thus offered opportunities to 
bypass these obligations. Hence conflicts between coheirs about their share of 
inheritance, if one of them registered all in his name, or if they disagreed about what 
was owed to each other. In short, the land belonged to the person momentarily 
responsible for it, but soon was claimed by others, and the family estate divided. 
 While the ownership of land was linked to a family’s relationships, 
agreements on land were also quite flexible. The actual occupancy followed a 
variety of agreements and so a variety of types of occupants. Renting, 
sharecropping and mortgages were common and took many forms. Hardiman took 
a close interest in the functioning and diversity of tenures. In our area of study, 47% 
of the occupied land was rented in 1909,319 that is about 24,000 acres. In the whole 
District, about 15% of the land was mortgaged and 18% of the land acquired by 
mortgage was in the hands of non-farmers. To the British officers, this was the sign 
that, unlike in the Delta of Lower Burma, land was not concentrated in the hands of 
non-agriculturists.320 For them, the District harboured a relatively unregulated land 
market, albeit with very few sales. It was even assumed that the high frequency of 
renting originated in the regimental system when “[c]ultivators compelled to render 
military service had to let their lands during their absence at the capital”. (Hardiman 
1910, committee proceedings, paragraph 13).  
 
318 For example, a tenant – say a son of an old man who cannot farm it anymore – could have said 
that the land he farmed was own through a claim of first clearing, even if he never saw the plot being 
cleared. Nonetheless, he shared the harvest with his parents and coheirs. It was not his inheritance 
yet, but because he was part of the family’s line of descent, this claim had much chance to be realised 
(if not the plot, then other things included in parental patrimony). The land in question could have 
been inherited by the old man’s wife, and then became part of their conjugal estate. After his 
marriage, their son could rent others’ land as well, and a neighbour could become tenant on the old 
man’s plot for a time. In a moment of need, the plot could be mortgaged to this very man. 
Nonetheless, it would still be part of the family estate until its division is enacted, usually around at 
the death of the old man and his wife. And the son, if he came back to took over the family farm, 
would be responsible for their debts and assets. 
319 This figure concerned the Soil tract V and stems from my calculation, cf. Hardiman (1909: 17). 
320 Cf. Adas (1974a, 1974b), Boutry et al. (2007), Brown (2005), and Cheng Siok Hwa (1965), Mya 
Than (2001). 
221 
 Tenancies followed various principles depending on the quality of the land, 
access to water (inundation/irrigation), the level of competition for land and the 
relation between the contractors. The main agreement321 on dry lands was called 
thonsutitsu (“three parts one part”) (ibid.: 20) – meaning that the tenant gives one-
third of the harvest to the landowner. It was the norm for the latter to make a 
contribution to the tenant for expenses of cultivation and land revenue. It could last 
for a year up to a decade or more and this kind of agreement mostly concerned 
family members in our area of research, notably when the parents let their offspring 
build up their capital by farming on a parental estate. Furthermore, in the soil tract 
V, among the tenants, three-fourths had long term tenancies (i.e. more than six 
years) and had to provide half of the harvest to the owner.322 This kind of agreement, 
called myayzupay (“giving a share of the land”), was done between the main 
farmers – usually descendants of the founding lineages who mustered the biggest 
estates – and other farmers and would-be farmers. But in the meantime, competition 
for land increased as migrants returned and virtually all arable land was farmed (the 
total occupied area in the soil tract V rose only by 5.7% between 1909 and 1931). 
The turnover of renters offered opportunities for villagers to access land depending 
on their abilities, capital and network while awaiting their inheritance. Thus, for the 
British, landlord-tenant relations were egalitarian: “there is no well-defined line 
separating the tenant from the landlord class. A's landlord is frequently B’s tenant” 
(ibid.: 24). In other words, if there was no “sale market”, there was a “tenancy 
market” with most of the transactions occurring between acquaintances, if not 
neighbours or family members. 
 When tenancies and mortgages mostly occurred within communities, their 
forms follow a sense of what is just and fair about such transactions.323 At the 
village level, one of the main problems was the ability to cultivate land. And since 
colonialism impacted the hierarchy of status depending on regiments and 
 
321 Other forms were: the tenants gives half of the harvest (with or without contribution from the 
owner to the expenses of cultivation and/or land revenue), two-fifths, one-third, one quarter, one-
fifth, dead rent (in produce or in cash), no rent but payment of all the land revenue by the tenant. 
322 Cf. Hardiman (1909: 23). 
323 For instance, the repartition of the shares between owners and tenants (in fractions such as one 
half, two-fifth, one-third) depended on the quality of the soil, on the level of competition for land, 
on access to irrigation, distance from towns, on the relation and power balance between the 
contractors and eventually on the actual amount of crop harvested. Mortgage value was usually of 
two third of the land value and the person taking the land generally farmed it (sometimes the 
mortgagee even added more money during the length of the agreement). Cf. Hardiman (1909: 35). 
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obligations to the chiefs, social hierarchy slowly organised around farming. 
Gradually the taungthu – the real farmers – became the main elite and the myaukthu 
– the labourers – the dependent.324 The difference between both ‘ideal’ groups lays 
mostly in the ability to farm land, that is to have capital (cart, cattle, tools), skills 
and networks (being the child of a farmer helps). It is the product of an ideology 
emphasising the superiority of ‘real peasants’ over mere daily workers. And because 
most of the work was in the fields the myaukthu largely depended upon the taungthu 
for their survival. 
 In this context, the colonial land titling did not lead to the discovery of points 
of dispute as to ownership. Rather, it created an arena for disputing ownership, 
challenging customs, and to test out if and how the new political order could enforce 
individual claims. Hence the returning migrants going to court to reclaim land 
registered by their mortgagee for instance. Hence the old gentry’s tenants claiming 
the land they cleared as their own. The use of courts strongly resembles K. Von 
Benda-Beckmann’s ‘forum shopping’ in which Minangkabau villagers chose 
between various arenas to settle their disputes.325 While gradually suppressing the 
prerogative and authority of the old gentry leaders, colonial officers tried to find 
them a role in hope that they “and other local lugyi (or ‘big people’) could ‘arbitrate’ 
disputes […]. The feeling was that some sort of arbitration was the ‘traditional 
system’.’’ (Thant Myint-U 2001: 216). But ‘‘when people come to court they prefer 
to get the court’s decision. When asked why they do not go to the lugyis, the reply 
is we cannot agree with the lugyis, we do not trust the lugyis, we want an order 
from the court, etc…” (Report on the Administration of Civil Justice in Burma 
1890: 9, quoted from Thant Myint-U ibid.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
324 In the soil tract V, 57% of the household were classified as taungthu, while 26% were considered 
as myaukthu (among them, 20.3% were classified as “coolies”). 
325 Cf. Benda-Beckmann (1981). 
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The tale of U Po Shi 
 
 If the old gentry leaders used to be the ones judging most cases (with a 
possibility of appeal), the village system limited these prerogatives to a certain 
extent.326 According to colonial records and historians’ narratives, most of the 
gentry lost their hold over the countryside. In Upper Burma “the old ruling lineages 
lost control over land to their former tenants” (Thant Myint-U 2001: 233) because 
of colonial courts in the 1890s. It is thus tempting to imagine the villagers “entirely 
free of the gentry or aristocratic control or involvement” (ibid.: 231). After the 
violence of the ‘pacification campaign’, the intersection of the village system with 
the territorialisation of land revenue and the new judicial system was a blow to the 
precolonial polity. Yet, in the Lower Chindwin District in the 1900s, some headmen 
held on to large estates,327 and, “at the end of 1908, 31 village headmen [were] 
empowered to try civil suits of a petty nature” (Hardiman 1912: 161). The 
jurisdiction and territory of the old gentry shrunk and their means to accumulate 
wealth were disrupted. But the countryside was not completely restructured. Debts 
were not forgotten. Some precolonial authorities kept their hold over the 
countryside via money lending. In Myinmilaung and Gawgyi, there is a story about 
a man called U Po Shi: 
 
“Before the Japanese left, U Po Shi had many lands in the area and a 
wife from every villages. Farmers had to bring him his share of the 
harvest with their own cart. […]. After his death, he became a buffalo!” 
(U Maung, Gawgyi elder, 26th of February 2016). 
 
 Since the early eighteenth-century gentry families in Badon province 
controlled large estates through money lending. They progressively accumulated 
land sold as a redemption of debt and contracted tenants to farm it, or had the 
mortgagors working on their own land as tenants. These families were known as 
 
326 Thant Myint-U’s argument (2001) is to say that the old gentry lost its prerogatives during early 
colonial period. Overall, the territory of the gentry families shrunk partly due to the creation of 
village headship. Some retained part of it, but most were officially turned into tax collector with, 
occasionally, civil powers. 
327 Monywa headman is an exception with an estate of 3.826 acres in 1909, the only estate of such 
size in the District. Cf. Hardiman (1910: 27). 
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myayshin (“master of lands”), not because they owned land but because they 
controlled loans and debts related to land. Thus, if Myinmilaung people were no 
longer liable for dues and fees toward the previous gentry families since U Nyunt 
became village headman, these families still controlled loans.328 
 According to Gawgyi and Myinmilaung elders, as well as to a historian of 
Monywa University and U Po Shi’s grandson (86 years old),329 U Po Shi was the 
descendant of the gentry family of Thazi village. He had a large amount of land and 
loaned money in fifteen to twenty villages since at least the late 1900s and moved 
back and forth between Thazi and Monywa where he built several houses and 
patronised theatre performances. What people remember most is when he settled 
permanently in Monywa when the Japanese were defeated in 1945.330 He allegedly 
came there with fifty pots full of gold mounted on his tenants’ ox-carts. On 
occasion, the figure is seven hundred pots. Some interviewees say he had seven 
wives, others say twenty, sometimes one in each village, and at times even a 
hundred. Also, people disliked him. A story about him goes this way: due to his bad 
deeds, he reincarnated into a buffalo. One of his sons, weary of hearing this story, 
sued one of the men spreading the rumour. The two men, a judge and the buffalo in 
question were present at the trial. The defendant looked toward the buffalo and said 
“Po Shi”. The animal came to him. And he won the case.331 Unlike U Po Shi’s 
grandson, most villagers laugh at this story. For them, this man became an animal 
because of his excesses. His journey to Monywa mounted on his tenants’ ox-cart 
was not a sign of splendour. The people who carried his wealth after the war were 
not strictly speaking his clients. They were his debtors and his tenants, and they had 
to be there. 
 One of the main problems for villagers was to get money in times of need. 
Previous office holders and money lenders had the wealth to support them. They 
funnelled loans in villages for decades and mustered fragmented estates up for rent. 
When rain and harvests were bad, people could resort to seasonal migration. But 
 
328 Even if the colonial government created a system of credit (Brown (2013), Turnell (2009)), there 
was also the money lenders U Kha Kha from Kyawka, U Ho, Daw Mya Mya and Daw Chaw from 
Monywa. 
329 I notably interviewed U Po Shi’s grandson with Monywa historians on the 15th of July 2016. 
330 He most probably has left because of the communist underground groups were gaining territory 
and advocating for land redistribution. 
331 This story was told to me on several occasion, the first time by Ko Kyaw on the 20th of February 
2014. 
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they also often mortgaged their land for those who had some, or contracted loans 
for the poorest. And those “who did not possess land or other valuable property […] 
resorted to the sale of their children, wives, or themselves.” (Toe Hla 1987: 78). 
Those were not sales in my opinion, but temporary debt bondage, or kyun.332 They 
were either signs of alliances, or of extreme poverty. In our case, my hypothesis is 
that U Po Shi’s numerous wives were in fact his bondmaids, waiting for their family 
to repay the debt. A 1782 dhammathat,333 or Burmese Buddhist customary law, 
stated that “when the borrower is weak, and the lender powerful” and if the 
borrower “cannot furnish the security and have not the means of paying, let this 
“person be sunk” (become a slave) and let his wife, children or grandchildren, his 
heirs, if living with him, also become slaves.” (Richardson 1847: 71). Such an 
obligation was thus recognised by law. And the fact that people always insisted that 
U Po Shi had so many wives was a sign that he was a wealthy and important man, 
with whom people could get money but at a heavy price. 
 But U Po Shi also invested in land, notably mortgages, and assembled an 
estate up for rent. The mortgaged land was rented to tenants who were either the 
mortgagors, or other people that could thus access land outside family relationships 
by becoming a client of the mortgagee/money lender. The sort of debt patronage 
that existed since at least the eighteenth century continued. The precolonial office-
holders traditionally provided such loans and accepted land, or people, as 
security.334 Deprived of their office with the village system, some were recorded as 
“rent receivers” and “non-agriculturists”, and represented the chief category of 
people acquiring land by mortgage or purchase since the 1900s in the soil tract V.  
 The biggest landlords in the district sometimes required services from their 
tenants such as “the cutting of firewood” and assistance when they were “giving an 
entertainment (a-hlu) [sic] and the like.” (Hardiman 1910: 25). Exactions were 
“rare” according to Hardiman, and the Thazi family was never mentioned in the 
1909 and 1932 settlement reports. Its virtual absence from the records is due to the 
British methods of computation. Fragmented estates escaped the Settlement’s 
radar335 and debts were not recorded as per who loaned the money. In the meantime, 
 
332 In the sense of bondman, cf. Aung-Thwin (1984). 
333 On the Burmese Buddhist law, cf. Crouch (2016a, 2016b), Huxley (1997) and chapter 7. 
334 This was part of the patron-client relationship, along with the financing of festivals, exaction of 
services and dues that marked and repeated the hierarchy between them. 
335 Because estates of less than fifty acres per kwin were not recorded and that land obtained by 
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the large landlords336 are presented as rack-renting their tenants.  Even if large 
estates were apparently “not numerous” and landlords who kept land-stewards were 
“very few” (ibid.: 22), the tenants complained about them: 
 
“When a land steward conducts the appraisement, he usually takes as 
remuneration, in grain, two-and-a-half per cent. of the total appraised 
yield, and this the tenant has to pay in addition to the rental. The land 
steward receives no salary. The tenant usually bears the cost of carriage 
to the landlord's house. […]. There are cases – the most prominent 
being those of the landlords living in Mônywa [sic] – where 
appraisement is conducted stringently, and it is then accompanied by 
abuses.” (Hardiman 1910: 22). 
 
 In other words, and as recalled by the elders, the terms of the relations 
between U Po Shi and his tenants were not fair.337 Obviously, this kind of tenancy 
was different from the flexible agreements that usually prevailed between residents 
of localities. By accepting tenancy, and taking loans with them, the farmers 
accepted such landlords as their superiors. The obligations stemming from the 
rentals were not justly quantified. They had to carry the harvest on their cart to him, 
let his trusted men estimate his share, pay them and pay all, or a portion, of the land 
revenue. The obligation to provide services are remembered as unfair, such as 
carrying his wealth toward Monywa. That is why they laugh about U Po Shi 
becoming a buffalo and underline his excesses when talking about his numerous 
wives. For them, he becoming a buffalo was karmic justice.338 
 
usufructuary mortgage appeared under the name of the original owner, there was no way to see U 
Po Shi appearing as a landlord in the figures collected for revenue purpose. Cf. Hardiman (1909: 
27). 
336 The larger being the headman of Monywa with 3,826 acres in 1906. 
337 Interestingly, U Po Shi allegedly employed about twenty ‘land stewards’ known as his luyon 
(“trusted man”) and the tenants as myayloktha (literally, “son of the work on the land”). Interview 
with Zalok yatmiyathpa on the 21st of June 2019. 
338 Graeber offers an interesting insight on such case.  He wrote that in medieval Hindu law codes it 
was often emphasised that a debtor who did not pay would be reborn as a slave in the household of 
his creditor-or in later codes, reborn as his horse or ox. These warnings of karmic revenge against 
borrowers, reappear in many strands of Buddhism, but when the usurers were thought to go too far 
the logic was reversed, and karmic justice was reduced to the language of a business deal (2011: 11-
12). He took as an example the fate of Hiromushime, a greedy money lender charging enormous 
interests around 776 C.E. in Medieval Japan. On the seventh day after her death, her body sprang to 
life half human half ox. For the author of this story, a monk, it represented a clear case of premature 
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 This kind of obligation and patronage (at this level) pervaded the countryside 
for a long time.339 U Po Shi story’s ended when the Japanese retreated from 
Monywa in 1945, or rather, before the communists (the White Flag group in our 
case) took over. This micro-event marks a long-term change, namely affecting the 
type of hierarchy in place, which was based on debt bondage and money lending 
and embodied by local patrons, heirs of the precolonial gentry, whose rule was 
ending. Instead, a new hierarchy was taking shape in the countryside as the main 
farming families of villages were able to monopolise local leadership and use state 
and armed group projects to consolidate their wealth and position. 
 
Farmers power 
 
 Since the late 1940s, the White Flag “advocated a policy of ‘land to the tiller’ 
and land redistribution” (Smith 1991: 131). In fact, farmers did not pay any land 
tax since the outbreak of the Second World War.340 And it is mostly under U To 
Kaing that Myinmilaung and Gawgyi that indebted tenants could change their 
situation. Yet, it does not mean that most tenancy agreements disappeared 
overnight, on the contrary. Tenancy conditions were, besides taxes, a paramount 
grievance expressed in the last decades, notably in Lower Burma and concerning 
the Chettyar moneylending Visayan caste from Chennai (Madras). The U Nu 
government tried “to outflank the communists and secure rural support” (Brown 
2013: 97) by enacting a Land Nationalisation Act341 in 1948 whose objective was 
to turn every farmer into state tenants by proclaiming state ownership of all land 
and resources. But it had limited effects and scope.342 Most of the countryside was 
out of reach for the central government in 1948. In 1953, a more detailed Land 
Nationalisation Act was enacted, but again its implementation was slow and 
 
reincarnation as the woman was being punished by the law of karma for her violations of what is 
both reasonable and right. 
339 To some extent, the employment of young people in teashops today for instance shares some 
commonalities with debt bondage, may it be a debt of the parents to another person, or for the child 
to finance schooling. 
340 Cf. Taylor (2009) and Brown (2013: 86). 
341 The 1948 Land Nationalisation Act for the most part reproduced the unimplemented 1936 
Tenancy Act which objective was to resolve the tenancy problem in Burma. 
342 Cf. Steinberg (1981), Brown (2013). 
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“disrupted by the communist insurrection and the continuing lack of security across 
much of rural Burma well into the 1950s.” (ibid.: 97). 
 In the Chindwin region, the communist insurgency was an opportunity to 
negotiate property relations in certain cases, but not for most. What first went ‘to 
the tiller’ was most likely the land held by gentry descendants and contested money 
lenders like U Po Shi who could not maintain their hold through debts.343 In 
Myinmilaung, the central government was able to regain control around 1956. 
Farmers started repaying land taxes to U To Kaing instead of a fee to the White Flag 
group as the State Land Record Department (SLRD) started remaking cadastres344 
for U Nu’s land redistribution scheme. For the elders who have some knowledge 
about that period, it was just about getting land use titles.345 But how it was 
implemented locally remains a partial mystery in which corruption, party 
engineering, insurgency, counter-insurgency and local factionalism were the main 
ingredients.  
 As Brown put it, “there were far too few officials on the ground with training, 
experience, political judgement, and indeed the honesty346 that were undoubtedly 
required.” (ibid.: 97). The official stance was to abolish landlordism by suppressing 
tenant-farming, providing credit347 and supporting the creation of cooperatives. 
According to the law, a six-man committee348 had to be selected in each tract by the 
open-voice procedure to take charge of the distribution in the tract.349 Farmer-
owners could retain a maximum of 50 acres350 and had to declare their 
 
343 The system of small-scale tenancies (as described by Hardiman, Report Settlement) remained 
through the second half of the 20th century (Steinberg 1981a: 121-127). The land that did go ‘to the 
tiller’ occurred in localised and sporadic cases, depending on the waxing and waning of the 
authorities at play in the villages. 
344 See the Cadastral map in Appendix A. 
345 This fact was highlighted in most discussions I had about this period with many elders, it was 
also emphasised by Zalok yatmiyathpa during our interview of the 21st of June 2019 
346 the organisation created by the U Nu’s government to handle the redistribution of land, called the 
Burman Farmer and Labourer Council (voiced PaTaLaSa), was quickly accused of clientelism and 
corruption, redistributing as it pleases fertile land that can grow paddy, and so was re-titled by 
villagers: The Burman Dishonest Villagers Council (also voiced PaTaLaSa). 
347 The State Agricultural Bank (SAB) was created in 1953 for this purpose. 
348 Known as the Farmer and Labourer Council during the AFPFL and later transformed into the 
Village People Council after Ne Win coup, with other subgroups (Socialist Youth Council and so 
on) created in villages as well. 
349 Cf. Nash (1965: 285). 
350 Cf. Steinberg (1981: 125). 
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dependents.351 The policy was to give about ten acres to eligible cultivators,352 that 
is, ‘actual farmers’ with tools, ox-cart, cattle and know-how. 
 In practice, the implementation depended on the previous changes of 
ownership that occurred before the central government returned. But it was also 
contingent on local settlement histories, on the type of cultivation (dry or wet lands) 
and on the power relations at plays in village tracts. I do not know precisely how it 
was implemented in Myinmilaung tract. However, the work of Nash and Spiro show 
how local farming families became the top of local hierarchy and competed 
between themselves to accumulate wealth by monopolising village leadership. 
Relating the 2016 selection of Myinmilaung headman, it helps understanding how 
the lugyi and candidates are the ones monopolising the institutions of power. 
 For Spiro, the land nationalisation was one of the historical roots of 
factionalism in Yeigyi, a rice-growing village where he did fieldwork in the early 
1960s. One faction was led by the village headman who just became re-elected to 
this position in 1960 after the military interlude – the office was kept in the same 
family. Before that, he and his faction “exploited their influence with insurgents, 
their official positions in the Village Solidarity Society, and their power in the Land 
Distribution Committee to deprive certain of their fellows of wealth” (Spiro 1997: 
151). The committee received bribes to allow some land owners to retain more land 
than legally allowed while, on paper but not in reality, transferring the possession 
to their former tenants. The new wealthy farmers that were not part of Yeigyi 
traditional farming elite saw their land seized even after paying bribes. Overall, the 
land reform was a means for the old elite represented by the headman to keep the 
new one at bay. Some tenants may had received land, but it seems unlikely that the 
land went ‘to the tiller’. 
 For Nash, the land reform in some cases reinforced factionalism, and in others 
political fragmentation was buffered by the authority of a man of hpon. He worked 
successively in Nondwin (remote drylands on the road between Monywa and 
Mandalay) and in Yadaw (a rice-growing village of in-migrants south of Mandalay) 
in 1960-61.353 In Yadaw, the land reform started in 1953 ended in 1958-60 with the 
officialization of the status quo ante when the army took over and suspended the 
 
351 Cf. Spiro (1997: 151). 
352 Cf. Nash (1965: 285) 
353 From 1960 to 1961, he did 18 months of fieldwork in Upper Burma. 
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program of land distribution. “The farmers of Yadaw reverted to the land they had 
customarily farmed, prior to the program of grant land. When U Nu resumed the 
reins of government, he legalized the tenancy of farmers on the land they were 
farming, thus freezing the Yadaw squatter pattern, which emerged after the British 
landlord had fled the Japanese”354 (Nash 1965: 286). Some land went ‘to the tiller’, 
but before and not in the way promulgated in the Act. Furthermore, land distribution 
resulted in a murder, many jailing and the formation of factions tied to national 
parties. The committee, composed of “lugyi lugaun”, 355 was accused of favouritism 
and corruption. The problems were related to the different qualities of land and to 
how some farmers “were asked to move from good land they had been farming, as 
tenant, for years, to poorer land, or other cultivators were shifted about from one 
plot to another for no apparent reason” (ibid.: 285). It discredited the office of 
headman and was symptomatic of the “attenuation of traditional control by a man 
of pon” (ibid.: 286). The land reform led to factionalism and unfolded through party 
engineering during the national election356 the military caretaker government 
organised in 1960.357 In the drylands of Nondwin, it is as if nothing happened. Nash 
did not even mention the land reform. In this dryland area, with no irrigation system, 
the village appears as a community of kinsmen, not as the fruit of migrations or 
displacements. And there was a paramount leader, U Sein Ko, the man of hpon who 
managed to cut off open competition.358 
 Overall, changes in land tenure were mostly a matter of village bigmen 
politics because large land owners (or tenants in the case of Yadaw) came to form 
the upper class of villages. Small-scale tenants and labourers (in many cases the 
‘tillers’) were dependents upon big farming families. Change in social stratification 
and local politics depended on the type of cultivation.359 But the main farming 
families used the successive changes and overlapping of supra-village authorities 
 
354 Before the Japanese left, ten families owned less than 10% of the 1,344 acres which means that 
the tract and the rest was tenant operated. After U Nu government was elected, 123 households held 
52% of the total. See Nash (1965: 213, 224). 
355 Cf. chapter 8 for a discussion of the transformation of the authority of the lugyi. 
356 Between U Nu's Union party known as the Clean AFPFL; Ba Swe's Stable AFPFL, and the 
National United Front 
357 Cf. Nash (1963: 200). 
358 U Sein Ko was not headman. The latter was elected but this election was more a ratification of 
the consensus of the proper person for office than a political contest given that he comes from a line 
of headman. 
359 There was more competition and potentially more factionalism in rice growing areas which 
settlement histories is marked by various waves of migrations. 
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(the British, the Japanese, the Communists, the Army, U Nu’s government) to 
compete for resources and power by investing in leadership and monopolising the 
implementation of land policies. In his work on rural administration in villages of 
central Burma, Lubeigt (1975) has shown a similar trend, namely that the people 
who invested in local leadership were almost all large farmers. And when Mya Than 
(1987) ‘revisited’ a village studied some twenty years before by Pfanner (1962), 
she reached the same conclusion. 
 In Myinmilaung tract, changes in land ownership almost followed the same 
lines. It exacerbated factionalism between Myinmilaung proper and Gawgyi and 
was perhaps mostly contained within these villages. For instance, Gawgyi main 
farmers of that period were able to get more land. The figures traced from the 
transmission of inheritance for today’s main peasant families – but not all – show 
an increase of their holdings three generations ago, that is during this very period. 
For instance, Ko Kyaw’s grandparents – receiving a total of fifteen acres as 
inheritance from both sides, mustered a holding of more than thirty acres at the time 
of their death. And these main farmers from Gawgyi were allegedly part of the land 
committee in charge of the distribution under U To Kaing. The same is said to be 
true for Myinmilaung proper but I was not able to verify it. U To Kaing thus may 
have buffered against political fragmentation – as did U Sein Ko – thanks to his 
authority and his influence as man of hpon. He may have also taken advantage of 
the situation. And some people from Myinmilaung started giving their land tax – 
the system was revived once U Nu government reclaimed sovereignty over this area 
in 1957-58 – directly to the township administration to bypass and confront him. 
 Overall, the distribution of ownership was not completely transformed during 
the 1940s and the 1950s – there were cases of aggrandisement by some farmers 
over others and of some tenants over landlord and money lenders like U Po Shi 
whose power was diminishing. Some ‘tillers’ benefited indirectly from the state 
and/or armed group projects because they could access land by becoming or 
remaining sharecroppers for the main peasant families. But most importantly, this 
period witnessed a rearticulating of local hierarchies because the obligations and 
affiliations toward previous authorities were gradually challenged since the colonial 
encounter. Ultimately, the local hierarchy came to divide (real) farmers, the 
taungthu, and the labourers, or myaukthu. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This chapter has explored the history of the local polity from the 1890s to the 
early 1950s by focussing successively on the crafting of Myinmilaung tract with its 
first headmen, on the embodiment of moral change and authority by the last men of 
hpon, and on the gradual transformation of the local political order. It highlighted 
how Gawgyi, Myinmilaung, Ogon and Mingalagon villages were gathered under 
the same village tract and a single headman once the British ‘pacified’ the 
countryside and designed a new system of government based on direct rule through 
settlement operations. The colonial encounter offered opportunities for some people 
to challenge shifting affiliations and establish their own power. As described by 
Berry in Africa, “British efforts to build a stable system of native administration on 
customary foundations had the effect of maintaining fluid, flexible social 
boundaries and structures of authority” (1993: 37). The early colonisation of our 
area of study was but another episode in a space characterised by political fluidity, 
fragmentation and competition. It also created a political arena centred on villages 
and provided the means to challenge traditional obligations regulating access to 
land and wealth. Beyond the institution, headship became a matter of individuals 
as successive leaders adopted different positions echoing local stakes. Some of 
them became exemplary figures of the moralisation of behaviours and engagement 
in secular affairs when villagers reinterpreted their role toward Buddhism and 
contested colonial rule. The junction of a new context and the emerging of new 
leaders allows one to think about power and authority in terms of worth, beyond 
the emphasis on charismatic leadership (hpon). The chapter ultimately made a case 
for seeing the whole period as a moment when claims to authority was channelled 
by belonging to farming families. It showed how local hierarchies were transformed 
and headed by the ‘real farmers’ who used colonial devices, state and armed group 
projects to challenge pre-existing affiliations and get a hold over the leadership of 
Myinmilaung tract. 
 The next chapter explores the rise of village affairs as the form of Gawgyi 
politics against a background of state disengagement and violence.  
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CHAPTER 5. THE RISE OF VILLAGE AFFAIRS (1960S-2010S) 
 
MEETING THE HEADMEN 
 
 One of the advantages of doing fieldwork with a village headman was that I 
could meet the people who had previously held this position. Once Ko Kyaw 
stopped being headman in March 2016, it became almost inconceivable. On the 5th 
of December 2015, I convinced him that I needed to meet U Win who was in charge 
of Myinmilaung tract from 1995 to 2006. We went to his place. U Win was 
infamous for a number of reasons. To some degree, he embodies the worsening of 
the ways the government interacted with villagers during post-socialist military 
rule. Under his tenure, the state disengaged from the organisation of village life 
after the collapse of the socialist system in the late 1980s and resorted more to 
violence to tighten its hold on the population. Another set of reasons is related to 
local disputes, notably over land, in which U Win’s corruption often comes to the 
forefront. To some extent, he is the U Po Kin, the corrupt magistrate, of Orwell’s 
Burmese Days (1934). But I was not yet fully aware of how all these aspects related 
to one another. Sitting with them both on that day at U Win’s house, I was the 
unwitting instigator of a strange situation. 
 Most of the questions I asked were answered by lies covering U Win’s 
misdeeds. Ko Kyaw knew they were lies. But he never pointed them out directly. 
He felt awkward and gave ready-made statements when the discussion turned awry. 
In the following weeks, Ko Kyaw gradually provided me with other versions of the 
facts. But the situation in and of itself is worth describing first. For instance, as I 
was interested in how he became headman, U Win told me that his election was 
democratic: the ten household leaders queried villagers’ opinions, put the name of 
the candidate they chose in a box and the previous headman and his assistant 
counted the votes. Ko Kyaw nodded. But this was a copy-paste of the conduct of 
the 2011 selection, except for the vote count. And it was certainly not how it could 
have happened twenty years ago under the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC). Ultimately, the reasons for U Win's emergence as village 
headman remain uncertain. Our meeting turned into a political cant and it did not 
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stop there. When I asked U Win if there was any public land in Myinmilaung, 
referring either to the cooperative shop built in Myinmilaung in the early 1970s, the 
football ground or some threshing floors, he was taken aback. Ko Kyaw, hiding 
underneath his longyi (puso) as if he was taking a nap, immediately answered: 
“there is no such thing in Myinmilaung”. U Win nodded. A few weeks later, I 
learned that he had actually built his house where there used to be the cooperative 
shop. Beyond the fact that U Win was corrupt, using his position of headman to 
acquire wealth in ways contradicting local ethics, this situation offers another 
insight. Ko Kyaw, even as headman, was not in a position of force. He dissembled 
ignorance and covered facts in front of U Win to keep face. In other words, he was 
going along with the situation and the stakes of the moment, notably because he 
was required to solve a land dispute involving U Win at the same moment. 
 Things were quite different when I attempted to meet his successor while 
conducting fieldwork for my master’s research in 2013. U Htay is from Gawgyi 
and he held Myinmilaung office from 2006 to 2011. In the first few weeks, I had 
trouble meeting him. He kept avoiding me. Some days, it became a game of hide-
and-seek. On the 23rd of November 2013, we had one main formal discussion during 
which he remained laconic. Our relation changed completely when I came back in 
2015 for a much longer period. I realised that he kept his distance not only with me, 
but also with many officials. He tried, and still tries, to stay away from the 
government while being at the centre of Gawgyi politics. This apparent paradox 
enabled me to understand that his tenure marked a shift in local politics. And that 
shift was a transition from U Win to U Htay, from distrust and corruption to 
trustworthiness and propriety. From the Infamous to the Worthy. U Htay was a 
counterpoint to U Win. That was one of the main narratives about the 
transformation of the local polity after the socialist period. Of course, it was not as 
if everything had changed with the replacement of one man by another; factionalism 
and corruption were still present under U Htay (and after, chapter 2), and some 
people challenged U Win during his mandate. But it is part of a larger movement 
in Gawgyi. U Htay’s commitment to local matters reflects how village affairs were 
monopolised by the villagers who articulated new stakes within a more traditional 
form of collective sociality called luhmuyay or “social affairs” (from which 
Myinmilaung proper was excluded). In other words, engagement in village affairs 
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became the (fragile) form of local politics in Gawgyi at the beginning of the 21st 
century.  
This chapter explores the transformations of the local polity from the early 
years of the socialist period (1962 onward) to the democratic opening of the early 
2010s to locate how village affairs became the principal form of Gawgyi politics. 
It is divided in three sections. The first one introduces the reader to the general 
historical backdrop of the period covering the socialist (1962-88) and the militarist 
(1989-2011) eras. It presents the implementation and failure of the ‘Burmese Way 
to Socialism’360 under the dictatorship of Ne Win which eventually led to the mass 
revolt of 1988 followed by the reasserting of military power under the 
SLORC/SPDC361 government until the partial democratic opening under the Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government of Thein Sein in 2011. It 
describes how the socialisation of society reinforced the control over peasants and 
opened up to democracy in an age of distrust. The failure of the agricultural policies 
and of the authoritarianism of the regime resulted more generally in the worsening 
of living conditions that ultimately led to the 1988 uprising. The rupture, however, 
had a different temporality in Myinmilaung tract and a more moral dimension when 
corruption, collusion, forced labour and violence became the way the military and 
a series of officials administered the countryside. 
The next two sections shift the focus from a state-centred narrative to an 
emphasis on how this period was experienced by villagers and on the 
transformations of local politics. It first argues that Myinmilaung tract became a 
polity closed in upon itself during the socialist period (1962-1988). Class division 
between farmers and dependents were reinforced in villages as the main families 
were able to control the local institutions empowered by the socialist state. The final 
section explores the SLORC/SPDC period as lived by the villagers. It is divided in 
two parts each focusing more closely to two headmen – the Infamous and the 
Worthy – in order to reflect the temporality of the moral rupture that accompanied 
the rise of village affairs as the main form of politics in Gawgyi. The history of land 
relations is not directly addressed in the following sections. This task is devoted to 
chapter 7 which centres on the transmission of inheritance within farming families. 
 
360 Cf. Aung-Thwin and Thant Myint-U (1992) and Steinberg (1982) among others. 
361 SPDC stand for the State Peace and Development Council (1997-2011), the organisation that 
replaced the SLORC. 
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In this chapter on transmission, a case study explores continuity and change in land 
relations and shows how the conceptions and practices related to property are 
articulated with family obligations. This ethnographic approach of land allows to 
reinterpret the transformations of ownership during the second half of the twentieth 
century and before. 
 One of the main challenges was to integrate my data into a historical narrative 
marked out by other academic interests while letting the materials reflect the 
experience of my interlocutors. This chapter is thus informed by a series of 
interviews and informal discussions in Gawgyi and Myinmilaung proper as well as 
in other villages.362 The latter were visited either under the auspices of the INGO I 
worked for or as a guest accompanying people from Gawgyi during daily trips and 
while attending ceremonies. This approach allows me to compare the past 
experiences of a variety of villages and to fill in the gaps of the chronology of 
significant events for Myinmilaung tract. It also enables me to locate the 
particularities of this polity. 
 
  
 
362 Among these villages, the most notables are: Hnawpin North, Hnawpin South, Innte, Ayadaw, 
Kyawka, Thazi, Ywadon, Budaungkan, Kyawsipon, Booba, Minzu, Zeehpyubin, Salingyi, 
Nyuangpinthar, Kothan, Hledar and Aungchanthar. I visited each of them several times in 2013-14 
and in 2015-16. 
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HISTORICAL BACKDROP 
 
 
Figure 15. Timeline of the military period 
 The literature used for this chapter mostly draws from studies about the 
socialist period,363 economy and development at large,364 agriculture,365 the 
experience and meaning of the 1988 revolts,366 the functioning of military rule and 
its daily experience,367 and about the transformation of the state and its political 
economy.368 One of the contributions of this chapter is to document the functioning 
of socialism at the village level, a scale often left out due to the impossibility of 
fieldwork leading to a focus369 on textual analysis of political philosophies and on 
the macro-economy (among others). 
 
363 Cf. Aung-Thwin and Thant Myint-U (1992), Hlaing (2003), Lintner (1990b), U Maung Maung 
(1969), 
364 Notably Brown (2013) and Steinberg (1981, 1982). 
365 Cf. Boutry et al. (2017), Kurosaki (2008), Kurosaki et al., (2004), Mya Than (1987, 1990), 
Thawnghmung (2003a, 2003b, 2004), Warr (2000). 
366 Cf. Boudreau (2004), Ferrara (2003), Lintner (1990a). 
367 Cf. Callahan (2003), Fink (2009), Lehman (1981), Skidmore (2003, 2004). 
368 Cf. Steinberg (1981, 2001), Taylor (2001, 2009), Thawnghmung (2003a, 2003b, 2004). 
369 With at least two exceptions that should be noted: Lintner study of the fall of the Communist 
Party of Burma (1990b) and Brown’s book on economic history (2013). 
1962-74 Union Revolutionary Council (General Ne Win coup)Planed economy / Quota system / Rise of black market
1974-88 Burma Socialist Program Party (General Ne Win)
Gradual worsening of living conditions
Demonetisations (1985, 1987)
1988 Mass revolt against the military
1988-2010
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC 1988-1997)
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC 1997-2010)
Forced labour / Partial liberalisation
30th of May 2003: Depayin massacre
2010-2016
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
Farmland law (2012)
Democratic elections (2015 – victory of the National 
League for Democracy of Aung San Suu Kyi)
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 One of the arguments that runs through this thesis is, however, closely related 
to Thawnghmung’s studies on rural perception of state legitimacy (2003a, 2003b, 
2004), and more precisely on how villagers engaged with local officials – notably 
village headmen – under the SLORC/SPDC government. In this chapter, and more 
broadly in the thesis, I approach village headship through a succession of particular 
individuals embodying the institution. One has to consider the ‘stakes of the 
moment’ to understand the politics of village leadership and this leads to the 
expansion of the question of legitimacy beyond formal institutions. This is 
particularly true when considering the authoritarian regime that ruled the central 
plains of Myanmar from 1988 to 2011. For instance, the rise of U Htay as a leader 
in Gawgyi happened in a context where old references – prior leaders, conceptions 
of worthiness, engagement toward the collective – were rearticulated while being 
faced with military violence in an atmosphere of collusion and corruption. The 
worth of people, rather than their “sheer power” or hpon was key in the rise of 
village affairs as the primary form of Gawgyi politics and U Htay gave ‘arms and 
legs’ to this dynamic. Thawnghmung’s longitudinal analysis of a variety of 
headmen370 ends up describing them as mere brokers either using their position to 
extract wealth thanks to patron-client ties or to buffer state demands for their fellow 
villagers. Therefore, the old debate about the nature of leadership in the countryside 
repeats itself.371 Scott, reviewing Thawnghmung’s book, makes a point in saying 
that “peasants are clearly capable of distinguishing a rather better local official from 
the overall quality of the regime” (2007: 121), but that does not make them 
legitimate by definition. Thus, and following Thawnghmung’s call for taking into 
account the diversity of contexts and histories (2004: 168), this chapter centres its 
argument on the case of Myinmilaung tract. 
 “In the two years between the coup in March 1964, by which time the bulk of 
the economy had been nationalised, the Revolutionary Council declared all political 
opposition illegal, took over the direct management of most educational and 
cultural organisations, and established the nucleus of a political party with ancillary 
mass organisations and its own ideology, through which it was intended to mobilise 
support for the state.” (Taylor 2009: 295). Yet, the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ – 
 
370 Notably in the chapters 2 and 3, pp.43-129.  
371 Cf. the general introduction, and more specifically the section “Debating local politics”. 
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the official ideology of the Revolutionary Council and the Burma Socialist 
Programme Party after the military coup – took some time to find its way in 
villages. On paper, all forms of agricultural and industrial production, distribution, 
transportation and external trade were declared to be owned by the State or by 
cooperatives. The re-organisation of the economy and society followed the line of 
the previous government, but rapidly turned into a more radical – yet “piecemeal” 
(ibid.: 300) – process of nationalisation.372 Under Ne Win, the centralised system 
of crop procurement and goods distribution became more interventionist and 
expanded to virtually all products while the government promised an agrarian 
revolution “that would bring the tenancy system to an immediate end” (Charney 
2009: 123). In the first decade of the socialist period, many attempts were made to 
transform the local polity by appointing new authorities linked to a centralised 
administration. However, the government gradually fell short of its ambitions and 
the authoritarian functioning at the top of administration, in which loyalty, 
obedience and mistrust were key, pervades all levels of the bureaucracy. One-
upmanship was about meeting the expectations of senior officials who “came to 
practise the three mas – ma-loke (not doing any work), ma-shote (not getting 
involved in any complication) and ma-pyoke (not getting dismissed)” (Kyaw Yin 
Hlaing 2003: 35).  
 At large, the implementation of socialist policies during the 1960s-1970s 
empowered new institutions in villages but the authoritarian functioning of the 
bureaucracy and the failure of the economic reforms worsened the living conditions 
for villagers by the mid-1980s. Making a living was more and more about making 
trade-offs with village authorities to get around the law. Despite that, officially, the 
state sought to secure people’s support by creating supra-local networks and a 
centralised administration. In this period, one of the main dynamics was the closing 
off of the local polity on the village tract. The institutionalisation of socialism 
through local men made Myinmilaung tract a more insular polity because villagers 
depended more on arrangements with these individuals in order to make a living. It 
also reinforced patronage and factionalism (related to land), the political 
 
372 Cf. The 1963 Nationalisation Law and the 1964 Law to Protect the Implementation of Socialist 
Economic System. 
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mechanisms through which socialism operated at the grassroots level in continuity 
with pre-socialist practices (chapter 4). 
 In Myinmilaung tract, organising the agriculture and the economy along 
socialist lines was gradual. Officially, farmers now worked on the land as tenants 
for the state and sold a quota of their crops to the government at a fixed price. Since 
the 1963 Tenancy Act, farmers became state tenants liable for their production with 
a formal interdiction to transfer – sell, mortgage and, since 1965, rent – their land, 
except through inheritance, in order to nip landlordism in the bud, the ghost enemy 
of socialism. Thereafter, in the districts “classified as ‘planned’ areas, distant 
administrators with little agricultural expertise or experience directed cultivators as 
to which crop to grow, how, and when.’’ (Brown 2013: 141). The pressure was acute 
for rice cultivators, but dryland farmers were also targeted. Besides, villagers would 
have to buy rations of commodities (rice, oil, clothes, soap, etc) from the Township 
cooperative via a local proxy. 
 But, overall, the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ did not bring about an agrarian 
revolution. In 1971, between one-third and one-half of the land in the Chindwin 
region was still operated via small-scale tenancies.373 Estates fragmented generation 
after generation – mostly due to the nature of inheritance patterns (see chapter 7) – 
except for a few families who managed to expand their holdings by controlling the 
village tract Land Committee.374 The possibility and profitability of accessing land 
decreased and the lives of villagers – and daily labourers in particular – worsened 
greatly during the second half of the 1980s. There were less avenues for migration, 
less food, less cash (Brown 2013: 154), and less work. Three-quarters of the 
country's currency became valueless, when less than a week after removing the 
control on domestic trade in September 1987, “the government announced the most 
stringent demonetization (not a devaluation of the currency but the declaration that 
certain bank notes were no longer legal tender and could not be redeemed) in 
modern history.”375 (Steinberg 2010: 76). The effect was disastrous. Peasants 
refused to sell their harvests because they were their main asset, and the whole chain 
of exchanges between locals were impacted (in markets and in daily transactions 
for labour, credit and so on). Farmers were more and more afraid of crop and cattle 
 
373 Cf. Steinberg (1981a: 121-127). 
374 Cf. Lubeigt (1975) for a similar pattern in another region of central Burma. 
375 The first ones were in 1964 and November 1985 but conversion was possible. 
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thefts, and village stockades and night watches resumed after a short interlude of 
relative peace. Many, if not most, resorted to eating sorghum mixed with rice as 
staple foods. The poorest – the daily labourers – picked trees’ leaves to sell soups 
while breeding goat and eating “one meal a day” to make ends meet while farmers 
and tenants prioritised their nuclear family at the expense of clients and 
dependents.376 There was a growing and unbearable contradiction between the 
state’s demands and the actual lives of people. Food prices were no longer 
subsidised and thus rose highly. In addition, headmen were again required to control 
and record individuals’ movements. 
 The failure of socialism “was seen each day in Burma in the shortages, 
queues, rationing, the poverty of choice, quality, and provisions – the endless 
struggle for basic survival for the many, but privileged access for the few – and 
announced to the world when, in December 1987, the United Nation classified 
Burma as a ‘least developed country’.” (Brown 2013: 160). But events turned awry 
in the capital Rangoon and many student-led demonstrations were ruthlessly 
smashed by the army377 in March, June and July 1988. A change was called by Ne 
Win himself, the dictator that isolated Burma internationally, who, purposefully or 
not, acknowledged that “the bloody events of March and June show a lack of trust 
in the government and the party” in his address to the party’s emergency congress 
on the 23rd of July 1988 before announcing his resignation. Ne Win remained 
nonetheless in command and the revolts against the government increased in 
August 1988 and took the form of mass movements in Rangoon and beyond, 
involving monks, workers, civil servants and students calling for a more democratic 
government and the halt of exactions, corruption, killings. This series of events, 
known as the ‘Democracy Summer’, constitutes the largest popular uprising in 
Myanmar’s modern history. The revolt crystallised in the Four Eight Movement, in 
reference to the general strike that began on August 8, 1988, seeking to force the 
resignation of Sein Lwin, the puppet chairman of the Burma Socialist Programme 
Party and president of Burma. Hundreds of thousands of ordinary townspeople 
participated in the country’s main cities. Sein Lwin stepped down on August 12, 
 
376 This expression was given to me on the 5th of August 2016 by U Htoo, a would-be farmer who 
bought land recently (Chapetr 6). 
377 Notably the infamous Lon Htein under Sein Lwin, known as the ‘Butcher of Rangoon’ for his 
role in the suppression of March and June demonstrations, cf. Lintner (1990). 
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but only after hundreds of demonstrators had been killed or wounded by the 
army.378 
 From July to early September in Monywa, several hundreds of students 
started gathering at the Shwezigon pagoda located in the city centre. Pick-ups 
toured the countryside to gather potential supporters. Soon, the movement split into 
two groups.379 While many democratic figures emerged (such as Aung San Suu 
Kyi, the daughter of Aung San, the father of Burmese independence), or re-emerged 
(such as U Nu) onto the national political scene in August and early September, 
protests kept going under the watch of local committees which almost controlled 
Monywa “with more the character of gangs than activist cells. […]. When security 
forces and government officials abandoned their positions, activist committees that 
replaced them soon encountered problems of maintaining order, policing food 
supplies, preventing smuggling and resolving local disputes.” (Boudreau 2004: 
208) 
 In Monywa, what is most often remembered and told in a low voice at 
teashops, is the moment when ‘spies’ were beheaded. They were four in total, 
accused of working either for the government or for one of the two groups in revolt. 
Their heads were put on spikes and transported all around the city in a macabre 
procession. This event marked one of the apexes of the 1988 revolt in Monywa. 
The second was the violence of the soldiers once General Maung Saw and the 
military retook power in the country, established a new government, the SLORC, 
and imposed martial law on the 18th of August. The army battalion that ‘restored 
order’ in Sagaing, which was also the theatre of exactions such as the ‘Sagaing 
Massacre’,380 came by train to assist the garrison posted in Alon. A looming threat 
of bloodshed and imminent death blew over Monywa. Most people returned to their 
villages. Within a few nights, the rebellion ended abruptly, and the universities were 
closed for four years consecutively. 
 
378 Cf. Seekins (2006: 161). 
379 I am not able for the moment to account for the reason of this split, neither of the content of each 
revendication. 
380 At the beginning of the Four Eights Movement, thousands of demonstrators marched on a police 
station in Sagaing. They were shot at by police and troops and, reportedly, five hundred and thirty-
seven persons were killed. This was probably the worst event, in terms of casualties, to occur during 
Democracy Summer outside of Rangoon, cf. Seekins (2006: 385). 
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 There are various discourses about these events in the villages of Monywa 
Township. For instance, the individuals who were civil servants under the socialist 
government condemn the uprising because it was led by ignorant people.381 The 
beheadings exemplify their foolishness and the so-called democratic movement 
used them to swell the ranks of the opposition. They do not understand that taking 
care of people’s affairs required an over-arching organisation (the army) in place 
beyond political factions as embodied by parliamentarianism. And after all, 
socialism was not that bad in theory. But for most people, the violence and 
repression of the new military regime was merely a continuation of past policies 
and went hand in hand with the worsening living conditions of the population. In 
the next few years, new headmen were appointed (mostly people not involved in 
the revolt) and most of the socialist organisation of agriculture was officially 
abandoned. But the 1988 interlude did not bring about massive change in how 
agriculture was controlled. It rather led to a deterioration of daily life due to 
extractive practices by a series of officials in continuity with the past decade.  
 The general narrative about the state in the second half of the twentieth 
century tells a story in which once the socialist government gradually had lost its 
tight grip over the countryside due to its economic failure, the subsequent military 
regime (SLORC/SPDC) imposed hard-line governance mixing partial market 
liberalisation and a command economy. In her study on rural perception of state 
officials and policies in rice growing areas, Thawnghmung (2004) argued that the 
changing presence of the state is visible in the shifts of agricultural policies. If 
peasants were a group the state wanted to rally to its cause in the mid-1960s, they 
became a mere source for wealth extraction about ten years later. As Steinberg put 
it, “[a]griculture had effectively been de-emphasized” under Ne Win (1981b: 32). 
Thawnghmung shares the same diagnosis.382 While the financing and material 
ability to operate the Burmese Way to Socialism declined and the black market 
pervades the countryside, new directions were taken. First through the introduction 
 
381 This was the point of view of one of Hnawpin South elders interviewed on the 11th of September 
2015 for instance. 
382 Cf. Thawnghmung (2004: 78). She also wrote, referring to Steinberg (1981b) that “public 
expenditure on agriculture declined from 11.3 per cent of capital expenditure in 1964/65 to 4.4 per 
cent in 1970/71. In 1972, only 1.8 million out of 4.4 million rural households in Burma had access 
to official credit, and only about 13 per cent of agricultural areas could be used for multiple cropping 
because of lack of irrigation.” (2004: 78). 
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of ‘high yield varieties’383 (1975-85), then via a very ‘partial liberalisation’ from 
1987 onward and finally with land reclamation in the 1990s. In short, the 
agricultural policies moved from a command economy virtually merging peasants’ 
production and state capital to intensive farming based on inflows of inputs. And 
when liberalisation was finally abandoned under the SLORC, a strategy of 
extensive farming was adopted.384  
 But corruption and rent seeking continued to pervade the military regime 
under the SLORC/SPDC. Thawnghmung described a countryside where most 
extension agents385 were corrupt, selling the pesticides, fertilisers and products they 
should distribute, taking bribes to admit peasants to advantageous programs and 
exclude them from damaging ones, seizing land outright, making tours of 
inspection into bribe-collecting circuits in which their subordinates and the local 
population must shower them with gifts and cash. To some extent, in the dry lands 
the command economy lost its grip on villagers but some structure for wealth 
extraction remained, notably the system of forced procurement and tax on 
exportation of beans and pulses,386 with variations from one place to another.387 
Overall, the distance the government had tried to reduce with the peasants widened 
in the mid-1980s and that gap took on a more moral drive later on.  
 In Monywa region, the period ranging from the early 1980s to the late 2010s 
is an age of distrust, violence and silence in which the state’s emphasis moved away 
from the control of land to the control of people and sought to restore its legitimacy 
through a process that Houtman has coined ‘Myanmafication’ (1999). 
Myanmafication amounted to positioning the state as a defender of Buddhism, 
 
383 The HYV program required a more intense use of fertilisers and pesticides as well as new seeds. 
Even if it targeted primarily rice growing areas, this program had also concerned dry crops such as 
beans and pulses for the use of fertilisers and pesticides. 
384 Cf. Thawnghmung (2004: 78-86) 
385 Such as the local managers of the Ministry of Agricultural Services, of the Irrigation Department, 
of the Myanmar Agricultural and Rural Development Bank, of the Myanmar Agricultural Produce 
Trading and of the State Land Record Department. 
386 Beans and pulse, which were relatively spared by state policies because the government focused 
primarily on rice cultivation, became one of the top products at the turn of the 1990s. Thawnghmung 
indicated that, while “under the “socialist government (1972-88),” the cultivation of pulses and 
beans meant the death penalty or life imprisonment”, under the new policies “the sown area for 
pulses increased 85 per cent from 1984/85 to 1995/96. Since 1990-91 pulses and beans have taken 
over the top list of all other items of agricultural export, including rice and rice products, both in 
terms of value and volume.” (2004: 143). 
387 In our area of study, crop procurement, notably concerning beans and pulses, seems to have 
disappeared in 1997. 
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reinventing national unity within a horizon of ‘disciplined democracy’, patronising 
the sangha, building pagodas, and creating an auspicious country while revisiting 
Myanmar archaeology to re-write human origins. Under the SLORC/SPDC, forced 
labour became a main tool to control the people mostly secluded in villages. Cattle 
rustling almost disappeared and villages’ fences stopped being maintained in most 
places.  Beyond cases of bribery and corruption, the construction of dams for 
irrigation projects to support double cropping (notably the summer paddy 
programs) was done with forced labour which fed a series of grievances toward the 
military. Villagers simply became used to keeping their mouth shut, and in that 
sense, the 1988 events did not bring about a decisive rupture – even if the uprising 
was of national importance and became a turning point in the grand narrative of the 
country’s politics. 1988 and its aftermaths had an impact on morality because it 
participated in the growing feeling of distrust toward the government. And even if 
the military regime developed a new massive organisation, the Union Solidarity 
and Development Association (USDA) which membership enabled access to 
services and positions,388 people were not fooled; many if not most remained 
silent389 and avoided direct confrontation. 
 Villagers were even called, against remuneration, to rally USDA operations. 
One of them, known as the ‘Depayin Massacre’ or ‘Black Friday,’ has had a lasting 
impact in their memories and was allegedly organised by the USDA. While 
returning from a visit to Kachin State, on the 30th of May 2003, Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi (DASSK) and members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) were 
attacked by a large gang of men armed with bamboo staves and other crude 
weapons in Depayin (or Tabayin), a one-hour drive from Monywa to the north-east. 
“The assailants were believed to be members of the progovernment Union 
Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), and the violence left as many as 
70 or 80 persons dead (the official figure was four)” (Seekins 2006: 111). Hundreds 
were arrested and injured. What villagers recall is the dexterity of DASSK’s driver 
who managed to get her out of the situation. I also met a man in Monywa in March 
2016 who acknowledged that he had been called one or two days later for some 
 
388 See Houtman (1999: 116-119) and Thawnghmung (2004: 173-175). 
389 The word “silence” has been widely used to describe the attitude of civilian under military rule. 
See for instance the chapter five (The Roots of Silence) of Thawnghmung book (2004: 169-205) and 
Fink’s book titled Living silence. Burma under military rule (2009). 
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paid work. That job was to burn the dead bodies. These kinds of events and 
memories, coupled with the encounters with violent soldiers and forced labour, 
created a context of fear. Prices were kept low to avoid unrest. To some degrees, 
politics were banned from the public space. But it unfolded in other forms.  
 As we will see in the following subsections, the various policies targeting the 
countryside empowered village headmen and the farming families who were able 
to monopolise state institutions at the local level. So, even if conditions worsened 
for the general population, notably the small farmers and landless,390 there was 
room for manoeuvring. Situations varied from one village to another and headmen 
were key players in dealing with the competing and overlapping claims made by 
local branches of state departments and agencies. Under the military regime, there 
was a lot of confusion and diversity in the way leaders were chosen. As 
Thawnghmung puts it, they were either hand-picked or elected locally depending 
on power balances between villages, the will of township chairmen and the 
connections between candidates and officials: “Some are handpicked by the 
township and district PDC authorities, other are voted into office by their peers; the 
choice depends on the preferences of the township authorities” (2004: 95).  Her 
study and my own fieldwork show that villagers would prefer to have someone 
responsive to their needs who is able to buffer the changing demands of officials 
with whom they may develop patron-client relationships. She describes a series of 
men holding this office under the SPDC government in several rice-growing areas 
in order to demonstrate a gradient of perceptions of legitimacy to challenge the 
image of the military regime as a monolithic entity. But, as Scott argued (2007), it 
is not because half of headmen were better than the other half that they were 
perceived as legitimate. Headmen were needed because they made it possible to 
control and administer villages since colonial times as responsible yet disposable 
native officials. Yet, one of Thawnghmung’s insights – and critiques toward the 
“moral school of thought” (2004: 168) – is that each locality has its own history. 
How people evaluate their headman, their “degree of leniency” toward them, 
depends “on their past and present relationships with state authorities […].” (ibid.: 
168). 
 
390 Brown stated that the number of landless in agricultural population was estimated to have 
“accounted for perhaps a quarter of all households in rural Myanmar in the 2000s, nearly ten million 
people, largely dependent on labouring wages alone.” (2013: 185) 
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 In that vein, and to open up to a more detailed analysis of Myinmilaung tract, 
it is interesting to look at one case in particular and not to confine the question of 
legitimacy to officials because they are just one kind of leader. If we look at 
headmen beyond the institution, and take it as an entry point, we see how particular 
headmen can exemplify a variety of moral stances. For instance, those described as 
‘kings in their domain’ quite often are accused of corruption and collusion. They 
embody the bad treatment inflicted on the population from the 1970s to the 2010s. 
Others may have embodied a shift in how local affairs are organised. It depends on 
the case. And the following case shows how the exactions, the killings, the 
‘stealing’ of harvests through imposed quotas, jailing for those unable to provide it, 
the forced labour and the growing corruption of officials during the 1990s fed a 
movement of self-organisation of local affairs at a distance from a disengaging 
state. In other words, when the military abandoned the idea of organising village 
life, local officials used their position of gatekeepers (loans, land records, 
agricultural input and so on) to extract wealth. In Gawgyi, as in many other areas, 
villagers’ ideology of autonomy came to the forefront: they simply “do it by 
themselves” and avoid dealing with state agents. They call it kotukotha, which can 
be transcribed as “rising by and defining oneself,” an ideology of self-reliance. 
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THE TIGHTENING OF THE LOCAL POLITY 
 
Headmen of Myinmilaung tract 
From Myinmilaung Proper From Gawgyi Period 
 U San 1964-1989 
 U Mya 1989-1995 
U Win  1995-2006 
 U Htay 2006-2011 
U Yay  2011-2012 
 Ko Kyaw 2012-2016 
U So  2016- 
Figure 16. The successive headmen of Myinmilaung tract (1964 to 2016) 
 When looking back, farmers see themselves as “the machete's ferrule” 
(dhamanawpeiqkue), a round piece of metal that one smacks on a hard surface to 
tighten the blade.391 It means that each time the government had a plan, villagers 
would bear the consequences. Even if it created close relations between the 
government and the peasants, the socialist policies of the military regime leaned 
ultimately toward greater extraction of wealth from the countryside and a 
“tightening control over the rural population” (ibid.: 84). The policy of crop 
procurement is a case in point and more complex and intimate processes of 
exclusion392 were also at play. The investment in, and monopolisation of, the 
institutions empowered by the state to control land and wealth by the main farming 
families exemplifies these processes. 
 
391 This expression was first given to me by U Than from Zalok village on the 15th of January 2014, 
and I’ve heard it multiple times in the villages where I had a chance to interview elders about local 
history. 
392 Hall et al. (2011: 145-169) define intimate exclusion as a process of everyday accumulation and 
dispossession of wealth among neighbours and kin who share common histories and social 
interaction, which cumulatively produce agrarian classes. 
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 Once the socialist government had stabilised its hold over Monywa, the 
Township Security and Administration Council (TSAC),393 composed of military 
officers, started appointing and creating new institutions in the countryside in 1964-
65. In Myinmilaung tract, after the news was spread by village criers, a Captain 
from the TSAC came to ask who wanted to be appointed as headman, as members 
of Village Tract Security and Administration Council (VSAC), as well as head of 
the tract cooperative. U To Kaing declined the offer. U San, from Gawgyi, became 
headman and U Than, from Myinmilaung proper, became head of the tract 
cooperative and ‘member two’ of the VSAC. All of this happened in a single 
meeting, but this repartition of powers would have consequences in the further 
development of the local polity. When I asked about how did it go, most of Gawgyi 
elders gave me a general statement about how the selections operated under the 
military. Those appointed either had connections with the government,394 were able 
to act as community leaders or were those who knew how to “show their face”.395 
In other words, it was a matter of pre-existing connections, ability to get 
information, and, in our case, of the balance of power between Myinmilaung proper 
and Gawgyi.  
 This balance of power, embodied by who is the village headman, was kept in 
favour of Gawgyi until 1995. The main families of Gawgyi and Myinmilaung 
proper staffed a variety of local committees – mostly the Peasants’ and Workers’ 
Councils and the Socialist Youth – created to organise the society along socialist 
lines and which membership “brought ancillary benefits such as access to officials 
and rewards” (Taylor 2009: 316). Once the village tract’s SACs were transformed 
into the Village People’s Council in 1974, elections were held to select its members 
and thus the headman. U San and Gawgyi bigmen managed to secure the People’s 
Council and “chose people from among their members to staff their Executive 
Committees, on which most of the work fell, and the People’s Courts, as well as 
their Inspection and Affairs Committees’’ (Taylor 2009: 332). The positions of 
power were monopolised by a few farming families and, for the villagers, most of 
 
393 Called NaLaKa in Burmese. The SACs are the main structures – present at all level of 
administration – created by the Revolutionary Council to centralise the government authority. They 
became the People’s Council with the 1974 Constitution, cf. Taylor (2009: 315-316). 
394 Usually expressed by using the vocabulary of friendship, cf. Spiro (1997). 
395 The expression given to me goes like this: “the big face gets the big part of the meal,” meaning 
that the man who is famous, who presents himself nicely gets people’s favour. 
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the members in these committees were just names on paper, while the headman 
retained most of the prerogative in practice. In other words, the institutions created 
to support the state became a means to control village tract politics to a certain 
extent. This is notably true for the tract Land Committee which was empowered to 
organise the agrarian revolution on the ground. 
 In Myinmilaung tract, the socialisation of agriculture and the economy 
developed gradually. Officials from Monywa Trading Corporation compiled 
information about the tract from the land records (land types, areas, cadastre 
registered by the SLRD), the cultivation data (Township branch of the Ministry of 
Agricultural Service (MAS)), and the list of farmers and family members via 
Myinmilaung SAC in order to determine the quantity of harvest to be expected (per 
basket) from each farmer and the delivery of consumables per family. U San was 
then in charge of updating the farmers’ booklet every year, recording the plots they 
worked, their quality and the crops planted. U Than had to do a similar operation 
for each family who also received monthly vouchers to collect commodities, rice, 
soap, clothes and other items in his house. On the one hand, the headman’s house 
in Gawgyi became the place where farmers came for updating land records and to 
store their harvest quotas. On the other hand, people had to get their supplies at the 
house of the cooperative head in Myinmilaung. There was a virtual monopoly by 
two men on the circulation of products coming in and out of the tract.  
 At the beginning, it was as if the officials coming to the tract (from the SLRD 
or the Trading Corporation) “knew our land better than us”, according to one 
elder.396 And they had more ana (capacity of coercion) than the headman. Villagers 
could not under-report their holdings or harvests and thus had to sell most of their 
crops to the Trading Corporation or, at an even lower price, to military garrisons. 
The socialisation process impacted household economics in two ways. First, the 
1964 demonetisation of the K100 and K50 banknotes – officially to fight domestic 
and foreign capitalists397 – affected their savings to some extent – even if gold, 
clothes, land, cattle and sometimes rubies were the bulk of farmers’ capital. Second, 
the state’s ability to organise the centralisation of procurements and deliveries failed 
to make ends meet as less products and foodstuffs could be found in daily markets 
 
396 Gawgyi elders highlighted this idea many time but was emphasized upon clearly during the 
gathering of Gawgyi bigmen on the evening of the 8th of August 2016. 
397 Cf. Brown (2013: 151). 
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and the cooperatives’ stores in the early 1970s, while the nationalised industries, 
mills and transportation were poorly operated by the Trading Corporation.398 In 
addition, procurement prices were kept very low, with a mild rise in the early 
1970s,399  until the official abolition of the system in 1997.400 And from this 
standpoint derives many stories of grievances, misrule and growth of the black 
market. 
 In Myinmilaung tract, there are two types of discourse about U San. In 
Myinmilaung proper, U San is said to have under-reported the crops brought by the 
farmers in order to sell the surplus on the black market thanks to his bargain with 
the man from the Trading Corporation. In this view, the headman and government 
staff are depicted as those cheating the farmers – this kind of story pervaded the 
countryside. To counter it, farmers would bring their crops at the last minute to his 
house, bribe U San, or tried to sell it directly to the Corporation (but bearing the 
cost of transportation to its store in Monywa if and when the army did not blockade 
the main road to avoid crops being sold illegally). Besides, headmen were pivotal 
to get around the law and register (forbidden) changes of ownership. They could 
even dispossess farmers through the Land Committee – the courts were barred from 
hearing most land conflict cases401 – if their quota was not reached and, thanks to 
the Tenancy Act, tenants working on a land for up to five years could now claim the 
right to cultivate it in their own name.402 In other words, the local recognition of 
ownership and tenancies – officially illegal – was in the hands of the Land 
 
398 Cf. ibid.: 149 
399 The failure of Revolutionary Council in the late 1960s led to a readjustment of state policies that 
occurred during the early 1970s and unfolds toward a focus on the exploitation of natural resources, 
the substitutions of importations while being partly constrained by international aid and loans, cf. 
Brown (2013: 149). 
400 Cf. Boutry et al. (2017). 
401 The reforms introduced by the Revolutionary Council (The Farmer's Rights Protection Law and 
The Tenancies Law Amending Act in 1963) aimed to prevent the interference of civil justice in land 
matters by prohibiting seizures (of land, livestock, tools) and/or arrests for debts for example – 
except in cases concerning inheritance and those in which the government is involved. In other 
words, justice between individuals over land matters – excluding inheritance – was organise through 
Village Land Committees. In addition, the government has authorised, by administrative notification 
(act 1/64), the cessation of rent payments by tenants to their landlords. To achieve this, the SACs 
were instructed to institute a system of People’s Courts, continued after the 1974 Constitution, and 
so have become the only regulatory bodies for agricultural land use. The individuals who were 
tenants, by ceasing to have to pay rent as a means to fight landlordism, could then be granted a 
delegated right of use on the land they were cultivating if they were registered as such in the SLRD's 
registers. Cf. Boutry et al. (2017), and Taylor (2009: 339). 
402 Cf. Boutry et al. (2007: 116, 144) concerning the Regulation 1/64, stipulating that a land 
cultivated by a tenant for more than five years consecutively may go to the tenant. 
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Committee, thus of U San, and in turn also in the hands of a few of Gawgyi main 
families which outnumbered those of Myinmilaung proper. These powers 
concentrated in the headman’s hands fuelled stories of dispossessions/repossessions 
and factionalism based on grievances stemming from the changes that happened 
during the ‘land reform’ less than a decade ago. From around 1975 to the late 1980s, 
the only positive fact recalled by villagers are the good rains. But things got worse 
because the procurement system, from a minutely calculated system, turned into an 
apparatus of imposed quotas depending on regional targets notwithstanding local 
land types and irrigation capacities.  
 In Gawgyi, as opposed to Myinmilaung proper, U San is inversely depicted 
as a patron buffering the state’s demands. He was selected headman quite young, 
allegedly because he was educated and already involved in village affairs as leader 
of the bachelor group (lubyogaung). Farmers had to fulfil the quota based on the 
potential of each township and each village tract – by referring to un-updated data 
and despite the failure of new crops that were forcefully introduced. Besides, U San 
also managed the credit system403 based on how many acres a farmer was 
cultivating. As the years passed, less officials justified the quotas based on the 
capacities of a given tract. The more credit was insufficient, debt rose, and the black 
market expanded.404 The targets materialised in a number of acres to be cultivated 
for each crop and how many baskets of pulses, beans, cotton or rice would have to 
be sold at government price. In practice, the story goes like this: a crier was sent to 
the village to announce the coming of the officials. The headman called all farmers 
for a meeting by beating his drum with a fast rhythm. If it was for a routine 
inspection, some plots were ready for display. If it was for announcing the planned 
targets, U San asked the farmers to shut their mouths while officials were there. 
There was no way to negotiate with them frontally. But there was possibilities to 
find trade-offs before and after the meeting: with the headman who allocated the 
quota to each farmer of the tract; with other farmers to exchange quotas depending 
on land types; and even with brokers to buy some crops one cannot produce to sell 
at a fixed price later on. U San also made a case for bad rains and arranged the 
figures with the SLRD or MAS officials when the quota was not met.  
 
403 Cf. Turnell (2009) and Brown (2013) for the history of the credit system in Burma/Myanmar. 
404 This trend was explicitly stated in each and every villages I visited. 
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 If Gawgyi was in a position of strength during the socialist period, 
Myinmilaung proper was not to be outdone. Indeed, one of its villagers was head 
of the cooperative and his house embodied the cooperative until a dedicated 
building was built on a ‘vacant’ land next to his house around 1971. If, in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the “state distribution network failed to meet the needs of Burma’s 
population’’ (Brown 2013: 146) – the classic imagery was that of bare shelves – it 
was a means for accumulating wealth and manoeuvring village factions, 
nonetheless. U Than had to go to Monywa cooperative’s store to fetch both, the 
products to be sold at cheap prices to villagers, and the vouchers rationalising the 
amount each family could get. Soon, he was accused of selling products “on the 
road’’, that is, on the black market.405 In addition, he also lent money to villagers 
by accepting their vouchers as mortgage security. But, allegedly, no one could really 
complain, and everyone saw the livelihood of U Than rising while his house-store 
became less and less full of commodities. An attempt was made to bring him down 
by U San. When U Than called for the construction of a real store U San tried to 
have a man from Gawgyi enrolled as clerk (i.e. able to see the in and out of money, 
vouchers and products). But it failed and the store remained in the hands of 
Myinmilaung proper. During the readjustment of the socialist policy in 1972/73406 
– emphasising prior failures and the problems of corruption – new rules were 
enacted, notably in the functioning of cooperatives. From then on, the cooperative 
head would have to be elected every two years by the members of a committee of 
fifteen people from all villages in the tract. This, apparently, was a means to put 
pressure on U Than, but the leadership of the cooperative seems to never have left 
Myinmilaung proper. 
 The variety of men and institutions, empowered to bring about socialism, 
controlled how people could access products and credits, sell their crops, and farm 
their land. The black market was a means of resistance as much as a burden while 
it also helped officials to sustain state policy because “the illegal economy reduced 
the prospect of social unrest and made it possible for the party-state at the local 
level to function” (Brown 2013: 166). Along with the failure of government policies 
in the 1980s, villagers were pressured more and more by officials to answer state 
 
405 This information was confirmed by Myinmilaung elders during an interview conducted on the 
23rd of March 2019. 
406 Cf. Brown (2013: 149). 
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demands. There was, of course, trade-offs, and avenues to sell and buy things on 
the black market but for even more exorbitant prices as the shelves of the 
cooperatives emptied. The tension between Gawgyi and Myinmilaung proper 
intensified along with the empowerment of local men in new or redefined roles. U 
San, the headman, saw his capacity for coercion (ana) growing as he was able to 
monopolise most of the apparatus built to bring about socialism. As in the village 
of lower Burma studied by Mya Than – after Pfanner407 – the “Village People’s 
Council leaders […] came from the same families as the former headmen and other 
village elders, and these tended to be individuals ‘who represent[ed] the “upper 
layer’’ of the village and who live[d] in the “best’’ houses’. The same individuals 
also tended to dominate the leadership of other local branches of central 
organisations such as the BSPP, the Lansin Youth and the cooperative society [sic]” 
(Taylor 2009: 332, citing Mya Than 1978: 14). In Myinmilaung tract, factionalism 
between Myinmilaung and Gawgyi and patronage by Gawgyi leaders were the 
mechanisms through which socialism operated. The latitude to negotiate depended 
on connections, on bureaucratic functioning and, for the farmers, on the stance of 
the headman, the relationships developed with him, his ability to practice forum 
shopping between institutions and the power balance between villages in the 
tract.408 And, in a long-term perspective, the fact that the socialist policy and 
practice empowered farming families has strengthened the local hierarchy between 
farmers (taungthu) and labourers (myaukthu) as well as the dependency of the latter 
on the former.  
 Finally, with the gradual collapse of Ne Win’s regime, finding trade-offs with 
the Myinmilaung headman and cooperative was not seen as a strategy anymore, but 
rather as a push to cheat and bribe. The malfunctioning of the government corrupted 
people, or at least this is how people put it. If the bloodshed of 1988 was not a 
rupture in Gawgyi as it was in the capital city of Rangoon, it contributed to 
increased distrust toward officials at many levels. And locally, the rupture came 
later, when an Infamous headman was succeeded by a Worthy one. 
 
407 Cf. Pfanner (1962). 
408 There are also a story in which a village headman from another tract in that period was jailed 
because he took some of the crops gathered at Monywa store. In one version, it was to give it back 
to farmers who were really poor. In another, it was to sell it again and make a profit. The point is 
that the headmen were often seen either as dubious persons or as protectors depending on the 
interlocutors. 
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THE INFAMOUS AND THE WORTHY 
 
 This section continues to explore changes in Myinmilaung tract's politics after 
the fall of the socialist government. It follows the succession of its headmen from 
1989 to 2012 as a red thread and focuses on two persons in particular: U Win the 
Infamous and U Htay the Worthy. This denomination underscores the intersection 
between personalities and shifts in morality during these years. The passing of the 
torch from U Win to U Htay crystallised a rupture in local politics, as local affairs 
became a domain of engagement against a backdrop of governmental violence and 
disengagement. I hereby refer to the argument that values are presented to and 
instilled in subjects through the influence of exemplary persons.409  For U Win: 
distrust; for U Htay: worthiness. There are numerous examples of how a person 
embodies the ‘style’ of an era in national history, and Burmese language clearly 
displays this connection. For instance, the socialist period is “Ne Win’s time” (Ne 
Win kayt) and the worsening of the military is known as “Than Shwe’s time”; 
Senior General Than Shwe being the head of the junta from 1992 to 2011. The 
institution and the person are one and the same because they embody the stakes of 
an era. In other words, the perception of U Win and U Htay’s tenure as headmen 
reflects the state of local politics. And the transition from one to the other represents 
a moral shift which unfolded during the rise of village affairs as a field of politics 
in the 2000s in Gawgyi. 
 
“Don’t deal with them” 
 
 “Don’t deal with them” is the clear-cut answer most elders in the villages I 
visited gave me when asked about their past relations with the government.410 It 
means: do not make deals with officials, do not give bribes, do not get involved in 
that. It was a piece of advice, rendered in another expression: kotukotha, meaning 
“rising by and defining oneself”.  But it is also a moral take on state practice from 
the late 1970s onward. If you start dealing with them, that is, making arrangements 
 
409 Cf. Humprey (1997) and Robbins (2015). 
410 It was notably formulated in this way by Innte elders on the 23rd of February 2016. 
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(nalehmu), it could get you. It is better to stay away from officials and soldiers. This 
statement reflects a certain mistrust. My point is not to say that the government 
remains ‘the fifth evil’ no matter the period,411 but rather to show how distrust 
toward village headship has crystallised and has become a backdrop that explains 
the emergence of a particular political configuration in Gawgyi. 
 In 1989, a new village headman, U Mya, from Gawgyi, was handpicked 
directly by the military once it reasserted its hold over the region of Monywa. U 
Mya was from one of the main farming families of Gawgyi and a member of the 
previous People’s Council of Myinmilaung village tract. Apparently, he was not 
involved in the 1988 uprising against the government, and that made him a rather 
fitting candidate. Overall, people remember his time as a moment when the 
headman had to maintain order by any means necessary. The military government 
was disengaging from the countryside and the organisation of local affairs and 
economy. U Mya was left to rule almost alone and was backed, if case needed, by 
the military apparatus. In short, he had ana and was accompanied by “members one 
and two” (ahpwe-win tiq hniq) of the Village Tract Council, one from Myinmilaung 
proper and the other from Gawgyi. The balance of force power remained in favour 
of Gawgyi, but Myinmilaung was represented. This is pretty much what local 
people were willing to say about U Mya. 
 The situation for villagers in the 1980s and early 1990s was ambivalent. 
Those with enough land and capital could accumulate wealth while the bulk of 
villagers were on the verge of starvation. For the non-farmers, the myaukthu (in this 
case also called the lokdama, kulikunga), it was a period of harsh shortages and 
daily quests for livelihood. Most resorted to a combination of activities to face the 
growing lack of work, cash and food. Some started picking tree leaves to sell soups 
in Monywa while others sold their remaining goats they usually kept to breed and 
feed in the open pasture after the harvests. Even small farmers started climbing 
palm trees to collect its sap (to produce alcohol or sugar) and its leaves (to remake 
roofs), a risky activity usually reserved for the poorest. Many newly-wed couples 
migrated from one village to another in search for this kind of contract with land 
 
411 Maung Maung Gyi (1983: 154-155), Spiro (1997) and Nash (1965: 75) had presented this view 
of the government as part of the longue durée in Burmese conception of politics. But, as this chapter 
shows, the distance with the state changes from on period to another and depends on who embody 
this or that position. 
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and tree owners. Young men went to work in the mining and the rice growing areas 
but often came back empty-handed. Meanwhile, in the village most families 
reverted to sorghum, sometimes mixed with maize, as staple food instead of rice. 
The degradation of economic conditions made the complex hierarchy and 
dependency relations between taungthu and myaukthu appeared in its crudest form. 
One could be protected by a farmer, but few did it or mostly towards close relatives. 
Farmers were selling their crops less and less to the myaukthu, preferring to 
consume them directly or sell them in Monywa. It became nearly impossible to 
access credit. Mutual help and service-giving were reduced to a minimum, family 
solidarities concentrated more on the couple and less on extended relations, and the 
ceremonies of donations, based on family’s savings, became rare. In short, distrust 
was rampant. Most of the myaukthu were considered a threat, crop thieves who 
would then sell it at the market in Monywa. And village fences were a fragile 
bulwark against bandits and cattle rustling.412 
 Yet the late 1980s and early 1990s were also years in which some families 
accumulated (and spent) wealth. While visiting a number of villages in Monywa 
township to attend ceremonies and football matches, I noticed that the biggest 
houses and many private wells were often built during this very period.413 This is 
obviously related to how some families monopolised local institutions empowered 
to control resource access, as we have seen in the previous section and chapter. But 
it is also conjectural. The government notably decontrolled the price of crops in 
1987 and for a time lifted the ban on the private export of agricultural commodities 
in late 1988 (except for rice). The following years witnessed increasing exports of 
beans and pulses.414 The case in point is the pigeon pea, a crop that nobody eats but 
which was grown by most farmers (until recently) and exported to India. In other 
words, while the government partially withdrew from the agricultural chain, village 
elites were able to accumulate more wealth. It is in this context of disengagement 
of the state from local affairs and increasing inequalities between villagers that a 
new village headman emerged in 1995. This man is U Win, from Myinmilaung 
 
412 Cattle rustling decreased in the late 1990s and thus villages’ stockades were less and less 
maintained, to the point that during my own fieldwork, villages’ gates had almost disappeared. 
413 The year of construction of many types of buildings (brick houses, wells, pagodas, monasteries) 
is often written on their facade. 
414 Cf. Brillion (2015). 
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proper, and he is the infamous person who embodied village headship from 1995 to 
2006. 
How and why U Win became headman is uncertain. He himself says that it 
was a democratic election, that he was chosen by each leader of ten households 
under the watch of elders. But such elections actually started in 2011-12. Others say 
that he was nominated directly by the Township GAD. Nobody was clear on that 
matter. What is troubling is that forced labour (lok-a-pay) started to be used on a 
larger scale since he took office, and people's movements in and out of the village 
tract were increasingly controlled in the region. A general sentiment in Gawgyi is 
that this man embodied corruption. He is depicted as an archetype of the SLORC 
era (1989-97): a greedy and immoral official who worked for a militarised 
government which relied on violence and pushed people to cheat. And there is a 
series of grievances and stories against and about him. 
Under U Win, the villagers of Myinmilaung tract experienced a new kind of 
state violence when forced labour became the main way to build roads, canals and 
dams. Irrigations works were intended to support the new agricultural policies by 
drafting free labour “without relying heavily on foreign exchange” (Thawnghmung 
2004: 81). First, they heard about the construction of a dam in Thazi which started 
in 1994 (figure 3). Stories of people being beaten, women abused, and pagoda relics 
and treasures stolen by the soldiers spread through the whole township.415 In late 
1995, once the Thazi dam was completed, the 20th Artillery battalion under Captain 
So Win started supervising the construction of another dam in Kyawkka. U Win 
most likely became in charge of Myinmilaung tract during that period. One person 
per family was requested to work for several days from dusk until dawn. If a family 
member could not come to work, he or she had to pay 100 Kyats per day to the 
army. But trade-offs could be found trough the agency of U Win who became a sort 
of a labour broker. And the poorest families either repaid part of their debt to richer 
ones via forced labour or got indebted if they could not provide a valid worker in 
order to avoid jailing. Being on U Win’s good side made life easier for those who 
could afford it. For this dam, some villagers had to destroy a monastery and a 
pagoda. Some still fear karmic justice for such demeritorious act.416 And the 
 
415 This notably relates to the interviews done in Thazi with Hnawpin headman on the 16th of 
February 2016. 
416 On how military attempted to legitimise itself through donations and foundation of pagodas, cf. 
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soldiers were immoral, drunk, beating the workers, insulting their own religion and 
disrespecting people who could have been their parents and grandparents. Those 
were not the same kind of soldiers previous generations had dealt with under the 
socialist system.417 A canal was then built along the road between Kyawkka and 
Thazi, and so forced labour continued.418 Besides, villagers’ movements were also 
increasingly monitored. For instance, they had to declare their goings and comings 
to the village headman, even to go to a donation ceremony. In addition, any stranger 
had to announce their entry into the village as well.419 U Win kept records of all of 
it, but apparently gave his notebooks to his successor who told me, in mid-
December 2013, that he never saw any of them. Considering this, it appears that U 
Win’s job at large was to control manpower and people’s movements.420 And it gave 
him a certain hold over villagers, who mostly learned to stay silent in front of guns 
but who took their revenge when football matches were organised against soldiers. 
But there are also more local stories and rumours that allow me to explore 
how people gauge the worth of this headman. One of his first achievements was to 
take over the old building of the socialist cooperative, sell what could be sold and 
install his own house on this former ‘public land’.421 At large, villagers also recall 
that they had to pay high fees to record changes in ownership. Land transfers (apart 
from inheritance) were illegal until 2012, and so the headman and the agent of the 
SLRD in charge of this tract required fees to update the records and get around the 
law. This is widely known as “eating the sale” (yaunsadeh) and it is important 
because the next headman (U Htay, 2006-2011) is recognised for not doing it while 
Ko Kyaw (2012-2016) was more ambiguous. U Win’s official stamp was a means 
to extract wealth when formalising contracts, registering families, giving travel 
authorisations and negotiating agricultural loans.  Legality was but “only in the 
mouth” (chapter 6). U Win's vanity is said to have extended beyond his official 
 
Houtman (1999) and Rozenberg (2002, 2009). 
417 Thawnghmung made a case of how the change in recruitment of military personnel under the 
SLORC/SPDC distance the Tatmadaw from villagers. While most were coming directly from the 
countryside during the socialist period, enrolment was then confined to relatives, families and 
associate of the military (2004: 82). 
418 The renovation of the river embankment and the main roads in Monywa was also done for a large 
part with forced labour coming from the whole township. 
419 On this point it seems that the registering of newcomers has been a long-standing practice since 
the late precolonial period. 
420 To some degrees, this practice shares commonalities with the role of local chiefs in the 
precolonial polity, cf. chapter 3. 
421 For a study of the category public, cf. Huard (2016). 
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position and reached the religious sphere. I heard multiple times how he and U Myo, 
a fellow from Mogaung (included in Budaungkan tract but part of Myinmilaung 
proper), used to “eat the sale” of cakes and embezzled donations during the 
Myinmilaung pagoda festival422 with the help of the clerk.  
But their mischief did not stop here and partly structured local politics 
because they related to how ethics permeates leadership, the use of wealth and land 
arrangements. And eventually, the threat of an overwhelming collusion between 
them led to a shift in headmanship in Myinmilaung tract.  For instance, there is a 
case of a land dispute involving U Win and U Myo. The case surfaced after 2012 
and Ko Kyaw, who was supposed to solve it in his capacity as headman, could not. 
Here is the story.423 Around 2003, eleven farmers mortgaged their land to U Myo, 
one of the biggest moneylenders of the area. The type of agreement was unusual 
and called yahman-ngway meaning “the guessed price of the land”. Usually, those 
agreements do not involve interest and last for one to three years. U Win formalised 
the contracts and stamped them. Three years later, U Myo became headman of 
Budaungkan tract. The dispute started a few months later. Most farmers asked for 
an extension of the agreement because they could not reimburse U Myo. But the 
latter refused and was later accused of changing the agreements by asking for 
interest. The eleven farmers went on to seek resolution with U Win who initially 
signed it. But he refused and advised on meeting with Township authorities to settle 
the case. The latter sent the cases back to village authorities. During the following 
years, the situation remained at a standstill. At some point, U Myo and U Win were 
accused of having forged counterfeit contracts to turn the mortgages into land sales. 
And U Myo tried, unsuccessfully, to register the plots under his name, arguing that 
he was the tiller and thus, following the socialist regulation,424 he should get the 
right to cultivate the land. In other words, they used moneylending, loopholes in the 
law and the monopolisation of official institutions to extract wealth. 
In the meantime, U Myo and U Win tried to get a hold over the cemetery 
located on both sides of the path dividing Myinmilaung and Budaungkan tract at 
the centre of Myinmilaung proper. On Myinmilaung side, U Win’s plan was cut 
 
422 All the villages included in Myinmilaung proper (Myinmilaung, Mingalagon, Ogon, Mogaung 
and Mayodaw) participate in the Shwepanhla festival. 
423 I first heard about this story through Ko Kyaw on the 10th of January 2014. 
424 Regulation called Act 1/64, cf. note 369. 
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short as U Htay, the main lugyi of Gawgyi, was selected as headman in 2006. But 
on the Budaungkan side, U Myo managed to get the area registered under his name 
with the SLRD as soon as he became headman. He gave part of it to his son who 
started building a house on it. So the scam came to light. Seeing this, villagers and 
the monk voiced their disagreement. Nothing changed. U Win eventually built a 
pagoda on a portion of the previous cemetery. But people were not fooled. Even if 
building a pagoda is the most meritorious donation, whose merit could trickle down 
to the whole settlement, it was by no means an act that legitimated his authority.425 
To some extent, the selection of U Htay was a reaction of both villages, Gawgyi 
and Myinmilaung, to the growing threat of collusion and unfairness if U Win and 
U Myo were to be headmen of the two neighbouring tracts. And true or not, partly 
exact or just rumours, these stories are nonetheless the backdrop against which a 
new era of politics was taking shape in Gawgyi. 
 Overall, U Win was described as the Infamous. He embodied corruption, 
collusion and a certain immunity due to military support. That was his ana. Control 
was less exercised to extract wealth from harvests and rather focused on people’s 
movement and manpower for state projects. To some degree, U Win reflected the 
clientelist game at play in political relations in Myanmar, based on personalities 
and networks, with village headmen being the brokers between villagers and 
government officials. He is but one example that partly, but not completely, 
contradict the description of village headmen Thawnghmung made in her study on 
state legitimacy: 
 
 “The village tract or village chairmen, who occupy the lowest rung of 
the […] security, political, and administrative structures are the most 
hard-pressed authorities. They are trapped between protecting the needs 
of the local population and fulfilling the demands of the central and 
local governments. […]. Although they are not paid a salary, there are 
many ways in which village chairmen can get reimbursed, depending 
on the economy of their villages. Village chairmen may earn money 
from imposing fines on law breakers, charging fees on land contracts, 
 
425 See the discussion of the relation between merit making and power in the general introduction 
(section “From patronage to engagement”) as well as in chapter 8. 
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and on visitors' registration. He may supplement his income by taking 
bribes from his villagers in return for covering up their activities that 
are considered illegal from the central authorities (one example would 
be under-reporting cultivated acres when it comes to selling the 
procurement quota)” (Thawnghmung 2003b: 308-309). 
 
 My point is not to see if U Win fits this description or not, but to show another 
side of the picture in order to explore the question of headship in a different 
perspective. In short, headmen may be brokers, either as hard-pressed or extractive 
officials, stuck in-between the government and villagers. This fits the early 
qualification of headship as an intercalary position, an argument developed by 
Gluckman.426 But they have their own stance, family background, and networks, 
and are empowered by the state in different ways. So, following Kuper’s idea,427 
headship offers room for manoeuvre. But there is something else to it. In my case, 
the village headmen are benchmarks to evaluate the morality of a time, acting as a 
backdrop to explain the difference between today and the past. They are references 
or examples people draw upon to explain the ups and downs of village morality and 
show how ethical shifts transform the local polity (this discussion is continued in 
chapter 6). 
 
“One of a kind” 
 
 After the first monsoon rains in July 2016, the Gawgyi electrification project 
became a reality. There were further steps, and a sine qua non condition was that 
all the paths in the village should be enlarged to install the pylons. It had potential 
for causing disputes and many villagers would have to give up some land. Besides 
disagreements between neighbours about the how much each household should 
give away, the electricity project brought up the issue of the circulation of corpses 
and auspicious flows and eventually opened negotiations on village membership 
(chapter 8). In July 2016, it was a potential maelstrom that almost no one was 
 
426 Notably in Gluckman et al. (1949), and in Gluckman (1955, 1963). 
427 Cf. Kuper (1970). 
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willing to be responsible for. The headman – U So from Myinmilaung proper 
selected in January 2016 but who took office in March 2016 – was supposed to be 
responsible for it. But he just left it up to the villagers. U Thein, Gawgyi’s candidate 
in the last election, should also have been responsible in his quality of hundred-
houses’ head. But it was clear to most people in August that he could not supervise 
the enlargement of the roads and solve the upcoming disputes. U Htay did. “Why 
him?” I asked Ko Nway, the younger brother of Ko Kyaw. “He is one of a kind”, 
he answered (thuka tiqmyo). Nothing less, nothing more. When I enquired more 
systematically, everybody agreed that only U Htay could do such job. But nobody 
referred to him as a man of hpon. He is different, but hpon is almost gone. He is 
rather an example, in the sense that he embodies the value of propriety and 
demonstrated trustworthiness in his life. When he became headman from 2006 on, 
U Htay personified a moral rupture with U Win the Infamous. And his engagement 
toward the village collective gave momentum for village affairs to become the 
primary form of local politics in Gawgyi. 
 U Htay succeeded U Win in 2006, and, in the mouth of most villagers in 
Gawgyi, this was for the best. I literally have not heard any criticism toward him. 
Before his selection, new heads of ten households were chosen, and it seems that it 
was at this moment that the threat of having the duo U Win-U Myo as local bigmen 
influenced the vote. Once selected, U Htay chose new official elders for all the 
villages of the tract. U Maung was chosen in this capacity for the whole tract and 
the power balance shifted one more time, this time in favour of Gawgyi. The 
selection of U Htay was lived as a turning point. Almost all the criticisms of U Win 
and his clique had their counterparts in the way U Htay managed his tenure. The 
land sales were not “eaten” anymore, bribes became obsolete to make contracts, 
identity cards and even to get loans from the Agricultural Bank. In retaliation, the 
agent of the SLRD in charge of the tract apparently stopped coming here to update 
the cadastre. In short, U Htay demonstrated that he was selfless and had a helping 
mind and short-circuited the way local affairs were managed. 
 But it was not all peace and light. U Htay, in his capacity as the local rung of 
the government, had to organise the confiscation – without compensations – of 
farmlands located within Myinmilaung tract for the creation of a poultry hatchery. 
The official of the land administration department who did not dare coming in 
Gawgyi suddenly disappeared with the cadastral map in question. There was no 
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more map, no official in charge, but one member of the regional government willing 
to make a poultry zone. And U Htay was the one who had to explain all of this to 
the villagers. On a different note, one of his achievements was the building of a 
road to shorten and ease transportations between Gawgyi and Monywa in 2009. To 
do so, he first convinced all the people who had their land crossed by the future 
road to donate a part of it. Then, he obtained the funding promised by the Township 
administration to make this road and organised the rest of the villagers with the help 
of U Lin, Gawgyi’s teacher and head of the bachelors’ group, to carry out the 
necessary work. Finally, he approached a wealthy businessman in Monywa to ask 
for his help (i.e. to make a donation428) to build a bridge (over the canal that the 
villagers dug a few years ago under forced labour). Since then, this road has been 
the main route to Gawgyi, used daily by an increasing number of daily workers. 
 U Htay kept involved in the management of Gawgyi affairs after he stopped 
being headman in 2011. He decided not to be candidate for the 2011’s round of 
selection following the announcement of a democratic transition under Thein Sein’s 
government. That selection was chaotic. At that time, most of the ten house leaders 
refused to participate and even less were inclined to being candidates. A few hours 
before the arrival of the Township officials, some elders of Myinmilaung proper 
tried to gather all the villagers of the tract in the monastery. Only a few came. And 
the elder re-selected three candidates, all from Myinmilaung. This is how U Yin 
became headman, but only for one year. U Htay withdrew from candidacy by 
proclaiming himself the official elder of Gawgyi, and nobody challenged him. This 
was his first move in distancing himself from government positions. Yet, U Htay 
remained a key actor in Gawgyi politics. He became the key interlocutor of 
incoming INGOs that flowed into Gawgyi in the early 2010s. For instance, thanks 
to a sanitation project led by the UNDP, he attended workshops on the making of a 
water pumping system and pushed for the creation of a water station that would be 
built a few months before my arrival in Gawgyi (chapter 2). The water system was 
an assemblage of efforts, knowledge, money and donations. And Gawgyi bigmen, 
U Htay, U Lin and U Maung, as we will see in chapter 8, were the ones organising 
it. The village first had to be on the target list of several NGOs, then fees were 
 
428 Donation and charitable funding to create ‘public services’ has been commonplace in this region, 
at least since the late 1990s. For a thorough study of this dynamic in another part of the country, cf. 
McCarthy (2018). 
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collected from all villagers, donations were given by the main families, a lottery 
was organised, networks of external donors were activated, and finally a committee 
administrating water delivery and money collection was set up. More recently, U 
Htay took the reins of the committee in charge of the distribution of a loan of about 
30,000 USD granted to Gawgyi by the Monywa Rural Development Department. 
Repayments by the villagers fund new loans and the renewal of village commodities 
used in ceremonies (tables, chairs, cooking pots and so on). And thus, for most 
people, having U Htay in charge of a project, even in the background, guarantees 
its effectiveness.  
 Overall, U Htay has demonstrated his commitment toward Gawgyi and has 
set an example. He embodies propriety and the references in this domain are the 
last men of hpon, notably U To Kaing described in chapter 4. In other words, he is 
inscribed in a genealogy of men of power. Men remembered, rightly or wrongly, 
for their engagement toward the enhancement of village life. And if we follow the 
criteria set by Nash to distinguish a leader, U Htay fits the description: 
 
“The qualities of a leader according to village standards are: industry 
(he is a hard worker), alertness (he does not appear sleepy or slow in 
movement; his speech is quick and pity), mercy (he does not push his 
power to the limit), patience (he does not rush into things, but await the 
propitious moment for action), judgment (his decisions do, in fact, turn 
to his benefit), and perspective (he sees events from the right angle ; he 
can tell more than other people about the meaning of events)” (1965: 
77). 
 
 This description has the advantage of being suitable for any leader at any time 
in history because it emphasises individual qualities and excludes the political and 
moral issues of a given period. The qualities of a typical leader are plastic enough 
to encompass a multitude of incarnations. But the meaning and the practice have 
changed. U Htay’s actions and the perceptions of his achievements combine old 
references and new stakes. The embodiment of propriety clearly draws on the 
legacy of U To Kaing and U Za Nay Ya. The latter are the backdrop against which 
the worth of U Htay make sense and is evaluated. Yet, nobody told me that U Htay 
was a man of hpon. This qualifier is reserved for people of a past era. Bigness 
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became difficult to achieve through village headmanship because it was 
synonymous with wrongdoing and collusion from the 1970s to the 2000s. Yet, U 
Htay gave ‘arms and legs’ to village affairs, even if (or rather because) he gradually 
withdrew from government affairs. What makes him special in Gawgyi is that he 
personifies a moral rupture with U Win the Infamous. And the sense of rupture was 
reinforced by an engagement toward village affairs presented as a transition from 
raw clientelism and corruption to the defence of a common good. Trustworthiness, 
as exemplified by U Htay, became a value organising local politics to some extent. 
 But U Htay did not create a new political order out of the blue. He has 
contributed to a larger movement in which the management of local affairs became 
monopolised by the villagers against the state. This trend was articulated with a 
more traditional form of collective sociality called luhmuyay or “social affairs”. 
This concept can encompass a variety of stakes. It includes potentially all kinds of 
collective undertakings from the making of ceremonies to the resolution of disputes, 
and thus its scope changes following what is deemed important at a given time. At 
a sociological level, luhmuyay is about taking responsibility for the welfare of a 
collective beyond individual and familial responsibilities. In theory, it concerns 
everyone and encompasses a wide set of relations from the hospitality of strangers 
to the funerals of neighbours. But in practice, it centres on a locality and, in our 
case, it includes Gawgyi and Tozigon but not Myinmilaung proper. As we will see 
in the chapter on the worth of bigmen, the engagement of some individuals toward 
a collective contributes to making village affairs the main form of local politics, as 
a space where the worth of the people is evaluated depending on their engagement 
toward a common good. 
 But it is a fragile state of affairs ridden with uncertainty especially because 
this political order is linked to a few persons. When these men stop taking care of 
village affairs, then what happens? In addition, other political dynamics are at play. 
As we have seen in Chapter 2 about the selection of a new headman in 2016, 
factionalism within the village and the battle between Myinmilaung and Gawgyi 
weaken the primacy of collective affairs as something to stand for. Even if village 
affairs are considered independent of government affairs, they inevitably overlap. 
At another level, village affairs depend eventually on people’s engagement. And if 
this engagement shapes some spaces as political, collective affairs are not the only 
field of power relations. As we will see in the following chapters, crafting one’s 
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place in the village is notably about negotiating social obligations. And Ko Kyaw’s 
experience as headman, described in the next chapter, exemplifies a central 
dilemma: how far should a person be responsible for a collective when one has to 
be responsible for a family? The crafting of one’s position is thus ridden with 
dilemmas in which the care for a collective is but one part. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Reflecting on my encounters with two headmen who succeeded one another, 
the introductory part of this chapter has shown how I came to realise that the shift 
from U Win to U Htay marked a broader rupture in local politics. It was a shift from 
distrust and corruption embodied by U Win the Infamous to trustworthiness and 
propriety with U Htay the Worthy. This narrative of change reflects how the 
conception of leadership moved from a discourse of individual’s hpon to one of 
people’s worth. This transformation is intimately linked with the historical 
background of state violence and corruption and U Htay gradual estrangement with 
the state was counterbalanced by a commitment to Gawgyi affairs. Village affairs 
were progressively being reinvested by villagers who were articulating new stakes 
within a more traditional form of sociality, making collective undertakings the 
fragile form of local politics at the beginning of the twenty first century. 
 To account for this metamorphosis, the chapter has explored the local history 
from the early years of the socialist period to the democratic opening of the early 
2010s. It has introduced the reader to the implementation and failure of the 
‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ under the dictatorship of Ne Win which eventually 
led to the mass revolt of 1988 followed by the reassertion of military power until 
the democratic transition period. It described how the socialisation of society has 
reinforced the control on peasants, tightening the local polity on itself and 
heightening the divide between farmers and dependents as the former were able to 
control the local institutions empowered by the socialist state. It has also opened in 
an age of distrust when the failure of the agricultural policies and the 
authoritarianism of the regime led to the worsening of living conditions ultimately 
giving rise to the 1988 uprising. This rupture had its own temporality in 
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Myinmilaung tract and took an ethical leaning when corruption, collusion, forced 
labour and violence became the way to rule the countryside. 
 This chapter has argued that the transition from U Win to U Htay marks this 
rupture as the latter practice of headship was a counterpoint to the former and that 
both were exemplary people who represented different values. U Win epitomises 
corruption, collusion and embezzlement while U Htay embodies propriety, a value 
articulated with the memory of the last men of hpon. The transition from one to the 
other thus represents a moral shift anchored in the local understandings of the 
history of Myinmilaung polity. In reaction to state disengagement from local 
affairs, a self-reliance ideology took ground in Gawgyi and symbolise how a group 
of people – the lugyi – has started making the engagement in village affairs a field 
of politics in the 2000s in Gawgyi. 
 Ultimately, this chapter and the previous ones have offered a background to 
explore current forms of leadership. Relating back to the selection of the headman 
in 2016 (chapter 2), the study of precolonial politics (chapter 3) in our area has 
shown that the antagonism between Gawgyi and Myinmilaung proper was partly 
anchored in competing visions of indigenousness once the two settlements were 
grouped under a single jurisdiction and a headman (interlude). Headship then 
became a matter of persons as successive leaders adopted different positions 
echoing local stakes. Some of them became exemplary figures of the moralisation 
of behaviours and engagement in lay affairs when villagers reinterpreted their role 
as Buddhist and contested colonial rule in a period a when claim to authority was 
more and more channelled by belonging to farming families (chapter 4). This 
chapter made a case for seeing Myinmilaung headmen as benchmarks to evaluate 
the morality of a time, acting as a backdrop to explain the difference between the 
present and the past. They are references for the ups and downs of village morality 
and U Htay’s trajectory – he distanced himself from government affairs as during 
the 2016 selection – underscore the rise of village affairs as the form of Gawgyi 
current politics.  
 The questions are now: 1) how does this background impinges on Ko Kyaw’s 
practice as headman? 2) how does leadership is conceived and practice within 
farming families? and 3) how do the lugyi actually perform village affairs? The 
issue of the worth of the lugyi is examined through the engagement in village affairs 
in chapter 8 while chapter 7 is devoted to study the entanglements between family 
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leadership, land relations and inheritance transmission. The following chapter (6) 
focuses on Ko Kyaw political navigation during a day in his life to explore 
Myinmilaung headship as a matter of craftmanship. 
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CHAPTER 6. CRAFTING VILLAGE HEADSHIP  
 
“IT’S ONLY IN THE MOUTH” 
 
 For Ko Kyaw, being the headman of Myinmilaung tract meant embodying a 
position people distrust while having to be trustworthy, playing both sides against 
the middle to craft his authority. If we approach village leadership as a set of 
uniform institutions, regardless of the place, the persons who embody it and the 
historical dynamics that have produced current political landscapes, we end up not 
seeing how people craft their position every day and navigate across spaces shaped 
by long-term dynamics and ethical dilemmas.  
 We have now reached the part of the thesis exploring present days’ politics 
and this chapter describes a day in his life to show how Ko Kyaw crafted his 
authority when he was the headman of Myinmilaung village tract from 2013 to 
2016. As we have seen in the chapter of the emergence of village headship, the latter 
was created in the late 1880s as an armed wing of local governance. Since then, the 
power of village headmen waxed and waned429 depending on how far local 
authorities entitled them to implement policies and organise local politics. 
However, their authority was and is also anchored in local relationships frequently 
described as patron-client.430 Today, village headmen are most often seen not as 
persons of authority, but as officials with ascribed powers and as political 
entrepreneurs. They are – like the headmen depicted by Thawnghmung and the 
ward’s administrators by Prasse-Freeman431 – uncanny officials with whom people 
have to deal with one way or another. Yet, locally, authority is about recognition 
 
429 The metaphor of waxing and waning is borrowed to Sikor and Lund (2009). The nature of local 
politics and the peculiar position of village headmen are discussed at almost each political shift in 
Upper Burma/Myanmar, since the early colonial rule and throughout the coming of independence, 
the socialisation of the economy, and across the successive militarist agendas up to the recent so-
called democratisation of the regime. See in particular: Boutry et al. (2017), Donnison (1953), 
Furnivall (1957), Huard (2016), Iwaki (2015), Mya Sein (1973), Nash (1963, 1965), Scott (1972a, 
1972b), Spiro (1997), Thant Myint-U (2001), Thawnghmung (2004) and Tinker (1967). 
430 Patron-client relationships have been analysed as either proceeding from a leader’s prowess 
(Aung-Thwin (1983, 1984); Koenig (1990); Lieberman (1984); Nash (1963, 1965); Pye (1962)), as 
embedded – or not – in a moral economy (Adas (1980, 1988); Scott (1976)), or based on power 
flowing from merit-making (Hanks (1962); Lehman (1984), Schober (1989)). 
431 Cf. Thawnghmung (2004: 94-102) and Prasse-Freeman (2015: 95-96). 
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and achievements. It is a quality embedded in the person, his life, his actions and is 
linked to the display of propriety432 as a gauging standard resulting from local 
history. The stance, achievements and memories of previous headmen and monks 
influence how Ko Kyaw craft his own authority because they contributed in and 
exemplified the transformation of the local understanding of morality, headship and 
collective affairs along the past century. As we have seen in the last two chapters, 
the emphasise on propriety and morality stems from two men (U Za Nay Ya and U 
To Kaing) who are, for our contemporaries, the archetypical and last men of hpon. 
They were able to bring people to emulation and embodied a renewal of propriety 
in the contest against colonialism. On a different note, U San was more of negotiator 
empowered by the socialist state to bring about socialism and whose prerogatives 
fostered factionalism within the village tract. The tightening of the local polity on 
the village tract worsen when the state partially disengaged from the countryside 
and U Win, the Infamous headman from Myinmilaung proper, embodied, for 
Gawgyi people, corruption, forced labour and unsolvable conflicts. U Htay then 
appeared as a moral rupture, drawing from the examples of previous men of hpon, 
propriety and impartiality. And Ko Kyaw became headman when the later distanced 
from official positions while remaining central in the organising of Gawgyi affairs. 
 Ko Kyaw sums up this ambiguity in a peculiar way. For him, “it’s only in the 
mouth”, meaning that what powerful people say is doubtful and should not be taken 
for granted. This sentence is a critique about what (government) power is and how 
it operates. As a counterpoint, it suggests that authority implies thitsashihmu, that 
is, aligning acts and words, and showing a degree of “trustworthiness”. Ko Kyaw 
clearly articulates the moral rupture when talking about power relations. Local 
politics are thus gauged through a moral scale dividing what is doubtful on the one 
hand and what is trustworthy on the other. Even Spiro, reflecting on his fieldwork, 
wrote about how issues of trust were key in village political life: “as a newcomer 
to the village, I had not yet learned that general distrust was a pervasive feature of 
village life” (Spiro 1992: 159). For him, one “characteristic of factional behavior is 
the discrepancy between words and action.” (Spiro 1992: 165). But, in contrast with 
Spiro, distrust is understood here as a produce of past experiences, not a 
 
432 The importance of morality in political dynamics has notably been emphasised by Turner (2014) 
and Walton (2017). 
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psychological inclination for factionalism. 
 So, what is “it”? And what does the mouth symbolise? “It” refers to 
government orders, officials’ stance and to how political entrepreneurs are 
perceived. It is display and strategy. The “mouth” is a mouth speaking words that 
align or not with acts, a Janus. If governing is described as being “only in the 
mouth”, then achievements and past deeds are counterpoints. They create a degree 
of legitimacy which require time and evaluation. For Ko Kyaw, being a village 
headman was thus a matter of craftsmanship or bricolage. For him it means evading 
obligations while abiding by local ethics, being responsible while dodging various 
forms of contention. On a day-to-day basis he had to dissemble as he was 
representing layer upon layer of individuals through the institution, and not simply 
his own authority via the institution. The tools at hand were his family reputation, 
his way of haranguing, smiling, being silent; of accepting, refusing and giving 
things; of forming, avoiding and manoeuvring factions; and also his manner of 
complying with the village bigmen (lugyi) and having a fair idea about the lines he 
should not cross. As one follows Ko Kyaw in his routine, it becomes clear that he 
does not represent the government as an entity. He gives ‘arms and legs’ to an 
institution that has a peculiar role in a network of personalities. Thus, this chapter 
describes the flow of life in a day of a village headman and shows the ambiguous 
ways a person in this position is crafting his authority. 
 In the following sections, the narrator and the reader follow Ko Kyaw during 
a day as a more or less omniscient character. The first part is a background recap 
on how Ko Kyaw became headman. The core of the text is then divided into parts 
of a day re-created from multiple ones (referred to in each sub-section). It is thus 
partly a fiction, but not an imaginary one. The constraint was to render daily life in 
a written form condensing an experience while describing how the past affects 
people. Ko Kyaw acknowledged that it could reflect his journey as headman, but 
his normal days are usually less busy. At times direct speech is used and mostly 
draws from recollection of memories and notes. Indirect speech also draws from 
the same sources. Besides, past events and events that I have not witnessed are 
recalled by cross-cutting information in interviews and casual discussions. 
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KO KYAW’S STORY 
 
 Ko Kyaw, as stated in the general introduction, comes from a relatively well-
off family of farmers living in the oldest area of Gawgyi. His father, who is the 
village healer, is from Gawgyi and his mother from Ywadon. Ko Kyaw has built a 
reputation as a caregiver and a simple person, a reputation that radiates beyond 
Myinmilaung tract since he became headman. Through the support and affiliation 
with Gawgyi’s big men, and notably U Htay, he ran for headship in 2012. This was 
a move of one-upmanship on the model of men of propriety. But being headmen 
was full of contradictions, as U Htay once warned him. 
 
Headmen of Myinmilaung tract 
From Myinmilaung proper From Gawgyi Period 
U Win  1995-2006 
 U Htay 2006-2011 
Ko Yay  2011-2013 
 Ko Kyaw 2013-2016 
U So  2016- 
Figure 17. The successive headmen of Myinmilaung tract (1995 to 2016) 
 Ko Kyaw ran for headship at a moment of reconfiguration of local politics. U 
Htay’s withdrawal from the office after a five-years mandate, and his refusal to be 
candidate led to a crisis in 2011. That year, the new government of Thein Sein called 
for a new round of elections following its pro-democracy agenda. But in 
Myinmilaung, that ‘election’ was chaotic. Most of the ten-houses’ leaders of the 
village tract refused to participate and nobody wanted to be candidate after U Htay. 
A couple of hours before the arrival of Township officials, an official elder from 
Ogon called all the villagers to gather in Myinmilaung monastery. A few came. The 
elder pre-selected three candidates, one from Ogon, one from Mingalagon and one 
from Myinmilaung. Gawgyi was not represented. Villagers voted by show of hands. 
Ko Yay, from Myinmilaung, was thus nominated headman. In Gawgyi, this episode 
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is seen with contempt and described as a typical example of how bad Myinmilaung 
proper handles local politics. 
 In late 2012, a new round of election was called, allegedly due to an electoral 
fraud in Yangon. This time, all the ten-houses’ heads were present and voting 
instructions were given. Under the patronage of U Htay, votes from Gawgyi heads 
were compound for Ko Kyaw. He totalised 14, Myinmilaung 13, Ogon 2 and 
Mingalagon also 2. Ko Kyaw took up his duties a few months later in 2013. He 
started reregistering families’ plots and delivering land titles. He formalised land 
agreements, set loan schemes, dealt with NGOs, took care of the village ‘security’ 
and solved various kinds of disputes. He had to fill out government injunctions, 
translating village realities into administrative categories. Progressively, he saw the 
value of not being competent in certain matters, such as land disputes, and found 
trade-offs between collusion and support (with officials and fellow villagers) 
because he was never sure of his authority in a given arena. Meanwhile, he became 
a husband and a father and had to negotiate conflicting obligations. Family, friends, 
acquaintances, factions and rivals were demanding. Ethical considerations, 
experience, foresight and advice from village big men helped Ko Kyaw to stay the 
course and manoeuvre. Eventually, he hosted me, acting as gate keeper and 
caretaker. He finally found an exit from politics when the victory of the National 
League for Democracy at the national level triggered a new round of headmen 
selection in late 2015 and early 2016.433 From that moment onward, he gradually 
declined his involvement in village affairs. 
 This chapter is an attempt to reconnect with the analysis of local politics in 
Myanmar. The study of patron-client relationships, the main feature of the local 
polity, is mostly left in the background434 in order to transform the study of 
headship, seen as an ‘intercalary position’435 with room for manoeuvre,436 by 
looking at it as a matter of craftsmanship: Ko Kyaw produces and navigates various 
social spaces and makes sense of, and uses of, a large array of relationships rooted 
 
433 For an analysis of that election nationwide, see Kyed et al. (2016). 
434 One way of studying patronage is to look at what circulates between people and how accepting, 
avoiding or delaying offers of goods and services produces such relationships. 
435 The theory of headship as intercalary authority, stating that headmen are hamstrung between 
bureaucratic and village demands, was first proposed by Gluckman et al. (1949) and developed in 
Gluckman (1955, 1963). 
436 Kuper (1970) argues that headship is also a resource offering room for manoeuvre. 
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in the past. In this vein, describing concrete situations437 enables one to decipher 
how people positioned themselves. But the stories and memories of the past are still 
present, in each encounter and linked to different temporalities. In short, how Ko 
Kyaw behaves in a given context produces his stance. Hence, this piece is written 
in a specific prose: it follows Ko Kyaw during a day and mixes descriptions and 
analysis of situations in an open-ended perspective aware of the incompleteness of 
ethnography while references to the past dot the text throughout. While going 
through this chapter, the reader should keep in mind how the competition between 
Gawgyi and Myinmilaung proper, the transformations of the local hierarchy, the 
embodied ethical ruptures, the rise of village affairs, and the issues of obligations, 
patronage, engagement and worthiness have shaped the local political landscape. 
 
A DAY IN THE LIFE 
 
8am. Family matters438 
  
 Ko Kyaw wakes up a little bit later than the rest of the people living in the 
house. I enter through the back door and find him lying on a bench with his puso439 
used as a blanket. The marital bed is right there, in the conjugal room in the 
southwest corner of the square-shaped living room. But Ko Kyaw sleeps on the 
bench because the bed is too small for him, his wife and their daughter. The living 
room gives an impression of a controlled chaos where items are piled up to make 
space for the flows of daily life moving around them. A table and two more benches, 
used for welcoming guests and evening discussions, are encased in the northeast 
corner. Beside it is an old desk, riddled by woodworms, on top of which stands a 
shrine for Buddha adorned every day with flowers, water and rice by Ko Kyaw’s 
mother. The desk is surrounded by some huge green trunks full of papers, tools and 
 
437 The importance of analysing social situations, and of extended case studies, was the leitmotiv of 
the School of Manchester (see Mitchell (1983)) and is akin to the pragmatic approach focusing on 
tests and performances in sociology and anthropology (cf. Barthe et al. (2013), Boltanski and 
Thévenot (2006), Naepels (2011) and Silber (2016)). 
438 This part of the day relates to the morning of the 26th of February 2016. 
439 Puso is the name of the male long skirt, which they are called in general, and for women in 
particular, longyi. 
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pieces of metal. Next to it lie two loudspeakers, a Yamaha keyboard and several 
sound boxes that Ko Kyaw rents out for ceremonies. The table, desk and boxes 
overfill the eastern part of the living room divided by a large path from the entrance 
to the back door. In the western part of the building are the beds. People always 
sleep with their heads pointing eastward. A second path, leading to the separate 
kitchen, corners Ko Kyaw’s mother’s bed in the northwest. The very making and 
positioning of the whole housing compound, including the living room, the kitchen, 
the toilet and two showers (one for males, one for females), was organised a decade 
ago following Ko Kyaw’s father’s calculation to facilitate flows of fortune.440 The 
latter is Gawgyi healer also versed in astrology. 
 
 
440 For a detailed examination of how space can be organised according to local cosmology, see 
Robinne (2000). 
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Figure 18. Inside Ko Kyaw's house 
 Ko Kyaw’s mother enters the main room from the door leading to the kitchen. 
She just finished the meal she cooked for herself. Earlier today she went with her 
pair of oxen coupled to the ox-cart to plough other villagers’ farm fields before the 
first rains. While tightening her worn longyi, she requests her son to give back some 
money. She gave him a certain amount a few days ago to visit his father in Mandalay 
public hospital where he is awaiting a stomach operation. He goes the bedroom, 
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lifts a box of clothes, opens another. He hands her the remaining banknotes she 
borrowed from a local moneylender a week ago in order to pay the hospital fees, 
the operation and the feeding of guests visiting the sick old man. When the latter 
decided to go to hospital, Ko Kyaw became in charge of making his stay there go 
smoothly. Since childhood, his parents appointed him to take care of them, their 
health and wealth, and thus, he is still living with them. This type of relation is 
called adunay adusa, literally “living and eating together”. It emphasises 
complementarity and dependency between two generations. But it is never fully 
achieved and remains in a state of becoming. The origin and use of incomes are 
central to this relationship. Ko Kyaw’s father will die a few weeks later, officially 
from stomach cancer. But no one dies here except from sorcery or ‘evil influences’. 
And the debt related to the hospitalisation will be the sole responsibility of Ko 
Kyaw’s mother until he receives his inheritance and become responsible441 for the 
whole house (chapter 7 on transmission). 
 Ko Kyaw drinks some tea and then goes to the small kitchen. He eats the 
meals cooked by his wife Ma Khin and joins me for smoking cheroots and chewing 
betel nuts. After unplugging his phone from a battery linked to a solar panel, he 
checks the state of his team on his favourite game, “Clash of Clans” (hereafter 
CoC). A great deal of villagers, invariably male, have been playing this game for a 
year or so. Three years ago, only a few wealthy people had phones. Now, most 
villagers have one with a Facebook account(s) – one of the main sources of news. 
But CoC is special. It is a collective game, yet people create individual strongholds. 
Then they gather in a team and compete with other coalitions all around the world. 
Seeing her husband on his phone again, Ma Khin, upset, huffs and puffs. Ko Kyaw 
answers by squeezing out a smile, his best-loved weapon. His nickname – Sweet 
Smile – originated in that very gesture. She shouts: “we just came back from my 
mother’s place to live here. There is plenty to do and you’re playing on your phone 
again!”. And indeed, for only a few months, Ko Kyaw, his wife Ma Khin and their 
young daughter have been settling back in his parents’ house on the east side of 
Gawgyi. This place is the biggest compound of the village and is located in the 
oldest area of settlement. One striking feature of this location is that most of the 
 
441 On the fact that transmitting inheritance is more about taking responsibility over a family than a 
transfer of ownership, see Huard (2018). 
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males settle in this compound with their wives, building new houses or taking over 
their parents’ place. While neolocal settlement is paramount in this area, fixing 
people in a place, whether it be marital partners, children, relatives or dependants 
shows ‘bigness’ and influence. Ko Kyaw moved to Ma Khin’s place in the western 
part of Gawgyi when she gave birth to their daughter. Changing houses was a 
manifold project. On the one hand, it was an opportunity for the baby to spend time 
and receive care among his mother’s family. But on the other hand, it was an 
investment in kinship to potentially access resources (taking care of the land of Ma 
Khin’s mother means maybe claiming part of it later). Going back and forth 
between both parents’ places is a negotiation between Ko Kyaw, his wife and their 
respective families. And Ko Kyaw tries to get the upper hand, forbearingly. The 
complaints about his time spent on the phone are a way to gauge if he could amend 
his behaviour. Yet, CoC is special to him: on top of being the current headman, Ko 
Kyaw is also the leader of the online village team, a team mostly composed of 
young males from 14 to 22 years old who help him in many ways. 
 
10am. The game theory442 
 
 Ko Kyaw makes a phone call to his nephew and asks him to come over to 
prepare the forthcoming war campaign on CoC. While we put out our cheroots, the 
promising boy – he is majoring in Geology at Monywa University – arrives on his 
brand-new scooter, a “one two five”. He visits us nearly every day and is often 
commissioned with doing petty tasks. The online challenge is going to be a difficult 
one and thus Ko Kyaw provides bits of advice to improve the attacks. CoC operates 
in a warlike language. A person builds a stronghold, bolsters his defences, 
strengthens his attacks in one-on-one battles to gain loot. Joint fights or war 
campaigns are climaxes. The troops – accepted beforehand by the team leader – are 
ranked by levels. They need to combine resources to win a war in successive duels. 
The success of a campaign – that lasts 24 hours – depends on the coordination of 
the group, on the support of its leader and on the respect of the rules of thumb. CoC 
 
442 This sub-section refers to the 15th of November 2015, when Ko Kyaw was finalising the 
deliverance of Land Use Certificates. 
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is a perfect metaphor for how a faction is built up and manoeuvred. Ko Kyaw 
coordinates the campaigns of his team. He endlessly shares resources with 
followers, advises on war strategies, provides defences and plans battles. The 
composition of his team is not random. Most of them are players on the Gawgyi 
football team and form a more or less cohesive group gradually involved in village 
affairs. 
 
 
Figure 19. Clash of Clans 
 After settling the detail of the next war campaign, Ko Kyaw asks his nephew 
to fetch U Min, a villager. U Min, a farmer in his late forties, arrives fifteen minutes 
later and the nephew, getting off his motorbike, tells Ko Kyaw that the monk wants 
to see him. U Min was awaiting Ko Kyaw’s call. He has recently bought a piece of 
land located in the southwest of Gawgyi. One of the main jobs for Ko Kyaw after 
being selected headman in 2012 was, with the land officer, to reregister individual 
plots for the four cadastral units composing Myinmilaung tract.443 He needed to 
gather information on nearly every plot of land for the officer. What is sensitive 
with U Min’s case is the location of his land. The cadastral map in question had 
been stolen a few years ago by the previous land officer in charge of this area, who 
 
443 Following the Farmland law passed in 2012, Land Use Certificates had to be handed to farmers. 
The affair was long and troublesome. For a general description of the scheme, cf. Boutry et al. 
(2017). 
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then “disappeared”. In the meantime, an army officer grabbed land in order to build 
a poultry factory in this area. Remaking and updating the land record is thus 
delicate.  
 U Min arrives at Ko Kyaw’s who has prepared fresh betel nuts to share. I get 
off the bench to make way for the guest and join Ko Kyaw’s nephew sitting on a 
chair. U Min takes off his straw hat, removes his machete (dah) from the back of 
his puso and sits in front of Ko Kyaw who engages the discussion. Ko Kyaw offers 
him coffee-mix – tea (literally “hot water’’) is too casual in this occasion – but U 
Min refuses, he, as a real farmer, always prefers “hot water”. When they finally 
touch upon the question at hand, Ko Kyaw stands up and searches for a plastic 
folder where he amasses his files. He tells U Min that the land officer will eventually 
give him the Land Use Certificate in the next few months. He adds on that from his 
last meeting with his direct superior – the monthly meeting with the head of the 
Township General Administration Department – he learned that the cadastre is 
about to be completed. U Min nods without hope. He tried to give some money to 
Ko Kyaw but the latter refused, arguing that the process is not over yet and that he 
already paid the registration fee (0.4 USD). They joke about the labyrinth of 
institutions, offices and personalities one has to navigate to get things done, and the 
prospect for compensation for those victims of land grabbing is “only in the mouth”. 
After a minute or two of silence, U Min leaves. I told Ko Kyaw that navigating the 
village might be easier than government offices. Yet it could be tricky too. And 
tricky it seems to be for Ko Kyaw, notably since he became headman. 
 If the government authorities are a labyrinth, the village is a maze. CoC is not 
a mere game in this perspective. The core of the Gawgyi team on CoC was 
assembled by Ko Kyaw when he became headman. He recruited them to convey 
information, call on people and for dodging influence from his fellow villagers in 
petty cases. In short, Ko Kyaw minimises the chances of being under someone 
else’s roof by using his group of followers. They are often sent to fetch villagers to 
come to Ko Kyaw’s house when he has to make new ID cards, conduct the census 
of family members, record people’s age, marital status, activities, and so forth. 
Calling U Min to come to his place through the agency of his nephew was a way to 
limit negotiation. The place where the headman lives becomes a sort of public 
space. Even if Ko Kyaw casually navigates from one location to another, he avoids 
as much as possible situations where his position as headman could be undermined 
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by personal relations. Thus, recruiting youngsters as intermediaries eases his 
tasks,444 at least in Gawgyi. There are many ways to become obliged to somebody. 
For instance, at his place, Ko Kyaw is the host. If he goes to U Min’s, he might have 
to refuse food. While accompanying me in the village, he taught me how to gauge 
the potential liabilities stemming from accepting or refusing presents, food or 
services. It mostly depends on the relations between people, their personalities, the 
stakes at hand and the ramifications of their relationship pertaining to past 
generations, kinship, service-giving, grievances, accountability, debt and so on. 
And the chances are greater to be trapped at someone’s house than at one’s own 
place. 
 After U Min’s departure, I ask Ko Kyaw about a dispute involving people 
from Myinmilaung proper. It relates to a lasting land conflict now in court known 
as the U Myo case. The Township Farmland body is about to give his verdict. Ko 
Kyaw tells me that both sides are going to appeal. The dispute reopened in 2013 
when farmers applied for Land Use Certificates. Five plots were claimed twice. In 
each case it involved a man named U Myo from Budaungkan village tract next to 
Gawgyi. A village committee445 had to handle the cases. Created by government 
order for resolving any issue emerging from land titling, the Myinmilaung ‘land 
committee’ consists of the headman (Ko Kyaw), the land officer, the official elder 
of the village tract (U Htay), the leader of farmers446 and the clerk.447 Three out of 
five members are from Gawgyi. This is how the headman and Gawgyi big men 
permeate crucial institutions with people from ‘their’ side. Yet, for Ko Kyaw, there 
is no way to settle the case. Eager to meet the protagonists of this affair, I try to 
convince him to go visit some of them in Myinmilaung. He tells me that it’s not that 
easy. So I reply, “why don’t you go see your father’s ‘small' wife, and use this to 
visit friends to see if these men are around?” I told him that because I knew he often 
accompanied his father when on medical tours in the past decades, so he has 
acquaintances in Myinmilaung, even family. But he refused. This is notably due to 
the animosity between the villages. This antagonism has lasted since as long as 
 
444 It also shows his ability to bridge younger and older generations (a shown off skill) and it gives 
the youngsters an opportunity to experience adults’ affairs. 
445 The committee is officially named VTFMC or Village-Tract Farmland Management Committee. 
446 A position created by the 2012 Farmland law and staffed by Ko Kyaw with a villager from 
Gawgyi. 
447 Staffed directly by the government several years ago with a villager from Myinmilaung proper. 
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people could remember and the selection of headmen marks, like football matches 
and pagoda festivals, a climax in rivalry. Hanging out in Myinmilaung proper is not 
a sheer pleasure for most Gawgyi villagers. And for Ko Kyaw, who was selected 
against the Myinmilaung’s candidate, it is a matter of diplomacy. “So why not fetch 
them like you did with U Min?” Ko Kyaw remains silent, looks at me, smiles and 
says “it’s not easy brother”. Any mistake could create an opportunity to challenge 
his authority. Myinmilaung proper is not an area where he is as influential as in 
Gawgyi, even as headman. And his nephew – listening carefully with his lips sealed 
– should not be involved in that.  
 Navigating villages thus requires a knowledge of ongoing relationships and 
various strategies to accommodate role, status and obligations. Recruiting the 
youngsters was a way of easing the handling of some affairs in Gawgyi. CoC 
emulates the creation of a faction led by Ko Kyaw in a space where he achieved a 
degree of bigness. It is a matter of performing his duty through personal 
relationships while dodging potential obligations. His authority mixes his stance as 
a headman and as a person because of his origins, his achievements, his affiliations, 
the networks of patronage he navigates, those he avoids, and the challenges 
surrounding his tasks. Yet, CoC found its limit in the bigness of other personalities 
and in the stakes of the ongoing land case. 
 
11am. Beyond the ceremony448 
 
 After finalising the last details of the next conquest campaign on his phone, 
we stay for a little while talking about his father’s health, his brother’s secret lover 
and the latest news from the British Premier League. Chelsea, his favourite team, 
lost. The discussion shifts to the Gawgyi football team’s failure during the last 
match. A relative of Ko Kyaw (at some point, most of the villagers are relatives), 
joins us, makes a chew of betel from Ko Kyaw’s supply and shouts: “Gawgyi 
younsters! They all have shoes, but we lose against barefoot fellows.” A woman in 
her fifties arrives and stops the discussion. A premarital meeting, called 
tintaungpwe, is going to take place in Tozigon, a village nearby. She calls Ko Kyaw 
 
448 This sub-section and the following ones (1pm and 4pm) happened on the 28th of January 2016. 
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to come along. 
Administratively, Tozigon is attached to the neighbouring tract of 
Budaungkan. Yet, villagers from Tozigon do their weddings, Buddhist novitiates, 
or burials with the help of Gawgyi’s villagers, institutions and pagoda. In other 
words, they use and rely on Gawgyi organisation of village affairs for catering their 
own needs. Gawgyi and Tozigon are close neighbours, both spatially and socially. 
They call it yathswe-yatmyo. It means “people akin by (sharing a) dwelling” and is 
made of a combination of a building block of kinship (hswemyo) with a reference 
to the common dwelling area (yat). Such a mix is also found in the title of village 
elders, yatmiyathpa, or “parents of the dwelling area”. Ko Kyaw’s mother used to 
live there and a high number of intermarriages occurred between the two villages 
before Gawgyi absorbed most of Tozigon population. But intermarriages, also 
happening between Myinmilaung and Gawgyi, cannot justify why they feel bonded. 
Their proximity has more to do with a shared history translating into close relations 
between preeminent families of farmers whose descendants settled progressively in 
Gawgyi. Thus, access to land and livelihood through marriage and inheritance 
enabled individuals to maintain relatively good relationships and to be integrated 
within the same domain of social affairs (luhmuyay) while belonging to different 
jurisdiction. 
The meeting is held between a family of Tozigon, marrying their daughter, 
and a family from another village, marrying their son. We quickly take our 
motorbikes and drive to their house. There, U Lin, the head of the Gawgyi 
bachelors, is crouched next to the fire, preparing tea with U Htay, the main leader 
of Gawgyi, while sharing betel chews under the sun. In the house, several women 
– kin and neighbours of the bride’s family – cut cakes into pieces. Imagine three 
tables aligned. On the left one, relatives and acquaintances of the bride side seat 
while people from the fiancé’s side sit on the right one. The spouses’ parents take 
their place in-between, accompanied by elders from Gawgyi and Tozigon. This is 
the negotiation table, where U Maung operates. In this kind of situation U Maung 
acts as master of ceremonies (or rituals) and it recognises and produce his bigness 
(chapter 8 on the lugyi). The women serve small cakes, and the men cups of tea.449 
 
449 Those expenses are covered by the parents of the fiancé and bought in advance by U Lin, leader 
of bachelors. 
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U Maung begins his address about what marriage means and how to behave for the 
best. This part of the speech is named ahsaung-ama, a generic way to describe an 
exhortation to follow morals.450 Then, he announces what both families are willing 
to give to the couple. The boy’s father starts talking about why he, as daily worker, 
cannot provide much but that, by custom, he will pay for the wedding. Both 
spouses’ parents agree in front of everyone. Gawgyi traditional institutions 
embodied by U Htay, U Lin and U Maung, and the headman (Ko Kyaw), facilitate 
and are key witnesses for such an agreement. Even if they do not do much, they 
have to be there. At last, the headman and the hundred-houses’ head of Budaungkan 
village tract arrive on a motorbike (Tozigon officially belongs to Budaungkan tract). 
They do not come to witness the marital engagement. Rather, they come to finalise 
a land sale. 
 
 
450 Ahsaung ama also refers to monks’ sermons and the promotion of Buddha’s teaching at large. 
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Figure 20. Preparing tea in Tozigon 
 We finish our plate of cakes and cups of tea. As I walk toward the fire, U Lin 
told me that he needs our help this afternoon at his house. We drive back to Gawgyi, 
followed by the two officials from Budaungkan and a man from Tozigon, named U 
Htoo. This man is buying a plot of land that belongs to Daw Than, Ko Kyaw’s 
grandmother. Because the land is located in Budaungkan tract, the signature and 
stamp of the appropriate headman are mandatory. U Htoo has already given her the 
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third of the price to formalise their agreement. He is a former daily labourer who 
wants to start growing betel leaves. He borrowed money and sold most of his goats 
to buy land, a pump, to dig a well and build a bamboo greenhouse. On the way, I 
overhear Ko Kyaw, sitting on the back of my motorbike, confirming for U Htoo 
that he will provide him the cuttings of betel soon. We stop at Daw Than’s house. 
She is waiting with two of her grown-up children. One, a son paid monthly to farm 
her land, lives next door with his own family. He knows about his mother’s land. 
The other is her last child, a daughter in her thirties, still single. She is “living and 
eating” with her mother and will become in charge of her estate. The stakeholders 
arrive one by one. As a sign of respect, they take off their slippers before stepping 
onto the concrete floor. I stay aside on a bamboo chair. In a “bossy” gesture, 
Budaungkan headman requests Ko Kyaw to write the contract. The former stamps 
and signs it. He, or maybe his henchman, will deal with the land officer to update 
the cadastre. U Htoo gives the rest (two-thirds) of the money to Daw Than and, 
following their prior agreement,451 she gives money to both the Budaungkan 
headman and his henchman. Ko Kyaw received nothing directly. Akin to both 
contractors, he facilitates the transaction. His status, network and knowledge of land 
laws and contracts make the procedure go efficiently. 
 
1pm. In the field 
 
 Once the contract is signed, Ko Kyaw goes to his house. He swaps his shirt 
and longyi for a T-shirt and a pair of shorts. His wife, Ma Khin, came back a moment 
earlier from their greenhouse of betel leaves. It is harvest time, which occurs every 
two weeks. They pack their meal and a batch of betel nuts, cheroots, water and 
snacks for their workers. I help carrying the straw baskets to fetch the precious 
green leaves. We slalom between the palm trees and finally reach the field. A group 
of girls and women—a bunch of relatives, neighbours and acquaintances—as well 
as Ko Kyaw wife’s uncle—an alcoholic—are working in the greenhouse since 
morning. The uncle controls the flow of water while the females collect leaves. The 
leaves should neither be too small nor too big, of a clear and dense green catching 
 
451 The amount given to headmen for such service is usually 10% of the land price. 
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the rays of the dimmed sun. Picking the right ones requires sharp eyes, agile hands 
and bearing the pain of walking crouched down for several hours. In current times, 
labourers are scarce. There is a rise in day labour opportunities in Monywa for 
males, notably as builders and, to a lesser extent, as weavers for females at home. 
In addition, seasonal and long-term migrations cause shortages of farm workers and 
raise daily wages, a situation favouring the labourer (myaukthu) usually seen as 
lower status than farmers (taungthu; chapter 4, section on transforming hierarchy). 
Ma Khin organises the labourers, looks for more workers, checks their availability, 
sets agreements and pays them. She combines her previous network with the one 
she is progressively crafting out of her husband’s relations. Labour relationships are 
thus made out of needs, opportunities and timing on a daily basis.  
Consider now Ko Kyaw in his greenhouse, ploughing a furrow to ease water 
flows. This place and the adjacent plots enriched his extended family for decades 
before they were sold out like today. He grew up there and knows every little thing 
around. Yet, Ko Kyaw is not really a landowner. A few months later on the same 
location, gazing at the land he envisions for a second greenhouse, he will tell me 
that “nobody owns” it (chapter 7). Thus, he is rather a would-be owner and a farmer 
in-the-making. Take the greenhouse. He built it in late 2015 on his parents’ land. It 
is a regular source of income that requires substantial capital to set up: digging a 
well, buying a pump, an engine and pipes, building the greenhouse and purchasing 
saplings. Ko Kyaw’s parents supported the investment that he reimbursed after one 
year of activity. Now he is planning to create a second and larger greenhouse on his 
own, but still on land officially owned by his parents (he did the land registration). 
Usually, people access land through inheritance at various times during their life 
(chapter 7).452 Accessing land depends highly on family strategies. As we will see 
in the next chapter, the biggest dilemma is to achieve a livelihood while supporting 
the children to make their own later. Relations of commensality are emphasised and 
partially resolve this dilemma. Ko Kyaw accesses part of his parents’ estate because 
he is their would-be caretaker. He gradually took responsibility for organising the 
farming of his parents’ land with them. Beyond mere consultations on farming 
strategies, their relationship also involves land sales and loan politics. Ko Kyaw 
 
452 It could happen at marriage time or a little before or after the death of one or both parents 
depending on their plan and the stakes associated to the patrimony; see Huard (2018). 
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just smiled at me and jokes that, if he does not succeed as a farmer, he will come to 
France on his rototiller. 
Seeing U Htoo and his wife walking around the plot they just bought some 
two hundred yards away, Ko Kyaw shouts to hail them. “Come eat with us!”, he 
yells from afar. Five minutes later, they arrive with their lunch boxes. We sat there 
on a wickerwork tarp while the nephew joins us. Plates and dishes are gathered in-
between us. Once again, I, an uncanny guest, am asked to eat more every time I 
finish a handful of rice. Each couple displays overt hospitality to the other, offering 
to taste that dish, this soup of beans, that salad of leaves. But everyone politely eats 
mostly the dishes they brought. 
 
 
Figure 21. Lunch next to the greenhouse 
 Ko Kyaw gives more details on the when and how the cuttings of betel will 
be available. U Htoo and his wife need about four hundred to start and will 
reimburse him once they can harvest it. In short, Ko Kyaw invests in them and, 
beyond being cousins, it solidifies further their relationship in which Ko Kyaw is a 
sort of patron. After another cheroot, several chews of betel and an umpteenth look 
at the ongoing war on CoC, we head back to Gawgyi. 
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4pm. The big men 
 
 Back from the field, we take a rest at Ko Kyaw’s house. After an hour or so, 
I told him that his uncle U Lin asked for our help. He is currently rebuilding the 
roof of a shelter for his cattle. Building repairs are moments of collective help. In 
theory, everyone comes to give a hand, but in practice, it often displays a relational 
engagement under the rubric of help. For this shelter, the roof, made of palm leaves, 
needs to be changed. Now that the main crops are harvested, most villagers do so 
before the peak of summer heat. When we arrive there, a small group of men are 
bustling around. One of them splits up leaves from branches with his machete. 
Another, holding his machete with his feet, slices the edges of the branches and 
soaks them in water to make strings. The last one makes incisions in the leaves to 
tie the strings that will eventually be attached to the bamboo structure. The scene is 
familiar. Those men are the ones met earlier at the premarital ceremony. U Lin, Ko 
Kyaw’s uncle, teacher of the village school and leader of the bachelor group, is 
accompanied by U Htay, Ko Kyaw’s brother-in-law and official elder, and U 
Maung, the most respected elder often officiating as master of ceremonies. They 
are the main village big men. To a certain extent, they represent a familial 
accumulation of leadership positions. However, as most villagers are relatives in 
some way, the concentration of leadership particularly reflects how a few farming 
families have managed to secure and gather, through alliance and descent, land, 
cattle and know-how. To such an extent that being an accomplished farmer 
(taungthu) is the valued status. But when asked about what, in their opinion, makes 
a man (lu) big (gyi), they always emphasised propriety and achievements (chapter 
4 on the last men of hpon). 
 “You guys aren’t early”, U Lin mocks us. I retort with a joke I know will 
work: “That’s because Ko Kyaw is afraid of his wife!" They all laughed at it. 
Whereas Ko Kyaw starts slicing strings in no time, I try in vain to make myself 
useful and finally give up and sit. They take a break a short moment later and engage 
casual discussion. We talk about the morning’s ceremony, the current change in 
government, fluctuations of crops prices, the next pagoda festival and so forth. I 
pour coffee. U Lin unpacks snacks. U Htay offers Ko Kyaw a betel chew and U 
Maung lit his cheroots. Tea or coffee, smokes and betel chews are the ingredients 
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of male sociality. The offering of any of these items follows a basic understanding: 
apyan-ahlan, which means “one good turn deserves another’’, the ethics of living 
together. To some extent, assistance, help, and offerings follow a simple rule of 
reciprocity. But it is also a highly relational matter, depending on and reflecting the 
state of relationships. In the same vein, us coming here to give a hand shows a 
degree of affiliation, for the place is saturated by big men. I remember that Nash, 
an anthropologist working in the dry zone in the late fifties, said that this kind of 
men are not powerful. He wrote: 
 
“The lugyi do not set style; they do not necessarily move anyone to 
emulation, and they have no power, only the recognised right to use 
moral suasion (…). One of the reasons these men are elders is that they 
do not overstep the vague but delicate line that separates individual 
responsibilities.” (Nash 1965: 270). 
 
 Rather, I see them as people taking care of village matters. They make village 
affairs a space of commitment where the worth of the people is gauged, and thus 
create a political order within the village. And yet, “the vague but delicate line” is 
all that is on my mind at that moment. So, I ask: “why do people call you the village 
big men?”. They laugh. “We are not”, replied U Lin. I retort, “So why do you take 
care of village affairs? (ywayay okhteinhmu)”. And U Htay to answer, “Who else 
would do it?”. A deep silence follows. Everyone gazes in other directions. After a 
minute that felt like an hour, U Maung teases me: “It’s not easy young man”. Ko 
Kyaw smiles again, and we resume our petty discussion until he touches upon a 
specific subject. 
 They start talking about U Myo’s case and Ko Kyaw gives the details of the 
current unfolding of the dispute (chapters 2 and 5). Background information is 
required to understand it fully. In short, around 2003, eleven farmers mortgaged 
their land to U Myo, at that time a moneylender and gambler from Mogaung. 
Usually, this kind of agreement (here called yahman-ngway, “the guessed price of 
the land”) does not involve interests and lasts for one to three years. U Win, the 
Infamous, wrote and stamped the contracts. Both U Myo and U Win have the 
reputation – at least in Gawgyi – of being rogue, crooked and yet powerful men. 
Three years later, after U Myo became headman of Budaungkan tract, the dispute 
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started. Most farmers asked for an extension as they could not reimburse U Myo 
yet. But he refused. The eleven farmers, accusing him of changing the terms of the 
agreements by asking for interest, went on to seek resolution with U Win who 
refused. So they sent the case to the Township authorities which sent it back to U 
Win, who refused again. The situation remained at a standstill for a few years during 
which U Myo and U Win were accused of having forged counterfeit contracts to 
turn the mortgages into land sales. In 2008, U Myo unsuccessfully attempted to get 
the land registered in his name. Later on, six out of eleven farmers managed to get 
their plots back – those of the poorest quality. The five remaining farmers awaited 
the successive headmen to handle the case, but no one did. The contracts, fake or 
genuine, stayed concealed. Nothing moved forward until the Farmland law (2012) 
was implemented in Myinmilaung tract in 2013. Old grudges were revived.453 The 
plots were claimed for title twice so the “land committee” had to judge the case. Ko 
Kyaw asked for a meeting between all stakeholders in May 2014 to reach a 
consensus. It failed. And now the case has been transferred to court. That was the 
point they touch upon while drinking coffee under U Lin’s shelter. 
 Their gazes drop down again. Once Ko Kyaw says that the court has not 
settled anything yet but that the odds are in the favour of U Myo, the air thickens 
with unspoken thoughts. Silence. Trying to find a consensus was the only way for 
Ko Kyaw to not be at odds with the previous headmen, with the farmers and with 
his superiors. It is the most common way of settling disputes. To put it simply, it is 
nearly impossible for headmen to engage the responsibility of previous ones. Even 
if in theory a headman can decide alone, Ko Kyaw simply could not take the risk 
or responsibility to rule the matter all by himself. And this is the point, that on a 
day-to-day basis he has to dissemble because he represents layer upon layer of 
individuals and not simply his own authority via the institution. The stakeholders 
are too close. The past is too imbued with military-style rule. The men of power, if 
they were officials in the past, play the card of outright invulnerability. If they fall, 
others will too. Ko Kyaw is just not big enough. Nor are Gawgyi bigmen. And the 
value of not being competent enables Ko Kyaw to craft the dynamics that are put 
upon him because of his position. He says, “in a few months, I’m done.”  
 
 
453 For an analysis of that type of land conflict, see Boutry et al. (2017: 142-147). 
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6pm. To the teashop454 
 
 Once we run out of toddy leaves and betel nuts, Ko Kyaw brings me to his 
house. There we resume the ongoing war campaign on Clash of Clans. The 
discussion stops short as his wife comes back from the field. It is time to fetch the 
harvest from the greenhouse. In a quick move, we get on our motorbikes and drive 
back to the sandy field. We pack the loaded baskets and secure them with straps. 
The workers eventually walk home. Later in the evening, once the yield is 
transformed into cash, they will come to Ko Kyaw’s wife to get paid. The precious 
green leaves will soon be estimated in a broker house in Monywa. Brokers455 and 
farmers often try to trick each other about prices and weights. Only after regular 
intercourse can they trust each other. Thus, “having” a broker or two is an asset that 
farmers hardly share with newcomers, especially in this business, unless the latter 
(like U Htoo) depends on the former (like Ko Kyaw). Back at Ko Kyaw’s house, 
his wife and cousin are unpacking the leaves to then clean and pack them up again 
with wet towels to keep them fresh. His brother joins us before the departure with 
a bag of betel chews to share. We carefully load the baskets one more time on the 
motorbikes and begin the journey toward Monywa. 
 Our first stop is the grocery store located on Gawgyi main road to buy betel 
chews. As usual, U Htay is sitting behind the shop keeper, close to the money box, 
on the high-mounted wickerwork mattress under the shade of the straw roof. At this 
time of the day, the shopkeeper makes betel chews as if on an assembly line. We 
each order a bag according to our taste. Ko Kyaw insists on paying. He is the one 
getting some money tonight. We resume our trip to Monywa. The shortest way is a 
straight dirt track intersecting with Kyawkka Road that goes eastward from 
Monywa. The dirt path was built quite recently in 2009, when U Htay was headman 
(2006–2011), following an ancient oxcart lane and spanning through farmlands. 
Since this road has been built, land prices have risen on both sides of the 
thoroughfare and continue to escalate as it gets closer to the city centre. We come 
across many villagers driving back from their daily jobs. Once we reach the sealed 
 
454 This sub-section and the next one are drawn from the events which happened on the 19th of May 
2016. 
455 Pwesa, literally the person making a living from connecting people. 
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road, we stop at the freshly built petrol station just around the corner. During the 
past couple of years, such stations have been mushrooming on road banks in the 
outskirts of Monywa. We turn westward and pass the tollgate that nowadays stops 
loaded trucks only. We finally arrive at the destination. Two young men help unload 
the baskets. The broker warehouse is bustling, so while we wait our turn we go in 
a nearby teashop while keeping an eye on the merchandise. It is now up to the owner 
to explain to the clients why a foreigner accompanies Ko Kyaw. We politely end 
the discussion, for the baskets are going to be weighed.  
 With this bi-monthly wage in his pocket, Ko Kyaw drives us to a downtown 
teashop famous for its local fried specialties. Some Gawgyi youngsters, the ones 
proactive on Clash of Clans, join us. Ko Kyaw makes a point in treating us, his 
small troop of followers, to food and drinks. He does that without being bossy. It is 
just normal. He got paid, so he pays. But in this case, Ko Kyaw cannot completely 
hide the fact that he is somehow above the others. There were no explicit 
expectations that Ko Kyaw would treat us. It is all implicit. And even if he does not 
want to be seen as a patron, his behaviour, his deeds, his experience, his age, his 
family and his assets put him in that position in this context. More, the fact that 
people implicitly anticipate things from him and that he aligns with those 
expectations—he got paid, so he pays—allows him to expect things from others in 
return in a potentially endless game. And the degree of obligation and the weight of 
expectations depend greatly on relationships and contexts. The same stands true for 
daily services, sharing betel chews, cigarettes or playing Clash of Clans. At the 
teashop, the friendly atmosphere is emphasised upon to keep in mind that no 
hierarchy is overtly at play here. It is about having a good time. This fluidity 
contrasts with the more hierarchical relationships Ko Kyaw was dealing with a few 
hours before. Everyone orders tea to his taste and eats fried chicken sticks on coffee 
tables filling the road as soon as daylight fades away. The waiter refills the pack of 
smokes as we empty it. The conversation flows from one subject to another, from 
lovers and university gossip to planning on how to improve our football team. Once 
sated, we spit copiously on the half-dirt, half-sealed road, a blood-like saliva 
produced by betel chews. When everybody has eaten, spit and smoked, and Ko 
Kyaw’s generosity could not be pushed further, the group promptly seeks out their 
motorbikes parked in the heaped mass of engines and plastic.  
 Riding in a group is a pleasant thing. As soon as there are at least two drivers 
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sharing a journey, people will go along side by side whenever possible. They cannot 
help it. There we cruise back to Gawgyi, lights on, exchanging jokes, betel chews, 
pointing and gazing at girls, in gang-like fashion. 
 
At night. 
 
 As we arrive, Ko Kyaw’s cousin is standing at the edge of the kitchen door 
while his mother finishes her meal. The former came to get her daily wage and 
organise the next rounds of work. He passes on the banknotes to his wife who 
vanished in the living room to come back a few seconds later and discretely hands 
over her salary. Ko Kyaw is reminded by his wife, for the record, that he should not 
spend too much in teashops. He smiles at her and pouts until she grins back. I then 
shower and eat up my dinner with him in the living room, followed by the habitual 
coffee, cheroots, and betel. Another routine waits ahead. 
 We walk to the village shop to buy betel chews and coffee bags before going 
to the house of the father-in-law of Ko Kyaw’s brother in the middle of the village. 
There, a small gathering occurs almost every night. Drinking coffee is the stated 
reason for meeting up. U Htay and U Lin were already there, reading news on 
Facebook. We sit on benches and U Htay pours coffee for us. When U Maung 
arrives, most of us cannot help but offer him our seat. We usually do it for anyone 
coming, but especially with U Maung. He is old, wise and a bigman. Giving up 
one’s seat shows deference and such seat politics are clues for understanding local 
hierarchies to some degree. Yet, it is a convivial time between relatives, neighbours 
and friends although not everybody dares to join. In short, this meeting is the small 
council of village affairs. A council from which Ko Kyaw will gradually withdraw 
from as soon as he stops being headman a few years later. 
 Tonight’s conversations are about a ceremony that took place a few days ago. 
A novice, native of Gawgyi, came back to the village after successfully passing an 
examination in a famous monastery in Sagaing. The ceremony (called gonpyupwe) 
was organised to honour his literary prowess and to ordain him. On the road from 
Monywa to Gawgyi monastery, he was high mounted on the quarterdeck of a pickup 
in a triumphal yet dignified posture, followed by a procession of villagers. The 
ordination ensued in the monastery where invited monks gathered to read Pali texts. 
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The quality of the procession456 depends greatly on villagers while the quality of 
the ordination hinges mostly on the hsayadaw (“head monk”) of Gawgyi monastery. 
I know people like gauging the quality of ceremonies, so I ask what they thought 
of it. They laugh about the fact that the speakers were faulty, notably when invited 
monks gave talks after the ritual. Most importantly, U Htay underlines the presence 
of a highly worshipped hsayadaw of a nearby village who, beyond being one of the 
few reading Pali, is said to have supernatural powers. This is no coincidence. Most 
men from Gawgyi in their thirties today were pupils of him before. He taught them 
Buddhism, morals and cosmological calculations, topics that are usually left out of 
schools’ curriculums. More than a spring of merit, he is perceived as a fountain of 
knowledge and embodies living ethics and potency. 
 I discreetly tell Ko Kyaw that the Gawgyi hsayadaw called him today. He 
nods but says it is too late for this tonight. This monk is more respected because of 
his status than his achievements. He is the head of two monasteries given the 
number of years since ordination, but he hardly evokes the same sense of 
admiration. Rather, I noticed that many distanced themselves from him since a year 
or two, when he undertook the reconstruction of Gawgyi and Zalok monasteries. U 
Lin, organiser of most ceremonies, is in close contact with him and tonight spreads 
his word that donations of 1000 kyats per month per family would be needed to 
finalise the construction of a house for monks in Gawgyi monastery. He says, “merit 
will flow from it.” Ko Kyaw avoids my gaze. In Zalok, at the periphery of Monywa, 
the meritorious donations from laypeople mostly draw from the recent rise in land 
prices and business opportunities, escalating in a race for prestige and merit. They 
sell plots, whose value has multiplied tenfold in some cases, and sponsor sumptuous 
ceremonies. In Gawgyi, there are fewer donations. Land prices have risen, but not 
to the same extent, and most of the new buildings were founded by outsiders’ 
donations. U Maung pours a round of tea. Nobody talks about greed or openly 
criticises the monk. But the fact is, he already has a house. The general attitude is 
avoidance, as much as possible. If one speaks his mind, he might regret it. Rather 
than voice his opinion – which could be “only in the mouth” – Ko Kyaw prefers to 
remain silent, and only sets foot in the monastery for the main ceremonies. 
 
456 This also includes the facilitation of the whole ceremony (cooking food for guests and monks, 
building the temporary structures, and so on). 
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Avoidance means staying away from situations where intimate conceptions 
contradict reality. U Htay, sensing the dilemma, openly acknowledges that it is a 
complex topic that Ko Kyaw is not at ease with yet. There is ambiguity in every 
relationship. Keeping the mouth shut is sometimes a way to be loyal to one’s 
conceptions.  
 We finish our cup of tea. I refuse an umpteenth chew, for my mouth is burning 
and we head back to Ko Kyaw’s. His mother, his wife and daughter are already 
sleeping. Alone, finally, with him and his brother, we pursue our discussion. At 
some point, I plainly ask him why he wanted to be headman. He does not want it 
anymore but was “pushed’’ by fellow villagers. For him, “it’s just not worth it”, the 
responsibilities are overwhelming for the pay grade. I tell him that many headmen 
are known for being political entrepreneurs who use the position to expand their 
network, take bribes, to show their ‘face’457 to officials and, if manoeuvred properly, 
to be able to line up for opportunities (such as the deployment of rural development 
funds). But on the other side, Ko Kyaw insists that it means being responsible for 
the tract, putting in time and effort to get things done (land recording, ID cards, loan 
requests, and so on) while, at the same time, being ‘poorly’ paid.458 I remark that he 
also gets money on transactions, notably land sales, and that U Htay is renowned 
for refusing such transactions when he was headman (2006–2011). Ko Kyaw 
expands on this example. 
 Here is his technique. When he measures a plot and fill out contracts for 
relatively normal sales, the buyer or the seller will invariably ask how much they 
owe him. Those are tests wherein everyone tries to keep face and it shows how Ko 
Kyaw is always judging situations and acting in them. If he answers a specific 
amount, it becomes a request that sounds like any other headman asking for money. 
To ward off this dilemma, he says, “give me what you want”. The thing is that 
people give money either way, unless he strongly refuses,459 and thus short-circuits 
the rules of the game (as did U Htay the Worthy). However, by neither refusing 
 
457 An interesting parallel can be found in Koenig (1990: 157) when he analyses corruption under 
the Konbaung dynasty. 
458 His salary is 120.000MMK per month (less than 100USD), minus compulsory purchase of 
government newspapers and stationeries, his monthly income totals to 100.000MMK, the same as a 
daily worker on construction sites in Monywa in 2015. 
459 This money is also given to ensure a change of ownership in official records. 
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overtly nor asking for a specific amount, Ko Kyaw plays with ambiguity.460 People 
have to guess on the go. It becomes a test for them. Ko Kyaw gets money and keeps 
face. Thus, he adjusts how he performs headship according to previous headmen’s 
stances, how obligations are brought about, agrarian customs and the running of 
village affairs at large. 
 I tell him that I am not convinced. His brother stays silent, playing CoC with 
his own team which members are from all around the country. On our side, we won 
the war against a coalition from South Korea. The coolness of the night invades the 
house as we light a last smoke before going to bed. 
 
RETHINKING VILLAGE HEADSHIP 
 
 Historically, headmen were crucial in the control of land and people 
movements, providing identity documents when a person was willing to travel or 
registering every visitor coming in the village. In short, as they could register people 
movements, crops procurement, loans and transfers of property, they were in-
between villagers and governments agencies for them to access each-other.461 Thus, 
village headmen could be described as brokers between the villagers and the 
government as much as the latter tried to control people movement and activities, 
and as much as people were willing to access or avoid its officials. But following 
Ko Kyaw during one day in his life gives a sense that any reading of headship as 
patronage or as the simple brokerage of governmental authority is insufficient. 
Village headship is not just in an intercalary position hamstrung between 
bureaucratic and village demands (Gluckman et al. 1949) that gives him room for 
manoeuvre462 (Kuper 1970). Gluckman’s and Kuper’s headmen, like Ko Kyaw, 
were living in a peculiar configuration of forces, personalities and histories.  
 The particular configuration of past dynamics in day-to-day life is the key 
 
460 Spiro (1997) shows a similar pattern when describing how Township Officers in 1960 used the 
rhetoric of help to talk about bribes. 
461 Concerning matters of taxation, land ownership securing, resolving conflicts, providing or 
escaping free labour for official projects, providing more or less crops for the procurement, 
providing agricultural loan following land type and land records from the State Agricultural Bank 
beyond others 
462 By taking into account only the capacity for manoeuvre, headmen end up qualified generally as 
political entrepreneurs. 
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point to understand power and authority in our context. As for him, Ko Kyaw’s 
dilemma was to align acts and words and to show trustworthiness. On a practical 
level, his challenge was to fashion the dynamics that are put upon him due to his 
position, as he did not simply represent his own authority via the institution. 
Situations, people’s stance and strategies are informed by the past, or rather by how 
actors order the past into narratives. In this, trustworthiness is a matter of time and 
of examples. The last men of hpon, the moral rupture between the Infamous and the 
Worthy, the rise of village affairs are thus turning points. It constrained Ko Kyaw 
in his ability to be the headman as much as, or maybe even more than the legal 
definition of his rights and duties. We have seen that previous village leaders are 
benchmarks to evaluate the morality of a time, acting as a backdrop to explain the 
difference between today and the past. They are references, examples people draw 
upon to explain the ups and downs of village morality and it shows how ethical 
shifts influence and scale the local polity. And so, Ko Kyaw could not display 
exactly the qualities of a leader enumerated by Nash463 as well as he could not just 
be a political entrepreneur. While he was headman, the men of hpon were gone, the 
government has shown its violence, Gawgyi and Myinmilaung proper were 
competing for decades if not centuries and village affairs were oriented by the local 
elite. He had to deal with old and new in multiple social spaces where obligations 
and memories influenced how he engaged with others. Ko Kyaw’s craft was to be 
at the juncture between past and present dynamics and he was evaluated according 
to how, in concrete situations, he aligned or played with the local understanding of 
worthiness. Overall, being the headman of Myinmilaung tract was for Ko Kyaw a 
matter of embodying a position people distrust while having to be trustworthy, 
playing both sides against the middle to craft his authority. 
 He was, however, navigating a slightly different landscape than Gawgyi 
bigmen. The latter were making village affairs a political space at distance with the 
state and informed by an ideology of self-reliance. That landscape was delineated 
by the making of collective affairs, the evaluation of propriety and expressed 
through a sense of belonging which included Tozigon but partly excluded 
Myinmilaung proper. The fashioning of these political landscapes and the narratives 
defining it – the emergence of headship, the succession and monopolisation of 
 
463 Industry, alertness, mercy, patience, judgment, perspective, cf. Nash (1965: 77). 
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leadership by large families of peasants, the shift in local hierarchy, the diverging 
senses of belonging at play in headmen selection, the transition from hpon to worth 
and propriety as political values – were rooted in the past. In that sense the village 
tract was but one arena, among others, where local politics unfold. Ko Kyaw was 
the one entrusted to deal with that part of politics under the watch of Gawgyi 
bigmen. But he also had to be trustworthy and involved in Gawgyi affairs in 
generals. Therefore, his position was ambiguous as he had to navigate multiple 
spaces delineated by uncertain boundaries between the private, the political and the 
government, and because he was evaluated following how he enforced, minimised 
and avoid those boundaries. 
  
CONCLUSION: DOUBT AND TRUST 
 
 This chapter has explored Ko Kyaw’s political navigation and how he was 
entangled in a variety of relationships and situations while headman of 
Myinmilaung tract. For him, setting up his family was a matter of negotiating 
obligations toward his parents while investing in kinship to access resources and 
gradually taking responsibility over the family. In Gawgyi, creating a small faction 
with CoC was a way of easing the handling of some affairs and dodging potential 
obligations by shortcutting hospitality rules. We also saw that he is not just a mere 
embodiment of the state as he participates in ceremonies beyond his jurisdiction 
with other villages’ big men. And this relates to how the inclusion of other places 
in Gawgyi affairs is a produce of the past Ko Kyaw had to deal with. He navigated 
between social spaces, from a ceremony to a land sale and the farm field, being an 
official, a bigman, an employer, a relative, a patron, a husband. Becoming headman 
was certainly a move for one-upmanship. But how he interacted with Myinmilaung 
disputants and the Gawgyi monk for instance shows that his job also means 
avoiding, accepting, and creating obligations; dissembling, showing competency in 
some domains, valuing incompetency in others, and playing with ambiguities in 
land transactions for instance.  
 If, literally, a village headman in Burmese is an ‘administrator’ 
(okchokyayhmu), in the sense of overseeing local affairs and being responsible for 
the local order in a state-like fashion, following Ko Kyaw during a day allowed to 
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see village headship beyond the brokerage of government authority by underscoring 
the dilemmas at play in how he navigated across the local political landscape while 
continuously crafting his position. He could not completely ‘oversee’ local affairs 
and was careful not to put his responsibility at risk in various arenas, such as when 
resolving disputes or dealing with previous headmen. Nonetheless, the idea of 
‘taking care of’, or ‘being responsible for’ pervades how leadership is conceived 
and practiced in other fields of village life. The following chapters thus explore how 
it reflects the political processes at play in two domains, first in family relationships 
through the issue of transmitting inheritance as a matter of stewardship 
(okchokhmu, chapter 7), and then in village affairs by analysing the worth of the 
lugyi in terms of guardianship (okhteinhmu, chapter 8). 
 
CHAPTER 7. TRANSMITTING LAND 
 
“NOBODY OWNS THIS LAND” 
 
 13th of May 2016. Picture Ko Kyaw. It is 1pm and he is about to leave his 
house to go to his betel garden on his parent’s land further afield. First, we join his 
wife, who packs some betel nuts, cheroots, water and snacks for their laborers as 
well as several straw baskets to fetch the precious green leaves. On our loaded 
motorbikes, we depart for the field some five minutes away to the east of Gawgyi. 
The tracts are sandy in summer, water drains in the monsoon. We almost collide 
with an oxcart. “The sun is hot isn’t,” shouts the driver. As we arrived, the usual 
group of girls and women as well as Ko Kyaw’s wife’s uncle welcome us with the 
usual “have you eaten yet?”. Ko Kyaw was ploughing a furrow to ease the water 
flow when I asked who owns the piece of land he envisioned for a second betel 
garden. This place and the adjacent plots enrich his extended family since decades, 
when not sold out to a neighbour. He grew up there and knows every little thing 
around. This landscape has been shaped by social life for centuries, and I could only 
guess how many hours he must have spent here building his dexterity in climbing 
mango trees and swinging his slingshot. He told me, in a deep, serious voice, gazing 
at the land and half-embarrassed by my recurring questions, that “nobody owns” 
this land (behdhuhma mapaingbu). What I knew was that his parents were the 
owners on paper, that it was given to his father after his grandparents’ death, that 
his sister also had a claim on it as inheritance and that him building a second 
greenhouse was a further step toward taking care of his parents. In a way, investing 
in family relationships was a means to access land. But there was something else to 
it. 
 In this chapter, I use Ko Kyaw statement as a line of enquiry for three 
questions: 1) how the dynamics of kinship and the moral and social obligations 
between family members organise the transmission of inheritance; 2) how they have 
maintained a degree of continuity in the countryside; and 3) how the transmission 
of inheritance, as a process of redefining authority and responsibility in families, 
could inform how village leadership is imagined. This chapter adopts three different 
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voices deployed in four sections. The first section takes a historical voice to look at 
how entitlement to inheritance has been a central feature of land relations in the 
history of Gawgyi village while several state projects and laws attempted to orient 
and control land tenure. The second section is more conceptual and presents the 
ideas surrounding how inheritance should be transmitted. These historical and 
conceptual parts serve as a backdrop for exploring the actual dynamics of 
transmission through the case of Ko Kyaw’s family. And the conclusion links the 
question of transmitting inheritance with the issue of transmitting leadership to 
open up a possible comparison between ‘taking care of’ a family (stewardship) and 
‘taking care of’ village affairs (guardianship) as a way of studying how authority is 
conceived in Gawgyi today (chapter 8). 
 Saying that nobody owns the land does not mean that no one can claim 
ownership or that no one has secured land rights. It is thus not directly about how 
land tenure has been formalised by a state at times lacking consistent infrastructural 
control and often dispossessing locals.464 It rather means that it is uncertain who 
will own this or that piece of land in a context where land disputes occurs mostly 
between villagers.465 Hence, it is a statement about the temporalities of family 
relationships, about the dynamics of property466 transfers, and about how people 
craft their lives. Exploring the transmission of inheritance as a redefinition467 of 
authority468 and responsibility crisscrossed by uncertainty through Ko Kyaw’s case 
shows that what makes a family – hierarchy, commensality – and the mutual 
obligations between its members – gratitude, care – create entitlement to property. 
Ko Kyaw statement is thus a point of entry to revisit ownership and authority in the 
Burmese context. To sustain this claim, this chapter connects property, authority 
and kinship.469 Land, and by extension property relations, have been analysed as a 
 
464 Cf. Prasse-Freeman (2012). 
465 This paper does not concern areas where ongoing or past land disputes involve resource 
extractions (such as the case of the Letpadaung copper mine near Monywa; cf. Amnesty 
International (2017) and  Prasse-Freeman and Phyo Win Latt (2018)), Military-Private partnerships 
(cf. Woods (2011), ethnic conflicts (Transnational Institute (2013)), or agro-industry (cf. Woods 
(2015)). 
466 Cf. Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006). In this book, property is defined as the legitimate cloth of 
wealth as property systems structure the ways in which wealth can be acquired, used and 
transformed. Property is understood as a matter of relationships and not as a tool of state regulation. 
467 On property as process, see Berry (1993). 
468 On the relations between access, property, power and authority, see Sikor and Lund (2009). 
469 On Burmese kinship see, among others, Kumada (2015), Nash and Nash (1963), Nash (1965) 
and Spiro (1975, 1986). 
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‘semi-autonomous’ social field470 with its own set of (changing) rules, arbitration, 
competitions, actors, arenas and bypasses471 that have come to be studied under the 
rubric of land governance.472 An everyday perspective473 shows that land needs to 
be seen in its connection to other aspects of social and political life. Foregrounding 
the fact that land is entangled in multiple relationships, this chapter, based on an 
ethnography of land relations,474 is an effort to describe how my interlocutors think 
about it in their own terms to provide an understanding, among others,475 of how 
rights are conceived. Highlighting the dynamics and dilemmas of inheritance 
transmission allows to explore how authority is conceived in family relationships. 
The core focus is the process, the temporalities of family relationships, how people 
engaged with each-other, and the outcome a redefinition of ownership 
(paingsainhmu) not in terms of rights (ahkwint-ayay), but of stewardship 
(okchokhmu).  
 In turn, this ethnographic perspective allows to explore the history of land 
relations from a new angle, showing how family relations have accommodated state 
projects and laws. Around Gawgyi, farmlands and harvests have been commodified 
for at least two centuries and multiple state projects were set up to organise land 
tenure. In the genealogy of such schemes, the rationalizing of the precolonial state, 
the creation of a colonial land tenure, the development of socialist land reform and, 
more recently, the introduction of a more open land market are turning points.476 
Yet, the domain of inheritance operated to some extent alongside these projects and 
has been integrated into Burmese Buddhist Law,477 “a construction of principles 
that apply to lay Buddhists and regulate matters of marriage, inheritance, and 
divorce” (Crouch 2016b: 86-87), mostly used in courts. On the ground, a large array 
 
470 Cf. Falk Moore (1978). 
471 Among the landmark works on land and property relations, see Berry (2009), Griffiths (1986), 
Lund (2008) and Ribot and Peluso (2003). 
472 Cf. Hall (2013). 
473 Cf. Blundo and Le Meur (2009). 
474 Cf. Colin (2008). 
475 Cf. Prasse-Freeman (2015). 
476 Here I refer to the post 2012 land bills, and notably The Farmland Law No 11/2012 and The 
Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law No 10/2012 which foster the commodification 
of land. 
477 As Crouch has shown, Burmese Buddhist Law encompass a series of precolonial texts called 
dhammathat compiled as a source of law by colonial lawyers and judges from which Burmese legal 
practitioners departed through comments and text books operating as definitive restatements of the 
law. Cf. Crouch (2016b). On dhammathat, cf. Huxley (1997). 
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of customs regulating land use and transfers have been operating in a countryside 
crossed by state and market forces.478 Among these customs, the entitlement to 
inheritance has maintained a degree of continuity in local land tenure for decades if 
not centuries because, as the ethnography of land relationships in Gawgyi village 
shows, transmitting inheritance is about redefining authority and responsibility over 
things, and obligations between people. In tracing the change in land tenure over 
time, I rely on different historical sources: colonial reports,479 academic 
publications on the history of the country,480 legislations,481 and oral history of 
villagers in Gawgyi and beyond.482 
 Finally, this chapter relates to the central argument of the thesis by showing 
how the study of land and family relationships opens on a discussion of how 
authority is conceived at the village level. After having studied how Ko Kyaw has 
crafted his position as headman (okchokyayhmu) in the previous chapter, describing 
the transmission of inheritance and in fine ownership as a question of stewardship 
(okchokhmu) allows to question village leadership in terms of guardianship 
(okhteinhmu) in the next chapter. This perspective enables to link a historical 
dynamic – rise of village affairs as the form of Gawgyi politics – with local 
conceptions of authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
478 On the power of exclusion of forces such as market and state in Southeast Asia, cf.  Hall et al. 
(2011). 
479 Cf. Hardiman (1909, 1912) and Hughes (1932). 
480 Cf. Brown (2013), Cady (1960), Charney (2006, 2007), Cheng Siok Hwa (1965), Furnivall 
(1956), Koenig (1990), Lieberman (1984), Steinberg (1981a), Taylor (2009), Thant Myint-U (2001), 
Thawnghmung (2004), and Toe Hla (1987). 
481 Tenancy Act (1936), Land Nationalization Acts (1948, 1953), Enterprises Nationalization Law 
(1963), Farmer Right Protection Law (1963), Tenancies Law Amending Act (1963), Procedures 
Conferring the Rights to Cultivate Land (1964, rule 64/1), Law to Protect the Implementation of 
Socialist Economic System (1964), the Farmland Law (No 11/2012) and The Vacant, Fallow and 
Virgin Lands Management Law No 10/2012. 
482 Oral histories and data on the conceptions and practices of transmitting inheritance were also 
collected in several villages in 2013-14 and 2015-16 in Monywa, Yinmabin and Budalin townships, 
notably in Hnawpin North, Hnawpin South, Innte, Ayadaw, Kyawkka, Thazi, Ywadon, 
Budaungkan, Kyawsipon, Booba, Minzu, Zeehpyubin, Salingyi, Nyuangpinthar, Kothan, Hledar 
and Aungchanthar. 
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A SHORT HISTORY OF CHANGES IN LAND TENURE 
 
 This section relates to the historical chapters of the thesis to describe how the 
flexibility of land relations over the past two centuries made the countryside around 
Gawgyi a rent market where debt, family obligations and arrangements for 
sharecropping operated outside the law to some extent. It shows that the colonial 
devising of a private property-based system at the turn of the nineteenth century 
created a picture in which the person in charge of a household was the owner of the 
land. But, during the colonial period as for today, there was often differences 
between who farmed the land (occupancy), who (momentarily) owned it and who 
had a potential claim to it (inheritance and pre-emption). The ‘owner’ became state 
tenant under the socialist period (1962-88) and is today the legible person for 
receiving a land title. On one level, the major changes in land tenure in Gawgyi 
since its settlement relate to state projects which either aim at rationalizing the 
precolonial government, devising a colonial system of land tax, developing a 
socialist land reform or, more recently, creating a more open land market.483 Yet, on 
the ground, many local rules regulating land use and transfer have remained. Small-
scale tenancies were the norm, and the entitlement to inheritance was the most 
enduring claim,484 which, in case needed, could be defended in courts following the 
principles of Burmese Buddhist Law. Inheritance was thus a domain the state could 
mediate but not truly interfere with in day-to-day practice and it was invested by 
the main farming families to muster estates and wealth. This section argues that 
beyond the formal land tenure system, and aside from patron-client politics, what 
organised land relations were the dynamics of kinship (alliance, descent and the 
succession of generations) and the moral and social obligations between family 
members.  
 
 
483 For an example of a genealogy of how state projects were adapted and transformed by the 
successive governments, see Ferguson (2014). 
484 I do not claim that the transmission of inheritance is a static custom that remained unchallenged 
and never transformed in the past decades. More research is needed to specify the transformation of 
customs pertaining to property relations in Myanmar at large. For an example of such study, see 
Crouch (2016a). 
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‘Hereditary private tenure’ 
  
 Two hundred years ago, Gawgyi was a tiny hamlet settled near a seasonal 
pond during a widespread famine. As we saw in the general introduction and 
chapter 3, Gawgyi settlers moved a few miles further south from their previous 
village. Today, most of the villagers are part of a loosely structured lineage called a 
myo485  allegedly deriving from these settlers. During the last years of the reign of 
Bodawhpaya (1782–1819), the village integrated a larger political space under the 
patronage of a local chief. The cultivated areas – mostly dry lands first farmed 
through shifting cultivation and a few rice lands – varied with the growth of the 
village population and their capacity to accumulate cattle and seeds, and to get loans 
from the local gentry. Gawgyi villagers progressively created their own cultivation 
area by gradually adjoining those of other and older settlements nearby. 
 On a larger scale, Gawgyi was part of the Badon/Alon province which was 
slowly integrated into the kingdom’s galactic polity since at least the eleventh 
century,486 which became a main pool of recruitment of soldiers during the 
Konbaung dynasty.487 As Boomgaard noted for Southeast Asian precolonial 
polities, the question was more “who owns the crop” than “who owns the land” due 
to scarce labour (2011: 449). Yet, forms of “hereditary private tenure” (ibid.: 448) 
existed in this important trading centres of the country. At large, the bulk of the land 
was cultivated by the villagers. The families usually cleared land and the deriving 
claim is called dama-u-gya, meaning first clearing. When passed down through 
inheritance it became bobuapaing myay, that is “father’s and grandfather’s land” 
(Thant Myint-U 2001: 41). The tenure was hereditary because it was inherited, and 
thus the term ‘private’ was merely a reflection of the temporary authority of one 
person over a family estate that could be sold, rented or mortgaged. The more or 
less formalized system of tenure of the early nineteenth century (appanage, first 
clearing, inherited lands and small-scale tenancies) was flexible enough to 
accommodate changes due to natural hazards, war and famine-driven migrations, 
competition for offices and depended on the ability of local authorities to control 
 
485 Cf. Thant Myint-U (2001: 29). 
486 Cf. Charney (2007: 228). 
487 Cf. Charney (2006: 63-65), Koenig (1990: 12, 241) and Lieberman (1984: 64). 
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land access and labour. 
 
The colonial “Record of Wrongs” 
 
 As described in chapter 4, one of the main changes was brought about by the 
British from 1886 onward.488 Their knowledge of the land was rudimentary, and 
quickly a revenue system able to sustain direct rule was put in place. Based on 
previous experiences in Lower Burma and Bengal, the Upper Burma Land and 
Revenue Regulation was enforced in 1889. Two major categories were officialised: 
state and non-state lands. The key test was to ask whether the land was inheritable 
(non-state) or not (state). Decades of in-fighting and competition over offices had 
largely disrupted what could have been a revenue system. Thus, revenue was first 
drawn489 from the capitation tax. Soon, non-state lands were targeted. The recording 
of rights started on the premise that Burmese land ownership (notably non-state 
land) were “held in private ownership, on what is practically a full freehold tenure, 
and in small estates” (Hardiman 1910: 150). What was a form of hereditary private 
tenure (bobuapaing) was understood as individual private property. In the Gawgyi 
area, the cadastral survey took place from 1897 to 1902 and, in the meantime, 
registers of rights and tenancies were compiled. At the end of this process, the 
parcels (called upaing) were assigned a serial number referencing the name of the 
person who now owns it, and who then became liable for the land tax. Plots were 
now ‘permanent holdings’ recorded under the name of an owner (paingshin) on 
paper. 
 Far from being a successful enterprise, the formalization of land rights 
became a source of conflict and competition. As Furnivall put it, the Record of 
Rights quickly became a “Record of Wrongs” (1956: 92), and Township Courts 
 
488 Before colonial rule, King Mindon (1853–1878) attempted to reorganise the local systems of 
dues and duties between the villagers, the hereditary gentry, the appointed officials and the Crown 
by introducing a capitation tax. It could have changed the nature of political hierarchies by 
undermining local traditions, but it remained largely a failure and, while it led to the rebellion of 
many gentry leaders (Thant Myint-U 2001: 115, 173), it did not transform how inheritance 
influenced land tenure. 
489 This inflow entered both the District’s coffers and the (newly created) village headmen’s pockets 
– the latter ascribing individual household’s shares. 
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were quickly put490 to work and opened a new arena for forum shopping.491 The 
cases were broadly of two types: suits for the division of familial property and for 
the redemption of mortgaged land. We saw in chapter 4 that in the second case, the 
use of courts was a way to challenge the precolonial gentry who accumulated land 
through money lending and mortgage. In the first case, the conflicts stemmed from 
the confusion between occupancy and ownership. Indeed, during the titling process, 
“the occupant was usually taken as the owner, although probably in a large majority 
of cases the family property had not yet been divided and the occupant was 
cultivating as the tenant or the mortgagee of the family as a whole.” (Furnivall 1956: 
92). In addition, nearly half of the land was farmed through small scale tenancies at 
the turn of the twentieth century492 and in the 1920s.493 In other words, there were 
often differences between who worked the land, who owned it and who had a 
potential claim to it. 
 But what is interesting is what it tells us about the forms of land relations. 
Once a plot is cleared, it became part of the possessions one has to transmit to his 
children usually in equal shares, inheritance being almost fully cognatic.494 
Sometimes, a larger part was reserved to the eldest son or daughter, known as the 
auratha.495 Thus, dama-u-gya land eventually became bobuapaing, that is, a 
transmissible family estate. It was not an ancestral property kept intact. Descent 
being usually bilateral and the family mostly nuclear, estates tended to be 
fragmented through time.496 In the early nineteenth century,497 as it is still the case 
today,498 people became owners mostly through inheritance, and tenant farming499 
was the main avenue to access land. It means that a person was recognized as the 
main authority on an estate quite late in his life. Before that, he might farm plots as 
a tenant (for his parents, coheirs, neighbours, local landlord…) or as a usufructuary 
 
490 Cf. Hardiman (1912: 162) and Thant Myint-U (2001: 216). 
491 Cf. Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (1981). 
492 Cf. Hardiman (1909: 17-27). 
493 Cf. Hughes (1932: 39–40). 
494 Cf. Hardiman (1909: 27) and Koenig (1990: 40). 
495 Cf. Thant Myint-U (2001: 30). This word can also be written aw-ra-tha and orasa, see Crouch 
(2016b). 
496 Cf. Hardiman (1909: 28). 
497 Cf. Hughes (1932: 40). 
498 Cf. Boutry et al. (2017 : 101-103) and Huard (2018). 
499 The local moral economy fixed the norms of these mostly sharecropping arrangements, 
depending on rains, relations, quality of the land, who pay the land tax, who provides the seeds, the 
tools, and so on. Cf. Hardiman (1909) and Huard (2016). 
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mortgagee for instance. Outright sales were rare and a right of pre-emption on sales 
and mortgages by relations, that is by kinsmen, heirs and even neighbours, was 
often asserted. Migration did not erase potential claims to land and colonial officers 
were confounded by how the sentimental or religious attachment to family land 
influenced its value and the conditions of transfers. All these claims and forms of 
transfers of land make up a bundle of rights500 whose core is entitlement to the 
family estate. One of the ideas organising land relations during the late precolonial 
and the colonial periods was the fact that land would be given to the children, which 
pertains to the realm of family obligations. The pre-emption on sales and mortgages 
by relation, the ability to migrate and keep a claim alive, the conflict over 
inheritance, and the use of colonial courts to bypass local customs make more sense 
when understood in these terms. And the formalization of ownership was but one 
aspect of local land relations. 
 
‘Land to the tiller’ 
  
 The next major change happened in the decades surrounding independence in 
1948 and took the form of a push to allocate the ‘land to the tiller’. Once the 
Japanese were driven out of the country and independence secured, the U Nu 
government tried to outflank the communists and secure rural support by enacting 
land reform through the 1948 and 1953 Land Nationalization Acts.501 The objective 
was to turn farmers into government tenants by proclaiming the state as sole owner 
of all land and resources. Yet, this anti-landlordism policy had limited effects and 
scope. Most of the countryside was out of reach due to communist insurrections. In 
Gawgyi, the promotion of a ‘land to the tiller’ reform by the White Flag communists 
was already an opportunity to negotiate property relations to a certain extent. What 
first went to the tiller was the land held by gentry descendants and contested 
moneylenders who could not maintain their hold through debts. The delivery of 
 
500 This notion was first used by Maine and was reconceptualised by Beckman as the arrangements 
of rights and obligations bundled in a thing – such as land – and is thus a metaphor used to describe 
property in its characteristic as a relation between different actors. Cf. Maine (1861) and Benda-
Beckmann et al. (2006). 
501 The 1948 Land Nationalization Act for the most part echoes the content of the unimplemented 
Tenancy Act of 1936 which objective was to resolve the tenancy problem in Burma. 
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land titles around 1956, when the central government regained power in the 
Monywa region, was considered a mere formality by villagers. But how it was 
implemented remains a partial mystery in which corruption, national elections, 
insurgency, counterinsurgency and local factionalism were the main ingredients. 
For Nash and Spiro, who did their fieldwork at that time in the central plains of 
Myanmar, it was mostly a matter of village bigmen’s politics.502 In addition, the 
successive changes and overlapping of supra-village authorities (the British, the 
Japanese, the Communists, the Army, U Nu’s government) were opportunities to 
compete for resources as they empowered some villagers over others in Gawgyi. 
 Nash has provided his own account about property relations in the dry lands 
of central Burma. For him, land was owned by the head of the household “but with 
presumptive inheritance rights equally distributed among all members” (1965: 49). 
The key word is presumptive. Rights to inheritance were potential outcomes, claims 
that could be enforced in a particular context. He went on about kinship relations 
and defined property stewardship as one of its bases: 
 
“Property stewardship involves the overlapping claims of kinsmen in 
tangible, real property […] chiefly land and cattle, house gardens, 
ploughs and jewellery. […]. Overlapping claims in real property are 
always graded claims. A son and daughter, a brother or sister, have 
putative rights in the land and cattle owned by parents and siblings. The 
rule of inheritance, almost always followed, of equal shares among 
offspring, or among a sibling group, is a recognition of this overlap in 
claims to property. The possession of graded rights (control by the 
property holder, inheritance by the offspring, usufruct for part-time 
work by brothers, first employment of cousins for labour, gleaning 
rights by anyone who can establish kin links) ties some contemporaries 
into tighter kin nets than their fellow Burmese who do not have 
estates.”(ibid.: 69). 
 
 While Nash described kinship as a rather loose social structure in the Burmese 
 
502 Large land owners and tenants formed the upper class of villages and small-scale tenants and 
daily laborers (in many cases the ‘tillers’) depended on big farming families. 
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context, he nonetheless has shown how entitlement to property and access to 
resources relates to family relations to a large extent. And this way of organising 
and legitimating claims would eventually remain operative throughout the socialist 
period. 
 We saw in chapter 5 that in Gawgyi, the unfolding of the ‘Burmese Way to 
Socialism’ was gradual. On paper, all forms of agricultural production were 
declared owned by either the state or cooperatives. The reorganization of the 
economy rapidly turned into a more radical nationalisation.503 The centralized 
system of crop procurement and goods distribution became more interventionist 
and expanded to virtually all products as the government promised an agrarian 
revolution “that would bring the tenancy system to an immediate end” (Charney 
2009: 123). Since the 1963 Tenancy Act, peasants became state tenants with 
delegated land use rights. They were liable for part of their production while being 
prohibited from transferring (by sales, mortgages and, since 1965, rents) their land, 
except for inheritance purposes, in order to root out landlordism.  
 Hence, the headman was pivotal to getting around the law and registering 
(forbidden) changes of ownership. He could – and did504 – even dispossess farmers 
through the Land Committee505 if their quota was not reached and tenants working 
on a plot for up to five years could claim the “right to cultivate” (lokpainghkwint) 
it in their own name.506 In other words, the local recognition of ownership and 
tenancies – officially illegal – was in the hands of the Land Committee, and thus of 
the headman, and it fuelled cases of dispossessions, repossessions and factionalism. 
Throughout this period, and after the reorientation of the state in 1989, small-scale 
tenancies,507 rentals, sales and mortgages occurred outside of the law. The legal land 
tenure system became a means for local officials to increase their wealth by, for 
instance, demanding fees for changing names on paper while it also allowed to keep 
ownership local. The follow up on the land record and crop harvests decreased with 
 
503 The nationalisation was notably enacted through the 1963 Enterprises Nationalization Law and 
the 1964 Law to Protect the Implementation of Socialist Economic System. 
504Cf. Huard (2016). 
505 Through the 1963 Farmer Right Protection Law and the 1963 Tenancies Law Amending Act, 
courts of law were expelled from most land cases except for disputes concerning inheritance, cf. 
Taylor (2009: 339). 
506 Procedures Conferring the Rights to Cultivate Land, 1964, rule 64/1. 
507 In 1971, between one third and one half of the land in the Chindwin region were still operated 
via small scale tenancies, cf. Steinberg (1981a: 127). 
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the gradual abandonment of procurement as the state at large lost interest in 
controlling land tenure and focused more on introducing new high-yield crops for 
export.508 But more importantly, local customs organised land tenure arrangements 
during the socialist period and beyond, operating in parallel to legal norms. That is, 
as with the colonial period, the state only controlled the tip of the iceberg of land 
relationships. One paradox was that, even if farmlands were never legally classified 
as bobuapaing, the entitlement to inheritance was the only legal way to transfer 
land from 1963 to 2012. And many contracts written to support a transaction 
borrowed the vocabulary of family obligations (for instance, to transfer a land for 
supporting a family, for eating, and so on) to accommodate reality and legality.  
 
Post 2012 
 
 The last main change in land tenure happened around 2013, when the 2012 
Farmland law barged into the village to create a land market. It opened up an 
opportunity for farmers to apply for a Land Use Certificate during the titling process 
carried out by the SLRD.509 To some degree, it reintroduced the concept of private 
property510 as land-use rights could be legally sold, mortgaged, rented, pawned, and 
inherited.511 In Gawgyi, the titling process opened a Pandora's Box, as some long-
standing disputes came to the forefront. But eventually, it was more a matter of 
recognising who has authority over which parcels and updating the cadastre at 
cheap costs. Overall, the flexibility of land relations made the countryside a rent 
market where debt, obligations and arrangements for sharecropping have 
accommodated laws and state projects to some degree throughout the past two 
centuries. To the colonial picture of individual and private land owners followed 
the image of farmers as state tenants who have now Land Use Certificates. The 
successive reforms may have changed forms of ownership.512 But beyond the 
formal land tenure system, and aside from patron-client politics, we saw that what 
 
508 Cf. Thawnghmung (2004). 
509 Now called the Department of Administration of Land Measurement and Statistics (DALMS). 
510 Yet, the state still remains the sole landowner and this law add another layer within a system of 
stacked laws, cf. Mark (2016). 
511 Cf. Boutry et al. (2017: 34). 
512 On that point, see Ferguson (2014: 298). 
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organises land relations are the dynamics of kinship (alliance, descent and the 
succession of generations), the moral and social obligations between family 
members and a conception of ownership as property stewardship. These domains 
are often overlooked as international NGOs, debates around the ‘rule of law’ and 
foreign investors drag the focus on laws, policies, and the recognition of customary 
rights.513 As we will see in the next sections, an ethnography of land relations shows 
that transmission of inheritance is not only about land as it relates to the conceptions 
of the person, to how relationships create claims on things and to how authority is 
conceived. 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF INHERITANCE 
 
 This section describes the local conceptions that impinge on inheritance and 
links it to legal, historical and anthropological literature in order to anchor the 
subsequent case study on the actual dynamics of transmission. 
 In the countryside of central Myanmar, inheritance (amway) is supposed to 
be given by the parents after their death514 to their biological children in an 
egalitarian way (anyi ahmya). This is how the villagers of Gawgyi formulate the 
rule governing the transmission of inheritance. In this village inheritance is still the 
main way to access land.515 At large, an ideology of inheritance is a set of rules that 
defines a strategy to allow for the continuity of a farm.516 In Gawgyi, it is a never-
ending process of legitimation of claims, of exclusion and of redefining obligations. 
 In the broadest sense, passing on inheritance refers to the responsibility of 
parents to raise their children. Life is conceptualized according to two meanings: as 
vital breath (athet) and as a condition of existence (bawa). Parents do not give life 
in the first sense, but allow it in the second, and have a duty to promote it. They are 
benefactors (kyayzushin) for their children – as are Buddha and teachers – who are 
 
513 See for instance: Andersen (2015), Faxon (2017), McCarthy (2018), Oberndorf (2012), 
Shivakumar and Saw Hlaing (2015), Su Phyo Win (2017) and Willis (2014). 
514 Traditionally, succession of parental properties is made on the third or the fifth day following 
burial of the last parent, during a commemoration ceremony to which all relatives come to gather. 
The elders amongst the relatives usually manage the division and distribution of the properties to 
the siblings. But in practice, the division of inheritance often happen before the death of the parents. 
515 Cf. Boutry et al. (2017) and Huard (2018). 
516 Cf. Rogers and Salamon (1983). 
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owed gratitude in return.517 There is an obligation of care between parents and 
children (pyuzu saunshauk): from parents to their children and vice versa later on.518 
It is dynamic. This must be known and applied without being said (htitat). And 
parents must pass on a set of knowledge, skills and possessions. But the children 
also have a responsibility toward their parents. In one of the written laws that were 
used to adjudicate cases in precolonial Burma, the metaphor of stewardship is 
deployed to explain how entitlement to property is created through personal 
relationships: 
 
“The teacher has power over the property of the scholar, parents over 
that of their children, husbands over that of their wives, and the master 
over that of the slave. The scholar has power over the property of the 
teacher, children over that of their parents, the wife over that of the 
husband, and the slave over that of the master. Regarding these four 
kinds of power, when the teacher has taught the scholar his craft, and 
they are living together, their property is in common; […]. Why is this? 
— because the scholar is the steward, the person in charge of the 
property.” (Richardson 1847: 177-178). 
 
 In other words, living together creates a relationship that entitles one to 
property because the mutual obligations between people create claims over things. 
And being entitled is to be potentially in charge of patrimony. Commensality, called 
“living and eating together” (adunay adusa) or “one pot, one household” (tit-o tit-
ein), is crucial in defining what constitutes a family as for the sharing of the same 
eating pot519 or the pooling of resources for instance. It has been noted early on that 
the equal division of inheritance eventually led to the fragmentation of the 
estates.520 This centrifugal tendency was nonetheless counterbalanced by a 
centripetal one that can be described as a ‘keeping-while-giving’ paradox (Weiner 
1990).521 The parents should pass on inheritance equally, but they often keep a part 
 
517 Cf. Schober (1989). 
518 Nash (1965: 264–265) also highlighted this tendency. 
519 Cf. Nash (1965: 45-47). 
520 Notably by Hardiman (1909: 28). 
521 My aim is not to follow Weiner’s argument about how the inalienability of transmitted things is 
the basis of political hierarchy. But rather to focus on the personal relationships (Weber 2000) visible 
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of it for the person who will take care of them and continue the family. Thus, if 
there is a tendency for families to fragment due to neolocal settlement after 
marriage, bilateralism in descent and equal division of inheritance, there is also an 
inclination toward maintaining continuity, notably within large farming families. 
The conceptions of kinship and family, in terms of shared blood, heredity and 
descent from a common womb and semen,522 emphasise this disposition. And one 
child in particular, called the awratha, the eldest son or daughter in theory,523 was 
supposed to take upon himself the burdens and responsibilities of the parents: 
 
“The status of aw-ra-tha [sic] was not solely ascriptive, however, as it 
carried with it certain functions which had to be fulfilled for the welfare 
of the family. The duties of the aw-ra-tha were to assume the 
responsibilities of the father, discharge his debts, and continue the 
family. It was therefore necessary that the eldest son be competent to 
meet these obligations […].” (Koenig 1990: 40-41). 
 
 This status still exists to some extent in Gawgyi, as we will see in the case 
study below. 
 In a narrow sense, inheritance refers to material or tangible patrimony. That 
set is divided into two categories following a centre-periphery distinction that 
shares commonalities with the galactic, or centre-oriented, traditional polities 
described by Tambiah.524 There is the “inner property” (atwin pyitsi) of the 
household: gold, jewellery, house, vehicles, farm machinery, sometimes 
livestock…; and the “outer property” (apyin pyitsi): agricultural land, trees, crop 
drying areas, and so forth. In general, outer properties are given in equal portions 
to each child and those of the core are meant for the person who stays with his 
parents to take over the family. The centre-periphery division of property is always 
 
at the village level and not on the quality of objects, because this quality is evaluated according to 
the relationships at stake. Starting with family relationships, one can see how the transmission of a 
patrimony is nonetheless political because, through the ability to give and keep, the question of 
responsibility and authority is at stake (Weiner 1992: 150). 
522 These aspects were also developed by Spiro (1986: 44–45). 
523 For key works about Burmese Buddhist Law, cf. E Maung (1970), Lahiri (1957) or Maung 
Maung (1963). 
524 Cf. Tambiah (1976, 2013). 
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subject to negotiations and thus should be understood as a sketch, and not a map,525 
of how to transfer inheritance. Passing on patrimony is a process that never really 
begins or ends and, because generations intertwine, the obligations between family 
members and the authority over people and things are constantly transforming.  
 For example, the transmission is rarely carried out in one go at the time of the 
parents’ death, but occurs at different times, such as during marriages and when the 
parents define how they will be cared for during their lifetime. A marriage 
officialises the creation of a new family and the spouses receive a wedding gift 
(lethpwe)526 from their parents, usually in the form of a sum of money. To propose 
to their future wives, men (their parents) bring what Spiro called the “bride price” 
(tintaung; 1975: 90), sometimes including land and which de facto constitutes all 
or part of their inheritance. Once married, the whole of the patrimony donated by 
the parents of the spouses becomes conjugal patrimony. During divorces, the 
contributions of each spouse can theoretically be separated if one or the other has 
committed a serious fault (adultery, non-involvement in the domestic economy, 
alcoholism, dubious expenses, and so on). So, the general situation is that of 
children receiving bonding gifts to create their own family, and if those transactions 
include their share of inheritance, it can call off their entitlement to their parental 
patrimony. In addition, adoption is often used to designate a person (a niece, a 
nephew, a grandchild)527 who will take care of the adopting parents, that person 
then becomes entitled to inheritance. To advance the family a ‘close’ outsider can 
thus be brought in the family and so becoming a full right member of it. Overall, 
transmitting inheritance means fulfilling one’s obligations by taking into account 
the history of various transactions occurring within a family. But it also depends on 
the strategies to access resources. To describe this difficult undertaking, let us 
follow the example of one family in particular. 
 
 
 
525 Seeing the norms for dividing inheritance as a sketch and not a map, that is as guidelines and not 
as strict rules, allows to highlight the processual nature of this transfer. On the difference between a 
sketch and a map, cf. Ingold (2016). 
526 The lethpwe also encompasses the things given by the people invited to the wedding and can be 
understood as a gift bonding the couple. 
527 The adoption of young children is called mwaysa, while the adoption of adults (for the explicit 
purpose of continuing the family) is called mwayhkan. 
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DYNAMICS OF INHERITANCE AND THE REDEFINITION OF 
RELATIONSHIPS 
  
 When we met in 2013, Ko Kyaw was about 33 years old and, unlike his older 
sister and younger brother, he was still single. Coming from a family of relatively 
wealthy farmers, he slept at his parents’ house and ate food prepared every morning 
and evening by his mother, Daw Hlaing, for him and his father U Bo. In the evening, 
the latter went to sleep at his “little wife’s” (meyange)528 house but still had dinner 
with Daw Hlaing. Sharing the same pot defines the restricted family sphere. Ko 
Kyaw, who was then headman of the village tract (from 2013 to 2016), occasionally 
registered sales contracts, demarcated the plots of land and worked some of his 
parents’ land.  
 A year and a half later, his situation was quite different. He had married Ma 
Khin and they had a daughter. Settling at first with Ko Kyaw’s parents, the couple 
then moved to Ma Khin’s mother, Daw Nu, after the birth of their child.529  Ma Khin 
stopped working at an electronics store in Monywa while Ko Kyaw had become 
more and more involved in agricultural work. His parents bought a tiller to make 
ploughing easier and lent him money to partially finance the construction of a 
greenhouse and the drilling of a well to establish a betel garden on one of their plots. 
Ko Kyaw can engage in such projects on his parents’ land because he is seen as the 
child who will become responsible for them. The boundaries are porous between 
what belongs to the parents and what belongs to Ko Kyaw, even after his marriage. 
For example, the betel garden project, set up to support his home, was partly 
financed by a loan from them which Ko Kyaw repaid after the first harvests. Ko 
Kyaw’s privileged access to his parents’ patrimony is granted to him because their 
respective assets – that of his parents and that of his couple – are supposed to be 
combined in the long term. Deciding who has the right to access the parental estate 
is a delicate undertaking for his parents, as they have not yet defined what, how and 
 
528 On the question of polygamy under Burmese Buddhist law, male domination through law, the 
impact of recent change in the legislation (the 2015 Monogamy Law and the Buddhist Women’s 
Marriage Law) and the debates and change over time in the use of the words to describe first, second 
and third wives, cf. Crouch (2016b). 
529 The settlement pattern of newlywed couples is mostly neolocal, but the issue of transmitting 
inheritance and of continuing the family (or just of saving enough money to build one’s own house) 
often led to the couple to reside at the parents’ house of one of the spouses depending on life 
circumstances and strategies to access wealth. 
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when to give inheritance to all their children.  
 
 
Figure 22. Ko Kyaw's partial family tree 
 Marriages are crucial moments in the temporality of this transmission. Daw 
Hlaing and U Bo gave inheritance to only one of their three children, Ko Nway, at 
his wedding. Ko Kyaw’s sister got married first. As is customary, she received her 
lethpwe at her wedding, but not her share of the inheritance. She married a former 
village headman who is in charge of his own parents. They promised him a large 
portion of their wealth at the wedding and the young couple settled in their house. 
Ko Nway, the last son, also received a lethpwe (approximately 100 USD) from his 
parents who funded the wedding ceremony. But he also received his share of the 
inheritance, in this case four acres and two zebus, following the agreement reached 
during the engagement ceremony between the spouses’ families. This marriage 
ensured a substantial economic base for Ko Nway and his family, uniting him with 
a woman whose patrimony was guaranteed. For her part, the bride, the eldest of six 
siblings, was adopted by her maternal grandfather, U Htoo, to care for him in the 
future.  
 Taking care of parents, whether through blood ties or adoption, also reinforces 
the legitimacy of claims over parental assets and even allows them to receive a little 
more. U Htoo has already given his two blood children their share of inheritance 
and since then has lived with Ko Nway and his wife, who thus gained access to his 
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patrimony – a house and 10 acres. The latter will own it after the death of U Htoo. 
Adoption can thus serve as a safeguard to avoid potential conflicts between rights 
holders while preserving land within families. It is a lever to secure a profitable 
alliance and ensure care for U Htoo in his old age. Changes of residence, marriages 
and adoptions are therefore crucial elements in understanding how inheritance 
transmission is configured according to family and patrimonial trajectories. Thus, 
the egalitarianism promoted by the rule of inheritance transmission is sometimes 
undermined. The dynamics of family formation, mainly articulated around 
marriage and adoption, is influenced both by strategies for controlling resources 
and the need to take care of people. Parents have to give equally but retain a larger 
share for the one who will be responsible for them. This is the keeping-while-giving 
paradox. It is justified by a sense of fairness: the person taking care and 
responsibility should get more. It relates to the precolonial definition of the auratha 
– the child that will take the burden of the parents upon himself – but is also seen 
as an investment in kinship to access land and resources.     
 For Ko Kyaw’s parents, it was not yet time to clarify how the inheritance 
between him and his sister would be passed on. Once married, Ko Kyaw 
temporarily lived with his mother-in-law, Daw Nu, a widow since 2005. He worked 
hard to establish his home – he, his wife, their daughter – while anticipating how 
he would look after his parents. Ko Kyaw and Ma Khin did not receive their share 
of the inheritance for their marriage. When he came to live with his mother-in-law, 
their arrangement was that Ko Kyaw farm her land without any direct benefit. The 
other children of Daw Nu never really farmed these plots. By joining forces with 
her son-in-law, Daw Nu ensured her harvest, as he had the necessary material 
capacities, knowledge and network. In addition, during the land titling process, 
certain parcels of Daw Nu were registered by Ko Kyaw – as village headman – 
under the name of his wife Ma Khin in order to apply for a larger loan from the 
agricultural bank. Thus, Ko Kyaw and his wife tacitly and partially have taken over 
Daw Nu’s land, potentially creating rights to her property. 
 A year later, the couple returned to live with Ko Kyaw’s parents because it is 
here that their home should flourish, he said. The two families lived together, but 
generally did not share meals. The two households remained side by side until the 
situation became clearer, that is when the young couple would take charge of the 
parents. During this phase of uncertain relationship building between the two 
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families, the definition of mutual responsibilities and the extent of the commitments 
made are tested. Ko Kyaw’s father, U Bo, became seriously ill during this period. 
To finance his hospitalization, U Bo and his wife Daw Hlaing sold two zebus530 and 
some jewellery and contracted a debt of about $700 from a villager. U Bo died a 
few weeks later, officially from stomach cancer, from witchcraft according to the 
local rumour. After the death of U Bo, Daw Hlaing had to finance the funerals alone 
and repay the debt. It was her sole responsibility and duty as a wife. Her married 
children were not directly responsible for this debt, at least not while Daw Hlaing 
was able to pay it. To do this, she worked daily before the monsoons, ploughing the 
land of other villagers with her two remaining zebus. She could have sold a piece 
of land, but she did not. Selling in case of emergency, selling “because you have a 
stomach-ache”, will surely come at a poor price. Moreover, there was no need to 
give away a piece of her patrimony to which a part of her offspring is entitled, and 
which, moreover, could be used as a pension.  
 Transmitting inheritance is thus about changing and endorsing a division of 
responsibilities and authority over things and people. It is a cyclical process, in the 
generational sense, whose stages need to be clarified according to individual and 
family trajectories. Concerning Ko Kyaw and his mother, this clarification was still 
problematic. 
 The death of U Bo in late March could have triggered the union of the two 
homes: that of Daw Hlaing and that constituted by Ko Kyaw, Ma Khin and their 
daughter. But it did not. At least not yet. At the age of 60, Daw Hlaing ploughs plots 
of land almost daily to pay off her debt and waits for her son and daughter-in-law 
to take care of her. For example, estimating that just by herself she represents about 
twenty acres, she says they will only receive the house if nothing changes. She also 
says they should “do the work for her” (alok kyway). This expression uses the verb 
kyway, close to treat in English, in the sense of offering, serving (a meal) or doing 
for. Thus, it seems normal for Daw Hlaing that her son and daughter-in-law do the 
work for her, that they take her place and take care of her. That should be their 
responsibility. 
 But Ko Kyaw and his wife mainly cultivate the betel garden. Ko Kyaw also 
 
530 A zebu is a type of cow (Bos indices) from South Asia, with a large hump on its shoulders and 
used in many farm works. 
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ploughs his mother’s land, that of his mother-in-law and others, thanks to the 
rototiller. So, they work partly for Daw Hlaing, but not to pay down her debt. The 
future of the relationship is uncertain. This fragile balance is reflected in the way 
food is shared. Every morning, Daw Hlaing cooks her own meals and rare are the 
dinners she shares with Ko Kyaw and Ma Khin. The tension is not obvious, and the 
partial absence of commensality symbolizes a situation in transition: eating together 
expresses a domestic union and a sharing of resources, home, property and debts. 
In addition, each family has its own money keeper (ngwayhtein), Ma Khin and Daw 
Hlaing, who keep track of their respective households’ expenses. 
 Although the two domestic economies are partially entangled, Ko Kyaw and 
his wife do not take full charge of Daw Hlaing. This has to do with an inheritance 
problem that makes it difficult to redefine who has authority over the household 
and who is responsible for wealth and debts. In this case, the situation is at a 
standstill because Daw Hlaing’s assets are not yet fully established. Therefore, it is 
necessary to go up the generational scale to understand the dynamics associated 
with this heritage.  
 Daw Hlaing was born in Tozigon, a neighbouring village of Gawgyi. She was 
adopted during her adolescence by her paternal uncle who had no children. She 
later married U Bo, lived with him in Gawgyi for a few years, and the couple settled 
with Daw Hlaing’s adoptive father until his death. Daw Hlaing then received her 
inheritance. The way she tells this story is significant. By way of inheritance, she 
received seven acres and a house. However, her adoptive father also bequeathed her 
a ruby, not as an inheritance, she said, but “to eat”. Daw Hlaing and U Bo then 
returned to live in Gawgyi to care for his parents. Later on, Daw Hlaing’s blood 
parents, caught up in a difficult situation, asked her to give them the ruby to pawn 
it, promising to pay it back as soon as they could. She accepted. During an evening 
discussion on this subject in late June 2016, Daw Hlaing and her two sons told me 
with some difficulty how her father, after having pawned the ruby to a lender in the 
nearby town of Kyawkka, lost almost all the money in gambling. Daw Hlaing has 
been waiting for her parents to pay this debt for over 20 years now. The latter settled 
in Gawgyi, on an area adjoining the house of U Bo. Daw Hlaing’s widowed mother 
still lived there with two of her sons. She is almost 80 years old and remained the 
guardian of the money in her entire household, collecting the income and deciding 
what to spend.  And she has not yet decided how the patrimony will be divided. 
 323 
 If, following Graeber (2011), we consider that debt is but one form of 
obligation characterised by the fact that it can be quantified and cancelled out, then 
the value of the ruby is now hardly quantifiable. It pertains to the realms of family 
obligations rather than debt and is an ambiguous obligation. The relationship 
between Ko Kyaw and Daw Hlaing therefore depends on the clarification of that 
obligation between Daw Hlaing and her mother. Since the death of her husband U 
Bo, she has more or less openly evoked how she has not yet received any 
inheritance from her blood relatives. In theory, she is no longer entitled to it, having 
already obtained that of her adoptive father. But she adds that the ruby was not an 
inheritance per se. Describing it as a given thing “to eat”, and not as inheritance, 
legitimises Daw Hlaing’s claim to her blood relatives – given the debt associated 
with the loan of this ruby – by reformulating the status of a thing according to its 
context of transmission.  And if Daw Hlaing estimates her land holdings at about 
twenty acres, it is not because of her title deeds. She counts her parcels but adds the 
acres owned by her mother that could potentially pay off the ruby. 
 Finding an equivalence, or a substitute, in the search for fairness in the 
discharge of the debt is a delicate undertaking. It requires one to find an equivalence 
of value in a peculiar situation that contradicts the normative framework of family 
relationships. This is especially true since the families live on good terms and a 
conflict would inevitably impact them, as well as relatives, or even the 
neighbourhood, and potentially the entire village. And no agreement had been 
found yet. It is now possible to answer a critical question: why does Ko Kyaw do 
not take care of his mother? Ko Kyaw does not yet take care of his mother because 
if he does, he becomes responsible for her debts in an unstable situation. It will put 
him in the middle of a tense situation in terms of who owes what to whom and on 
what grounds. Besides, his sister has not received her share of inheritance, his father 
has just died and his mother, in debt for the hospitalization, is trying to put forth an 
obligation to her blood family. If Ko Kyaw takes care of his mother, he will 
somehow take her place. Formalizing such a relationship with her would transform 
his relationships with other people, for he would have authority over patrimony 
whose contours are under discussion.  
 That is why, ultimately, Ko Kyaw can say that a piece of land belongs to no 
one. The land in question was his father’s on paper – he changed it under his 
mother’s name – and his sister was also entitled to it. But most importantly, the 
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question at stake was not who owns that land. It was who will. And that uncertainty 
is linked to the intertwinement of three generations. Thus, ownership is about 
gaining authority and responsibility over things, obligations, and people. It is a 
process of becoming and an achievement. Because entitlement to inheritance is the 
most enforceable claim, it is the closest thing to “a right that could exist outside of 
the context of realizing it” (Prasse-Freeman 2015: 96). Yet, it is always a 
potentiality that could be realised, because even if it is vested in the status of a 
person, it comes to craft one’s position within a dense social landscape. And when 
someone is recognised as the owner of an estate, it means that this person as 
achieved a position of stewardship on that property. Ownership is but momentary 
and the idea of stewardship (taking care, being in charge of) reflects how authority 
and responsibility on things and people is conceived. 
 
CONCLUSION: ISSUES OF TRANSMISSIONS 
  
 At the end of this journey, we have seen that the transmission of inheritance 
is critical in the production of power relations, for people do not transmit simple 
things, but also a responsibility and an authority over these things. The short 
discussion of changes in land tenure showed that entitlement to inheritance has 
organised local land relations since at least the eighteenth century alongside a series 
of state projects and legal codifications. In any case, it kept operating to the point 
that inheritance remained the main avenue to access land in the early 2010s in the 
rural areas of central Myanmar. This transfer is not only about land but relates to 
how familial and personal relationships create legitimate claims on things. In 
Gawgyi, the rule of equal division between children thus appeared as a roadmap 
constrained by a keeping-while-giving paradox: the actual transfers of inheritance 
combine the push to provide a living to one’s offspring and the pull to perpetuate 
the family. The main farming families had attempted to pull people and resources 
by using this paradox and muster estates and wealth. What makes a family – 
hierarchy, commensality – and the mutual obligations between its members – 
gratitude, care – are key because they create entitlement to property. And for one of 
the children, who usually receives more, it also means taking upon oneself parental 
patrimony and liabilities. A case study of one farming family in Gawgyi has shown 
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how this process is crisscrossed by uncertainty because the transmission entangles 
multiple generations, moments (marriage, adoption, death) and strategies to access 
wealth, to the point that one can say that ‘nobody owns’ this or that piece of land, 
given that the redefining of liabilities and responsibilities between people is 
underway. Ultimately, ownership is not about individual private property but about 
stewardship: taking care of a land, of a family, being in charge, being responsible 
and taking upon oneself the obligations, the debts and the opportunities. ‘Nobody 
owns the land’ is thus saying ownership is uncertain due to the complexities of life 
and family relationships. Who will end up as the owner is not completely foreseen, 
and ownership is never really finite as long as there are co-heirs and potential co-
stewards.  
 At this stage, we can say that transmitting is a process of redefining authority 
and responsibility over things, and obligations between people. It is now possible 
to expand the implications of this conclusion to the field of village leadership. 
Within the realm of family relations, authority is conceived as a matter of 
stewardship (okchokhmu): taking care of a patrimony and of the persons attached 
to it through kin ties. Yet, the field of family relations was a matrix for thinking 
about rightful filiation and by extension about leadership. The arguments justifying 
how an office should be transmitted are similar than those defining in the Burmese 
Buddhist Law who can take over a family. The conceptualisation of filiation and 
stewardship, through the concept of auratha (or ablest child), was a base for 
thinking about the transmission of offices in precolonial Burma when competition 
for leadership was a central stake in local politics (chapter 3). And Koenig has 
shown that personal abilities rather than primogeniture was the key because there 
was no ascriptive element strong enough in defining who among the children should 
succeed one’s parents: 
 
 “Heredity was necessary to establish a primary claim to office, 
but the claimant was also required to be minimally capable of 
performing the duties of the office as determined by the other local 
officials. The Da-yit-za di-pani [Treatise on inheritance] of 1811 
explains: If the son by the head wife is blind or deaf, or otherwise 
deformed, and is not known to the local authorities, he is the eldest son 
only in name but does not obtain the status of one. The son who 
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industriously performs his father's duties and is known to the local 
authorities is considered as the eldest son though he may be born of the 
lesser wife, and he shall succeed to the hereditary office. […]. 
Birthright was therefore contingent on competence and the consensus 
of the other officials, and primogeniture was qualified by the 
requirement of competence and the cognatic nature of Burman 
inheritance that gave all children some claim on the estate.” (Koenig 
1990: 144–145, my emphasis) 
 
 Thus, in the realm of family transmission, as for the domain of filiation in 
gentry families holding offices in the nineteenth century, authority was ascribed in 
terms of heredity but achieved in terms of aptitude. We saw in the general 
introduction (section “debating local politics”) and in the historical chapters that 
the emphasis on personal abilities goes beyond family relationships and pervades 
the literature on leadership, from the legitimation of kings to the conceptualisation 
of politics in terms of men of prowess and patron-client relationship. The 
combination of, and tension between, heredity and ability are at the core of the 
theory of politics in the Burmese context. Cast in realm of Gawgyi politics, what 
does it implies? 
 Since the inception of Myinmilaung tract, only the first two headmen were 
linked by heredity according to a local theory of habitus (“who lives close to a 
hunter become a hunter; who lives near a fisherman becomes a fisherman” cf. 
chapter 4, section “The first village headmen”). The succession of the next headmen 
(office holders) departed from this practice and they were selected following the 
balance of power within the village tract, the moral shifts, and the ways the 
governments wanted to transform and control the countryside. Thus, village 
headship in Myinmilaung became an ambivalent position crossed by conceptions 
about rightful leadership, by factionalism, and at times embodied by persons who 
marked ethical ruptures. We saw that Ko Kyaw could not have been the 
‘administrator’ (okchokyayhmu) imagined by the state, taking care of and 
responsible for the village tract. Nonetheless, the idea of ‘taking care of’ as a form 
of authority is present in family leadership, related to personal abilities and mutual 
obligations between ‘parents’ and ‘children’, and conceived in terms of 
stewardship.  
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 What is interesting is that the village bigmen, the lugyi who take care of 
village affairs since the moral rupture embodied by the shift from U Win the 
Infamous to U Htay the Worthy, are also called with an expression referring to the 
idea of ‘taking care of’. This expression, translated in English as “guardian of 
village affairs”, is ywayay okhteinhmu.  The word htein is preferred by Gawgyi 
people to the word chok – present in headman/administrator – because the former 
refers more to the idea of ‘looking after’, ‘herding’, or ‘guiding’, hence the 
translation as guardianship. This semantic leaning reflects the juncture of the rise 
of village affairs as the form of local politics with the transformation of village 
leadership. 
 The question now is how far can be pushed the comparison between family 
stewardship and village guardianship to understand the making of authority in 
Gawgyi context? If what makes a family and the mutual obligations between its 
member create authority, then what makes a village? What are the obligations 
between its members and how do they engage with each-others? To explore these 
issues, we now need to look at how Gawgyi is shaped as a collective and how 
village lugyi produce their bigness.  
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CHAPTER 8. GUARDING VILLAGE AFFAIRS 
 
THE WORTH OF THE LUGYI 
 
“If a man has led a good life, not quarreled with neighbors […], he may 
be one of the informal group of lugyi lugaun [who] chiefly give advice, 
moralize, and express the agreed-on folk wisdom. […]. The lugyi do 
not set style; they do not necessarily move anyone to emulation, and 
they have no power, only the recognized right to use moral suasion […]. 
One of the reasons these men are elders is that they do not overstep the 
vague but delicate line that separates individual responsibilities.” (Nash 
1965: 270). 
 
 In contrast to Nash's analysis, who saw in the lugyi ‘elders’ without influence, 
I argue that they do have an authority, that of asserting a common good by taking 
care of village affairs. This signifies that the lugyi I met during my fieldwork, such 
as when I first arrived at the water station in 2013, were not of the same kind as 
those Nash encountered. They have changed the meaning attached to this status and 
morality has become central in politics. Some sixty years had passed and there are 
historical reasons explaining why such men came to the forefront in Gawgyi 
political landscape. In the chapter on the rise of village affairs, we saw that the 
transition from U Win the Infamous to U Htay the Worthy crystallised a rupture in 
local politics. State violence and its partial disconnection from farmers in Gawgyi 
was echoed by a disengagement of village leaders from official positions in favour 
of a commitment to village affairs on the model of previous men of power (the last 
men of hpon). The management of local affairs was monopolised by the villagers, 
drawing from a more traditional form of collective sociality called luhmuyay. 
During my fieldwork, I saw these men circulating a lot in the village and they were 
always present during ceremonies for instance. Ko Kyaw was often among them, 
but he was the headman, not a lugyi yet, and his navigations were of a different 
kind. Progressively, I realised that by making village affairs a space of engagement 
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where the worth of the people is evaluated, the lugyi were producing a political 
order as guardians of Gawgyi affairs. 
 The question of the worth of the lugyi is thus about the nature of social 
relations in Gawgyi and the history of contemporary Myanmar: what place for 
village space and morality in the making of power and authority? This chapter takes 
up this question by analysing the making of the worth of the lugyi from the 
perspective of pragmatic sociology.531 Power and authority have previously been 
analysed in this region of Myanmar in at least two ways.532 First, some of the studies 
focusing on Burmese Buddhism have shown how meritorious activity produces a 
social order. For instance, the ‘field of merit’ theory (Schober 1989) defends the 
idea that obtaining merit through donation increases power (Lehman 1984). In a 
more secularist register, we saw how power relations have been analysed in terms 
of patronage – understood as the dominant model of politics in central Myanmar – 
where the individual charism, the hpon, is the key to the political alliance (Nash 
1965). The point is not to oppose these analyses, but to conceive them as different 
idioms used to describe how people engage with each other. A person can thus be 
great by his donations or by his charisma. The hypothesis is that the worth of the 
lugyi comes from another form, namely a commitment to village affairs where the 
notion of the common good is at stake. 
 The term lugyi is polysemic. It can be used to talk about media personalities, 
elderly people in general and Generals in particular. But the term lugyi is also, and 
chiefly, used to talk about influential and respected people in a locality. The quality 
of lugyi can therefore refer to different scales of worth to qualify a person, such as 
fame, rank, charisma, or the embodiment of a common good. To say that So-and-
so is a lugyi can be connoted positively or negatively depending on the context, the 
persons targeted and the interlocutors. For example, when Ko Kyaw organised the 
2016 selection, it was called “choosing the lugyi” by the people collecting the votes. 
But if one asks who the lugyi are in Gawgyi, the list is short and the silence often 
heavy. Being a lugyi in a locality is linked to what is at stake in a social space,533 
 
531 See, for example, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), Thévenot (2006), Boltanski (2009), Barthe et 
al. (2013). 
532 We leave aside here other studies that would make it possible to account for the multiple possible 
power relationships with influential entities such as arahants or saints (Kawanami 2009), the cult of 
the naq (Brac de la Perrière 1996), or that of the weikza (Rozenberg 2010). 
533 On the conception of social space in Southeast Asia at large, cf. Condominas 1980. 
 330 
whether in everyday life or during special events. It is a quality difficult to ascribe 
to a person, because it implies a moral evaluation and refers to the state of relations 
in a social and political space.534 More specifically, the lugyi we analyse are also 
called lugyi lugaung or person (lu) great (gyi) and good (kaun). The evaluation of 
the morality of individuals and the ethics attached to collective life are ubiquitous 
in the attribution of this qualifier. Therefore, by analysing what is at stake between 
the villagers we can understand how the presence of people ‘bigger’ than others is 
justified. To analyse this bigness amounts to qualifying it in particular, in a social 
space where other scales of worth exist to qualify people, such as prestige, charisma 
or meritorious achievements for example. 
 For Gawgyi’s case, I choose to present three lugyi who are seen as worthy 
because they each operate in their own way a ‘process of generalising’ to promote 
a common good by taking care of village affairs (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
The other name of the lugyi is ywayay okhteinhmu, the “guardians of village 
affairs”, and generalising535 is a process of ‘taking charge of’ a collective. Taking 
care of village affairs is how the lugyi assert and scale a political order in specific 
situations during which the prevalence of other forms of engagements are overtaken 
by the idea of common good. These engagements consist mostly of family, 
intergenerational, neighbouring, and clientelist relations actualised in a variety of 
transfers and the situations we will explore are two ceremonies and a dispute. But 
before describing them, it should be mentioned that taking care of village affairs is 
a matter of social and moral evaluation, of adjusting traditional conceptions to new 
stakes and of scaling a political space. 
 First, the question of the worth of the lugyi refers to a double process of 
evaluation. On the one hand, the lugyi are evaluated: this status is never completely 
achieved, and, for instance, we saw in the prologue how managing the emergence 
of a candidate for headship was a way of producing and consolidating their position. 
On the other hand, villagers are gauged. Because taking care of village affairs is a 
 
534 In order not to reify villages as spaces where cohesion has reigned since times immemorial, we 
situate ourselves in the line of Kemp (1991) who analyses in detail the aporias and the academic and 
political stakes which underlie the study of villages in Thailand in terms of traditional communities 
for example. 
535 Boltanski (2011) emphasises that the “process of generalizing” is a process of disseminating a 
particular justification (what we aim here in terms of engagement in village affairs) in specific 
situations among which disputes occupy a central position. 
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process of creating a scale of engagement and a collective, it results in the worth of 
people being measured according to their engagement in this domain. The 
engagement of some persons toward a collective contributes to make village affairs 
the form of local politics, as a space where the worth of the people is evaluated 
depending on their engagement toward a common good. In return, this engagement 
produces the worth of these men whose position reflects the way previous examples 
of propriety blend into current politics. 
 Second, the scope of village affairs combines a traditional form of collective 
sociality with new stakes following the recent transformation of Gawgyi political 
landscape. At a sociological level, luhmuyay, or “social affairs”, is about taking 
responsibility for the welfare of a collective beyond individual and familial 
obligations. Minimally, it refers to the mutual aid deployed for the “joys” (tha-yay) 
such as marriages, and for the “griefs” (na-yay) such as funerals. The luhmuyay is 
a concept encompassing potentially all kinds of collective undertakings from the 
making of ceremonies to the resolution of disputes. But its scope changes following 
what is deemed important at a given time. 
 Today, village affairs include the organisation of ceremonies (individual, 
family, monastery related), the management of the water and electricity supply 
systems, the rebuilding of roads, the treatment of sick persons and dead bodies, 
dealing with NGOs or the issue of enlarging the village for instance. In that sense, 
saying that village affairs have become the form of politics in Gawgyi refers to how 
the engagement in collective undertakings on the model of luhmuyay has been part 
of a moral rupture with a violent and corrupt state embodied by an Infamous 
headman and following an ideology of self-reliance.536 
 Third, the rise of village affairs also reflects how the political landscape has 
been imagined and scaled. After following Ko Kyaw during a day in his life, we 
saw that any understanding of the landscape in terms of administrative jurisdiction 
(Myinmilaung tract) is not really workable. For instance, when he went to Tozigon 
for a premarital ceremony, it was a matter of luhmuyay as he was more a privileged 
witness of the engagement than a headman due to the social proximity of these two 
villages. In other words, Tozigon has been included within Gawgyi affairs. For 
instance, they help each other for ceremonies, Tozigon people rely on Gawgyi’s 
 
536Kotukotha, which can be transcribed as “rising by and defining oneself”. 
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collective properties and monastery for such event and they call each other yathswe-
yatmyo, meaning “people akin by (sharing a) dwelling”. This expression reflects a 
sense of mutuality and affiliation through extended kinship bonds. It is made of a 
combination of the word relative, or kin (hswemyo), with a reference to the common 
dwelling area (yat). Such assemblage is also present in the title of village elders, 
yatmiyathpa, or “parents” (mihpa) of the dwelling area”.537 It means that the 
traditional form of sociality produces a landscape expressed in terms of common 
living space and kinship. In theory the luhmuyay concerns everyone and covers a 
wide set of relations from the hospitality to strangers to the funerals of neighbours. 
But it bonds villages together or excludes them, the yat being to some extent the 
spatial scale of luhmuyay. And this process of scaling depends on the history of the 
political landscape: while Tozigon has bonded with Gawgyi through their history 
and claim for indigeneity,538 Gawgyi and Myinmilaung proper have never really 
developed such relationship. On the contrary, people from Myinmilaung proper are 
clearly excluded from Gawgyi affairs, which means that they have to rely on 
themselves to organise collective life.539 And this divide goes hand in hand with the 
recurrent animosity between these two settlements (chapters 2 to 5). This means 
that the history of this socio-political landscape shaped how local politics unfold 
today and, in that sense, it provides a better understanding of the difficulties for Ko 
Kyaw to be the headman of Myinmilaung tract. In other words, Ko Kyaw’s position 
was ambiguous as he had to navigate Gawgyi affairs and Myinmilaung tract and to 
embody a position people despise while showing a degree of trustworthiness.  
 To show that the worth of the lugyi stems from the fact that they take charge 
of village affairs, it is necessary to show how they make the village a collective. To 
do so, I choose to present the lugyi of Gawgyi through three particular situations 
which form the following three sections of this chapter. It should be borne in mind 
 
537 So far, I have referred to the latter as ‘official elders’ as one person is recognised by the state for 
each tract as a traditional institution. But there are often more than one yatmiyathpa and often they 
are lugyi. 
538 Their proximity is related to a share origin from Ywadon village translating into close relations 
between preeminent families of farmers whose descendants settled progressively in Gawgyi. Thus, 
access to land and livelihood through marriage and inheritance enabled individuals to maintain 
relatively good relationships and to be integrated within the same domain of social affairs 
(luhmuyay) while belonging to different jurisdiction (cf. chapter 3, section “competing foundations 
narratives” and chapter 6, section “in the field”). 
539 In the same vein, people from Mayodaw have pooled their resources to buy their own “village 
property” for their ceremonies in order to mark a difference with Myinmilaung village. 
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that even if they embody propriety, the lugyi also represent how the main farming 
families had monopolised village leadership. In Gawgyi, there are three men540 who 
almost everyone agrees are lugyi: U Lin, U Maung and U Htay. Each of them has a 
particular role contrasting with Ko Kyaw crafting of headship. 
 U Lin assumes the role of “head of bachelors” (lubyogaung) for all village 
ceremonies: he, himself a bachelor, organises village mutual aid based on statutory 
groups (unmarried men and women) to carry out ceremonies such as weddings or 
Buddhist novitiates (shinbyu). The role of U Lin is analysed through the description 
of a shinbyu, the Buddhist noviciate of boys and the meritorious donation par 
excellence.541 Describing the making of a shinbyu allows first of all to show the 
village collective at work. But it also enables one to question to what extent 
meritorious donations contribute to the greatness of people because the multiple 
forms of engagement (sharing of merit, offering food, mutual help, and so on) 
entangle and are evaluate during the ceremony. Finally, it also shows the crucial 
role of U Lin as the organiser of village workforce and as the living memory of 
donations and transactions. 
 U Maung is frequently “master of ceremony” (beiktheikhsaya) during 
premarital ceremonies in which he embodies village morality through his speeches 
and the conduct of rituals. His role is explored through a premarital ceremony where 
the families of the future spouses meet publicly. The village system of reproduction 
and social ordering consists in the mediation of the engagement these families, 
making the ‘marriage’ an agreement going beyond the couple and intra or inter-
family relationships. U Maung, as master of ceremony, ensures that the village 
morality he embodies is heard. Describing such an encounter therefore makes it 
possible to show how the union of families calls for a “process of generalising” in 
order to go beyond individual and family interests so that marriage is collectively 
sanctioned. 
 
540 Other people are called more or less great depending on the context of enunciation. Daw Than, 
an elderly widowed woman, was the only woman lugyi, without it being possible to put her in the 
same rank as U Lin, U Htay and U Maung because she was so because of her character, her lucidity 
and her "natural" authority without taking charge of village interests in a public way. The chief cooks 
for ceremonies, the healer, the ‘master of the lower ways’ and the medium of the cult of the naq are 
also great figures. 
541 In theory, an ahlu refers exclusively to a meritorious donation involving offerings to the monks. 
In practice, lay ceremonies such as weddings, which do not required donations to a monk, are also 
called ahlu because they are also a moment of donation through the form of food to the guest for 
instance. 
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 Finally, U Htay is the yatmiyathpa 542 and in this quality he can speak for the 
village. The third section explores how U Htay settles a conflict linked to the arrival 
of electricity in the village. The trajectory of this lugyi within Gawgyi history, his 
achievements and abilities allow to better delimit the sphere of the village affairs. 
The ways in which U Htay positions itself through family, neighbourhood, and 
patronage relationships and his distancing from the government reflect how he 
embodies and promotes a common good. In this chapter, each of these people 
represents a form of the common good in Gawgyi: the organisation of mutual aid 
(U Lin), the embodiment of morality (U Maung) and the defence of village affairs 
(U Htay). The worth of these lugyi is explored through specific situations 
understood as trials because they put collective issues to the test543 of family, 
neighbourhood and patronage relationships while paying close attention to how 
transactions are performed and evaluated. 
 
U LIN AND A SHINBYU 
 
 This section first described what is the shinbyu to then explores the making 
of a shinbyu in particular. The shinbyu is a Buddhist initiation ceremony and it 
represents the meritorious donation par excellence in this region.544 The making of 
a shinbyu shows the village collective at work and raises questions concerning how 
meritorious donations contribute to the worth of people. A shinbyu is a ceremony 
where several forms of engagement (sharing of merit, offering food, mutual aid, 
and so forth) are entangled and are constantly evaluated and its description 
 
542 There can be several yatmiyathpa in the same village. However, one of them is appointed, at the 
request of the government and when the village headman is selected. Therefore, we choose to 
translate it as the “official elder” to reflect the process of selection. 
543 The notion of trial and test are in a broad sense to encompass both the sanction-test (associated 
with a mechanism for settling a controversy) and the challenge-test (referring to testing individuals 
throughout life), depending on the context (Martuccelli, 2015). 
544 The shinbyu is relatively well known in the anthropological literature about Myanmar. Shway 
Yoe (1896/82) described it as early as 1882. Nash (1965) and Spiro (1970), anthropologists by 
training who worked in central Burma after independence, analysed the ritual stages of the shinbyu 
by highlighting the ways in which they reveal a socio-cosmic order – relations between lay people 
and monks, man and woman, parents and children, master and student. More recently, Brac de la 
Perrière (1984) and Houtman (1990) have studied this ritual in more urban contexts in Lower Burma. 
Robinne first described the shinbyu in Shan State (2000) and then compared it with examples from 
Central Burma (2002). Finally, Brac de la Perrière has synthesised some of these approaches to show 
how the shinbyu operates a renunciation from the world in order to take a better place in it (2009). 
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illustrates the crucial role of U Lin as organiser and as a living memory of donations 
and transactions.  
 During a shinbyu, a young boy becomes an adult qualified for marriage545 by 
temporarily entering the monastic community (Sangha). The name of the ceremony 
is usually translated as “making the king/prince” (Brac de la Perrière 2009b: 121), 
referring to the way boys are made kings in the first part of the ritual to become 
novice in the second. Spiro, a landmark anthropologist on the study of religion in 
Myanmar, describes the novitiate as the country's most important meritorious 
donation ceremony. 
 
“The religious significance of the shin-byu is both symbolic and 
instrumental. Symbolically, it denotes the passage of the boy from the 
status of biosocial being to that of a spiritual person. No Burmese male 
is truly human […] unless he has worn the yellow robe. […]. 
Instrumentally, the initiation is the means par excellence for acquiring 
merit, not so much for the boy […] as for the sponsors of the ceremony, 
typically his parents. […]. The merit gained through sponsoring an 
initiation is so great that wealthy Burmans will frequently sponsor more 
than one […].” (Spiro 1970: 234-236) 
 
 According to this account, a shinbyu is an achievement. Giving a shinbyu is 
crucial for parents and sons. When becoming a novice, the child compensates an 
obligation of gratitude toward his parents, his masters and Buddha, also called 
kyayzushin or benefactors. Brac de la Perrière has suggested that the experience of 
the novitiate is a trial that young boys overcome thanks to a spiritual quality: 
 
“The spiritual quality with which male children must be endowed in 
sufficient quantity to endure the trial of monastic life is called ‘pon [sic]. 
This quality is unequally distributed among people according to their 
karma (kan), that is, it proceeds from karmic rewards, according to the 
merit acquired in previous existences, and indicates the level reached in 
the cycle of rebirths. […] men are [compared to women] better 
 
545 Cf. Robinne (2002). 
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endowed in ‘pon, which indicates their degree of spiritual fulfilment 
and opens to them the path of renunciation, the only way to salvation.” 
(Brac de la Perrière 2009b: 119, my translation). 
 
 In order to show how this ritual engages Gawgyi village as a collective, the 
following explores the ceremony through its kitchen rather than through its ritual 
stages. From the 3rd to the 4th of February 2016, before the Buddhist Lent, a couple 
from the village organised a shinbyu for their two sons after saving money for 
several years. Two weeks before the ceremony, the couple met with U Lin to 
finalise the preparation. The latter, teacher at Gawgyi public school, is also 
lubyogaung, or leader of the group of single boys. U Lin, in duet with a woman 
“head of the single girls” (abyogaung), is in charge of organising the village 
ceremonies, such as weddings and novitiates,546 by mobilizing the statutory groups 
who will take care of preparations, welcoming guests, serving food and performing 
the necessary ritual acts. U Lin is however perceived as the main actor orienting 
village workforce for ceremonies. He circulates all the time across Gawgyi and 
controls the village collective groups of single males and females. Present at every 
ceremony and recording every donation, he has become the living memory of the 
villagers' meritorious acts. A key player in village life, he is the guarantor and 
privileged witness of the villagers' commitment to the smooth running of the 
ceremonies. During their meeting with U Lin, the couple made a provisional budget 
and agreed with him on the rental of the “common property of the village” (ywabon 
pyitsi). These include dishes, kitchen utensils, tables, chairs and stools, bamboo 
structures and other plastic tarps commonly owned by the villagers and assigned by 
U Lin. The importance of a shinbyu depends on the donor. For this one, there will 
be a band of traditional Burmese musicians (hsaingwaing) coming from Mandalay 
who will be hosted in a large ceremonial pavilion (man-dat) assembled for a time 
to welcome musicians, novices and guests. All this has a cost varying according to 
the duration of the shinbyu (from one to three days in general), the meals proposed, 
 
546 The ceremonies in question are in a practical way called “meritorious donation” (ahlu) because 
they always contain a form of donation, whether it is directed toward the monks and the monastery 
or not. For example, marriage does not necessarily include an intervention by monks, and therefore 
does not fall within the definition of a donation (ahlu) in its narrow sense. However, in practice, 
many people are fed at weddings, which makes it a form of donation in the broad sense as long as 
the offering of food produces merit. 
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the number of guests, the reputation of the musicians, in addition to the rental of 
village things capped at 50,000 Myanmar Kyat (50 USD).547  
 A few days before the ceremony, the couple asked their close friends, family 
and acquaintances for help during the various stages of the ceremony. They have 
bought some items to solicit their help. For example, cigars and tea leaf salads are 
offered to several villagers through young boys under the guidance of U Lin. These 
gifts are requests for help before, during, or after the ceremony. They symbolise an 
engagement. That day, me and Ko Kyaw received a cigar to help serve the guests 
and wash the dishes with an explicit question: “do you accept this responsibility?” 
In these ceremonies, Ko Kyaw is like any other villagers, except that he often rents 
his loudspeakers and sound system. 
 The day before the ceremony, the two people in charge of the kitchen for this 
type of event simmered the main dishes in huge pots cleaned beforehand by several 
unmarried girls. The latter also helped with cutting vegetables while a group of 
young boys brought tables and chairs. In Gawgyi, the collective organisation for 
this type of event is well established. The only problem for U Lin is to ensure that 
the aid is effective. The next day, before the first guests arrive around 6am, U Lin 
went with the donors to the monastery to offer food (hsunkat) to the monks. 
Between 6 and 9 am, most of the villagers and many guests went to the ceremony 
rhythmed by the music played by the orchestra. In front of the ceremonial pavilion, 
some guests, before eating and sometimes even before greeting donors, stopped at 
a table where fans were stacked. Those were given to them in exchange for a sum 
of money called “aku-ngway” (literally “aid-money”). Its amount was recorded in 
a book dedicated for this purpose and carefully kept by the donor. It's an account 
book that lets you know who gave what.  In the photo below (figure 22), U Lin and 
Daw Thu, the head of the single girls, collect the aid-money and distribute the fans 
in return. A similar practice is found at weddings.548 As Nash recalls, but without 
further analysis: “[a]s in all villagewide or supravillage festivities, guests make 
 
547 The money will go to the village fund held by U Lin, which will be used to renew the utensils, 
tables, chairs and tarpaulins needed for the ceremonies. 
548 At weddings, what is given is called lethpwe (“union of hands”), a term that covers, in the 
restricted sense, gifts in kind made by the guests as well as by the parents of the spouses for the 
establishment of the couple. In a broad sense, the lethpwe refers to gifts symbolizing a marital union 
and can therefore integrate what is given in cash under the name of aid-money. Robinne (2000) 
specifies that the sums paid during a shinbyu can be given back to the monastery as a donation. 
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donations to hosts, and at every wedding someone, usually the school teacher, sits 
in a corner with a notebook and ballpoint pen, entering the names of donors and the 
amounts given.” (1965: 250). And Spiro added: “The amount of each contribution 
is recorded so that the delicately balanced system of reciprocity may be 
maintained.” (1977: 183-184). 
 
 
Figure 23. The two leaders of bachelor groups – in the middle and on the right – collecting 
the aid-money during a shinbyu (© Daw Htan Nu) 
  
 In a shinbyu, the transfer of aid-money is neither purely a gift nor purely a 
payment. Besides, this type of transfer is not found in all novitiates549 and not all 
guests necessarily give it.550 When it is done, this financial assistance is part of a 
series of transfers551 between individuals and families. In theory, a person gives 
what he wants, but in practice what is given will be given back for an equal or 
greater amount.  
 
549 Invitation cards sometimes give clues as to whether or not it is appropriate for a guest to give. 
550 Giving aid-money refers to a moral obligation for guests. However, each villager is also a guest 
at one time or another during the ceremony, and, depending on the help they give and their 
relationship with donors, they gauge whether it is appropriate or not to give it. 
551 These transfers of goods and services can be more or less formalised and cover a wide range, 
including, for example, matrimonial services, assistance for the construction of the ceremonial 
palace or the services of guests during ceremonies, assistance during funeral vigils, the construction 
or repair of houses, services rendered during agricultural work, and so forth. 
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 In general, there are two types of meritorious donations (ahlu): the “donation 
without remainder” (akywinme ahlu) and the “donation with remainder” (akywinshi 
ahlu).552 The first form is very rare and is a zero-sum donation, a sort of pure gift 
that does not create liabilities between people and from which the giver does not 
expect return directly. It mostly concerns donations for religious buildings and the 
‘best’ is not to put one’s name or picture as a dedication mark on the edifice. And 
when the donor dies, this good deed will be remembered and taken into account for 
her or his rebirth. The second type of donation is the most common and happens 
during Buddhist noviciate, funerals and weddings for instance. The aid-money is 
one example of it even if it does not strictly correspond to the definition of ahlu.553 
To some extent, people cannot escape the obligation stemming from this kind of 
donation because there is a ‘remainder’ which underscores the continuity of a 
relation between people. This kind of transfer belongs to the sphere of luhmuyay 
and bonds people. Given the relatively high number of occasions a person is invited 
to ceremonies during his lifetime, these transactions involve reciprocal 
relationships, obligations and liabilities. Hence, also, the importance of U Lin who 
is the collective memory of meritorious donations, but also of transfers made during 
ceremonies. These operations create or update an engagement between people. The 
amounts are scrupulously recorded so that, in the more or less near future, the 
person can give back. Such transactions also allow for a kind of collective financing 
of ceremonies. Thus, a shinbyu, the meritorious gift par excellence, is not really a 
“donation without remainder” because of the sharing of merit that obliged the 
participants to some extent. During this ceremony a variety of transfers occur (aid-
money, food offerings, mutual help) and they are linked with many other local 
ceremonies such as weddings or funerals, where multiple transactions also take 
place554 and where villagers represent the largest number of participants. 
 After giving (or not giving) financial support, the guests crossed an alley 
where young girls offered them cigarettes and flowers before entering the pavilion 
 
552 On the notion of ‘remainder’ in Myanmar cosmology, notably concerning how personal names 
are calculated and the role of the remainder as a notion of randomness or freedom which minimises 
the belief in karmic predestination, cf. Robinne (1998) and the general introduction. 
553 On the strict definition of meritorious donation as a transfer that require the mediation of monks 
for the production of merit, cf. Brac de la Perrière (2009a, 2015). 
554 For example, Pannier (2015) offered a detailed analysis of the role of these multiple transactions 
in the production of village sociality in Vietnam. 
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where the two novices sat dressed as “princes in the making” (shinlaung). Almost 
all discussions began with the formula: “have you eaten?” Once the ritual space is 
crossed, the guests were quickly brought to the eating area. Many people were busy 
around tables, filling dishes, clearing plates, changing cutlery. The guests followed 
one another under the gaze of U Lin. Young boys took turns serving. Some adults 
organised the service, measuring the need for plates and cutlery. Behind the 
banquet, other men washed the dishes in turn. The atmosphere was convivial. Jokes 
followed one another. Cigarettes passed from hand to hand. Betel chews were 
exchanged like hotcakes. It was the same scene in the outdoor kitchen, where the 
men were adjusting the cooking of rice while gauging the flow of guests. A sense 
of camaraderie floats over these spaces if enough people help. Irritation and 
complaints erupt if one does not get his hands dirty. Indeed, ceremonies are 
occasions when villagers are evaluated: the people who help are identified, a 
fortiori among singles, and the commitment of everyone is sanctioned. The 
morality underlying mutual aid is only recalled in moment of crisis, such as when 
there is no one to help serve food. 
 
 
Figure 24. Villagers cooking the meal during a shinbyu 
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 Offering food symbolises giving in its raw form in our context. Feeding 
monks, teachers or parents during rituals is usually understood as “an 
acknowledgment of gratitude and as a repayment of moral or social debt555 rather 
than as an attempt to create new obligations” (Schober 1989: 106). Food offerings 
can reflect obligations (parent-child, teacher-student), create liabilities (donor-
receiver) and participate in cycles of exchanges as we saw through the making of 
Ko Kyaw’s family and the issue of transmitting inheritance in the previous chapter. 
And following the theory of field of merit, the guests who participate in a 
meritorious ceremony receive a share of the merit made by the givers through their 
donation. But individuals evaluate the obligations associated with these 
transactions. This is a consubstantial ambiguity of the gift in our context. Intentions 
are appraised and interpretation varies depending on the pre-existing relationships 
and those one wants to create or show. In short, food donations oscillate between 
two poles: the disinterested nature of the Buddhist gift556 and the obligation arising 
from the gift. How people engage with each other through these transactions is thus 
constantly evaluated. 
 
 
Figure 25. The donors serving food in the plate of fellow villagers 
 
555 Drawing on our earlier differentiation between debt and obligation (cf. the general introduction, 
section on the “Limits of concept of hpon”), the acknowledgement of gratitude is not a repayment, 
but a moral obligation to fulfil. 
556 The less a gift is disinterested, the more it creates merit. 
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 The image above reveals the tension at play in food offering. As I filmed the 
event, the givers (standing) emphasised their position of donors by serving food to 
their guests themselves. However, one old lady, on the left, refused to be served 
directly. She withdrew her plate in a gesture stressing her wish for not being taken 
too far in this situation. Besides the fact that the two ladies do not get along, her 
refusal relates to a difference of status between them. The old woman descends 
from a family of large farmers while the donor worked as a daily labourer until quite 
recently. The tiny gesture thus reflects how, even under the veil of a meritorious 
donation, transfers are evaluated because they potentially symbolise an engagement 
that could impact status and hierarchies. One cannot give something, help, offer 
food to anyone in the same manner. The ways transfers are evaluated is thus key in 
local political dynamics, may it be during a shinbyu or when Ko Kyaw dodged the 
risk of being trapped at someone’s house by sending one of his followers from CoC 
to fetch the person. Hence, the drama of offering food can symbolise a meritorious 
act and create liabilities (that can be refused). But the multiplicity of ceremonies, 
transactions and offerings between people within and beyond a village and across 
several generations are part of the political landscape, as for the histories of 
transmission among families. In other words, gift giving, even formalised in a 
cosmology, is always contextual. And the engagement of villagers toward the 
collective is but one form of these transfers. 
 After eating, the guests drank and washed their hands near large jars arranged 
for this purpose. Some girls and women helped providing fresh water and ironed 
towels. The flow of guests increased sharply around 8 in the morning. The 
atmosphere calmed down around 9am. The dishes are washed, the tables cleaned, 
and the rest of the food gathered for tomorrow’s banquet or sent to the elderly 
unable to attend the ceremony. The next step was a ritual procession which took 
place around 11am. This procession, the length of which can be another sign of 
prestige, wandered through the village following the main paths from the couple's 
home to the monastery. The “princes in the making” were carried on wooden 
structures draped in the image of elephants and Ko Kyaw was among those hauling 
them. The procession represents the Burmese royal order and precedes the entry 
into religion, a crucial stage in the life cycle.557 A little later, in intimacy, the close 
 
557 For a description of this procession, see Spiro (1970: 240). The village elders, first the men and 
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family went to the monastery with the young boys to clip their hair, help them put 
on the monastic robe and witness their commitment to follow Buddhist teachings 
as novice.  
 Finally, in the afternoon, monks from the monastery came to the ceremonial 
pavilion to celebrate the ritual of sharing merit. This ritual of consecration consists 
in declaring that a person shares the merit related to his gift with all existing beings 
in theory. To share merit is to “make the water flow” in reference to the gesture of 
the donor. The latter makes a libation by pouring water into a silver plate at the 
same time as the monk recites the appropriate consecration formula to invite the 
goddess of the Earth to witness the meritorious act.558 The merit obtained by the 
donors through the donation then reflects on the people who participated according 
to the field of merit theory described by Schober (1989). The sharing of merit 
through the ritual of consecration creates obligations for those who enter the field 
of merit thus shared (with the guests and the persons who helped). Being in a 
person's field of merit is therefore a specific engagement. In other words, the ability 
to acquire and share merit through donations is essential to the fabric of power as it 
produces a hierarchy between donors and recipients. This theory therefore proposes 
an order of worth to evaluate people. But we saw how a meritorious donation is 
crisscrossed by tensions, diverging evaluations and by a variety of other transfers. 
 Overall, a shinbyu crystallises and sets in motion a complex whole including 
at the same time various ritual devices, the activation of networks (family, 
neighbours, guests, monks...) as well as multiple transactions. It is interesting to 
underline that a large part of these practices is possible thanks to the presence of a 
village collective controlled by U Lin. These collective activities, necessary for the 
realisation of meritorious donations, are also trials. Generally speaking, the 
ceremony is in itself a test, or rather a set of trials gathered under the banner of 
‘meritorious donation’. As an essential ‘rite of passage’, a shinbyu tests the novice's 
spiritual capacity (hpon) to respond to monastic demands. This ceremony also puts 
to the test the status and reputation of donors and their ability to attract prestigious 
 
then the women, lead the procession, followed by the beautiful women of the villages carrying betel 
boxes, followed by the "princes in the making", then the group of unmarried boys, the group of 
unmarried girls, and then the bulk of the guests and villagers wanting to mingle in the procession 
instead of watching it from their house, and finally comes the orchestra whose sound box is mounted 
on an ox cart. 
558 On this ritual, cf. Brac de la Perrière (2009: 126, 2015: 391). 
 344 
monks for example. Last but not least, the ceremony puts to the test the relationships 
of mutual aid and the ability of U Lin to empower the village collective. The 
rumours circulating and gauging the more or less lavish expenditure as well as the 
quality of the meals, music or clothing echo the permanent evaluation to which 
people and ceremonies are subjected. Pretences are strongly denounced, both in 
private and in public. In this vein, the presence or absence of some villagers is 
revealing. For example, a person I knew for a long time, one of Ko Kyaw’s uncle, 
was absent from most village ceremonies. When I talked about it around me, I was 
told it was because this man was ashamed. Not because he had made no donation, 
but because he was more interested in his “own affairs” (kokoyay) than in “social 
affairs" (luhmuyay). Nash asks this question in similar terms when he says that the 
lack of unity of a village, 
 
“[…] is also thought to be aggravated by two characteristics of the 
normal villager: (1) ko ha ko neide, the drive to live by and for oneself 
alone, and (2) hpathi hpatha neide, to be uninterested in others. It seems 
odd to me that these are said to cause trouble, since in a real sense they 
are among the honored, desired, and fostered attitudes in the ideal 
villager. But when cast in the political realm, there is some local 
appreciation of the negative consequences. If the village is peaceful, 
unriven by factions, led by a man of pon, then these traits help keep the 
peace and are fully desired […].” (Nash 1965: 272). 
 
 The opposition between living by and for oneself and committing oneself to 
others helps explain the absence of certain people during village ceremonies. This 
therefore highlights their collective nature. If avoiding ceremonies is “selfish”, then 
participating, all the more actively, is an engagement toward the donor and the 
village. The very presence of U Lin in Gawgyi encourages us to understand how a 
shinbyu builds a village collective set up for a common good. The village is thus, 
beyond the statutory groups, functions, jobs, and hierarchies an important network 
of people which enables to make donations during which the commitment toward 
the collective is evaluated. The organisation of ceremonies is in itself a test under 
the watch of U Lin who is the master of mutual aid. His worth is the result of a 
double responsibility: if U Lin is responsible for the ceremonies then he can request 
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the engagement of others for mutual aid. U Lin is thus a lugyi, because he invests 
himself toward the village to make the necessary ceremonies in the life of each one. 
His commitment to the collective is recognised and gives him, in part, his worth. 
 As for Ko Kyaw, he was on the fringe of the ceremony, being a simple 
villager navigating across networks of gifts, personalities, hierarchies and 
liabilities. He also has to display propriety and to help serving the guests for 
instance. The realm of village affairs and ceremonies in particular are a part of local 
politics that contrasts with government practices and yet fall within the local 
political landscape as they became a space of engagement. 
 
U MAUNG AND AN ENGAGEMENT CEREMONY 
 
In the chapter exploring how Ko Kyaw crafted his position as headman, we 
followed him during a premarital encounter in Tozigon. Such event is intrinsic to 
village social affairs and U Maung was officiating as master of ceremony. Weddings 
are to some extent a collective issue, and the very presence of U Maung during 
engagement ceremonies highlights how they are part of village affairs and how the 
worth of this man is produced. 
 Premarital encounters (called apyaw; or tintaungpwe) have not had the same 
appeal to anthropologists as noviciate or marriage ceremonies. Spiro (1977: 181) 
and Nash (1965: 250) describe them rather briefly as a process of gradual 
engagement in which the parents of the future couple meet several times to gauge 
each other and negotiate what will be given to the couple by each family.559 Spiro 
notes that the meeting formalising the engagement, 
 
“[…] is a public event, held in the presence of invited guests, and 
always including the headman, the village elders and the kindred of the 
engaged couple. The expenses are defrayed by the parent of the boy, 
despite the fact that the ceremony is usually held in the house of the 
girl. […]. The ritual itself is brief. A master of ceremonies, usually the 
 
559 For Nash, the first visit, at the boy's parents' initiative, was called kyaung lande [sic], “opening 
the road” (1965: 250). Spiro associates it with sei sat gyin, “being connected” (Spiro 1977: 181). 
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headman or a village elder, announces the amount and content of the 
dower […] which had been agreed upon by the parents.” (1977: 181) 
 
Spiro’s description is very similar to the way marital engagements are organised in 
Gawgyi today.560 During these ceremonies, the gift of tintha-ngway561 is announced 
and/or negotiated between the parents. Spiro initially spoke of engagement in 
‘psychodynamic’ terms (confirmation of the boy's intention, acceptance of sexual 
relations, protection of the bride's honour in the event of the fiancé's death) and then 
proposes a comparative anthropological analysis of the Burmese dowry (ibid.: 181-
209). However, in Gawgyi, a real mediation system is set up with U Maung as 
master of ceremony. U Maung, by his presence and during his speeches promotes 
the morality governing relations within couples, families and villages. It is therefore 
possible to argue that marriage goes beyond the couple and intra- or inter-family 
relationships and that the village is a space of reproduction and social ordering, 
which in no way prevents tensions and conflicts from being expressed.   
 Around 4pm, on the 8th of December 2015, I was invited by Ko Kyaw to an 
engagement ceremony where ‘the girl's side’ was meeting ‘the boy's side’ in order 
to agree on each family's commitments to the future couple for their wedding. This 
meeting was the last step before the union was sealed by a wedding ceremony. The 
family of the bride-to-be, living in Gawgyi, received at home the family of the 
future husband, coming from another village. Before their arrival, the bride's family 
and some of Gawgyi's single females prepared tea and cakes. The main room of the 
house was emptied to install tables and benches under the indications of U Lin. 
Little by little, the village elders arrived, including U Maung and U Htay. The future 
husband, anxious, helped with the preparations. The ‘husband's side’ then arrived 
in a compact group, composed of his parents, a few uncles and aunts, the “official 
elder” and the headman of his village of residence. After a quick and courteous 
exchange between the two ‘sides,’ everyone settled around the tables: one off-
centre for the different elders, another to the south for the boy's side, another to the 
north for the girl's side and a fourth at the centre for the negotiations. 
 
560 Where they are known by a generic name (say-sat-pwe [sic], “engagement ceremony”). 
561 A literal translation of tinhta-ngway could be: the “wealth placed (on the couple) for their 
enjoyment”. This gift is also called hkinwin pyitsi or the “properties (given) to enter (the relation) in 
good terms”. 
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 The parents of the future spouses faced each other in the company of U 
Maung and the village headman of the bridegroom. Ko Kyaw stayed in the 
background and let U Maung manage the affair. Once tea and cakes were served 
and consumed, the latter got up to talk. He began his speech by insisting on the 
fundamental principles of the bonds of marriage, on the rules and duties of each 
spouse in a couple (the man must provide for the needs of the household, the woman 
must diligently manage the domestic economy, it is necessary to show mutual 
understanding and to avoid conflicts between spouses, with their families and their 
neighbours, and so forth). He then listed the assets and amounts that the two 
families accepted to give to the future couple. The list was given to him shortly after 
the boy’s arrival. Once his monologue was over, U Maung sat down and let 
whoever wanted to speak do so. The parents of each spouse remained silent at first, 
leaving the initiative to the village headman of the boy. But he was quickly cut off 
by the bride’s mother. She asked who will pay for the wedding. Following the 
custom, the parents of the future husband agreed to pay for the ceremony to be held 
in Gawgyi. They had therefore to pay for the rental of Gawgyi’s common properties 
on the spot. Gawgyi villagers will take care of organising the workforce. 
Discussions restarted among the groups in a growing hubbub. Questions were 
flying. “With what you have, you could give more, right?”, “Are we talking about 
an inheritance or just a wedding present?”. The tension, palpable, increased. U 
Maung then took over with the help of the boy's village headman. They ask the 
parents of the future spouses to specify if what is given for marriage will be 
considered as inheritance or not. Gradually, the two families reached agreement. 
The room returned to calm; the agreement was stated aloud to all persons thus taken 
as witness. But before leaving Gawgyi, some women on the boy's side accused the 
bride of not being a virgin. The bodies clenched, they approached her, raising their 
voices, pointing at her, while she took cover behind the members of her family. The 
headmen and elders from both villages attempted to restore calm while getting the 
boy's family members out of the house and back to their motorbikes in a hurry. The 
wedding took place one month later. 
 This meeting shows how marriages are both a family affair and a village 
affair. A family affair, because it implies a mutual evaluation of what can be given 
to the future spouses. Each family assesses the status, reputation and assets of the 
other beforehand, while evaluating its own ability to give and transmit. Marriage is 
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a key stage in the constitution of individuals and potentially the time when one 
receives one's share of inheritance (chapter 7). The stakes are high. It is therefore a 
time when parents must clarify their children's entitlement to property according to 
their socio-economic trajectories. Parents must also reflect on how they will carry 
out their future parental duties (novitiates, schooling, marriage, inheritance), while 
taking into account their own means of subsistence and potential risk unforeseen in 
the future. However, the meeting is also a village affair in that the cohesion of 
families eases the cohesion of the village. The mechanism put in place to negotiate 
and witness the agreement between families is based on the idea that the village is 
a collective space where the morality of individuals must be recalled, and 
commitments sanctioned. Negotiations between families are ordered in space (the 
four tables), mediatised and witnessed. The witness-mediators are all the more 
important because they embody both a morality linked to experience and a system 
of proof. On the one hand, the headmen of the two villages take note of the 
agreement concluded in the event that a conflict emerges in the future. On the other 
hand, a certain number of people experienced in this type of exercise are present: 
the ‘elders’ are privileged witnesses, as are the ‘official elders’. U Maung is the 
traditional officiant for this type of meeting. He is known for his moderation and 
his ability to reconcile people by stressing in his speeches the difficult, but 
necessary, balance in human relations. And Ko Kyaw listened. The role of officiant 
is assigned to U Maung because his word is legitimate. He can give a sermon on 
how to direct one’s life in the right way, because he has proven it in the past and 
still proves it today. In other words, he embodies a certain village ethic and 
promotes a common good (a life without conflict, balanced alliances) which 
strengthens, while producing, his position as a lugyi. 
 Once again, Ko Kyaw appears at the margins of this event. As headman, he 
is a privileged witness of this ceremony of engagement. But the performing of the 
ritual and the meaning associated with marriage are fields of politics that go beyond 
headship and belong to the political landscape. 
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U HTAY AND A DISPUTE 
 
 Our last lugyi is the most important. This is U Htay, whom I called the Worthy 
in chapter 5, a former village headman who then became the ‘official elder’ and Ko 
Kyaw’s brother-in-law. His trajectory and how he takes charge of village affairs 
show another way the greatness of a lugyi is produced, at the interface between 
charismatic leadership and the embodiment of the common good. 
 U Htay past achievements have been described in in chapter 5. Among them, 
one can remember how he embodied propriety on the model of the last men of hpon 
(U To Kaing and U Za Nay Ya) during a moment of moral rupture that saw the 
emergence of self-reliance and the rise of village affairs as the form of Gawgyi 
politics. When headman, he notably embodied a shift in how headship was 
performed in contrast with U Win the Infamous. He also built a road connecting 
Gawgyi to Monywa, assembled donations for it and negotiated with villagers for 
them to give part of their land. He was renowned for not taking bribes and he kept 
farmers’ tax receipts at home in case any issues of ownership would arise (as he 
experienced with the construction of a poultry zone). When he refused to compete 
for another mandate as headman, a political crisis unfolded in Myinmilaung tract 
(chapter 5). At that moment, he proclaimed himself ‘official elder’ in order to keep 
an eye on local politics while this status protected him from being pushed to become 
headman again to some extent. This was a first move for distancing himself from 
officials. Yet, under his tenure, the domain of village affairs, drawing from the 
traditions of luhmuyay, expanded and nowadays includes the organisation of 
ceremonies, the management of the water and electricity systems, the rebuilding of 
roads, the treatment of the sick and the dead, dealing with NGOs, managing 
government loans and the enlarging the village among other issues. These 
challenges were not totally new, and village affairs existed since the creation of 
Gawgyi to some extent. What was new was the articulation of social affairs with 
new stakes at a moment of rupture with the state in the late 1990s, early 2000s. U 
Htay remained a central player in Gawgyi as guardian of village affairs, even more 
since he has stopped being headman. Besides, his general knowledge is valued, and 
his understanding of Buddhist morality is called upon during conflict. He is also 
interested in astrology and his erudition is regularly used to name children or to 
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guide the building of houses according to the flows of fortune and misfortune. 
Overall, he has chosen to take charge of village affairs by staying away from 
government control while emphasising the responsibility of villagers in common 
affairs. This middle position, difficult to hold, makes the worth of U Htay. 
 The dispute explored below shows that, today, he is the only one able to settle 
a conflict related to the building of Gawgyi power grid. This case shows how 
conflict resolution requires the ability to supersede individual issues by invoking a 
common good, that is, to defend village affairs. 
 In the middle of the 2016 rainy season, the Monywa Township authorities 
announced that electricity will be delivered to villages within two miles of the city's 
administrative boundaries. Gawgyi was one of them. The newly elected village 
headman, U So from Myinmilaung, informed the villagers during a meeting at 
Gawgyi’s school attended by at least one person per family. The conditions were 
as follows: in order to install the electric pylons, it was necessary to widen the roads 
of the village which should be twenty feet wide for the largest and twelve for the 
others. Villagers should therefore clean, level and sometimes give up some of their 
living space to widen the paths. They should accept these conditions unanimously 
or else the project risks being aborted. The project was accepted. But tensions soon 
arose over the areas to be ceded, the rights of passage of the living and the dead and 
the question of the future expansion of the village. 
 In theory, the village headman and the heads of ten households should have 
been the mediators of the project. However, the task fell on the lugyi, and on U Htay 
in particular. Ko Kyaw did not have a say in this kind of issue anymore. Having 
direct access to a path is essential for every household. The houses are built and 
oriented according to the main roads which channel auspicious and non-auspicious 
flows between the auspicious gate east of Gawgyi, and the inauspicious gate to the 
south. For example, the villagers who died in the village must be evacuated from 
their homes by a path going through the village and leading to the cemetery. The 
dead body’s journey must be made without passing through the enclosure of a 
neighbouring house so as not to disorient the dead man's butterfly soul562 to 
facilitate his transmigration. The paths thus structure the village space. It is the same 
for the cemetery (to the southwest), the monastery (to the north) and the altar of the 
 
562 Cf. the section “Ko Kyaw’s political navigation” in the general introduction. 
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village naq (to the southeast) which are not however ‘part’ of the village, but which 
limit its extension. The widening of roads has triggered the issue of road access, 
especially in newly inhabited areas, as well as the question of the future expansion 
of Gawgyi to the southeast. Overall, U Htay dealt with each problem on a case-by-
case basis during the month of August 2016. But the case below is interesting 
because it involves our three lugyi. 
 
 
Figure 26. Sketch of the households involved in the dispute 
 Gawgyi is roughly divided into four parts by a north-south and an east-west 
route (figure 2). The case in question is located in the southeast quarter where a 
path sinks toward the houses further south from the main east-west axis. This path 
passes in front of the house of U Maung to finish at the gates of the houses of A and 
B (who do not get along) and U Lin’s house is located behind them. In other words, 
U Lin’s family members do not have direct access to a village path. They must 
either go through a neighbouring house or leave the village. This does not pose any 
problems for accessing electricity, as it would suffice to extend the power line. 
However, the situation is more complicated because they want the path to be 
extended to their living space, even if it means cutting it in half. This path could 
then join a future road which would skirt the village on its southeast edge, and so 
promote its enlargement. In addition, U Lin's family demanded this extension in 
House
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order to bring their future dead to the cemetery in the best conditions. How, then, 
can A and B agree to cede part of their land to the village without giving the 
impression of having to align themselves with U Lin's wishes while overcoming the 
animosities between neighbours? 
 The village headman was warned of the case but did not wish to intercede, 
knowing all too well that his instructions would not be listened to. For Ko Kyaw, it 
was an example of how hard it can be to ‘perform’ headmanship, as the authority 
of a headman cannot easily overcome how people want to deal with their own 
affairs. As for U Maung, who was close to the people involved, he preferred not to 
intervene in order to avoid any accusation of taking sides. For the road to be 
extended and widened, each of the three families (A, B and U Lin) must give some 
of their land. This is not a problem for U Lin who wants to alienate a little of his 
housing space to have access to a path. But he can't be judge and jury. For A and 
B, who disagree on the portion to be given, the situation is different. A can only 
give two to three feet, because her house adjoins the edge of their modest living 
space. B, having a larger area, should then give at least ten feet. To convince the 
protagonists of the need to expand the path, one must be able to assert something 
legitimate, something that neither U Maung nor U Lin can do in this case. One has 
to be outside and above the game to be able to settle this consensually so that the 
village gain access to electricity. Describing an intra-village conflict (a story of 
insults between neighbours) Nash tells how such an agreement was reached during 
his fieldwork: 
 
“Restauration of “cool minds” among neighbours can only be done if a 
direct confrontation between the contestants is avoided. A direct 
confrontation means that a quarrel is pushed to the point at which 
somebody must clearly be the victor and somebody clearly be the 
vanquished. […]. The procedures of settling a dispute follow the dictate 
of making a clear issue out of the case. The process allows each person 
to keep his dignity, to compromise indirectly, and to indicate 
subscription to the norms of peaceful interaction.” (Nash 1965: 84). 
 
 Nash therefore insists on the search for consensus as well as on the 
importance of the authority of elders and the village leader (the man of hpon) for 
 353 
solving conflicts. More precisely, making a clear issue out of the case is similar to 
what Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) call the “process of generalising”: U Htay, 
grasping the ins and outs of the problem, took up this case. To resolve this conflict, 
he pleaded for the common future of the village whose extension to the south-east 
is being recorded. He argued with A and B – separately and without confronting 
the two families to each other – about the need to anticipate the extension of the 
village, to create new paths to bring the dead to the cemetery and the need to reach 
a consensus so that electricity arrives (finally) in Gawgyi. Furthermore, he 
promised B that the levelling of the land ceded to the village would not be at his 
expense, and that U Lin would be responsible for the works. The difficulty, 
concerning land, is related to what we described in the previous chapter, that there 
are potentially multiple claims on the housing area among A and B families. 
Convincing them to alienate part of it to facilitate the passage of a neighbour’s dead 
in anticipation of the enlargement of the village can be demanding. It requires to 
give credit to all potential claims and to show why this or that perspective is greater 
in a specific context. 
 U Htay's ability to reach consensus stems from his ability to overtake specific 
claims and assert a common interest. Guarding village affairs in that sense is a 
‘process of generalising’ by enforcing an idea of the common good. The common 
good covers a broad spectrum ranging, in this case, from the treatment of the dead 
to the enlargement of the village while going beyond the level of neighbourhood 
relations. Anticipating the extension of the village, promoting the fortune of the 
villagers, organising access to electricity: these are issues affecting Gawgyi as a 
whole. If U Htay is legitimate to assert and embody this interest, it is because he 
has demonstrated his worth in the past and continues to do so. He has achieved a 
certain degree of independence by moving cautiously between family and 
neighbourhood relationships, government and clientelism. He has the qualities of 
the leader described by Nash, but he does not throne at the top of a clientele. The 
men of hpon are long gone, but their memory remains, and the defence of village 
affairs is nowadays the fragile state of local politics in Gawgyi. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This chapter has explored how the worth of the lugyi comes from their 
engagement in village affairs by promoting different forms of common good. The 
three persons presented here had pushed in the past decades for village affairs to be 
maintained and enhanced, combining more traditional forms of sociality with new 
stakes in order to organise collective life following previous model of propriety in 
face of a violent and disengaging state. To do so, they used local institutions (head 
of bachelors, master of ceremonies, official elder) which are central to the domain 
of social affairs and upheld local ethics in situations where the worth of people is 
evaluated (mutual help, union of couple, consensus in disputes). In contrast with 
the analyses emphasising clientelist and meritorious hierarchy, the question of the 
village as a collective is key to understand power relations in Gawgyi and in fine, 
the worth and authority of its lugyi. Two points must be recalled. First, the fact that 
the current monk and his predecessor never really achieved a degree of recognition 
in the village as did U Za Nay Ya and their disengagement from villagers affairs is 
important to understand why the latter also ‘did by themselves’. Second, the three 
lugyi have credentials: they are all part of the main lineages of the village, they are 
educated and are, except for U Lin, large farmers who can take time outside of the 
field. Thus, even if they participated in the transformation of the local political 
landscape, they are still part of an ingrained hierarchy (chapter 4). 
 Describing a novitiate ceremony first showed that, in addition to the ways in 
which people engage with each other through various transactions (meritorious, 
monetary, food offerings, mutual aid, and so on), a shinbyu is also a village matter. 
Indeed, doing a shinbyu in Gawgyi requires the organisation of a collective for the 
mutual assistance to take place and be effective. U Lin is responsible for it in the 
shadow of the ritual pump. In addition, among the multiple forms of engagement 
occurring during a shinbyu (merit sharing, aid-money, food offering, music, giving 
a son to the monastery, and so forth), washing dishes, building the ceremonial 
pavilion, serving food, or cooking are all tests that measured the involvement of 
people. Their engagement in collective affairs is then central to defining the village 
as a political space. We also saw the union of couples is also a collective stake since 
a system of publicity and mediation sanctions the commitment of the spouses' 
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families, a system headed by U Maung who embodies the good order of the local 
life to some extent.  
 In addition, the common good can sometimes include the issue of the 
treatment of the dead, the extension of the village, but also the regulation of 
neighbourhood relations. U Htay's ability to promote the common good is 
intimately linked to his past actions where he has demonstrated integrity and a 
constant commitment to the entire village. The lugyi are therefore village leaders of 
a different type than the “man of hpon” described by Nash. Their worth does not 
depend on the quantity or number of their donations. Besides, neither patronage nor 
the field of merit – two forms of engagement that create hierarchy between people 
– fully reflect their bigness. This chapter showed that in the hollow of the 
contradictions between the multiple forms of engagement lies the realm of 
luhmuyay, which, cast in Gawgyi’s politics at the turn of the twenty-first century, 
became the domain of village affairs oriented by lugyi. The village issues therefore 
cross all the others, to different degrees, in that “my affairs” (kokoyay) potentially 
belongs to “social affairs” (luhmuyay). Thus, by making village affairs a space of 
engagement where the worth of people is gauged according to a common good, the 
lugyi are producing a (fragile) social order. They created their role as guardians of 
village affairs in a specific historical context.  To broaden the conclusions beyond 
the scope of this chapter alone, three more points should be added. First, by arguing 
that village affairs became the form of Gawgyi politics where bigmen build their 
authority, as during the selection of the headman in 2016, the making of ceremonies 
and the resolution of disputes, this work shows how local politics is a matter of 
excluding some individuals and entrusting others (the bigmen) to ‘take charge’ of 
local affairs. In Gawgyi, it was so notably because they exemplify propriety through 
their engagement toward the collective, but in many other places, such as in 
Myinmilaung proper or many villages of the Ayeyarwady delta, such engagement 
occurs at the margins.  
 Second, Gawgyi lugyi, no matter how legitimate they may be, still represent 
the elite sitting at the top of a local hierarchy that has transformed during the past 
century, as we saw in chapter 4. They are not the same kind of patron that colonisers 
and scholars imagined as the natural chief of the countryside, but rather descendants 
of large families of peasants who monopolised village leadership and remained 
influential by investing in inheritance politics. As we saw in the description of the 
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2016 selection, the voices of villagers are channelled, delegated and often excluded 
through, to and by this type of leaders who are entrusted to ‘take care’ of collective 
affairs. 
 Third, where does the headman sit in this picture? He is in a rather ambiguous 
position. Even if the official role of headship has not changed a lot throughout the 
twentieth century, Ko Kyaw is in a different position than U Nyunt, the first 
headman of Myinmilaung tract, or U To Kaing for instance. He had to deal with 
other kinds of leaders (past headmen, current lugyi, Township officials, monks, and 
so on) and stakes, and the scope of his authority was constrained by the fashioning 
of the local polity. He navigated a different political landscape than the lugyi, as 
they chose to keep distant with the state. But Ko Kyaw did not only operate in and 
for Myinmilaung tract. That was not the sole arena for him. He also had to craft his 
position in a landscape built in the past decades, a landscape delineated by the 
making of collective affairs, the evaluation of propriety and expressed through a 
sense of belonging. Overall, it means for him embodying a mistrusted position 
while having to be trustworthy, playing both sides against the middle to craft his 
authority.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 We have now reached the end of a journey that brought us from the 2016 
selection of Myinmilaung headman back to the creation of the villages in order to 
understand how headship became an ambiguous position of power. I hope to have 
demonstrated that Ko Kyaw’s dilemmas were different from those of the first 
headman. For the latter, becoming headman has been a matter of accommodating 
colonialism when village headship emerged as a central political institution to 
compete for during a period of warfare. For Ko Kyaw, it meant embodying a 
dubious position while showing a degree of trustworthiness in his daily encounters 
to craft his authority. Between both individuals, the local political landscape has 
evolved as a network of past and present personalities, hierarchies, stakes, places 
and memories fashioned through time and made meaningful in current politics. The 
following first present the main historical and anthropological conclusions this 
thesis points at before summarising the findings drawn from each chapter. 
 The main theoretical conclusion this work points towards is that political 
continuities are made of transformations. Historically, one major insight is that the 
colonial period should not be configured as an historical rupture. A considerable 
historical metanarrative about the impact of colonial rule on Burma draws on the 
notion that the introduction of the headman and village system was traumatic and 
transformative and that it completely destabilised traditional authority by removing 
traditional elites and reorganised space and land around new lines. By suggesting 
that the operation of traditional elites was less homogeneous than this narrative 
requires, and that the local conflicts around who possessed authority, its limits and 
operations, was a pre-existing framework onto which the headman system became 
attached rather than was displaced by, this work contribute to a more nuanced 
understanding of historical continuities and changes. In addition, the social memory 
of division between two villages shows historical relations to be fraught with 
tensions and contests that relate as much to pre-colonial structures as much as a 
reconfiguration of village system boundaries during and after colonialism. The 
legacy of this older relationship remains inscribed even until today, while the 
meanings attached to the figure of the headman have also evolved through time and 
in relation to the wider politics of local and national domains. Another historical 
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implication is that, by focusing attention on the local operation of power and its 
everyday practice, the thesis helps move away from a simplistic dichotomy between 
so-called ‘Highlands’ and ‘Lowlands’ in Myanmar. Rather than seeing power in 
lowland areas as coherent and institutionalised, they rather appear also subject to 
constant negotiation through local knowledge systems relating to kinship, history, 
morality, responsibility, obligation, powerful-ness and powerless-ness. In many 
ways, this argument challenges the idea of ‘state power’ running seamlessly through 
institutions into a local setting via the figure of the headman and presents as messy 
a daily landscape as seen elsewhere. 
 In terms of political anthropology, this study has made a case for seeing local 
leadership figures as paradoxical and ambiguous. It has shown that the headman is 
extremely constrained in his position as an intermediary between the local 
inhabitants and the state. At the same time, it insists on the decisive role of bigmen 
as collective organisers. Yet, neither the headman nor the bigmen have any real 
binding power. One further avenue would be to compare this case with Amerindian 
chiefdoms – as institutions without power allowing the perpetuation of a consensus 
and the avoidance of an important social differentiation563 – or with the Oceania 
model of bigmen — those figures of entrepreneurial leaders who gather people 
around them in collective projects, but whose influence can collapse radically if 
they fail to redistribute.564 The local society depicted in this work appears very 
differentiated, and the influence of bigmen linked not only to their moral qualities 
but also to their belonging to great families. Therefore, refining this research would 
require studying the actual, material power of these families as well as the central 
power relations in which they are caught. This thesis has attempted to link with a 
variety of academic debates regarding history and political anthropology. New 
avenues for research have been identified with room for changes in terms of 
methodology, reflexivity and voice. The following summarises the more detailed 
findings of each chapter. 
 The focus on the precolonial period has shown that competition for 
leadership, traffic in affiliations and fragmentation of authority were the main 
political dynamics in the countryside and that they endured the colonial encounter. 
 
563 As understood notably by Clastres (1989). 
564 As studied by Godelier and Strathern (1991) and Strathern (2009). 
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Descent groups anchored their settlements by composing with a landscape shaped 
through the expansion of farm cultivation, the transformation of spirit cults and 
Buddhism, and the affiliation with local chiefdoms. It produced and delineated 
diverse, if not opposed, senses of belonging. In that vein, Gawgyi and 
Myinmilaung’s founding narratives claim specific links with the landscape which 
show how the fluid system of precolonial status groups (servicemen vs. 
commoners) still pervades the political landscape in the form of differentiated 
entitlements to indigenousness (genuine allochthones vs. autochthones). Therefore, 
this thesis has enjoined, via the example of the opposition between Myinmilaung 
proper and Gawgyi, seeing local legends and myths as historical sources and 
discourses about contemporary issues. 
 This work has also challenged the understanding of the precolonial gentry as 
a monolithic group and the imposition of village headship as a change in the nature 
of authority. In that sense, the emergence of the village system appears as a search 
for traditions in which ‘local customs’ travelled together with colonial officers in 
an attempt to ‘pacify’ the landscape. But the actual creation of Myinmilaung tract 
was more of a process of accommodation of colonialism which provided the means 
– the village system, the revenue system and the courts – to contest the obligations 
and customs regulating access to land and wealth, notably within family relations 
and tenancies agreements. Village headship was thus as much a product of local 
politics as a colonial device when Myinmilaung tract became a locus of politics. 
Myinmilaung then turned as a scalable political space while headship became a 
matter of individuals when successive leaders embodied different postures 
reflecting local political issues.  
 The shift from the first two headmen, U Nyunt and U Shwe, to U To Kaing, 
combined with the arrival of Gawgyi’s first monk U Za Nay Ya illustrates how 
some individuals – known as the last men of hpon – became exemplars of the 
moralisation of behaviours and engagement in people’s affairs when villagers 
reimagined their role as Buddhists and challenged colonial rule during the first 
decades of the twentieth century. This perspective has allowed us to think about this 
period not only as a moment of social disintegration, but as a phase of 
reorganisation of political authority through the belonging to large farming families. 
The remnants of the precolonial gentry such as U Po Shi, a money lender from 
Thazi, were not entirely uprooted from the landscape during the first half of the 
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twentieth century. But their hold was reduced as the families of large peasants were 
able to buffer land reform projects either emanating from the state or armed groups 
during the decades surrounding the country’s independence. These families 
monopolised local leadership when the hierarchy transformed into a divided 
between “real farmers” (taungthu) and mere “labourers” (myaukthu). U To Kaing 
thus sat at the juncture between the colonial headman, the man of hpon and 
propriety, on the one hand, and the representative of the new local order, on the 
other. The fact that some leaders became exemplary figures of the moralisation of 
behaviours engaged in lay affairs during the contest of colonial rule marks a gradual 
shift in the form of authority from charismatic leadership towards worthiness and 
propriety. In turn, it pushed for the rethinking of Nash’s concepts about power and 
authority by showing how past and present contexts – and not just individuals’ 
quality such as hpon – are critical in evaluating the worth of leaders. 
 During the socialist period (1962-1988), state policies heightened the divide 
between farmers and labourers and tightened its control on local affairs while 
producing the image of a countryside of farmers-owners – when many, if not most, 
were labourers, dependants and tenants. With the gradual collapse of Ne Win’s 
regime, finding trade-offs with the local authorities was not seen as a strategy 
anymore, but rather as a push to cheat and bribe. If the bloodshed of 1988 was not 
a rupture in Gawgyi as it was in the capital, it contributed to increased distrust 
towards officials on many levels. And locally, the rupture came later. After the 
disengagement of the state from local affairs following the revolts, U Win, headman 
from 1995 to 2006, embodied the growing corruption and violence of the state when 
forced labour was reintroduced at a large scale in the dry zone. The next change of 
headman, from U Win the Infamous to U Htay the Worthy, echoed a broader rupture 
in local politics. It was a shift from distrust and corruption to trustworthiness and 
propriety. And U Htay gradual estrangement with the state after his tenure was 
counterbalanced by a commitment to Gawgyi affairs on the model of the last men 
of hpon. Village affairs were progressively being reinvested by the local elite who 
were articulating new stakes within a more traditional form of sociality (luhmuyay), 
making collective undertakings the fragile form of local politics at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century. In other words, in reaction to state disengagement from 
local affairs, a self-reliance ideology took place in Gawgyi and is symbolised by 
how a group of bigmen has started making the engagement in village affairs a field 
 361 
of politics. By doing so, they changed the meaning attached to the word lugyi, 
giving it a more moral significance. Yet, they are nonetheless the descendants of 
large families of peasants who monopolised village leadership and remained 
influent by investing in inheritance whose transmission has organised local land 
relations throughout the past two centuries. 
 Today, the lugyi are entrusted to ‘take care of’ and to be ‘responsible for’ 
village affairs, that is, to be their guardians. This practice of leadership depends on 
the delimitation between what is the private and the political. On one side, village 
and social affairs came to be a space of engagement where the worth of people is 
evaluated, and which is scaled through the handling of ceremonies and the 
resolution of disputes, creating a space of belonging and mutual help. On the other 
side, family affairs and one’s own affairs are part of the private. But both ‘fields’ – 
the private and the political – speak the same language. This thesis has shown that 
through the transmission of inheritance, family leadership is also a matter of ‘taking 
care of’ the properties and the people belonging to a family tied together through 
social and moral obligations. In other words, the private and the political constantly 
merge and distance themselves from one another. This has two implications. 
 First, it means that in the field of the political – village affairs – the voices of 
villagers are channelled through, delegated to and often excluded by the lugyi. 
Entrustment and exclusion are central processes of local politics. Second, it means 
that the village headman – Ko Kyaw – was in an ambiguous position as he was 
sitting at the crossroads between village affairs, village government and family 
relationships. The memories of past men of propriety, the examples set by the lugyi 
and their estrangement with the violent state, the opposition between Gawgyi and 
Myinmilaung and the presence of ‘infamous’ persons in land disputes for instance 
all affected his ability to craft his authority. By following Ko Kyaw in his daily life, 
this thesis has argued that any analysis of village headship as a mere formal 
institution is doomed to miss the point. In an attempt to renew the anthropological 
debate about headship by looking at it as a matter of uncertain engagement, political 
navigation and craftmanship, I hope that my work has shown how the particular 
enactment of past ruptures and memories of previous leaders and current forms of 
engagement impinged on Ko Kyaw’s practice of headship. By becoming headman, 
he endorsed a legacy and embodied a position most people distrust while having to 
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comply with the organisation of village affairs by following a model of propriety 
that is key to the definition of Gawgyi identity. 
 If no one overtly wants to become headman it is not only because headship 
does not “offer sufficient incentives in terms of influence, prestige, religious merit 
or financial profit relative to disincentives such as time, financial cost, public 
criticism and […] exposure to pressure from township authorities.” (Kempel: 2012: 
70). It is rather because it is where the private, the political, and the government 
converge, in a landscape that has been fashioned throughout two centuries where 
memories of ruptures, violence and propriety have come to the forefront. The fight 
for headship is constrained by the state of local stakes in each village tract, the 
family stories, the filiation issues and the historical opposition between villages. It 
remains a move for one-upmanship for candidates with credentials who are part of 
the local elite that pushes for controlling headship, nonetheless. But one also has to 
deal with forces and obligations that are intimately linked with the constant merging 
and distancing of the private and the political. Keeping this ambiguity may have 
been in the government’s interest, as it provides a means to engage collective 
responsibility through a single person, but this remains a speculative assumption.  
 It is clear that this local society is a historical construct and this thesis has 
attempted to outline some of the ways that landscape has been shaped from a 
particular and personal viewpoint. There has been and must be other ways. Politics 
in this part of Myanmar have often been studied in relation to Burmese Buddhism 
or the state for instance, and this work intentionally took the risk to shift the focus 
to contrast and complement these approaches. Its aim was not to be fully 
comprehensive or objective, but to express as much as possible the particulars of a 
place and its people through encounters that can only be subjective. Hence, the 
emphasis on the forms of engagement and obligations. My background, wishes and 
flaws influenced how I engaged with people in Gawgyi and beyond in certain 
situations. It produced an understanding of their life and dilemmas that I could only 
partially represent here. As much as any anthropological study is ridden by issues 
of trust and doubt, the same tension lies between this thesis and its audience. As 
stated in the introduction and in the chapter on reflexivity, I chose to use specific 
life stories and situations as examples of the uncertainties, continuities and ruptures 
at play in one particular location. My aim was not to use their private lives to make 
 363 
my point, but to anchor any understanding of their dilemmas and experiences 
through a fragmentary, yet revealing, account of their lives and history.  
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APPENDIX A. GAWGYI CADASTRAL MAP 
 
 
Map of Gawgyi kwin (made in 1897-98, remade in 1946-47, 1965-66 and updated 
until 2012).  
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APPENDIX B. ESSAYS ON THE FORMS OF ENGAGEMENT 
 
One of the themes that particularly caught my attention was the ways people engage 
with each other. Contained between the poles of violence and friendship, I wanted 
to show how the various forms of engagement are characterised by ambiguity and 
uncertainty. To do this, I have studied the different forms of exchange and how the 
transfers of things and services both organise sociality, but are also always, and 
above all, subject to interpretation. The following texts (Football misunderstanding 
and How to get screwed) aim to describe a situation and an encounter that triggered 
this interest and allowed me to explain it. The style of these texts and their 
incompleteness made it difficult to integrate them within the thesis, but they are 
intimately tied to the ways I came to reflect on the subject of this work and so, I 
decided to place them in this appendix that works as a complement of some of the 
points raised elsewhere in the core of the text. 
 
FOOTBALL MISUNDERSTANDING 
 
 One telling example of my guest dilemma happened when I became trainer 
for Gawgyi’s football team. After a month or so, I played regularly with youngsters 
in the evenings, taking advantage of the falling heat at sunset. As nearly all other 
villages in the region, Gawgyi has a team of its own. These teams compete in 
various leagues from the most local championships involving neighbouring 
villages, to regional ones. Gawgyi was not very successful anymore, to the great 
disarray of the previous generation which spot a lack of dedication in the current 
team. As Ko Kyaw’s brother puts it, “it used to be better before”. Matches are times 
of great intensity. During regional encounters, two hundred people would gather at 
a stadium. Football matches, together with pagoda festivals, donation ceremonies, 
spirit festivals and markets are the only gathering allowed. It is mostly composed 
of males who invariably chew betel, argue with the referee and tease the players at 
will. Females are fewer but louder when someone scores a goal. They gather at one 
end of the pitch and heartedly support their team which, usually, is from their 
village. Matches are also intense because there are like fights. A small group of 
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men, sometimes including monks, is always there, armed with sticks, to restore 
calm. Except for the local matches between neighbouring villages who “get along 
well”. 
Gawgyi team has a captain, Moe Gyi, son of Daw Nu and Ko Kyaw’s 
stepbrother. Moe Gyi, in his mid-twenties, keeps the team’s ball and chasubles at 
home most of the time. Those are a kind of collective property and most villages 
have one or two balls at most. He recruited me for the evening trainings. These 
trainings were actually real matches and I could not help myself thinking that there 
was not a real team, but rather a bunch of young guys willing to score goals like 
their icons evolving in the Champion’s league. I was obviously judging with the 
standards I learned at the Football camp of my French hometown. So, I started to 
plan ‘real’ trainings. Having between ten and fifteen players but only one ball was 
a challenge. We manage with the means at hand. For instance, once the sorghum 
reaped – the football ground is used as a threshing floor after the harvest – we use 
the piles for slalom exercise. Every time, once the training was over, Moe Gyi or 
another fellow would attempt to offer me a soda. I could hardly refuse. After 
another month, I had to travel to the city of Yangon for a couple of weeks. There, I 
bought two balls of good quality, and bought three more in Monywa along with 
studs to enhance training sessions. I thought it would be accepted as I made a case 
for having several balls in order to do a proper training. When I arrived back in 
Gawgyi, the kids were thrilled. One of Ko Kyaw nephews, who is a major player 
in the team, took a selfie with the balls and posted it on Facebook straight away.  
When Moe Gyi came back from work and saw the package, his face 
changed. I guessed he felt some sort of confusion. I did not understand why the 
‘presents’ did not make him happy. He seemed not at ease at all. Those were just 
balls and plastic studs, nothing more. I tried to figure out his reaction while 
explaining my motives: the balls were my contribution for the team and for the 
village kids; they have been hosting me so far without asking me anything, so I 
wanted to reciprocate and being useful. When I finally asked him directly about his 
feeling, he explained his reaction by saying, “a-na-lo”. Literally, “because (lo) [his] 
strength (a) [was] hurt (na). A-na-de is a crucial concept in Burmese and its 
meanings overcome any single definition. I heard it several times, in a variety of 
contexts, making it difficult to grasp its significance. Moe Gyi’s face was fraught 
with meaning and, from that moment onward, acts as a souvenir of the plasticity of 
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words. The work of Bekker in social psychology based on a study of children's 
essays and adult interviews gives an idea of the potential meanings of a-na-de. For 
her, it is used in a large array of situations:  
 
“1. observance of respectful behaviour, especially as related to age; 
using proper language modes of address. 
2. inability to express self-assertive needs or to resist social pressure 
which requires one to take part in unwanted social activities. 
3. desire not to impose on others, not to be a nuisance or inconvenience 
to others, especially those who are not intimates; timidity. 
4. control and fear of aggression by self and others, both inadvertent 
physical aggression and verbal aggression; avoidance of ridiculing, 
shamming, causing loss of face, or criticising in a face-to-face situation. 
5. observation of proprieties of behaviour as formally defined by 
situation or status; observing proper forms of giving and receiving 
hospitality; observing sex taboos to conform with social expectations 
as to proper behaviour between the sexes. 
6. maintenance of balance of obligations; being aware of obligations to 
family, neighbors, and friends; feeling distressed when unable to fulfil 
obligation to a benefactor; feeling hesitant to accept favors from a 
stranger which can not be returned. 
7. sensitivity to others’ needs; empathy, with desire to make friends or 
family members happy; compassion or pity for those in need, with 
stress on sharing.” (1981: 19, my emphases). 
 
 Another Burmese friend recently told me in plain English that for him, it 
could be translated as “feeling backward to put oneself forward.” In other words, 
the expression relates to the social and moral obligations between people and the 
latter changed depending on this or that persons’ status during specific moments 
that create the temporalities of relationships (interactions, transactions, succession 
of generations, seniority, and so on). It expresses a feeling that something in a 
situation could go wrong. 
Reflecting on this event, I think Moe Gyi felt a-na-de because I short-
circuited the way proper forms in giving and receiving hospitality are observed. In 
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other words, because I was a guest in the village and because he was the captain of 
the team, I should not have been the one providing ‘things’. Buying balls and studs 
was interpreted by Moe Gyi as a failure to fulfil his responsibility to some degree.  
A guest should not be responsible for the team. Thus, what I thought being a way 
to do my bit transformed into a question of responsibility and obligations. At the 
very moment when I tried not to be a guest, I was pulled back into that position. In 
other words, the ethnographer is by nature in an ambiguous position which often 
comes up against the normal course of events. The day after, Moe Gyi and his wife 
insisted that I had dinner at their place. The following weeks, he insisted twice as 
much on buying me something at the betel shop after training sessions. I assume 
now that it was a way for him to rebalance our relationship, to fulfil or maintain a 
balance of obligations. But, somehow, the gift was too great to be given back. Moe 
Gyi was not rich and even if the balls were not expensive for me, they were for him. 
I could not argue on this and Ko Kyaw and his brother spent few hours explaining 
me this kind of relationship. From that event onward, I attempted to temper any 
situation that could put me in place of Moe Gyi’s ‘patron’. 
 This drama led to a reflection on the relationships between responsibility, a-
na-de, reciprocity, obligations and patronage. When I gave (payde) the balls, Moe 
Gyi thanks me, or rather was grateful (kyayzutinde). Yet, because I am a guest, I 
should not be helping the team to a certain degree. Therefore, what I thought being 
a gift (without asking return) was understood as a sort of favour (kyayzupyude). 
Moe Gyi was thus in a dilemma: having a guest – toward whom he wanted to respect 
a set of obligations – who became a sort of benefactor (kyayzushin). His reaction 
(a-na-de) expressed this particular dilemma. And yet, it was nearly impossible for 
him to reciprocate. In Burmese, the expression “kyayzu”, commonly (and wrongly) 
translated as “to thank” is the intransitive form of the verb “kyay” which, in its 
transitive form (hkyay), means to loan or borrow (and by extension a fee). In other 
words, it refers to a transaction. Yet, there are two kinds of “borrowing 
transactions” according to its nature and especially to what is transferred: either one 
gives back the exact same thing, either it will be an equivalent (because the exact 
same thing cannot be returned). If I borrow (hkyay) money, then I am liable to give 
back (saq) an equivalent if I can; if I borrow (hnga) a pen, then I have to give back 
(aq) the exact same thing. In Graeber words (2011), the first act of borrowing 
creates an obligation, the second a debt. 
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 In the case of kyayzu, being a gratitude, a favour, it cannot be given back as 
such. More, it is hardly possible to give it back at all. If I place my gratitude onto 
you for a service or help you gave me, I will say kyayzutinde, the very expression 
translated as “thanks” even if people hardly say it as much as westerners like me 
would say thank you. For instance, kyayzushin, literally “master of gratitude”, is 
often translated as benefactor. In the Burmese Buddhist cosmology, one person has 
automatically a set of three kyayzushin to revere: Buddha, one’s parents, and one’s 
teachers – the latter are also equivalent to masters). In addition, kyayzushide (shi 
means “to have”) is translated as either being indebted to somebody, or that 
something is beneficial, profitable. By extension, kyayzushin has been described as 
a social structure to explain how order between persons is conceived in terms of 
obligations and liabilities, masters and dependants (cf. introduction). In other 
words, kyayzushin became a crystallised social structure from which was derived 
that clientelism is pervasive to the whole society. 
 But on another level, it relates more to how the ‘person’ is conceived and how 
everybody crafts their position in the world than to a social structure. In that sense, 
the etymology of the expression can be of interest. Without trying to essentialised 
individuals’ quality or substance, it seems to me that if the “strength” is “hurt”, it 
says something about how people are expected to deploy their abilities in a 
landscape crowded by other entities whom they engage with, negotiate with or 
avoid on a day-to-day basis. 
 
 
HOW TO GET SCREWED 
 
“A friend wants to talk to you” 
  
 Ko Zaw, a villager from Gawgyi in his thirties, told me several times that he 
had a friend who spoke fluent English. Ko Zaw sometimes tries to converse in 
English and even has a Burma-French dictionary at home, where he lives with his 
parents when he is not on a business trip to sell fertilisers in the country. One day, 
during a novitiate ceremony in Gawgyi, I was washing dishes with Ko Zaw and Ko 
Nway, the village headman’s younger brother. When Ko Nway went to get a pile 
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of dirty plates, Ko Zaw asked me if I could follow him to Monywa one day to meet 
his friend. Apparently, this person would like to talk to me. Curious, I accepted and 
set the date for the following Thursday.  
 On Wednesday, I left Gawgyi early to work in the NGO’s office. Unable to 
find me in the village, Ko Zaw called me to check if our appointment the next day 
was still on. We set the meeting at 10 a.m. in a nearby teashop. But on Thursday, at 
7 a.m., I get another call. This time it's Ko Nway, on his way to work, who wants 
to warn me: “don't give your help”, he tells me. His message is clear and yet it took 
me a long time to understand it. Ko Nway did not refer directly to Ko Zaw, but he 
knew something was going on. What seemed clear to him was still vague to me. 
Why shouldn't I help? What was going to be asked of me? 
 Ko Zaw was already having breakfast when I arrived at the teashop at 9:30am. 
Clearly in advance, he did not hide his joy at finally being able to make me meet 
his friend. My first mistake was to go with him on his motorcycle. We leave this 
first teashop to go to another one not far from there, where he and his musician 
friends meet regularly. When the owner comes to take our order, Ko Zaw makes 
the presentations: “This guy is French, does research in my village, works for an 
NGO, and speaks Burmese!”. As usual, in this kind of situation, I feel like a trophy 
you walk around with. 
 Ko Zaw’s two friends finally arrive. The first one says he is the singer of the 
band. He shows me pictures of their last concert at the Water Festival (Burmese 
New Year) in Monywa. The leader of this occasional group of forty-year-old guys 
seems quite rich. He apparently cultivates his telephone directory like a 
businessman. I figure he is the famous Friend. The second one is a guitarist. His 
friends cannot help but joke about the fact that he is still single. We laugh and 
discuss Mona Lisa, old French currencies, airline tickets and rock’n roll. None of 
them is the person Ko Zaw wants me to meet, it was rather an acquaintance of the 
Singer. After an hour of tea, jokes and Bon Jovi, it is time to go. The Singer pays 
the bill and the owner of the teashop gives me the t-shirt he had made to celebrate 
the 20th anniversary of his establishment.  
 Back at the back of the bike, we head towards the real meeting. Since the 
guitarist does not join us, I conclude that the Singer is the go-between. As we sneak 
into the city centre, Ko Nway's words come to mind. He knew someone is trying to 
meet me. He has guessed the how, but was afraid of the why. I was imaging my 
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way out, wishing I was on my own bike. When we take the street that leads to the 
NGO's office, I get anxious: but where are they taking me? We stop in a restaurant 
about a hundred feet from the office. My colleagues have told me about this place. 
It opened recently. We park in the inner courtyard and I scan the area in case 
someone familiar is around. No one. An old lady offers us tea while waiting for her 
son, the English Teacher, the famous friend who went shopping, to come home. 
 He finally arrives. Instead of sitting down and letting Ko Zaw or the Singer 
introduce me, he speaks directly to me in English, without even greeting anyone 
around the table. He explains that he has been teaching for a long time, that he has 
just opened the restaurant in his house where he also gives classes. He presents 
himself as a passionate musician, the first to have created a studio in Monywa after 
several attempts to make his own album in Yangon. In short, he is famous in 
Monywa. This scene is disturbing, for me, for Ko Zaw and for the Singer too. The 
Professor, using his English skills, bypasses the normal conversational game where 
presentations – via an intermediary – are required. We are under his roof and he 
monopolises the stage. English allows him to reduce the social distance between 
him and I and so, neither the Singer nor the Villager can claim the service they 
provide by introducing me themselves. As if he does not need third parties to make 
contact.  
 “Is he good in English?” asks the Villager. I can only approve. We talk for a 
moment about English grammar, then French and finally the reason for all this 
staging comes up: “Could you come here from time to time, during my class, to talk 
with my students?” That was it. All this staging to make the Foreigner speak in his 
class. He had seen me in the neighbourhood, learned that I spoke Burmese and lived 
in Gawgyi. And I agree, saying yes, I could come over from time to time to meet 
his students. I immediately have the feeling that I have been fooled. There was no 
way to step back. Yet, I want to give my interlocutors a hard time. 
 When the Villager asks me again if I would help the Professor – was he trying 
to get credit for my approval? – I add something like “... but I won't come on a 
regular basis, only when I can”. To reduce the sense of control, I take the 
opportunity of a remark on the quality of education in Myanmar to testify – in 
Burmese – of my commitment to free education, arguing that if it had not paid off 
for me, I could never have been here with them. That was my guarantee in case 
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there was money at stake. Feeling my embarrassment, and fearing that I would run 
away, they had to seal my commitment according to their standards. 
 “Are you hungry?” asks the professor. I ordered a plate of fried rice with pork 
and, again, felt like a novice. If I let him give me something, I became obliged. 
Does offering food could be an “advance payment” for my future help behind the 
disguise of hospitality? Maybe. Maybe I am getting paranoid. Ko Nway's voice 
echoes in my head. Finally, I impose myself (or free myself) by paying the bill, 
arguing that according to “the French tradition” good accounts make good friends. 
Feeling of victory. They knew it, but the story does not end there. “Are you free 
today?” asks the Professor. “I can help you with anything you need. If you want to 
take a ride in my car someday, just ask. If you have a problem, call me. I was a 
musician, people know me...”. The Professor, the Singer and the Villager are ready 
to offer me all kinds of services. I express my gratitude to them, but refuse, politely. 
“Do you want to have a cup of tea? Shall we go to the teashop?” continues the 
Singer. “My stomach is full,” I reply. Half an hour later, same question. But this 
time, with a slight change of intonation and the use of a particular term: “let's go to 
the teashop to seal this friendship”. It was no longer a simple proposal, but a request. 
And I accepted, both because I wanted to see what would happen next and because 
I could not really escape.  
 The Professor makes it a point of honour to drive us there in his car. I see my 
bike moving further and further away. Once there, we order tea according to 
everyone's taste. Many agreements are sealed in these teashops, which are often 
meeting places for brokers of all kinds. The one we choose is prised by car brokers. 
A young boy is serving us. The Singer immediately said: “It's okay now, you're 
going to help, aren't you?” The word is out, loud and clear: help. This was exactly 
what Ko Nway predicted earlier in the morning. I have no choice, no emergency 
exit. And they kept telling me that I could count on their future help. 
 I do not even try to pay the bill. There is no way to override my commitment 
now that it is sealed. The obligation is born and ratified. The Professor pays the bill 
and we go back to his restaurant. I could now leave, my word has been given, and 
given in front of witnesses. From there, I walk to the NGO's office, ask the guard 
to drop me off by my motorcycle and then returned to the village. In the afternoon, 
I told my story to Ko Nway when he got back from work. He and his brother knew 
something has happened. What worried them is that the Professor may take 
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advantage of my presence to increase his fees. The only way to clarify my position 
was to tell the class that I would be meeting them for free, which I did. That was 
my dilemma. Yet, I could not help but wonder why such a device had been 
mobilised to create this situation. 
 
The vocabulary of help, friendship and hospitality 
  
 It seems that this case partly reveals how people oblige each other by using 
the vocabulary of help and friendship during situation of hospitality. These 
situations and this vocabulary make it possible to reduce the social distance between 
people by offering a scene where standards of hospitality and mutual help pacify 
the relationship. But, as Spiro (1997) already pointed out, by showing how 
‘corruption’ borrows from the vocabulary of help, this lexicon also makes it 
possible to hide power relations. Asking for help sometimes means giving an 
implicit order, reporting a difficult situation so that the other person understands 
that he or she should contribute. It can also be done in good faith, and often mutual 
help is deployed without the need to say it, just like family relationships, 
neighbourhoods or proximity where one must know when to engage. Mutual 
assistance therefore contributes as much to the creation of solidarity as it does to 
guiding power relations. It operates between violence and friendship and depends 
on the interpretation given, the reading of the forces involved and the techniques 
for affiliating oneself or exiting a relationship. 
 In my case, the forces involved (the Villager and the Singer) have been 
aligned to create a scene where hospitality (the restaurant, the teashop) makes it 
possible to make me do something. And the activation of this network also 
transforms relationships between people. Let us see where an analysis in terms of 
motivations, challenges and distance leads us. For the Professor, it seems to be 
adding value to his course by bringing the Foreigner into his classroom. It can also 
strengthen its reputation, recruit more students and thus improve his income and 
prestige, as the ability to attract people (a centripetal force) is appreciated and 
recognised as a sign of greatness. It is less clear for the Singer, especially because 
I was not able to gather enough knowledge about his position. He may be very close 
to the Professor, they may have made music together, it may be a matter of doing a 
service or maintaining their relationship. For Ko Zaw the Villager, the situation 
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presented many opportunities. It was he who made the meeting possible and used 
it to enter the Professor's network. This created an obligation for the Teacher to 
him. It was clear when, a few weeks later, we found ourselves in a beer station. Ko 
Zaw got drunk there, expecting the Professor to pay the bill, argued loudly with a 
young client and then accompanied us to a music studio where his behaviour almost 
damaged the Professor's reputation. Subsequently, the villager could no longer go 
to the restaurant and lost his credibility. 
 At another level, the Professor's restaurant is located near the NGO's office, 
but socially at a distance from it. As I had never been there before, the Professor 
could neither speak to me directly nor ask someone from the NGO to put us in 
touch. Yet he knew I lived in Gawgyi. How did he understand that through the 
Singer he could ask the Villager to take me to the restaurant remains a mystery. The 
fact is that to achieve this, he had to reduce the distance between us, i.e. use third 
parties first, then communicate directly in English. It also means that he had to let 
the Villager come near him to get me. Accepting to be a little obliged was the price 
to pay. 
 In the end, the whole scene was one of friendship and mutual help and there 
were many exchanges of words, promises, services and things. First, there were the 
teas, three in total, and I was never able to pay the bill, which marked my status as 
a guest receiving a t-shirt as a sign of welcome. The only time I was able to pay 
was for my plate of fried rice in the restaurant, which was a way to signify, to some 
extent, my doubt about what was going on. The motorcycle and car rides, presented 
as a service offered, were for me a loss of independence. And finally, there are the 
exchanges of words where the lexicon of mutual help (“you are going to help, aren't 
you?”) and friendship (“sealing friendship”) made it possible to mark reciprocal 
commitments with the promise of future services at stake. In other words, it was a 
question of creating obligations under the auspices of hospitality and mutual 
assistance. 
 This episode of my fieldwork opened up a whole new field of research for me 
on the role of transactions and their negotiation in the production of local ethics and 
forms of engagement. It also allowed me to better understand my status of guest in 
Gawgyi. An atypical status with fluctuating boundaries that was given to me by my 
host family so that I would remain as far as possible outside the social obligations 
that deeply organise sociality in Gawgyi.  
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